

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
AND DISARMAMENT

SPEECH OF
SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

FEBRUARY 4, 1958

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Mr. President:

In recent weeks the American people, members of Congress, and indeed our allies have given prolonged thought to the military and foreign policy implications of the launching of the two Soviet earth satellites.

Significance of the Soviet Sputniks

The Sputniks have caused us to realize that the Soviet Union is exerting tremendous effort to accomplish impressive feats in science and technology. These accomplishments have alerted us to reexamine and reevaluate our defense policies, our defense organization, and the state of our military preparedness. Sputniks I and II have made us realize that if we hope to maintain our defense capabilities and if we do not want to be out-distanced in the vital area of outer space, vastly increased effort and expenditures of funds will be required.

The areas in which decisive action must be taken to strengthen our defense capabilities have been pointed out in the unanimous interim

report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, under the able and dedicated chairmanship of the Majority Leader, the senior Senator from Texas. A program of action has been outlined and the nation anxiously awaits the fulfillment of the specific proposals.

We have the resources to match -- yes even to surpass -- the U.S.S.R. in military might. We are prepared to speed up production of missiles, and to equip our army, navy, and air force with weapons which can, if necessary meet any type of attack. We are able to devote whatever is required to defend our shores, our fields, our industries and our cities against the new weapons of mass destruction. But even when all this is done, Mr. President, the world will still be dangerously divided into two highly armed camps.

Furthermore, The peace we seek must be more than the absence of armed conflict.

It must be a peace that embraces the expansion of the areas of political freedom, the development of closer bonds of international cooperation among all nations and peoples, ~~and the~~

We who have the responsibility for appropriating funds for the new weapons of defense must keep reminding ourselves it is essential that we search perseveringly for ways and means of securing a just and enduring peace so that the terrible reality of the use of these weapons will never

happen. We need the same courage and patriotism in our search for peace that would be required of us in the defense of our nation from hostile attack.

As the distinguished former Senator and Assistant Secretary of State, William Benton, declared in a recent statement:

Nearly everybody realizes now that the United States has fallen behind the Russians in key elements of military power. Further, they have awakened to the fact that we are falling behind in science and education -- as I have been reporting to Congressional committees and the country these past two years since I saw developments in the USSR at first hand.

But it is not yet fully understood that, because of complacency in high places, the Soviet propaganda has stolen the role of peacemaker throughout much of the world and has seriously undercut the world prestige of the United States.

It will take courage, vision, enormous energy and all our experience to restore the balance and thus lessen the danger of devastating war.

Mr. Benton's pertinent remarks were underscored here on the Senate floor by our Majority Leader when he said:

But the same forces, the same knowledge and the same technology which are producing ballistic missiles can also produce instruments of peace and universal cooperation.

We are engaged in a race for survival and we intend to win that race. But the truly worthwhile goal is a world of peace -- the only world in which there will also be security.

. . . Somehow, somewhere, the great minds which have done so much to bring us modern implements, great adventures in science, and great discoveries, must be able to find a solution whereby men can live in the world together. If not, the road ahead will not be a very happy one.

Modern science and technology forewarn us of the appalling destruction that threatens us in the nuclear age -- that same science and technology beckons us to beat our "swords into plowshares and our spears into pruning hooks" and that "man shall study war no more". The nuclear age can be an inferno of death and destruction or a garden of peace and plenty. This decision is the difference between good and evil -- man and beast.

↳ In our endeavor to regain our strength in missiles, rockets, and other weapons it is imperative that we not fool ourselves into thinking such effort is sufficient in the long run. In a recent New York Times article I referred to it as "a Pyrrhic victory whose very process of achievement may squelch our search for positive approaches to peace, may weaken our endeavors to curb the weapons of war and may cause us to lose our sense of perspective. We must not let our fixation on security through

more and bigger armaments lead to a stage where arms alone would control our policy, for this would invite our ultimate destruction."

Our immediate task is to prevent the two great power systems of the Communist bloc and the free nations from colliding, either by design or accident, and thereby touching off World War III. The world needs time - time to think, to negotiate, to find answers - time to realize the utter futility of armed conflict and the wondrous opportunities to be found in peaceful living. The world needs leadership, yes inspired and humanitarian leadership to point the way patiently and firmly to peace. But this peace we so zealously desire shall not come easily. Peace like war requires sacrifice. It requires the mobilization and planned use of our material and human resources.

It is within this frame of reference that I venture to discuss the difficult and perplexing problem of the control and reduction of armaments. The discussion of disarmament policies and proposals must be undertaken within the context of our entire foreign and military policies. Nor should we be restrained by inhibitions and preconceptions which so often bind us to the policies of the past. This generation has witnessed two amazing and sensational scientific developments, the harnessing of nuclear energy and the breakthrough into outer space. The diplomatic and political formulae

of yesterday are not adequate for this era of power.

Dilemma of Speaking Frankly

Before going into the substance of my remarks I wish to say that in these days a member of Congress who speaks at all critically about foreign policy is confronted by a real dilemma. Criticism of the Executive branch can be and undoubtedly is misused by the Kremlin.

Radio Moscow is quick to pick up our statements as evidence that the policies being pursued by the United States are wrong and that those of the Soviet Union are right. We have observed on occasion that excerpts from speeches delivered before this body have been reprinted and broadcast by the Soviets in an effort to discredit our country.

This illustrates one of the difficulties of a free people in the struggle with a totalitarian dictatorship and society. Nevertheless, since freedom of speech and expression is one of our dearest and most cherished freedoms, we must be willing to exercise it when the situation demands it.

If we do not speak with candor, voice our concerns, and offer constructive criticisms and suggestions, we may well be doing our country a disservice. Our responsibilities, as representatives of the people of the United States, require that we present to the President and his officers, yes the public, our views with respect to foreign policy. We must use discretion and judgement. But when we differ and have genuine doubts, these differences must be expressed openly,

Special Responsibility for Arms Control

In the area of arms control I feel a special responsibility.

I have been privileged to serve these past two and a half years as chairman of a special committee to study the control and reduction of armaments. This committee has issued a unanimous report with conclusions and recommendations. What I am about to say in no way contradicts this report. Much of what I say is foreshadowed by it.

Disarmament bears on so many aspects of foreign policy and defense strategy that one cannot possibly touch in one speech on every question related to it. Consequently, and regrettably, I must omit several matters which deserve our attention. I would like, however, to discuss some of these related aspects. The first is our attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Assumptions About the Soviet Union

There is reason to believe that those who conduct and design foreign policy make two false assumptions regarding the Soviet Union.

The first is that the United States has such political, military, and economic superiority that it can force the U.S.S.R. to accept our terms in any series of negotiations.

The other assumption is that the internal domestic difficulties of the Soviet regime are so great, that all we need to do is continue to apply pressure and the collapse of the system will follow. Both of these assumptions have been stated or implied many times.

Recent developments have shattered the validity of these assumptions. The Soviet Sputniks indicate that the U.S.S.R. is, or will be in the near future, capable of launching intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Reports from Sweden seem to indicate that the Soviets have, or are in the process of building, atomic powered submarines among their gigantic fleet of some 500 under water vessels. May Day parades and public celebrations of the October Revolution reveal highly mechanized and mobile tank units and artillery. We now have disturbing evidence of the sizeable expansion of Soviet economic aid, political infiltration, propaganda and cultural offensives.

There is evidence that the Soviet system has many weaknesses. Soviet industry is suffering from manpower shortages. Efforts to open up and cultivate new land have not been too successful to date. Soviet citizens are still relegated to a standard of living considerably below the countries of Western Europe and some of Eastern Europe as well. But there is little sign that these problems are about to force any sudden fundamental changes in the regime.

Too often, United States proposals regarding the settlement of political problems and arms control appear to stem from the assumption that Western military and economic pressure will produce unwilling compliance on the part of Soviet leaders.

In point of fact, the United States did weaken its own strength during the course of disarmament negotiations in London last year with the Soviet Union. While the U.S.S.R. was making naval sallies into Middle Eastern waters, funneling arms into that area, hurling threats of nuclear annihilation at our allies, and announcing boastfully its achievement of an intercontinental ballistic missile, we were lowering the ceiling on our defense expenditures, cutting back or pulling back our armed forces, and

curtailing or slowing down our military aircraft and missiles programs.

It is difficult to see how we could have presented a strong negotiating front to the Soviet Union when we were so busily engaged in unilateral disarmament.

Negotiating From Strength

A foreign policy designed to meet the realities of international life requires that we face up to the true power and political relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. On the one hand we cannot act as though we have the strength to force the Soviet Union to accept our terms without offering reasonable compromises and concessions. On the other hand, our capacity to defend ourselves and our allies must be sufficient to discourage the Soviet Union or any of the Sovietized states from embarking on misguided and miscalculated military aggressions. While we have allowed ourselves to fall behind in three crucial areas -- missiles, outer space, and capacity to deal with limited armed conflicts -- it would be wrong to assume that we are so weak that we are inviting Soviet aggression


or that the Soviets could force us to accept their terms in any series of negotiations. We need not tremble at the thought of sitting face to face with the Soviets at the conference table. *P* Negotiating from strength means not only the appearance of strength, but the fact and reality of ~~strength~~ *strength*. By strength we must include military preparedness with modern weapons, alliances that are strong and secure both militarily and politically, and a vigorous and expanding economy. The friendship, goodwill and understanding of other nations is another source of strength that we should seek and merit.

Science,
favorable world opinion is one of those immeasurable and intangible factors, ~~which~~ while not decisive in matters of world politics, is at least worthy of our concern and attention. Negotiating from strength thus embraces military, political, economic, and moral strength *in depth*.

The Soviet Union too must come to accept the reality of the balance of power existing between it and the free world. It may be under an illusion that its achievements in missiles and rockets have so elevated its power position that negotiations with the United States can only be on Soviet terms. Perhaps this is why the Soviets abruptly broke off the London disarmament talks of last summer and why it is boycotting the newly expanded United Nations Disarmament Commission. Soviet leaders must be persuaded ~~both~~ through our *planned* increased defensive strength, ~~and~~ through a broad program ~~to pursue~~ *of* works of

peace and a willingness to conduct negotiations at any time, that neither side can force terms on the other. Any agreement, to be effective, must serve the national interests of both countries as well as the many countries allied and associated with us in our search for peace.

> The successful launching of the 1958 Alpha, our Explorer, last Friday night was a spectacular affirmation that the United States has had and does have the technological ability -- and now has the will -- to close the gap in missile development. The world knows that at last we are aroused from the lethargy of the past few years that has characterized our efforts in the development of missiles, rockets, and outer space science.

In terms of the immediate future of disarmament negotiations, the successful launching of the Satellite Explorer gives new emphasis to the urgency of the reduction and control of modern weapons. This, coupled with our own scheduled production programs of the intermediate range ballistic missiles 

and the Thor
Jupiter, and the recent breakthroughs in the development of the solid fuel Polaris, combine to indicate a far stronger probability that the Soviet Union can be persuaded to return to the conference table for serious arms control discussions.

Improving the International Climate

To reach lasting agreements with the Soviet Union on such fundamental issues as arms control and political settlements, the international climate must be conducive to the development of mutual confidence. It is somewhat pointless to expect immediate success to result from discussions on disarmament when the Western nations and the Soviet Union are simultaneously exchanging verbal threats of how each can retaliate against and destroy the other.

There are many ways to help build an environment of confidence. It can be improved through an acceleration of private and public contracts on all levels.


The recently announced agreement to liberalize ~~and~~ broaden the exchange programs in order to encourage a greater measure of contact between the people of the United States and those of the Soviet Union is a big step in the right direction. Such an exchange can do much to calm the fears, and help to create a degree of understanding between our people and those of the Soviet Union. I wish to commend and compliment the Administration on the recent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. It deserves our continuing attention and support.

I would go even further. I would like to see us encourage anyone -- and particularly those from behind the Iron Curtain -- to come to the United States on a visitor's visa for a certain limited period of time. By a single stroke of this nature, we could restore much of our ~~damaged~~ image abroad. By the same token, I think we should encourage American tourists to go behind the Iron Curtain, encourage them to do so as part of official policy.

Soviet education is producing a new intelligentsia in fields of science, literature, music, agriculture and industry. I am told that the young scientists, engineers, musicians and even publicists

are increasingly non-political or apolitical in their outlook. Science and technology not only contribute to the arms race and the power drive of aggressive rulers. *They* also can be made to contribute to peace. Science is not political; it is neutral. Scientists, in the main, place professional and scholarship standards, above political ideology. This offers opportunity for association in those broad areas of non-political activities.


We must encourage Soviet citizens, yes and others, to come to this country, to visit, to travel, and to study. More of our citizens should be meeting with Soviet experts in all fields and in as many places as they can be found. International fairs, international scientific conferences, and international educational conferences are some of the places United States and Soviet citizens should be meeting and exchanging views and ideas. Let us accept the challenge of competitive coexistence -- but let us be sure to compete. *tt*

< The time is ripe to devise and execute extensive programs designed to improve the international atmosphere. We cannot expect progress on arms control and the settlement of major political problems overnight. Many moons and many earth satellites are likely to pass over our heads before we see significant agreements on fundamental issues. If we can expand our efforts in these many peripheral areas then the possibilities for reduced international tension and a break in the arms 

race may be realized. The world atmosphere needs to be "disarmed" by better human relations. Political problems, just like bacteria, have less chance of becoming dangerous or fatal if the surrounding environment is not conducive to their multiplication and contagion.

But, at all times,

We should be the exponents of political settlements, negotiations and peaceful progress.



The challenge the Soviet Union presents is a total challenge. It is military, political, social, economic, cultural and ideological. We must meet this challenge on all fronts.

The first challenge, the immediate one, is to recover from our delays and mismanagement in the field of military rocketry and missiles. There is no doubt that Congress will respond with increased appropriations for these programs, probably more than the President has asked.

The second challenge is to provide the basic defense in depth which these defense programs need with a new and lively rediscovery of the importance of education, trained minds, basic research, not only in the sciences but in the humanities too. There are signs that people are

belatedly awakening to the full dimensions of this ~~challenge, too.~~ *competition.*

The third challenge is the major one for the long haul. At the moment, we have only a sobering and disturbing awareness that our current struggle to regain military parity ultimately will lead nowhere but to increased world problems. We are only vaguely aware that the long-term challenge lies in the competition for men's minds, hearts, and enthusiasms.

We cannot afford to relax on any front, for we can be sure that the Soviet Union's determination to envelop the world with its political and economic system will never let up.

We must rid ourselves of the fallacy that there is a kind of priority of programs and negotiations. Negotiations and programs on the most difficult as well as the least complex need to be pursued simultaneously.

I now wish to turn, Mr. President, specifically to the problem of the control and reduction of armaments.

Administration's Disarmament Proposals
As a First Step

In discussing United States disarmament policies it is necessary to evaluate them in light of the changing definition of disarmament.

Today, "disarmament" has meaning only if it is defined in terms of five key words: strength, understanding, limitation, inspection, and control.

Strength is the continuing prerequisite for effective bargaining, the one persuasive catalytic agent without which negotiations are futile.

Understanding signifies broader and better public conception of the difficulties and complexities involved in disarmament in a nuclear age.

Limitation, inspection and control are the essential features of an effective system, without which disarmament is a mirage.

In the context of this definition of disarmament it is essential to look at and examine our past policies as we prepare to deal with the disarmament discussions of the future.

There will be those who say all this is well and good but then ask when and how do you negotiate with the Soviets in light of

recent developments? The Soviet Union has offered two possibilities. The first, the so-called summit conference; the second, within the General Assembly of the United Nations.

While neither of these alternatives lend themselves to truly responsible, effective and methodical negotiation, they do suggest other possibilities within the framework of the United Nations or within the channels of traditional diplomacy. For example the Secretary General has mentioned three approaches in addition to the General Assembly -- the Disarmament Commission, the Security Council, and the Secretary-General.

Outside of the United Nations there are these possibilities: negotiations at the ambassadorial level, the foreign minister level, negotiations at the summit with a limited agenda and with agreed upon items for discussion. It is our responsibility as a nation in our search for peace to explore every reasonable possibility and alternative. The door is not closed to negotiations. It is a question of how the door shall be opened and in what environment and at what political level disarmament talks may be resumed.

There are several aspects of United States policy on arms control which are sound and constructive.

I endorse wholeheartedly the President's statement that the one indispensable condition of any disarmament proposal is "reliable means to ensure compliance by all". I also applauded his appointment of a Special Assistant on Disarmament and the initiative he took at the 1955 Summit Conference in proposing aerial surveys, the "open skies" plan, to guard against surprise attack. These were imaginative and constructive acts.

There are two recent developments that deserve special attention and commendation. ^{First,} the careful negotiation last summer among all the NATO countries that resulted in agreement which produced the so-called western disarmament proposals. Secondly, at the recent session of the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge skillfully handled the difficult question of the expansion of the disarmament commission. The disarmament machinery of the United Nations has been strengthened and improved as a result.

(Our present disarmament proposals consist of the following points:) 1) prevention of surprise attack through aerial and ground inspection, 2) suspension of nuclear weapons tests, 3) prohibition of fissionable material production for weapons purposes, 4) a beginning on the transfer of fissionable material from weapons to peaceful purposes, 5) modest reduction of armed forces, 6) the transfer of selected armaments to international depots, 7) the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries, 8) the establishment of a committee to study ways to insure that objects sent into outer space will be used exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and 9) the grant of authority to an international agency to study the control of the export and importation of armament.

The United States refers to these nine points as constituting a first-step disarmament treaty. I submit that these points amount to much more than a first step. What would be left for a second, ~~third~~, or fourth step agreement would be rather insignificant compared to the disarming

that would have been undertaken in this so-called first step. To call these nine points a "start" on world disarmament is inaccurate and unrealistic. No nation least of all the suspicious, tightly controlled Soviet Union would agree to such sweeping provisions all at one time. The most important points in the United States disarmament package require the installation of elaborate inspection systems. Do we really expect the Soviet Union to open up its country to the extent of foreign inspectors in all atomic energy plants, all test sites, all major communication centers, all ports, all airfields, all depots to mention only the most important inspection points in our proposal? And would we be ready to reciprocate if the Soviet Union were to surprise us by accepting the proposal?

A policy which is predicated on the willingness of the Soviet Union to turn overnight from a totalitarian dictatorship out to conquer the world, to a peace-loving, cooperating, submissive nation willing to acquiesce in our demands, is doomed to defeat and ridicule.

There is one note of optimism that I can add, however, in this respect. The recent letter of the President to Premier Bulganin

appears to have a more moderate tone. The letter indicates that its creator, reportedly the Secretary of State, may have had some second thoughts about the scope and substance of our disarmament policies and procedures.

What seems necessary at this point if we are ever to reach a real and genuine first step agreement with the Soviet Union is to be willing to break up the disarmament package. We should be prepared to negotiate on some of these nine points separately. I will elaborate on this point later but I must emphasize here that it is utopian to expect to reach comprehensive agreements with the Soviet Union on any matter. To think we can obtain them on the most sensitive aspects of their and our national security is deceiving to the American people as well as the entire world.

However, no matter what the dimension or scope of the negotiations, there are certain ground rules in the field of disarmament which must be followed if negotiations are to be successful.

Need for Positive Attitude

One of the ground rules is that all the participating governments approach the conference table with a positive attitude. It is imperative that the United States reflect and adopt such an attitude. Unless such an attitude exists on the part of all participants the negotiations will deteriorate to mere propaganda battles in the cold war.

No government, least of all the government of the United States, should ever be casual and negative about limiting the arms race. We must never devise proposals that obviously have no chance of being accepted. Every proposal of ours, and every rejection of proposals from the Soviet, should be given only after the most thoughtful and scrutinizing study.

There has all too often been a tendency for spokesmen in the State Department to ~~brush aside~~ the latest Bulganin letter at the first news flash. Such actions may demonstrate alertness to news but they also reveal an automatic reflex of prejudice and skepticism which weakens our stature and posture of leadership. If we find it necessary to say "no" to Soviet proposals let us do so after careful examination despite the obvious record of propoganda and cold war political maneuvers that

have been so evident in past U.S.S.R. proposals. We do no honor to our own character or image by aping the Kremlin.

Case of Soviet Proposal for a Test Ban

For example, we have handled very badly the proposal of the Soviet Union to ban nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet offer, on its face, includes the installation of an inspection system within the borders of each testing state and near each testing site. The purpose of such an inspection system would be to verify the observance of a test suspension.

We rejected the Soviet proposal out of hand. We did not follow an elementary principle in dealing with the Soviet Union. We did not challenge them. By rejecting the Soviet proposal, and not giving cogent reasons for the rejection, we let them score another of their many important propaganda victories.

We should seek to determine what kind of inspection system the Soviet leaders envisage. Is it the type we agreed to in the Korean armistice? If it is, then we and the world should realize that the Soviets are trying to pull the wool over our eyes. The Korean inspection

system, as we have since learned to our sorrow, was inadequate. Perhaps the Communists never intended it to work. However, if the Soviets have in mind another type of inspection system and are prepared to consider an inspection system which we believe is adequate, then we should know that too. Above all, when the Soviet indicates a willingness to accept inspection as a component part of a proposal for the cessation of nuclear testing then let us pursue the proposal to its most intimate and minute detail. If the Soviet is prepared to accept genuine, effective inspection within its borders, this could well be the break through the Iron Curtain that is more significant than the launching of the Sputniks.

During the course of the debate on disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly, I wrote to the President suggesting that the United States propose a suspension of weapons tests with appropriate inspection apart from the proposal to stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the other features of our disarmament package.

The President's response was not wholly negative. The Administration is still studying this possibility, he said. The President's letter to me seemed to indicate that the Administration still had an open mind on the matter.

However, five weeks later the President wrote to Prime Minister Nehru and said something quite different. He told Mr. Nehru the United States could not consider separating the test ban issue from a cut-off of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Could it possibly be that in the intervening five weeks the Administration's so-called study had been completed and the President felt compelled to report on it first to Mr. Nehru, one of the statesmen of the world least likely to be pleased?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record at this point the exchange of letters between the President and myself and the President's cable gram to the Prime Minister of India.

(Letters to be inserted attached. Humphrey's letter of November 4, the President's letter of November 8, the President's cablegram)

C O P Y

November 4, 1957

The President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I have become increasingly concerned with the recent developments regarding the efforts of the major powers to reach a first step agreement on the control and reduction of armaments. I feel that we are fast approaching a stalemate which will be difficult to break. By this I mean that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken positions which seem to leave little room for compromise.

There is no question in my mind that the major responsibility for the present stalemate rests with the Soviet Union. If the Russians had not insisted on abruptly terminating the London negotiations we would at least be in the position of exploring various possibilities for a limited and safe agreement. However, I also believe that the United States has taken an unnecessarily rigid position in its insistence on combining a two-year ban on nuclear weapons tests with a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and also with aerial and ground inspection zones to guard against surprise attack. While I understand the basis of the various parts of the present United States proposals I do not think that their inseparableness should represent an ultimate position.

Throughout the summer months I participated, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, in weekly meetings with the Secretary of State or his deputies regarding the progress of the disarmament talks. These meetings were constructive and gave those of us on the Subcommittee an opportunity to explore the position of your Administration on the disarmament issue. As a

result of these meetings as well as the independent research and hearings conducted by the Subcommittee it appears that there is no military reason why a two-year ban on nuclear weapons tests must be accompanied by agreement to cease the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. In fact, the present disarmament package of the United States has its disadvantages. One of these is stated as a conclusion of the unanimous recent report of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee:

"The subcommittee has concluded that a disarmament agreement must include measures to test the observance of its provisions. Measures for inspection, adequate to safeguard each separate disarmament proposal in the package may, however, when added together, be so extensive as to be impractical or unacceptable. . ."

I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that the United States, after consulting with its allies, declare its willingness to negotiate separately on a ban on nuclear weapons tests for a two-year period with the only condition being agreement on an effective inspection system with United Nations supervision to insure that the ban is being scrupulously observed.

It is my belief that such a proposal would be a safe and reasonable one. It would be a concrete step toward ending the arms race. It would also enable the people of this and other countries to learn more clearly whether the Soviet Union is truly ready to accept effective inspection. We cannot challenge the intentions of the Soviet Union on inspection unless we are in a position to negotiate on a test ban irrespective of the other measures in the Four Power disarmament proposal.

I have discussed this matter with Governor Stassen. These discussions have convinced me that this course of action would be in the best interests of the United States and should be proposed by the earliest possible date to the United Nations General Assembly.

Respectfully,

Hubert H. Humphrey

CC: Secretary Dulles
Governor Stassen
Ambassador Lodge

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 8, 1957

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Thank you for your letter of November fourth. I appreciate your comments based upon your observations and review in your Subcommittee.

The entire subject of nuclear tests and its relationship to disarmament agreement is under continuing study and review. I am referring copies of your letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for their consideration in connection with their own recommendations to me. Your own views will be helpful to us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Importance of Adequate Preparation

Along with the need for a constructive attitude toward the problem of disarmament, there is the requirement of adequate preparation and an expenditure of considerable effort.

A few comparisons of our effort to perfect weapons with those made on behalf of armaments control are revealing. We are all somewhat familiar with the energy, resources, and funds behind the production of a new missile-- hundreds of millions of dollars, detailed blueprints, hundreds of contracts and subcontracts, frequent tests, elaborate facilities, and thousands of individuals, each striving to perfect a single weapon. And all this effort goes into a project which we hope will never be sent on its mission. Major General Schriever, who is in charge of the Air Force ballistic missile program estimated that over 75,000 persons are engaged just in perfecting the Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

Compare this to the kind of effort and preparation we are making to realize progress on arms control. The Disarmament Office in the last fiscal year spent some \$530,000 and in fiscal 1956, expenditures totaled \$450,000. Estimates for fiscal 1958 show a reduced budget of \$375,000.

Mr. Stassen has a staff of about 40. I am told this staff is being reduced by half. In the meantime, the staff in the State Department has not appeared to have been augmented. The Defense Department has had one or two individuals working on arms control in the office of International Security Affairs. The Atomic Energy Commission, to my knowledge, has no one assigned to work on control of nuclear materials except those who are working on the regular United States bilateral and international atomic energy inspection programs.

This is the total effort at the staff level of the Executive branch assigned to secure progress on disarmament. It would seem to me that a problem as complex and as interrelated to our entire defense and foreign policies should command an effort vastly greater than this.

The Disarmament Subcommittee made definite recommendations regarding the type of effort that the Executive Branch ought to make in order to be thoroughly prepared regarding all arms control possibilities. The Subcommittee suggested in its report the "creation of special advisory

groups of non-governmental experts who are especially knowledgeable regarding problems related to disarmament." The Subcommittee also recommended that the President and the Secretary of State make sure that the Head of the Office of Disarmament has the necessary funds and authority to carry out his assignment.

The Congress should determine whether the Administration is considering and acting seriously on these recommendations. Unfortunately, I fear the opposite has been done. The Disarmament staff is being reduced. The Office of Disarmament has an uncertain role in the State Department. No special study groups have been created.

A few weeks ago I added a personal recommendation with respect to the matter of preparation and effort devoted to disarmament. When I heard that Mr. Stassen might be leaving the government I wrote to the President to give my own views regarding the continuation of the Special Office on Disarmament. I also referred to the advice contained in the Subcommittee's report. I ask unanimous consent to insert this exchange of letters into the record.

(Letters to be inserted attached. Humphrey's letter of December 27, the President's letter of January 3, 1958)

I wish to make one further comment regarding the matter of preparation for disarmament negotiations.

Subcommittee's Efforts to Learn of Task Force Studies

Mr. Stassen, when he was first appointed as the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament, made a special point of announcing the creation of eight task forces, each dealing with a different aspect of inspection -- inspection for nuclear materials, aerial inspection, army inspection, navy inspection, budget and financial inspection, communication, industrial and power inspection, and steel inspection.

In telling of these task forces, Mr. Stassen said: "As a result of their studies, . . . I believe we shall have something we have never had before -- a detailed operating manual of what to inspect, how and where it would be inspected, a knowledge of what can and cannot be profitably inspected if we seek to provide a safeguard against surprise attack and to supervise an international arms limitation agreement."

December 27, 1957

The President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Recently I have noticed reports in the press to the effect that the Office of Disarmament within your Administration is about to be reduced considerably in size and function. I hope this is not true. However, I am taking this means of expressing directly to you my personal concern over such reports and my apprehension over their apparent accuracy.

The problem of armaments control, as you know, is as complex and difficult a problem as any facing this country. Given continued Soviet intransigence, it may be insoluble. In any case, it will not be solved easily, for we do not have the sole power to achieve a solution. However, the United States has a tremendous and continuing obligation to the people of all nations to put forth our very best efforts to achieve some measure of control over the new weapons now being produced and soon to be spread throughout the world. We must not only say, and say convincingly, that we are devoted to finding new avenues of approach. We must actually, seriously, make these approaches.

There have also been press statements indicating that your special assistant for disarmament may be resigning his post. If this is true, I hope his successor will be given all the support he deserves in the performance of his difficult assignment.

Last September, the unanimous and bipartisan report of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee made several very pertinent recommendations regarding the organization of the Disarmament Office. I hope that you will not consider it to be pre-

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1958

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter on the always difficult subject of disarmament. As your letter indicates, I and my associates are at this very time reappraising the various problems in all of the aspects that you mention. Your personal suggestions will be helpful, and I thank you sincerely for sending them to me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

It was announced that when the task forces completed their work United States policy would have a "firmer foundation" and our negotiating position would be enhanced.

All of us would agree that the creation of these task forces was a commendable act and their assignment covers a key element in our country's quest for a safe and workable arms control agreement. Our Subcommittee naturally became interested in the results of the eight task forces. And so we made inquiries regarding them.

Our efforts to learn about the task forces have been fruitless. When we first asked Mr. Stassen whether the Subcommittee might be informed regarding their work, we were told that the reports were not in a form that would be useful to the Subcommittee.

Some months later I inquired again, this time of Secretary Dulles. At that time, the Secretary assured me that the task force reports would be available whenever the members wished to see them. Subsequently, I addressed a letter to Mr. Dulles indicating that the reports would indeed be useful to studies being undertaken by the Subcommittee. Mr. Dulles first responded

by suggesting I see another document. When I repeated my request in another letter, Mr. Dulles replied that the task force reports were prepared for the President and that the Department of State had no authority to release them in any manner whatsoever.

I then addressed a letter to the President inquiring whether the results of the task forces might be made available to the Subcommittee. The President's reply was in the negative. He gave as his reason of refusal that the task force reports came under the cloak of Executive privilege and he indicated also that no useful purpose would be served to have anyone else see them besides the few who needed to have access to them. I ask unanimous consent to place at this point in the record the correspondence regarding the request to gain information on the task force reports.

(Letters to be inserted attached. Humphrey's letter of September 16, Dulles' letter of October 3, Humphrey's letter of October 17, Dulles' letter of November 6, Humphrey's letter, ~~the~~ the President's letter of December 4)

The decision of the President in this matter is precisely the same as it was in connection with the request of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee concerning the Gaither report. It illustrates the difficulty of committees of the Congress in obtaining valuable information in order to carry out their responsibilities.

C O P Y

September 16, 1957

The Honorable
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In your appearance before the Subcommittee on Disarmament on June 27, 1957, you stated that you would make available for use of the Subcommittee the studies on inspection prepared by the task forces of experts appointed by Mr. Stassen, and I said I would contact you when the material was needed. I have now requested the staff of the Subcommittee to undertake a study of inspection of an arms control agreement and would like for them to read the task force reports for background information.

Could you arrange to have them sent to the Foreign Relations Committee in Room F-53 in the Capitol, attention Mrs. Ellen Collier. Or, if you prefer, a member of the staff could come to the State Department to read the reports.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey
Chairman
Subcommittee on Disarmament

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 1957

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I have looked into your request of September 16 for material to assist in a study of inspection of an arms control agreement. I understand that, at your request, the Department has sent you a copy of a Department of Defense report entitled "Outline Plan for Implementation of an Aerial Ground Inspection System in First Phase Disarmament."

I hope this will prove to meet the needs of the study you have in mind. If it does not, representatives of the Department would be glad to discuss the subject with members of the Subcommittee staff.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles

The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey,
United States Senate.

C O P Y

October 17, 1957

The Honorable
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your letter of October 4 indicates that there may have been some misunderstanding as to the material on inspection that the Subcommittee on Disarmament is attempting to secure. We would like to see the reports on inspection which were prepared by the eight task forces commissioned by Mr. Stassen in 1955 to study various aspects of inspection. The heads of these task forces were Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Gen. James H. Doolittle, Vice Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Benjamin Fairless, Walker L. Cisler, Dr. Harold Moulton and Dr. James B. Fisk. As I mentioned in my letter to you of September 16 you stated before the Subcommittee on Disarmament on June 27, 1957 that you would make available for use of the Subcommittee the studies prepared by these task forces.

I should appreciate it if a representative of the Department of State could discuss the matter with Miss Betty Goetz, the Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Disarmament.

We did receive the "Outline Plan for the Implementation of Aerial-Ground Inspection System in the First Phase of Disarmament" which you mentioned in your letter. While this was helpful it was a study of only a limited phase of inspection and apparently was prepared by the Department of Defense rather than a task force group.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey
Chairman
Subcommittee on Disarmament

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1957

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I have your letter of October 17, in which you identify eight Task Force studies on inspection which the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament would like to examine.

I find that these studies were prepared under the direction of Governor Stassen prior to his association with the Department of State. I have checked with Governor Stassen, and he tells me the studies were prepared with the understanding that they would be for the express use of the President. We do not, therefore, believe that we can properly make them available to the Subcommittee.

I regret that under the circumstances I cannot send you a more favorable reply in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles

The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey, Chairman
Subcommittee on Disarmament,
United States Senate.

C O P Y

The President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

On October 7, 1955, Mr. Harold Stassen, as your Special Assistant for Disarmament, announced that eight task force study groups had been appointed to make "a new, fundamental and extensive expert study . . . of the methods of international inspection and control." It seemed to me that the appointment of these task forces was commendable in view of the importance of inspection in any agreement on the control and reduction of armaments.

It is my feeling that the problems of inspection in a disarmament system need to have a great deal of attention by all those concerned with arriving at a safeguarded agreement. Consequently I asked Mr. Stassen whether the reports of the task forces could be made available to our Subcommittee. His response at the time was that the reports were not in a usable form. Subsequently, I repeated my request to Mr. Dulles, and although he first agreed to make the reports available, he later indicated that the task force reports were prepared only for your use. I now, Mr. President, ask of you whether the Subcommittee might have the task force studies made available to it for study. I am sure that the findings of the various task forces on inspection would give the Subcommittee on Disarmament valuable insight into the problems involved in reaching a disarmament agreement and be an aid as background material in the study of disarmament which the Subcommittee is conducting.

You can be assured that any classification of the material would be scrupulously observed in the event you could see fit to extend to us access to the task force reports.

Respectfully,

Hubert H. Humphrey

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1957

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I have your letter asking that I make available to your Disarmament Subcommittee the eight Task Force studies on international inspection and control that were prepared as a basis for policy decisions in the field of disarmament. These studies were prepared for the National Security Council and for my own use, and I prevailed upon various individuals to undertake these studies on this understanding. In view of this circumstance and the nature of the information these studies contain, I believe it would not serve the public interest to make them available outside the very limited group that has had to have access to them.

With best wishes and warm regard,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Suggestions for Future Negotiations

I now turn to a consideration of how our present arms control policies should be modified and to what extent new policies should be devised and tried.

My first suggestion is one I alluded to earlier.

✓ We should take some of the points in the present disarmament package and break them up and offer them as separate proposals.

1. Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests

To me, acceptance of an agreement on either one of two these proposals would be significant. One is the inspection system to verify a suspension of nuclear weapons tests. The other is the inspection system for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

As to nuclear weapons tests, I believe that public opinion in the United States and throughout the world would support the suspension of these tests provided an adequate inspection and detection

system can be installed in all testing countries and close to all possible test sites.

It has never been clear to me, all of the explanations and arguments of the Administration notwithstanding, why the United States insists a test suspension with inspection safeguards should not be proposed as a separate measure.

President Eisenhower, in his cablegram to Prime Minister Nehru, gave the impression that weapons tests were not important as a factor in halting the arms race. He said, "I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied by any assurances that other measures -- which would go to the heart of the problem -- would follow." In the first place, the term "heart of the problem" is a new way of stating the objectives of our disarmament policy. I thought it was to be a "first step," a "start toward world disarmament." I would like to know whether the President's cablegram represents a departure in the description of our proposals.

I agree with the President that a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes constitutes the heart of the nuclear weapons problem. But the testing of weapons is not insignificant. A suspension of tests would retard, and I hope prevent, the spread of the production of these lethal weapons to other countries. According to Admiral Strauss in a letter to the Disarmament Subcommittee last June, "there is no substitute for tests to determine the reliability of a weapon, conventional or atomic." What this means to me is that a test ban would freeze nuclear weapons development where it is now in the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and possibly France. According to the former Secretary of Defense this would not preclude testing of missiles. If it did, a new problem would be presented.

Freezing nuclear weapons development at present levels should involve no threat to our security, since we have been

assured that we are ahead of the U.S.S.R. in this aspect of weapons technology.

Assuming, therefore, we are equal or ahead of the U.S.S.R. on nuclear weapons development then I think we should press for an agreement on an inspection system to verify the suspension of these tests. I repeat, to gain admission to the U.S.S.R. for inspection by an International Agency, would be a political and technological breakthrough second to none.

Now I wish to turn to the other point in the present United States disarmament package worth exploring as a separate agreement. That is the proposal to cease production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

2. Cessation of Production of Fissionable Material For Weapons Purposes

This proposal, according to the Administration, is considered to be the most important of all the points in the package.

We should remove it from the package and offer to negotiate on it separately.

The Soviet Union has never flatly rejected this proposal although the Soviets have never appeared enthusiastic about it.

Negotiations for a cut-off would center on the inspection system needed to verify the production ban. The Soviet Union undoubtedly is fearful of such an inspection system. Our negotiators must press harder to persuade Mr. Khrushchev and his subordinates that an inspection system to verify a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes is not only essential but urgent if the world ever expects to put a ceiling on the amount of available nuclear ammunition.

Devising an adequate and acceptable inspection system must be determined by the experts and the negotiators. The Administration apparently thinks it would not be difficult. Admiral Strauss has indicated in regard to inspection for a

cut-off that "while an adequate system of control and inspection cannot be simple, nevertheless it should be feasible to install such a system." The French weapons control expert, Jules Moch, has asserted that, assuming all nuclear facilities are declared or are known, "on the whole, less staff is required in a large country to control the cut-off of manufacture for military purposes than to verify that there are no secret explosions." Mr. Moch further asserts that as of this time there are less than 100 nuclear facilities in the world that would need to be inspected.

3. New Study Groups Needed

With respect to the requirements for both the inspection system for a cut-off of production and for a suspension of nuclear weapons tests, I propose that the Executive branch appoint two teams of prominent and highly qualified nuclear scientists and weapons experts. One should be charged with making a complete and thorough study of the requirements of inspection for a test ban; the other group for inspection for a cut-off of production. These two groups

should offer to meet with comparable scientists and nuclear experts from the Soviet Union in order to devise inspection systems acceptable to both countries. If the U.S.S.R. refuses both of these proposals then we should try such a proposal on the non-governmental level. The United States National Academy of Sciences could appoint two teams of weapons experts. These teams might then negotiate with the Soviet Academy of Sciences to determine whether they could agree on the necessary requirements of an inspection system to verify a test ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The Administration should also create special groups of experts both in and out of government to study in relation to arms control such problems as posed by the successful testing by the U.S.S.R. of an intercontinental ballistic missile. We should also be investigating to what extent the achievements of the launching of earth satellites will affect present plans for aerial inspection to prevent surprise attack.

In this connection, it is imperative that the United States take the lead through the United Nations to work for international control of outer space along the lines suggested by the Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, and the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Sir Leslie Munro, one of the world's great statesmen.

The United Nations should establish a special committee for the joint exploration of outer space - a committee which should include the scientists of many nations including those of the United States, ^{and} the Soviet Union, ~~the United Kingdom, Japan, India, and France.~~ Such an act would constitute a truly new enterprise in genuine international cooperation. One of the first projects such a committee might sponsor could be a United Nations reconnaissance satellite. A satellite of this nature would impress all nations that no longer are national borders and countries sacrosanct. It would be a vivid example of internationalism which by its very existence would require the creation of new concepts of international law and order. Why not let the most important international organization dedicated to peace be the sponsor of a special kind of an earth satellite? This would be science at work for humanity, not nationality.

Arms Control in Specific Areas

Mr. President, I now offer some suggestions regarding arms control measures in specific geographical areas. I preface my remarks here by quoting from the report of our Disarmament Subcommittee. The Subcommittee concluded that: "Reducing international tension and diminishing the threat of war should be pursued both through efforts to settle political problems and through negotiations to curtail and control armaments." The report also noted that: "Substantial reduction of armaments cannot be made without corresponding progress on the resolution of at least some political issues." Therefore it seems that the United States should be adopting and pursuing concertedly and actively policies designed to reduce international tension in specific areas to the end that armaments themselves can be cut back.

I am thinking of the division of Europe, the tension in the Middle East, and problems connected with the existence of two Koreas, two Chinas, and the two countries North and South Vietnam.

The problems confronting these areas are political as well as military. In each area the United States is heavily committed. And the tragedy is that in all five of these areas our policy has been essentially of a military nature. If tension increases, our reaction has been to send more armaments and more military aid. While the immediate situation in each or any of these areas may require more arms or military aid, surely for the long run, we should lay plans and study alternatives designed to relax tension through solutions based on both political settlements and arms control measures. At least, we must try. Hardware consignments to friendly nations and increased armaments to American troops and bases abroad are no substitute for an effective foreign policy. Their purpose is to provide defense capabilities so that we can pursue political and diplomatic policies. They are effective only when they are a part of a broad foreign policy and national security system.

1. Armaments Limitations for the Middle East

Adroit Soviet diplomacy and propaganda have made a shambles of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The only possibility of rescuing that doctrine and American Middle East policy generally is to face up to the challenges of that area in a variety of specific ways.

We and the Soviets are engaged in an arms race in the Middle East that is inconclusive, costly and dangerous. We should initiate proposals to end the arms race in the Middle East by an effective embargo against shipments from any outside source other than under United Nations auspices. To this end, we should seek the establishment by the United Nations General Assembly of a Special Commission on Arms Traffic, which Commission would be charged with responsibility for proposing early recommendations on regulating all flow of non-United Nations materiel into that region.

We should strengthen the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East for its continued and further use in this area if necessary.

We should seek agreement on a pilot project, open-skies aerial and ground inspection system.

We should propose the establishment of a United Nations Good Offices Commission, whose purpose would be to reduce tensions in the Middle East by promoting direct negotiations between the current antagonists and mediating among them if direct negotiations prove to be impossible.

We should reaffirm our interest and support for long-term regional economic development programs. Toward this end, we should take the initiative in the United Nations in proposing a Middle East Development Authority, as an administering agency for the mutual pooling of capital and technical aid in the region.

I consider these proposals to be sound, practicable and indicative of the positive approach which the United States must adopt.

2. Political Settlement in Europe

The second regional arms control proposal concerns Europe.

There are three major European security and political problems.

One is the continued division of Germany. The second is the subjugation of the majority of the peoples in the satellite nations of Eastern Europe through the occupation of Soviet military troops. The third is the constant danger that either one of these problems could erupt into a European conflagration. If Soviet intermediate range missiles and the 17⁵ divisions of the Soviet army descended upon Western Europe, the present state of NATO defenses would be hard pressed to stop them.

So far the answer of the Executive branch to these three problems is to arm Western Europe with a variety of missiles when they become available. It is a proposal backed by many of us in Congress on both sides of the aisle.

I submit, however, that when the problems and the proposed solution to them are lined up side by side, the solution looks pretty weak and inadequate.

The Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament gave some attention to the problem of Germany in its report of last September. I would like to quote now from that report.

The achievement of a free and reunified Germany would probably involve some ceiling on the size of its armed forces and its supply of armaments. Such restrictions to be binding, however, must be accompanied by similar restrictions on the armed forces and armaments of other nations in Europe as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. These restrictions should apply to the European NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe, and would involve relocation and possible reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and United States forces in Germany.

I think it is important to emphasize here that the report stated that:

If United States forces were to be withdrawn from Germany provision would need to be made for stationing them elsewhere on the eastern side of the Atlantic so long as NATO military strategy requires it.

The Subcommittee concluded that:

. . . if German reunification is to become more than a slogan, Western policy must be both persistent and realistic. Neither the Western Powers' nor Soviet policy on German unification appears to be sufficiently flexible to encourage progress toward the solution of this problem.

This section of our report, particularly the last sentence, is just as applicable today as it was five months ago when the report was filed. I urge the Administration to consider the findings and suggestions of the Subcommittee on this question.

It is on this point which I believe Mr. George Kennan, former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the foremost American experts on Russia, has made a significant contribution. I do not agree with everything that Mr. Kennan has said but I do believe he has helped to jar many of us loose from a stereotyped kind of thinking about European problems.

We must face up to the possibility of change in the political leadership of our major allies. There are powerful political

forces already advocating a withdrawal of allied troops from Germany and Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. If for no other reason than this, it would be prudent for NATO political and military advisers to formulate various plans and alternatives that could serve as the basis of negotiations with the Soviet Union. As the Subcommittee report notes, one of the problems that must be solved in this connection is where else on the eastern side of the Atlantic American troops could be based.

If such a withdrawal did take place Germany would not turn Communist nor even neutral toward Communism as an ideology or power system. But, a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany and Poland could result in a political upheaval of significant proportions and meaning for a free Europe.

3. Arms Control in Asia

A third area in which tension exists is the Far East. In Korea there is a divided country with each half heavily armed and separated by a thin buffer zone across the middle of the peninsula.

When the Communists violated the terms of the armistice and brought new armaments into North Korea, the United States as the agent of the United Nations felt obliged to protect the forces under its command by modernizing their military equipment.

If, however, we expect to reduce tension in the area it will be through a reduction of armaments available to both sides rather than through a buildup of armaments. Here, then, is another case where the United States should attempt to win support in the United Nations to limit, through adequate inspection provisions, the number of troops and amount of military equipment based in North and South Korea.

I would at least like to see a plan submitted. We have not, to my knowledge, made any proposals of an affirmative nature regarding the division of Korea in over three years. It is time to take positive steps toward bringing a more stable situation in that part of the world. Furthermore, a reduction of armaments, which

could be verified by an adequate inspection system would furnish an excellent pilot project to test the adequacy of aerial and ground inspection which might be applied in a more general arms control agreement.

Another area in Asia which is fraught with tension and large armaments is the area of China. If we expect to achieve any disarmament among the major powers, some settlement of the China issue must take place. Surely, no thinking person could envisage an overall disarmament agreement with Communist China excluded. Such an ~~arrangement~~ ~~agreement~~ would be an open invitation for Soviet evasion of arms agreements by collusion with Red China.

United States policies regarding China need a thorough reexamination, especially if we are ~~to~~ seriously ~~to~~ pursue disarmament.

Competent observers and students of China and Asia have warned us that Communist China is the new aggressive force in Asia. We have commitments in the Asian area. We have already

suffered from one terrible example of Chinese Communist aggression. It would be reckless and in fact dangerous to our national security and vital interests to reduce substantially our military strength even if the Soviet Union did likewise while at the same time Communist China was exempt from any control, inspection, and reduction of its military machine.

4. Arms Control in Latin America

Latin America is another geographical area in which armaments expenditures of individual nations might be reduced. This area offers especially hopeful possibilities because of its highly developed machinery for the settlement of inter-American disputes. The Organization of American States, set up in 1948, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 have provided means to handle any controversy which might arise between the member nations.

The success of the inter-American system does not rest on the absence of political disputes among the nations of the area.

As in every area, some grievances of long duration remain. Therefore, it is not the lack of political and economic problems which is responsible for hemispheric peace. It is the creation of a system of handling disputes peaceably and the determination by the member nations to make the system work that give the Americas their admirable record.

The continued and successful operation of the inter-American system should make possible a beginning on the reduction of armaments of the individual countries and also a decrease in United States military aid to the region. It would be much more desirable if United States aid and Latin American national budgets could be geared primarily to developing Latin American economies and raising living standards of the people.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. President, I have made a number of suggestions which I hope will be given serious consideration by the members of this

body and by the Executive branch. My aim in all of these proposals is to make some headway toward diminishing the threat of a total and terrible third world war, toward achieving some settlements of the major political problems that account for the persistence of international tension, and finally toward reducing the gigantic burden on all peoples of large armament expenditures.

I realize, too, that the United States cannot do these things by itself. The rulers of international communism must be brought to realize that the only alternative to peace is destruction.


We need to pursue our foreign policies and programs in close consultation with our allies in NATO, with the newly created nations as well as our older friends in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and with our neighbors in our own hemisphere. We need to make our alliances fortresses of mutual respect, partnership and positive programs. And above all, we must strive unceasingly to

strengthen the most important of all international institutions dedicated to peace, the United Nations.

Our sincerity, integrity of purpose, and the realistic nature of our proposals can serve to mobilize the understanding, support, and friendship of the world's non-Communist peoples. To have them and their governments working with us is the true meaning of negotiating from strength -- strength of conviction and strength of support.

Some of my colleagues in this body may disagree with my suggestions. Disagreement, however, often serves a useful purpose when it helps to clarify thought. I want to be helpful to our President and the Secretary of State because the problems we face affect the very survival of our great country. The President deserves all the support we can give him in the quest for a just and enduring peace. As he said in his State of the Union address: "But of all the works of peace, none is more needed now than a real first step toward disarmament."

I firmly believe that we must keep trying to negotiate as long as there is a faint hope of success. The people of this and all countries desperately want and need peace. The nation which by its dedication, persistence, boldness, and imagination persuades people that it is the champion of peace will have universal support. This is what the United States must represent to the world.

America's foreign policy needs the inspiration of the "works of peace" -- not merely the words of peace. 

The works of peace are the very heart and core of our tradition and philosophy. Health care for the sick, food for the hungry, jobs for the unemployed, homes and shelter for the needy, Peace, Advance Energy for Peace, opportunity for youth -- these are the concrete works of peace we must do. This great promise of the good life, with "liberty and the pursuit of happiness" is one we can fulfill, and we should move ahead vigorously to do it.

We have an opportunity to recover that generosity, humanitarianism and compassion that in the past won for us the world's admiration and respect, and even turned our enemies into friends.

Let us be the people of progress, the people of performance, and the people of peace.



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