

Pontiac, Mich.
October 30, 1959

001879

NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

works of Peace
U. N. + Agence

Exchange
econ. aid
Trade
cultural Rel
Food
Health
Educa

Three
Challenges

- (1) Historical
Lesson Potential
- (2) Full
Realization of
Full Freedom,
Justice,
opportunity
for all
Americans
- (3) attainment
of a just &
Enduring
Peace.

Normally at a political rally you might expect a good rousing party speech.

And frankly, I would like to perform a public autopsy on the record of this Republican Administration. I believe it serves a salutary purpose to bring this lesson home to the American people.

But tonight I am going to forego that pleasure because the issues are great and the time is short. We are confronted by a whole series of decisions which may well determine the future course of our lives, and of our children's lives and of our nation's future.

Public Autopsy
NO GO, NOT
NOW.
Veto,
Administ.

✓ The times call for serious thought
and a very candid, hardheaded appraisal
of our world situation.

✓ And so I am going to leave aside
the story of Republican mistakes of the
past. I will ask you to join me in
examining one of the most important
problems of our foreign policy.

out

There is no more fitting place to do
this than at a Democratic party meeting.
The Democratic Party has always taken its
world responsibilities seriously. From
James Monroe through Woodrow Wilson,
Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman,
Democratic Presidents have set the course
for American foreign policy. And the
Democratic Party, in local communities

out

throughout the country, has not lagged
behind its leaders in these matters - it
has often been way ahead of them.

but

I want to discuss with you tonight
the problem of disarmament - a subject
which lies at the very heart of international
relations and military policy.

A few months ago, a Congressional
Committee was informed by ^{*nuclear + military*} experts that a
surprise nuclear attack on the United
States would last just a few hours, but
would cost the lives of about 50,000,000
people - ~~just about~~ ^{*almost*} one third of the
population. *— and many more casualties!*

The large nations of the world have
just about given up the old concepts of
strategy - soldier against soldier, ship
against ship, army against army.

Now our military calculations involve
the bombing of cities, the destruction
population centers, the elimination of
production facilities. These measures
mean death to millions of people at a
time.

And the most frightening thing is
that we have almost grown accustomed to it.

But it does no good to express horror
or to display moral indignation.

The problem is also a practical one,
and we must solve it practically. We must
insist on a fair solution even as the
loaded guns are pointed.

In his speech at the U.N., Mr. Khrushchev
stated that the Russians want to reduce
arms at the present time. *If true,* This is encouraging.

But up to now, they have shown little
willingness to allow international officials
to inspect the Soviet Union to ascertain
whether they are performing according to
agreement.

The job of American diplomats is
twofold; first to persuade the Russians
to accept inspection, and second to be
sure that our inspection demands are
reasonable and necessary. ^{And} We must not
yield on any essential, because an agreement
without ^{effective} real inspection would be worthless.

But we must recognize that the Russians
have a historic passion for secrecy. The
thought of foreign inspectors travelling
freely around ^{the Soviet Union} ~~the country~~ is repugnant to them.

Nevertheless, any disarmament agreement
without inspection within the USSR
would be the height of folly &
irresponsibility.

But,

proposals

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We must make sure that our ~~comands~~ entail

And as if it is

the maximum in control and the minimum in

complexity.

This is the general task of American

diplomats. Now I want to become more

specific.

If the world is to witness any progress

toward ending the arms race and toward

reducing the burden of vast expenditures

for defense, we must determine whether the

Soviets mean it when they claim they are

willing to accept controls. Our main, and

at the moment, only opportunity to find

out is through the nuclear test ban

negotiations now in progress at Geneva.

I wish to discuss these negotiations

with you tonight because they bear so

directly on whether a breakthrough in the

*as K
SAG*

bomb

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in the disarmament question is possible.

If these negotiations succeed, then

future arms control talks can be conducted

in a much more favorable atmosphere than

if they fail or become stalemated

indefinitely. The negotiations are a test

of Soviet willingness to accept controls.

workable disarmament

My purpose tonight is to report

briefly the status of the negotiations and

also to share with you a specific proposal

for breaking what is fast becoming an

impasse in the test ban talks.

out

The three nuclear powers - the United

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union -

have been negotiating for one year. Definite

progress has been made.

I was there

Yes, Soviet representatives are beginning
to accept some concepts of control to
police a nuclear weapons test ban.

The Soviets
They have indicated a willingness to

cooperate with us to send satellites into

possible
space to detect nuclear tests hundreds

of miles above the earth. *yes thousands*

They have
agreed to establish within their borders

inspection and
about twenty fixed control posts to

house a variety of instruments to record

signals of possible nuclear explosions.

And they have accepted the idea that on

repeated a few -
a "few" occasions a year an international

inspection team may go to the site of an

unidentified event registered at the control

posts to determine whether a nuclear

explosion took place.

*Here is
the
problem.*

For a country in which secrecy and
suspicion are almost a cult, the willingness
of the Soviets to accept ^{even such limited} ~~the above~~ controls
is an advance over previous arms control
negotiations. Never in thirteen years of
" talks on disarming have the Soviets come
this close to accepting controls in
specified treaty language.

Kepf
Cox

However, the Soviet position on controls
is still inadequate in three major respects.

First, the control posts should contain
a higher proportion of foreigners than the
Soviet Union has yet been willing to accept.

~~The United States has asked for a ratio of
two foreigners to every national and the
Soviet Union has yet been willing to accept.~~

The United States has asked for a ratio of
two foreigners to every national and the
Soviet position is the reverse -- two nationals

for every foreigner. I believe that if both sides wish to reach an agreement the difference between them on this point can be compromised.

The second criticism of the Soviet position concerns the budget. The *required for the control & inspection system.*

Soviet Union has tried to insist that the budget for the international control organization should be adopted unanimously.

Here is the veto problem back again. But the Soviet Union has not always demanded a veto in the adoption of budgets, to name for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency. So it is very conceivable that this obstacle need not remain one for long.

Now I come to the third Soviet position *inspection and* on control which is inadequate. And this is the most important the most difficult question of all. On this point,

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the negotiations could fail or stalemate.

This question is the number of times that

a ^{*international*} mobile inspection team may travel to the

site of an event which could be suspected

of being a nuclear explosion. ~~As I have~~

~~said,~~ The Soviets maintain that this

will be necessary "only a few times" each

year.

The United States objects to the

restriction of "a few." But on this

question the United States has no counterproposal

figure of its own. *of the* We object to "the few" sought

by the Soviet Union but have nothing to

offer in return.

~~except~~ We say that the number of inspections

should be related to the number of unidentified

events which might be suspicious. — possible

nuclear explosions in violation of an agreement

United States scientists have attempted

to estimate how many unidentified events

Earthquakes, Explosions
~~*Earthquakes, Explosions*~~

there might be, particularly those

underground. Their estimate is based on

calculating about how many earthquakes

there will be in the Soviet Union and of

these how many the control posts will be

able to assert are definitely earthquakes

and not nuclear explosions. Some of our

scientists calculate that the number of

events that could be subject to inspection

is a very large one. This figure, in fact,

is so large that our negotiators are quite

certain that the Soviet Union will never

accept mobile inspection teams investigating

the site of every one of hundreds of unidentified

earthquakes.

Det
Mr. Mayfield

✓ The big problem, then, is how many
of the hundreds of unidentified earthquakes
should be subject to inspection? How many
will give a high degree of assurance
that the Soviet Union is not able secretly
to conduct a militarily significant series
of nuclear weapons tests.

✓ I have presented to you as objectively
and as briefly as I can the major issues
that are before the nuclear powers -as
they resume their negotiations at Geneva.

✓ The unresolved issues ^{Control Post} on staffing and on
budget, I believe, can probably be reconciled.

✓ On the third issue ^{of number of on-site inspections} I am not so sure

a reconciliation is possible. I say this

because the Soviet Union gives little

indication that it will submit to a large

number of inspections. And the United States

Keep

Test

160P

is not even able to say how many inspections

it thinks would be necessary. So you have

a situation in which the Soviet Union maintains

a position that is highly unsatisfactory to

us and in which the United States has no

position at all. Without a position on the

part of the United States it is difficult to

see how any compromise can be reached.

What is the answer to this apparent

impasse? I have urged the Administration

to reach some position on the question of

the number of inspections. Its answer is

that no position is possible until the Soviet

Union is willing to discuss the technical

complexities of the problem. The Soviet

Union, contending that it spent an entire

summer discussing the technical difficulties,

prefers to solve the problem by picking
a number out of a hat, and a low number
at that.

Many people, particularly those
inside or close to the Atomic Energy
Commission, would solve the impasse by
advocating a nuclear weapons test ban
that covers only atmospheric tests.
They say that because atmospheric tests
are so much more easily detected than
those underground or at high altitudes,
such a limited agreement would eliminate
the necessity of any mobile inspection
teams at all. The Soviet Union, thus far,
has claimed that it wants a comprehensive
agreement; that is, one that covers all
nuclear weapons tests. It has rejected
an atmospheric ban. *just*

I believe that an atmospheric ban

is better than no agreement. ~~I believe~~

But

~~that~~ it is less desirable than a total

ban because it would allow not only the

United States, the United Kingdom, and

the Soviet Union to continue ^{Bomb} testing,

but it would also allow other countries

such as Communist China and France and

many others to become nuclear powers.

*thereby spreading
the risk
of nuclear
Attack.*

Furthermore, if all our testing were

done underground, I think this could

result in an increase rather than a reduction

of world tension. With all countries

burrowing down into the ground to test

their weapons each would have less knowledge

of what the other was doing. Suspicion

and distrust would be increased.

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✓ If the Soviet Union is unwilling to discuss the technical complications of a comprehensive agreement and if the United States is unwilling to reach a negotiating position regarding the number of annual inspections, then some other way out of the impasse must be found.

I do not pretend to have the perfect solution to this problem. But I offer here tonight one possibility for your consideration and discussion.

✓ For a comprehensive test ban our scientists believe that the number of unidentified events in the Soviet Union alone would number several hundred. Obviously, this is too many to inspect. However, this number drops drastically as the size of the nuclear explosion or earthquake increases. For example,

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if the control organization had to inspect only
for explosions of approximately five
kilotons or larger, the number of inspections
needed in the Soviet Union, according to
our scientists, would be somewhere in the
range of twenty-five to fifty. ^{ay} Such a
range does not appear to me to be too
high, from a practical point of view
or from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union
with its suspicious outlook toward any
inspection or control.

My proposal, therefore, is as follows:

Point 1. Let the United States
extend its general moratorium on all
nuclear tests now scheduled to end on
December 31st for a maximum of one year.

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This would give the nuclear powers

But
ample chance to reach agreement. I would

not extend this moratorium more than one

year. If the Soviets stall longer than

that, it is a sign they are trying to get

a test ban with no controls whatsoever.

I think the United States must not allow

this to happen.

Point 2. We should offer to enter

into an agreement banning ^{all} nuclear weapons

tests equal to and above five kiloton

explosions. The agreement would specify

that all unidentified events equal to and

above a five kiloton explosion, would be

subject to inspection. The annual ceiling

on the number of mobile inspections in the

Soviet Union would be somewhere between

twenty-five and fifty. In this way I believe we could arrive at a number of mobile inspections that would correspond to our present best educated guesses from a scientific point of view as to what is necessary.

a
start -

Experience
in
Inspection

Point 3. We should be prepared to join with the other countries for two years from the time the agreement goes into effect in a moratorium on all tests below five kilotons. At the end of that time we shall know two things: 1) whether the Soviet Union and other countries are cooperating in installing the control system and 2) whether by observation and further research the control posts can be improved to identify most of the unidentified events below a size of five kilotons.

Point 4. During the two year period
in which the control posts and inspection
system for the five kiloton threshold
agreement is being established we should
conduct a comprehensive research program
in cooperation with the Soviets, with the
United Nations, and also by ourselves.
Such a program would be designed to find
ways of improving the control system so
that all suspicious events would be subject
to inspection within a reasonable ceiling.

Point 5. The agreement should specify
that if the international control posts or
our own detection system gave evidence
that the Soviet Union was not cooperating
in the moratorium on tests below five kilotons -
those not subject for two years to mobile

For minutes
Llyods
Proposal
USA
UK
USSR
under U.N.
Supervision
underground
Tests!

*or Call off the
agreement!*

inspection - then we would be free ourselves

to test in this range. We would present

our evidence to the international control

commission to show that the moratorium

had been violated. And if the Soviets do

not agree to install appropriate and

reasonable controls for tests below five

kilotons we should be free to test in this

range if our defense requires it.

*could
Come
out!*

~~My proposal is one I believe can be
reached within a short time, given the sincere~~

~~desire to reach agreement on the part
of the Soviet Union and the United States.~~

~~This is one that should be offered rather
than have the negotiations fail or continue
indefinitely as a stalemate. ✓ This proposal~~

out

covers the requirements of the United States,

namely that ^{*inspection and*} ~~an~~ control system should be based

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on what scientists estimate can be done.

It also covers the requirements of the

Soviet Union, that a control system must

not be confused with extreme complexity,

which to them looks like espionage. And

it is a proposal which gives considerable

assurance that we can have a total and

effective test ban agreement.

In advancing this proposal before you

tonight ~~I believe~~ some important and

related points should be stressed.

① A cessation of atomic tests is arms

control, but it is not real disarmament.

It is only a first step toward disarmament.

⌞ We believe that disarmament is necessary,

that it must eventually come, and that

without it, the whole world is in danger.

✓ We are willing to accept the kind of international inspection which alone can make disarmament effective and meaningful.

✓ Well, then, why don't we say it?
Why don't we identify our country with these goals? Why don't we let the peace loving people of the world understand that the United States is the leader in the great quest for peace?

Why do we leave it to Khrushchev to go before the United Nations General Assembly and proclaim the great goal of complete disarmament, as though he had invented it?

I think the present administration
has been ~~extremely~~ negligent in allowing
this idea to become associated, in the
eyes of the world, with the Soviet Union,
when in fact, it has been an American idea since 1946!

↳ In addition to proclaiming our sincere
and dedicated conviction to a system of
comprehensive disarmament we must also
be prepared with the necessary technical
studies for control and inspection in each
stage of disarmament. And we must also
be prepared to change a vast segment of
our production from arms manufacturing to
peacetime pursuits.

↳ There is no doubt in my mind that
money saved on armaments will find other
uses. It would make it possible to shift

emphasis to many urgent peacetime tasks.

If I listed the many opportunities that

we would have to make use of savings

from a reduction of defense expenditures

it would be another speech. I am certain

this audience will forgive me if I refrain

from giving you another speech this

evening.

∠ The big question is, will we find

these other uses quickly enough, and

will these other uses employ the very

people and the very facilities that

formerly were engaged in military production?

∠ It will take considerable planning to

make the transition smooth. Healthy

reconversion is not just one big overall

problem. Rather, it consists of thousands

of specific problems, involving particular
groups of employees. The fact that the
general national level of prosperity will
continue offers no reassurance to individual
workers who would lose jobs.

Finally, I want to conclude by underlining
the point that when I speak of disarmament,
I mean mutual disarmament, under effective
controls which will give assurance that all
parties are living up to the agreement.

I do not mean unilateral disarmament.

Indeed, I strongly oppose the tendency
of this Republican administration to reduce, *in the name*

of economy,

our armed power unilaterally, to try to

rely solely on the massive nuclear deterrent,

and to place the ^{*fiscal*} budget ahead of national

security *and human needs.*

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All of this is dangerous to our
national defense. It encourages

adventures on the part of the Communists

which may lead to wars which otherwise

might have been avoided. Weak defenses

make disarmament more difficult. A

nuclear war is horrible to contemplate.

But also horrible is the prospect of

a United States and a free world so

weak that domination by the Soviet dictatorship

becomes unavoidable.

Disarmament is at the very center of

our foreign relations. I have stressed it

tonight because I believe deeply that solutions

can be found. They can be found if our leaders,

the Soviet leaders, and the leaders of other

nations are convinced that large-scale
devastating wars no longer can be made
a substitute for resolving disputes in
ways that are peaceful, equitable, and
just.

World Weary of War
Massive doses of
Food, health, education,
science, capital and
Cooperation!!

People, Progress, & Peace!



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