Two related subjects, foreign trade, with the emphasis on current agricultural interest, and the matter of the general price level in the United States, with economic and political implications of the two major current possibilities. In the present cost-price squeeze in agriculture domestic demand has been good. Wages are high, well distributed. Major fall off is in foreign picture. Agricultural exports make good sense, both economically and politically, from the standpoint of major nations involved. Europe needs American agricultural products. Approximately one person out of three in Europe lives on imported food and fodder. Fiber is also important.

It is clear that alternative sources for absolutely necessary European imports will involve building the war potential of the Russian dictatorship.

American agriculture has the productive capacity to satisfy this need and the potential capacity to meet our own expanded needs and be a prime supplier of this export market.

We need to develop new, aggressive trade policies. It must be a two-way trade, based on mutual advantage from the movement of goods and services.

There is involved a five billion dollar market represented in the surplus of our exports over our imports. There is likewise involved good will, peaceful diplomacy, strong, self-reliant and truly friendly neighbors.

We note with approval positive actions by the Administration in this field.

(The American Farm Bureau Federation has recommended a Trade Study Commission to be set up in Congress, to report at an early date. Being responsible to this Congress such a commission would inspire the confidence of this Congress. The facts are too imposing to be overlooked. We believe this work
in and by Congress might make action by Congress easier and less a matter of being persuaded by the Executive Branch of Government.

A related proposition is the domestic situation arising from the long-continued inflation. It is related because this foreign trade has been based on war demand, and we have been willing to finance it with inflation where necessary.

The method of finance, however, does not change the fact that there is involved expanded production, capital investment, machinery purchases, etc., to supply the demand. Loss of foreign markets would mean severe repercussions at home.

In addition, farm costs are approximately three and one-half times 1940. The current cost-price squeeze results from the fact that any downward movement in the general price level affects farm prices severely and farm costs little. In fact, during the past two years farm prices have dropped. Farm production expenses have continued to rise.

In this sort of situation governments are tempted to plan inflation. It would give temporary relief to some of the imbalances created by the inflation, and agricultural prices would rise more rapidly than costs for another period. The major difficulty is that the end is inevitably chaos.

In a situation of this kind there are powerful deflationary forces too. No administration can afford to overlook this fact. Many technical matters are involved - the management of the public debt, the influence of the federal government on the expansion, contraction, cost and availability of credit. Here Federal Reserve Board and Treasury policy is important.

Likewise, federal expenditures and federal taxes exert strong influence. The cash budget position is important. Continued payment of a considerable
portion of the expenses of the Federal Government by addition to the money supply, will inevitably cheapen money.

For the short run, however, other factors may override. There COULD be deflation with a cash deficit in the budget under present circumstances. There WAS a post-Korean inflation based on credit expansion at a time when the cash budget was more than in balance.

The really important thing in this setting is the general price level. The psychology of the people is important. So far as government action is concerned, this could be more easily controlled if the tendency was for inflation than if we had unwittingly started a deflation. For instance, availability of credit has little effect on money supply if people do not WISH to borrow.

The most important economic and political aspect of the domestic situation is involved in the movement of the general price level. Serious change, either on the inflationary or deflationary side, would give great strength to the centralizers, the pseudo-Socialists, the price fixers. Inflation would mean eventual chaos, deflation, a ruined agriculture, and, in the present state of thinking about Government, a violent political swing to the left.

To move the general price level sideways and give real opportunity to demonstrate, in this setting, the abilities of the free people under the system of self-government in the United States requires continuing confidence in government and in ourselves. That confidence must be felt by the Administration, by Congress, by business, and above all by the citizen.

There is no doubt, further, but that at this time there is an extraordinary importance attached to the Office of the President, especially as it relates to this firm confidence in our own future.
Dear Harold:

This morning I learned from Bill Draper that he expects to be in the United States at least another week. I think that he visited Foster Dulles after dropping in at my office, but I am very anxious that he should have a long talk with you and with Charlie Wilson, in addition to Foster Dulles.

He left me a memorandum of which I send you a copy herewith. I am sending another to Charlie Wilson.

I think that if you could arrange a luncheon hour which both Charlie Wilson and Bill Draper could attend, all three of you would find the occasion very profitable. Incidentally, Bill Draper is anxious to quit public office and get back into private life -- so that anything he has to tell you will be completely objective.

As ever,

P.S.: Bill has some very interesting statistics concerning obligations and deliveries. You should be sure to ask him for them.

Governor Harold Stassen,  
Hotel Commodore,  
New York, New York.

Personal and Confidential
MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director for Mutual Security

Herewith a short paper furnished to me by Allan B. Kline. In it, he makes topical mention only of points that he discussed with me at some length. His paper is, however, sufficient in itself to indicate clearly the general tenor of his convictions and arguments. I thought you would be interested in it.

You will note that he proposes another Commission. It is possible that this could be advantageous -- but I would like your comment.
April 22, 1953.

Dear Harold:

This is a rather tardy note to tell you of my deep appreciation for your message of the seventeenth.

I understand you'll be back on Monday and look forward to seeing you then.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen,
Director of Mutual Security Administration,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE
FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

During the fall months, all of us will be heavily engaged in much work preparatory to the activities that will absorb our attention as soon as the Congress reconvenes.

This preparation has to do with the development and crystallization of Administration policy, specific recommendations, and methods of working out effective liaison both with the Congress and with the public.

I should like to call your attention to one point of internal organization that will have an important effect upon all the above purposes. I refer to the need for effective decentralization within each agency.

During the turmoil of taking over the government last January, it was difficult for any of us to organize properly for his job, even though we made such advance plans as were possible in the interim between election and inauguration. Now, however, we have the experience of the past months to help and guide us; and we have a few weeks, yet remaining, in which to make certain that organizational plans are suited to the responsibilities each has to carry.

My own interest in this matter arises not merely from the hope of saving wear and tear on principal assistants -- it is essential to me that the group, both individually and collectively, preserves to itself the maximum time for thinking and for study. This can be done only through skillful delegation of authority and responsibility to subordinates. Since each of these subordinates has been chosen by the individual he serves, this process of decentralization should not be difficult. I am sure we all understand that the marks of a good executive
are courage in delegating work to subordinates, and his own skill in coordinating and directing their efforts.

I think it is unnecessary to dwell further on this point; I bring it to your attention at this moment in the hope that all of these things will be in the best possible order by next January.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1953

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

The Director of the Budget is very much concerned -- and rightly so -- because of the slowness with which the 1955 budget seems to be forming up. In answer to a memorandum of his on this subject, I included the following paragraph:

"I note that you are disturbed by the planned absence from the city of several of the departmental heads during the coming weeks. I think that these absences are unavoidable, but I think also that this fact should not be allowed to impede progress or the speedy development of our budget figures. This means, of course, that responsible heads must either make final decisions (which decisions must be approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and by me) before their departure, or they must delegate authority to the next senior in their department to make whatever decisions may be necessary."

D.D.E.
January 20, 1954.

Dear Harold:

The ceremony in the Cabinet Room this morning surprised and delighted me. Mamie and I will cherish the truly lovely "Eisenhower Cup" during our lives. Its value for us derives not only from the personal symbolism that has been carefully worked into its design, but primarily because it comes from our good friends who have been so largely responsible for the government's achievements in this first year of post-war Republican responsibility.

To tell you of my appreciation for your thought on this, the first anniversary of the Inauguration, gives me one more opportunity to thank you for the splendid contributions you have made toward helping solve the challenging and difficult problems of our times. I know that, together, our progress will be steady and sure.

With warm personal regard, and my deep thanks,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen,
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,
Washington, D.C.

P.S.: My special thanks to you since I understand the celebration was primarily your idea!
Dear Mr. President:

Your thoughtful letter of January 20th is very deeply appreciated. Working under your leadership during this past year has been a source of continuing inspiration and true satisfaction.

Very few people have yet realized the tremendous contribution your leadership has made to our country and to the cause of freedom during this year. But the understanding of its significance is beginning to come forward and will grow as time passes.

With regard to your kind postscript, may I respond that Secretary Hruby made the greatest contribution to the successful development of the Eisenhower Cup, and all of the Steuben people could not have been more cooperative including, President Arthur A. Houghton, Jr., Vice President John Montelith Gates, Designer Sidney Vaugh and Assistant Designer George Thompson, Robert J. Leavy, Manager of the Glassblowers, Cutters and Engravers, and Miss Isobel Lee, Public Relations Division.

The entire Cabinet participated with enthusiasm in the preparation for the occasion.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
December 16, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Foreign Operations Administration
The Director of the United States Information Agency
The Honorable Joseph M. Dodge
The Honorable Clarence Randall
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

As you know, it has always been a policy of this Administration that in all subjects dealing directly with our government's foreign relations, we should seek bipartisan cooperation in the Congress. Under the changed circumstance brought about by the recent election, success in this matter will require renewed and even greater effort on our part. We must obviously have bipartisan consultations prior to the crystallization of policies and programs, as well as cooperation in the effort to get approved plans enacted into law.

Each of you will, I hope, maintain in his own field, such Congressional contacts as will be in conformity with this idea.

Quite naturally, much will depend upon the personal touch, and obviously we must not slight leaders of our own Party as we attempt to meet the requirements of true bipartisan cooperation. But I sincerely hope that we may make such a success in this direction that we may set an enduring pattern for the future.

D. D. E.
Dear Harold:

I am more than grateful for your part in presenting to me the beautiful books on "The Great Centuries of Painting." I hold out to myself no hope that they can improve my miserable forays into the fascinating business of painting. But because the books come from my close friends, because they are so truly handsome, and because they deal with a vast subject of absorbing interest, I know that both Mamie and I, as well as our son and his family, will treasure them for years to come.

As we pass this milestone in our Administrative life, I want once again to express my deep appreciation of your dedicated efforts. I have faith that -- working together -- we can make a great and lasting contribution to the welfare of America and the peace of the world.

With warm regard, and many thanks,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Director
Foreign Operations Administration
Washington, D. C.
EYES ONLY FOR GOVERNOR STASSEN FROM THE PRESIDENT

You are aware of my conviction that some individual, on behalf of the President and the State Department, must develop within the Administration and the nation and also before the world a firm and single basic policy toward the question of disarmament. This is the problem which the peoples of all the world demand we should solve and the U. S. must assume leadership. I feel that such an individual must not only be a coordinator and a spokesman within the Administration, but must also spearhead efforts to inform and instruct the American people in the basic factors affecting this vital subject.

Assuming that the FOA as such is to disappear from our governmental structure, how would you feel toward undertaking this job -- serving as my special assistant for the purpose? The magnitude and complexity of the task are such that I think we should make it the primary responsibility of someone of Cabinet rank.

I have come to the conclusion that I should make some reasonably early announcement along this line, and I send you this cable because I want to approach no one else until I learn of your feelings in the matter.

D. D. E.
FROM: DEPT
TO: AMBASSADY KARACHI 1196, March 1, 4 PM.

EYES ONLY GOVERNOR STASSEN FROM PRESIDENT.

You are aware of my conviction that some individual, on behalf of the President and the State Department, must develop within the Administration and the nation and also before the world a firm and single basic policy toward the question of disarmament. This is the problem which the peoples of all the world demand we should solve and the United States must assume leadership. I feel that such an individual must not only be a coordinator and a spokesman within the Administration, but must also spearhead effort to inform and instruct the American people in the basic factors affecting this vital subject.

Assuming that the FOA as such is to disappear from our Governmental structure, how would you feel toward undertaking this job - serving as My Special Assistant for the purpose? The magnitude and complexity of the task are such that I think we should make it the primary responsibility of someone of Cabinet rank.

I have come to the conclusion that I should make known reasonably early announcement along this line, and I send you this cable because I want to approach the wise until I learn of your feelings in the matter. D. D. Eisenhower.

HOOVER.
Dear Harold:

The last thing before I close up shop for Augusta is to send you a little note to wish you the happiest of birthdays on Wednesday. At the same time I might tell you how delighted I am that you have assumed your new post -- an assignment that I consider of primary importance to all of us.

With warm regard -- and Happy Birthday!

As ever,

The Honorable Harold Stassen,
Executive Office Building,
Washington, D. C.
June 7, 1955

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Director, Foreign Operations Administration

You took such an exceptional interest in the mass Refugee movement in Viet Nam that I thought you might like to see, if you have a spare moment, the excellent article in the National Geographic Magazine, written by Gertrude Samuels, an experienced reporter on the New York Times Magazine.

this successful movement and resettlement is becoming one of the epochs of the Far East in their own minds.

Enclosure

HES/mc
July 5, 1955.

Dear Harold:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your report to the Congress covering activities of the Soviets in the economic field. I had a chance to read part of it this morning -- and I found it both interesting and informative.

With warm regard,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
August 5, 1955

Dear Harold:

You are designated as the Deputy United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations to sit for the United States in the Subcommittee of said Commission meetings.

In this phase of your work relating to the United Nations, you will serve under the direction of the United States Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who in turn reports to the Secretary of State. In all other matters involving negotiations with other governments, you will be under the direction of and report to the Secretary of State.

For the maximum effectiveness in carrying forward a concentrated endeavor to reach a sound agreement under effective safeguards, you will organize a special committee on disarmament problems consisting of senior representatives designated by the Departments and Agencies principally concerned: the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Information Agency.

You will, through appropriate channels, seek to assure that all Departments and Agencies concerned in any aspect of the United States consideration of disarmament are informed as appropriate. Relations with the Congress and with the public should be arranged by you with the Secretaries of State and Defense. You will also keep me adequately and periodically informed. You are well aware of my extreme interest in this entire matter and of
its inseparable relationship to the prospects of future peace and security.

Through a copy of this letter you will enlist the active cooperation of the Departments and Agencies concerned.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Harold:

October 18, 1955

The doctors are relenting slightly their rigid rules as to my conduct here in the hospital and have allowed me to try to thank, however inadequately, each one of you for the competent and completely selfless manner in which you have carried on the governmental business during these last few weeks. Sometimes I think I take too much for granted the loyalty and devotion of each of you; I assure you that such an attitude merely reflects my own sincere admiration for the competence of the individuals who sit around the Cabinet table. Later I shall try to express my appreciation in person; meantime this note will at least tell you that I am most keenly aware of your devotion and dedication to the best interests of the people of the United States.

But now I want you to know that Mamie and I are delighted at the promise of the flowering quince that will bloom in our lane this coming spring; we hope each of you coming to the farm will be able to share with us the beauty that your gift will provide, and we join in deep appreciation of your thoughtfulness.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

P. S. Your musical "Happy Birthday" far exceeded in technical excellence many that I heard.

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Harold:

Saturday morning the Vice President presented to Mamie and me, on behalf of the individuals who sit around the Cabinet table, a pair of lovely gold candlesticks. Mamie and I are truly delighted to have such a magnificent gift, and grateful to all of you for your thought of us this holiday season.

Again my good wishes for a fine New Year to you and yours, and my warm personal regard,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The White House
December 27, 1955

To the Members of the White House Staff:

Mrs. Eisenhower and I are truly delighted with the gold dinner service given to us by the members of the White House staff. I assure you we share a profound feeling of appreciation of the continued thoughtfulness that is shown to us by the members of our staff.

I am sorry that this year we could not arrange a staff Christmas party, but at least I can report that General Persons ably represented the staff's sentiments when he brought us, Saturday morning, your wonderful gift.

With best wishes to each of you for a Happy New Year, and assurances of our lasting gratitude to all,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The White House Staff
Washington, D. C.
Dear Harold:

At the close of the two early years of this Administration, I attempted, however inadequately, to express to members of the intimate official family my appreciation of the dedicated services each has devoted to the welfare and advancement of our country.

This year, because of my illness, the obligation I feel to you is even more pronounced than previously, and my task, consequently, the more difficult.

The three months just passed have proved, to me and to many Americans, once again the strength that is inherent in a team of capable people dedicated to a common goal. I hope that each feels great satisfaction in your accomplishments, just as I feel a profound pride that this is so.

I am afraid it would be presumptuous for me to "thank" you for your efforts, but at the very least, permit me to say I recognize, with the clarity produced by hospital room and convalescence, the tremendous debt I owe each of you, and I salute you for a job well done.

With all the best to you and yours for a fine 1956, and, as always, warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Governor Stassen

For future guidance, you may wish to consider a decision on the following questions:

1. NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955, said:

"b. Agreed that the U.S., in its own interest, should, as interrelated parts of our national policy:

(1) Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

(2) Concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues.

(3) Meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the U.S. and the free world coalition required for U.S. security."

Does that continue to be present national policy?

2. NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955, also said:

"c. Agreed that the acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system."

Does that continue to be present national policy?

3. NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955, also said:

"d. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, in consultation with the interested departments and agencies, should:

(1) Develop methods of inspection which would be deemed feasible and which would serve to determine what would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis to the United States."

Does that continue to be present national policy?
4. NSC Action No. 1513 approved by the President February 15, 1956, said:

"(b) That the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament be authorized to explore and develop, as a basis for negotiation with the USSR, his proposal for the designation of small strips of territory in the U.S. and the USSR within which the feasibility of inspection systems would be tested."

Does that continue to be present national policy?

5. NSC Action No. 1513 approved February 15, 1956, declared the U.S. disarmament position to be taken in the Subcommittee Meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which took place in March and April 1956 should include the following:

"(a) Proposals for advance notification of projected movements of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil.

"(b) Proposals for an exchange for a test period of a small number of inspection personnel who could be used as members of inspection teams if an inspection agreement is subsequently concluded."

Does that continue to be the U.S. disarmament position for future negotiations?

6. The Annex to NSC Action No. 1513, approved by the President on March 1, 1956, reads as follows:

"If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a system is proven to the U.S. to be satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with the other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the forthcoming session of the United Nations Subcommittee, the United States Representative is authorized to indicate that such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of 2.5 million men for the U.S., USSR and China; corresponding appropriate levels for the UK and France and others to be determined after consultation with the representatives of these States."

Does this continue to be U.S. policy?
7. On June 29, 1956, this office circulated a memorandum to members of the National Security Council which included the following proposal:

"h. The United States to continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower type aerial inspection system to be combined with the Bulganin type ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of providing against the possibility of great surprise attack, and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis."

Is this proposal approved?

"j. The U.S. should be willing to favorable consider the progressive development of an inspection and control system which would contribute to providing against surprise attack, if the system could be safeguarded against providing a false sense of security, even though at the outset it was not adequate for a permanent arms control system. Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description."

Is this proposal approved?

"g. The U.S. to propose that all states agree that any research or development activity directed toward sending objects through outer space or traveling in outer space shall be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. Further prove that no outer space tests or long or medium range missile tests will be conducted without appropriate international participation and that an effective inspection system be installed to verify the fulfillment of the commitment."

Does the President authorize this proposal?

"f. The U.S. to express willingness to agree with other nations not to test nuclear or thermonuclear explosions after July 1, 1957, and to permit an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment."

The Department of State submitted on August 31, 1956, a proposal instead of negotiating for international agreement respecting
tests of nuclear weapons, the U.S. forthwith make a unilateral declaration that any "for a period of at least one year, the U.S. will abstain from conducting any tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more of high explosive." And that, "after the period of one year, the U.S. will continue to abstain from weapons tests in excess of 100 kilotons yield so long as this appears justified by the actions of other powers having nuclear weapons programs."

Which of these proposes does the President approve?

The State Department proposal, if approved, by AEC and Defense, would certainly not be opposed by this office. It does involve a balancing of considerations whether the possible public benefits and public approval of immediate unilateral action outweigh any possible negotiating advantages involved in existing U.S. policy.
"In principle, we have no objection to this proposal. .... It would be better, however, if such information concerning armaments were submitted by all States and not only by the United States and the USSR, to the international organ of control and inspection, concerning the creation of which we should reach an agreement."

(2) Molotov's statement at Foreign Ministers Conference November 11, 1955:

"We do not need to be convinced of the necessity of international control over the decisions which will be adopted on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union has stood and will stand for such strict international control."

(3) Soviet Proposal of May 10, 1955:

"The problem of instituting international control and of the rights and powers of the international control organ must therefore be considered in close connection with the execution of the above-mentioned measures for the relaxation of international tension, the strengthening of trust between States and the carrying out of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons. ....

"In order to prevent a surprise attack by one state upon another, the international control organ shall in particular have on the territory of all the states concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in airports. ....

"The functions and powers of the permanent international control organ shall be determined on the basis of the foregoing principles, and appropriate directions shall be prepared for this purpose."

(4) Kusnetsov's statement in the General Assembly, First Committee, November 30, 1955:

"The Soviet Union stands for giving broad powers to the control organ, and our proposal provides for gradual extension of the functions and powers of control along with the execution of the disarmament program."
July 20, 1956

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Harold E. Stassen

Major points for consideration with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to the June 29, 1956 memorandum.

1. Opposition which stems from their apprehension that the United States would not use its rights for suspension or termination, if the agreement is not being respected by the communists, and concern that the U.S. position may be watered down in the course of negotiations to one that is unsound and dangerous.

   Recommendation: Future officials of the United States can take wise action in many different ways, with or without an arms limitation agreement now, and there is no way to guarantee now against future officials. A sound policy now, leading to either a sound agreement or to no agreement, is preferable to the alternative of leaving a vacuum of undecided policy, with adverse effects at home and abroad.

2. Effective inspection as a requirement should be stressed in every paragraph.

   Recommendation: This should be accepted as it is the intention of the proposed courses of action.

3. Nuclear tests should never be stopped, but possibly we could reduce the size.

   Recommendation: The U.S. should propose the circumstances under which tests would be stopped.
4. The setting up of a UN force or a NATO force should not in any way restrict the U.S. rights and authority to use U.S. national nuclear and thermonuclear capability, and this should be made clear.

Recommendation: This should be accepted.

5. The progressive installation of the air inspection would lead to a false sense of security.

Recommendation: Progressive installation of air inspection, with radar and ground stations, would improve present security, especially against great surprise attack, and it should be possible to safeguard against a false sense of security.
Probable Questions:

1) Do you welcome or regret the Soviet announcement of the one million two hundred thousand planned reduction in their armed forces?

2) Will the United States reduce its force levels?

3) There has been some difference of emphasis and interpretation by Secretary Dulles, Secretary Wilson, General Groenther and Governor Stassen. What is your conclusion?

4) Did the United States have advance notice this cut would be made?

5) Does the United States continue to insist on aerial inspection?

6) Have you had an answer to your March 1 letter to Chairman Bulganin on the control of future nuclear material production?
HAROLD STASSEN PAPERS: Removals

Subgroup: Eisenhower Administration

Series: Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament Policy, 1953-1958, 1963 / Correspondence and Memoranda

Folder title/dates: Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1953-1958

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Document no.: 

From 

To 

Date Aug 1956 Classification Secret 

Pages 3

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Governor Stassen

FROM: Ambassador Peaslee


In response to your instructions, conferences were sought with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to discuss with them their present thinking regarding future steps respecting armament limitation, inspection and control. Reports are attached.

Recommendations:

1. Presidential decision upon any points which any departments desire. For prior NCS action see Nos. 1328, 1411, 1419, 1496, 1510, 1513, 1522, 1553, 1561; also President's speeches, letters to Bulganin and instructions to Stassen.

2. Quiet exploratory bilateral discussions with the U.K., France and Canada, respecting possible specific concrete action in the area of an inspection and "control" system.

3. After agreement among the four powers then consider, in consultation with them, possible quiet discussions with the Soviets.

4. Avoid setting any date for resuming formal five-power discussions until and unless there is prospect of emerging from them with something concrete.

Amos J. Peaslee
Deputy Special Assistant to the President
President Eisenhower

(1) Acceptance speech of August 23, 1956:

"With such weapons war has become not just tragic, but preposterous."

(2) Statement of August 26 regarding USSR test explosion of August 24:

"I wish again to emphasize the necessity for effective international control of atomic energy and such international control of atomic energy and measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible."
The conditions then prevailing in Indochina were such as to make unilateral American intervention nothing less than sheer folly.
"I determined to make certain that no misunderstanding existed among members of the administration. Therefore, I took the opportunity at a meeting on June 3 to change my attitude."
Mr. E

"Admiral Radford had apparently alarmed the British and encouraged the French."

O 355
April 15, 1954
RN

"If to avoid further Communist Expansion in Asia and Indochina, we must take the next war by putting our legs in, I think the President has to take the politically unpopular decision and do it."
October 13, 1956

Dear Harold:

Many thanks for your note. I only wish these "milestones" didn't seem to rush up on me with increasing frequency!

With warm regard to you and Esther,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
The White House
October 20, 1956

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Harold E. Stassen

In response to your request a draft is enclosed suggesting a manner of publicly discussing the armsment control question.

These six guidelines were followed:
1. The statement to be constructive and educational and thus in itself to be of service.
2. Each stand taken to be a natural position for the President to take in view of his past statements and actions.
3. The total statement to result in a focus on future leadership activity of the President in a dramatic manner and of a type proven in the past to carry the greatest public approval.
4. Include a negation and deflation of the opposition position without being narrow or sharp, and thus keep the center of attention and the potential headlines on Eisenhower future leadership action, rather than on Eisenhower cracks Stevenson.
5. Make the package as easy as possible for other members of the administration to accept.
6. Make no firm or unqualified commitments which would cause future difficulties in relations with other nations.
The experiences of my lifetime have developed within me a deep desire to help lead America along a practical path of permanent peace. The thorough knowledge of the nature of modern weapons has intensified that aim in recent years.

Rare is the day in which some portion of my thinking is not engaged in problems related to this goal of lasting peace. Unusual is the week in which some decisions are not made which have a bearing on this objective.

I believe my fellow Americans recognize that in recent years an initial condition of peace has been established around the world, and a beginning has been made on the difficult task of establishing the foundations for a durable peace. This has been accomplished through concentrated and devoted service, not only of the members of our executive administration, but also of the Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders, and of the men and women in the career services of our country, in uniform and in civilian roles.

We have built steadfast strength for defense. We have done so without any injury to the health of our people or the success of our economy. Our future plans will not prejudice the good health of our people in any manner and will not weaken our economic success for workers and farmers and businessmen.

Progress toward our goal of a durable peace has been marked by numerous specific changes for the better.
A very great advance has been made in the worldwide understanding of the realistic facts of the atomic age.

A substantial passage of people and of information has been opened up between portions of the world that had been closed off.

A number of intricate and potentially explosive international issues have been resolved without resort to force.

New avenues for improving the well-being of peoples are apparent on every continent.

"Atoms for Peace" has been transformed from a phrase in a message to a program of action and a practice yielding dividends.

But the dangers of future war are still serious. A number of surly situations are unsettled. The magnitude of the armaments of the world, necessary and essential under present conditions, devoted so far as America is concerned, to maintaining peace and security, are nevertheless themselves a source of tension. Mankind will not have made a major advance on the task of paving the path of peace until a sound and safeguarded method of reducing armaments, providing against surprise attack, and sweeping aside the secrecy curtains of military movement is established. Nor will the most significant improvements in the outlook for peace be realized until a manner is found under which the extreme power of the military atom begins to take on in some measure the characteristics of a United Nations police power for peace within the Charter of that organization.

No one should underestimate the difficulties of moving in the direction of control over armaments. The complexity involved, the caution needed, and the suspicions to overcome in establishing a reliable basis for
joint action with the other major nations of the world loom large in
the road ahead.

But the stakes are so high for humanity and for America that
we must persist with patience and determination to seek a sound basis for
more stability and a favorable evolution without war.

The prospects for agreement will never be brightened by signs
of weakness on the part of the United States. True understandings with
other nations are not furthered by soft evasion of the responsibility of
essential military service by our youth, nor by failure to keep ahead in
testing modern methods of defense of America and modern power to deter
aggression by others.

A sound system for reduced armaments will be established only
when all nations realize that the United States is sincere and stable in
its studied approach to the entire problem. The United States will not
again take unwise steps which deteriorate its power. The United States
will ever insist on the essential openness required to assure against
great surprise attack, and will be firm on an inspection system to assure
the mutual reduction of armaments in a comprehensive agreement.

The gap between the positions of the major nations on this sub-
ject has somewhat narrowed in the past year and one-half. There is substantial
agreement on ground inspection; and on a first level reduction to 2½ million
men each, proposed by the United States and tentatively accepted by the USSR.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet accepted the essential
aerial sentinels in open skies for a reliable inspection system. I have
asked that their government give further study to this requirement.
A method of stopping the growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles and of assuring the peaceful and scientific nature of future movement through outer space is also under study. The mutual advantage to all nations of a successful conclusion of these negotiations is evident. This entire matter has had and continues to have a very high priority in my endeavors on your behalf.

For such a purpose I will return to Geneva to meet again with leaders of other major nations. I will do so when the time is right and when preparatory negotiations make it clear that such a session would be fruitful. I will do so when the attitude of other governments indicate not only a willingness to meet but a readiness to make true progress toward the objective.

World peace has been unbroken since the first Geneva Conference. Taken in their entirety, events since that Conference have been favorable for a lasting peace. But we must not expect too much from a second conference. We do know that every effort toward our goal is worthwhile in the name of every family in America. It is to the 170 million Americans, and their fellowmen in other nations, to which, under God, I dedicate with humility my continued efforts to wipe out war from the pages of tomorrow's history.
Commission

Comments of July 26, 1956:

"... effective inspection system is an essential prerequisite to arms reduction .

"Continuation of negotiations is a desirable necessary approach, providing that it is clearly recognized as only a preliminary to actual disarmament.

"The Eisenhower aerial inspection plan proposed at scored the most telling victory yet achieved by .

One Department

JCS comments of February 29, 1956:

"The development and implementation of an inspection system should not be dependent upon acceptance of any agreement."

JCS comments of July 20, 1956:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that they have repeatedly sponsored, namely, procedure for the inspection and verification a prerequisite of an "international"

U.K.

(1) Prime Minister Eden at Prime Ministers Conference at Geneva, November 11, 1955:

"One point is, however, crucial -- the necessity of establishing an effective international control."

(2) Foreign Secretary MacMillan at Prime Ministers Conference at Geneva, November 11, 1955:

"No agreement on disarmament can be of any value unless it contains clear and adequate proposals for supervising and controlling the disarmament in question . . . ."

France

Mr. Pinay at Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting November 1955:

"Control is not an end in itself, but it is the cornerstone of any disarmament program."

"On behalf of my government, I can state that France accepts the establishment of controls on its territory, whether fixed or mobile, technical or financial, on the sole condition of equality and reciprocity."

Canada

Mr. Martin in Sub-
Dear Harold:

I have your note of the fourteenth and will have it studied by the people you suggest before I comment on it in a specific way.

As ever,

[Signature]

The Honorable Harold Stassen,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Harold:

Again a year's end is upon us. Together we have spent twelve months in the onerous, demanding, often confining but always rewarding, work of the Federal government. So I want to try once more to tell you of my lasting appreciation of the great service you are rendering. To you and your associates I am deeply indebted for invaluable support and assistance. Specific instances are without number. They serve only to remind me of the real gratitude that I owe to all of you individually and collectively.

Above everything else, I want to thank you for your dedication to our country's welfare and for the unswerving loyalty which have characterized your work in our country's behalf.

As, together, we approach the New Year, to continue tasks already begun and to tackle those that will be new, I experience that lift of spirit that comes from the realization that I am surrounded and assisted by able and firm friends. My confidence in the future stems, in great part, from my knowledge that the Administration is rich in its possession of men of character, ability and integrity.

With best wishes for the happiness of yourself and your family, and for continued success in 1958 -- and with warm personal regard,

As ever,

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.
February 14, 1958

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

Your thoughtful and friendly attitude in our February 7th conference was deeply appreciated by me. During the past four days at Key West I have thoroughly reviewed the situation and I have decided that it is best that I should not only conclude my present assignment but also step out of the administration. The center of my interest for many years has been the endeavors to maintain a just peace; and freedom to pursue this effort along the lines of my convictions seems clearly to be more important than any feasible work in the administration under the present circumstances. At the same time I will endeavor to rebuild our Republican party in Pennsylvania through a governorship campaign.

If I succeed, you may count on my efforts to lead the Republican governors in support of your national and world leadership in the crucial final two years of your Presidency. If I succeed, it may also spark many other men to rebuild and revitalize our Republican party along the modern and forward-looking lines which you have hoped to achieve.

In any event, should you believe at any time that I can make a constructive contribution through consultation or cooperation, please feel free to call upon me.

The draft letter which I gave you on January 31st in a form suitable for publication has therefore been dated today and delivered at the White House.

A memorandum to you of an additional suggestion for your consideration in response to your comment that perhaps you should try out an entirely different move with the Russians has also been delivered at the White House.

You will recall that you appointed Ambassador Amos J. Peaslee, an eminent authority in international law and an original New Jersey

Personal and Confidential
Personal and Confidential

2.

Eisenhower supporter, as my Deputy, and he will carry on and be responsive to your wishes. Robert Matteson is Director of the Special White House Staff, is thoroughly familiar with all studies and files, and is compiling the official records. He has agreed to be available at least until the end of the fiscal year. I have spoken to Sherman Adams regarding the agreed safeguarding of the opportunity of the faithful and able members of my special staff to obtain other work before the end of the fiscal year.

Esther joins me in our best wishes always to Mrs. Eisenhower and to you. It has been an inspiration and a privilege to work under your presidency during these five years.

Sincerely,

Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President

To the President
of the United States
November 5, 1958.

Dear Harold:

The post mortems will be loud and long -- but you must feel a great sense of gratification that you were able to help in the election of Hugh Scott. I have heard many reports of your able, effective work on his behalf, and I want you to know, at the earliest moment, of my deep appreciation of all that you did.

I dare hope we have learned our lesson; for my part I shall work as hard as I can between now and 1960 to win the campaign for the Republican cause.

With my warm thanks, and personal regard to you and Esther,

As ever,

[Signature]

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building
Philadelphia 9, Pennsylvania