

NEWS FROM: Democratic National Committee
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Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey's Address to the Nation on Vietnam and American Foreign Policy, Salt Lake City, Utah, -- NBC-TV

Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and as a candidate for President of the United States.

I want to tell you what I think about great issues which I believe face this Nation.

I want to talk with you about Vietnam, and about another great issue in the search for peace in the world -- the issue of stopping the threat of nuclear war.

After I have told you what I think, I want you to think.

And if you agree with me, I want you to help me.

For the past several weeks, I have tried to tell you what was in my heart and on my mind.

But sometimes that message has been drowned out by the voices of protesters and demonstrators.

I shall not let the violence and disorder of a noisy few deny me the right to speak or destroy the orderly Democratic process.

I have paid for this television time this evening to tell you my story uninterrupted by noise ... by protest ... or by second-hand interpretation.

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When I accepted the Democratic Party's nomination and platform, I said that the first reality that confronted this Nation was the need for peace in Vietnam.

I have pledged that my first priority as President shall be to end the war and obtain an honorable peace.

For the past four years, I have spoken my mind about Vietnam. frankly and without reservation, in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council -- and directly to the President.

When the President has made his decisions, I have supported them.

He has been the Commander-in-Chief. It has been his job to decide. The choices have not been simple or easy.

President Johnson will continue -- until January 20, 1969, -- to make the decisions in Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and help.

We all pray that his efforts to find peace will succeed.

But, 112 days from now, there will be a new President ... A new Administration...and new advisers.

If there is no peace by then, it must be their responsibility to make a complete reassessment of the situation in Vietnam -- to see where we stand and to judge what we must do.

As I said in my acceptance speech:

The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday.

We must look to the future.

For neither vindication nor repudiation of our role in Vietnam will bring peace or be worthy of our country.

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The American people have a right to know what I would do -- if I am President -- after January 20, 1969, to keep my pledge to honorably end the war in Vietnam.

What are the chances for peace?

The end of the war is not yet in sight. But our chances for peace are far better today than they were a year or even a month ago.

PAGE THREE

On March 31, the war took on an entirely new dimension.

On that date President Johnson by one courageous act removed the threat of bombing from 90 percent of the people, and 78 percent of the land area, of North Vietnam.

On that date, President Johnson sacrificed his own political career in order to bring negotiation that could lead to peace.

Until that time, the struggle was only on the battlefield.

Now, our negotiators are face to face across the table with negotiators from North Vietnam.

A process has been set in course. And, lest that process be set back, our perseverance at the conference table must be as great as our courage has been in the war.

There have been other changes during these past few months.

The original Vietnam decision -- made by President Eisenhower -- was made for one basic reason.

President Eisenhower believed it was in our national interest that Communist subversion and aggression should not succeed in Vietnam.

It was his judgment -- and the judgment of President Kennedy and President Johnson since then -- that if aggression did succeed in Vietnam, there was a danger that we would become involved on a far more dangerous scale in a wider area of Southeast Asia.

While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, several things have happened.

Other nations of Southeast Asia -- given the time we have bought for them -- have strengthened themselves ... have begun to work together ... and are far more able to protect themselves against any future subversion or aggression.

PAGE FOUR

In South Vietnam itself, a Constitution has been written... elections have been held...land reform and anti-corruption and refugee measures have been stepped up... and the South Vietnamese army has increased its size and capacity, and improved its equipment, training and performance -- just as the Korean army did during the latter stages of the Korean war.

So -- in sharp contrast to a few months ago -- we see peace negotiations going on.

We see a stronger Southeast Asia.

We see a stronger South Vietnam.

Those are the new circumstances which a new President will face in January.

* * *

In light of those circumstances -- and assuming no marked change in the present situation -- how would I proceed as President?

Let me first make clear what I would not do.

I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal.

To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations. It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already made.

It would be an open invitation to more violence ... more aggression ... more instability.

And it would, at this time of tension in Europe, cast doubt on the integrity of our word under treaty and alliance.

Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal.

Nor would I escalate the level of violence in either North or South Vietnam. We must seek to de-escalate.

The Platform of my party says that the President should take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam. I shall do so.

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North Vietnam, according to its own statement and those of others, has said it will proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if we stop the present limited bombing of the North.

We must always think of the protection of our troops.

As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success in the negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection for our troops.

In weighing that risk -- and before taking action -- I would place key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word -- of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

If the Government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I would reserve the right to resume the bombing.

Secondly, I would take the risk that the South Vietnamese would meet the obligations they say they are now ready to assume in their own self-defense.

I would move toward de-Americanization of the war.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to set a specific timetable by which American forces could be systematically reduced while South Vietnamese forces took over more and more of the burden.

The schedule must be a realistic one -- one that would not weaken the overall allied defense posture. I am convinced such action would be as much in South Vietnam's interest as in ours.

What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the defense of their own country.

That would be an immediate objective of the Humphrey-Muskie Administration as it sought to end the war.

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If the South Vietnamese army maintains its present rate of improvement, I believe this will be possible next year -- without endangering either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.

I do not say this lightly. I have studied this matter carefully.

Third, I would propose once more an immediate cease-fire -- with United Nations or other international supervision and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

American troops are fighting in numbers in South Vietnam today only because North Vietnamese forces were sent to impose Hanoi's will on the South Vietnamese people by aggression.

We can agree to bring home our forces from South Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese agree to bring theirs home at the same time. External forces assisting both sides could and should leave at the same time, and should not be replaced.

The ultimate key to an honorable solution must be free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people, including members of the National Liberation Front and other dissident groups, able to participate in those elections if they were willing to abide by peaceful processes.

That, too, would mean some risk.

But I have never feared the risk of one man, one vote. I say: Let the people speak. And accept their judgment, whatever it is.

The Government of South Vietnam should not be imposed by force from Hanoi or by pressure from Washington. It should be freely chosen by all the South Vietnamese people.

-- A stopping of the bombing of the North -- taking account of Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good faith negotiations and keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the Communists show bad faith.

-- Careful, systematic reduction of American troops in South Vietnam -- a de-Americanization of the war -- turning over to the South Vietnamese army a greater share of the defense of its own country.

-- An internationally supervised cease-fire -- and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

-- Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing to follow the peaceful process.

Those are risks I would take for peace.

I do not believe any of these risks would jeopardize our security or be contrary to our national interest.

There is, of course, no guarantee that all these things could be successfully done.

Certainly, none of them could be done if North Vietnam were to show bad faith.

But I believe there is a good chance these steps could be carried out.

I believe these steps could be undertaken with safety for our men in Vietnam.

As President, I would be dedicated to carrying them out -- as I would be dedicated to urging the government of South Vietnam to expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to broadening popular participation, including high priority to land reform ... more attention to the suffering of refugees ... and constant government pressure against inflation and corruption.

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I believe all of these steps could lead to an honorable and lasting settlement serving both our own national interest and the interests of the independent nations of Southeast Asia.

* * *

We have learned a lesson from Vietnam.

The lesson is not that we should turn our backs on Southeast Asia -- or on other nations or people in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood.

The lesson is, rather, that we should carefully define our goals and priorities ... and within those goals and priorities, that we should formulate policies which will fit new American guidelines.

Applying the lesson of Vietnam, I would insist as President that we review other commitments made in other times ... that we carefully decide what is, and is not, in our national interest.

I do not condemn any past commitment.

I do not judge the decisions of past Presidents when, in good conscience, they made those decisions in what they thought were the interests of the American people.

But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this Nation to bring our men and resources in Vietnam back to America where we need them so badly ... and to be sure we put first things first in the future.

Let me be clear: I do not counsel withdrawal from the world.

I do not swerve from international responsibility.

I only say that, as President, I would undertake a new strategy for peace in this world, based not on American omnipotence, but on American leadership -- not only military and economic, but moral.

That new strategy for peace would emphasize working through the United Nations ... strengthening and maintaining our key alliances for mutual security particularly including NATO ... supporting international peacekeeping machinery ... and working with other nations to build new institutions and instruments for cooperation.

In a troubled and dangerous world, we should seek not to march alone, but to lead in such a way that others will wish to join us.

Even as we seek peace in Vietnam, we must for our security and well-being seek to halt and turn back the costly and even more dangerous arms race.

Five nations now have nuclear bombs.

The United States and the Soviet Union already possess enough weapons to burn and destroy every human being on this earth.

Unless we stop the arms race ... unless we stop 15 to 20 more nations from getting nuclear bombs and nuclear bomb technology within the next few years, this generation may be the last.

For 20 years, we have lived under the constant threat that some irresponsible action or even some great miscalculation could blow us all up in the wink of an eye.

There is danger that we have become so used to the idea that we no longer think it abnormal -- forgetting that our whole world structure depends for its stability on the precarious architecture of what Winston Churchill called the balance of terror. This is no longer an adequate safeguard for peace.

There is a treaty now before the Senate which would stop the spread of nuclear weapons. That treaty must be ratified now.

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If this Nation cannot muster the courage to ratify this treaty -- a treaty which in no way endangers our national security, but adds to it by keeping these weapons out of the hands of a Nasser ... a Castro ... and many others -- there can be little hope for our future in this world.

We must ratify this treaty.

I also believe that we must have the courage -- while keeping our guard up and fulfilling our commitments to NATO -- to talk with the Soviet Union as soon as possible about a freeze and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear missiles systems.

To escalate the nuclear missile arms race is to raise the level of danger and total destruction. It is costly, menacing, fearsome and offers no genuine defense.

Beyond that, if I am President, I shall take the initiative to find the way -- under carefully safe-guarded, mutually-acceptable international inspection -- to reduce arms budgets and military expenditures systematically among all countries of the world.

Our country's military budget this year is 80 billion dollars.

It is an investment we have to make under existing circumstances. It protects our freedom.

But if we can work with other nations so that we can all reduce our military expenditures together, with proper safeguards and inspection, then, it will be a great day for humanity.

All of us will have moved further away from self-destruction. And all of us will have billions of dollars with which to help people live better lives.

The American people must choose the one man they believe can best face these great issues.

PAGE ELEVEN

I would hope that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Wallace and I could express our views on Vietnam not only individually, but on the same public platform.

I call for this because -- on the basis of our past records and past careers -- there are great differences between our policies and programs.

Those views of Governor Wallace which I have seen reported indicate that he would sharply escalate the war.

Mr. Nixon's past record reveals his probable future policies.

In 1954 -- at the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu -- he advocated American armed intervention in Vietnam in aid of French colonialism. It was necessary for President Eisenhower to repudiate his proposal.

Since then, he has taken a line on Vietnam policy which I believe could lead to greater escalation of the war.

In January of this year, Mr. Nixon described as "bunk" the idea that free elections in South Vietnam were of importance.

In February of this year, when questioned about the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said that a general "has to take the position that he cannot rule out the use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations that might develop."

Since then, he has indicated he has a plan to end the war in Vietnam, but will not disclose it until he becomes President.

If he has such a plan, he has an obligation to so inform President Johnson and the American people.

Few days ago, the Republican Vice Presidential nominee said there is not now and never has been a Nixon-Agnew plan for peace in Vietnam. It was, he said, a ploy to "maintain suspense." And then he said: "Isn't that the way campaigns are run?" I think we

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need some answers about this from Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Nixon's public record shows, also, consistent opposition to measures for nuclear arms control.

He attacked Adlai Stevenson and myself for advocating a nuclear test ban treaty -- a treaty to stop radioactive fallout from poisoning and crippling people the world over. He called our Plan "a cruel hoax." We can be thankful that President Kennedy and the Congress did not follow his advice.

Today, he is asking for delay of ratification of a treaty carefully negotiated over several years and signed by 80 nations -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

I speak plainly: I do not believe the American Presidency can afford a return to leadership which would increase tension in the world ... which would, on the basis of past statements, escalate the Vietnam war ... and which would turn the clock back on progress that has been made at great sacrifice to bring the great powers of the world into a saner relationship in this nuclear age.

On the great issues of Vietnam ... of the arms race ... and of human rights in America -- I have clear differences with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace.

I call on both of these men to join me in open debate before the American people.

Let us put our ideas before the people. Let us offer ourselves for their judgment -- as men and as leaders.

Let us appear together -- in front of the same audiences or on the same television screens, and at the same time, to give the people a choice.

We must not let a President be elected by the size of his advertising budget.

PAGE THIRTEEN

We cannot let a President be elected without having met the issues before the people.

I am willing to put myself ... myself ... my programs ... my capacity for leadership before the American people for their judgment.

I ask the Republican nominee and the third party candidate to do the same.

I ask, before election day that we be heard together as you have heard me alone tonight.

I appeal to the people -- as citizens of a Nation whose compassion and sense of decency and fair play have made it what Lincoln called "the last best hope on earth."

I appeal to you as a person who wants his children to grow up in that kind of country.

I appeal to you to express and vote your hopes and not your hates.

I intend, in these five weeks, to wage a vigorous ...tireless ... and forthright campaign for the Presidency.

I shall not spare myself, or those who will stand with me. I have prepared myself. I know the problems facing this Nation.

I do not shrink from those problems.

I challenge them.

They were made by men. I believe they can be solved by men. If you will give me your confidence and support, together we shall build a better America.

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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 114

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1968

No. 161

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON VIETNAM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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He has been the Commander-in-Chief. It has been his job to decide. The choices have not been simple or easy.

President Johnson will continue—until January 20, 1969—to make the decisions in Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and help.

We all pray that his efforts to find peace will succeed.

But, 112 days from now, there will be a new President . . . A new Administration . . . and new advisers.

If there is no peace by then, it must be their responsibility to make a complete reassessment of the situation in Vietnam—to see where we stand and to judge what we must do.

As I said in my acceptance speech: The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday. We must look to the future.

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The American people have a right to know what I would do—if I am President—after January 20, 1969, to keep my pledge to honorably end the war in Vietnam.

What are the chances for peace? The end of the war is not yet in sight. But our chances for peace are far better to-

day than they were a year or even a month ago.

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A process has been set in course. And, lest that process be set back, our perseverance at the conference table must be as great as our courage has been in the war.

There have been other changes during these past few months.

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President Eisenhower believed it was in our national interest that Communist subversion and aggression should not succeed in Vietnam.

It was his judgment—and the judgment of President Kennedy and President Johnson since then—that if aggression did succeed in Vietnam, there was a danger that we would become involved on a far more dangerous scale in a wider area of Southeast Asia.

While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, several things have happened.

Other nations of Southeast Asia—given the time we have bought for them—have strengthened themselves . . . have begun to work together . . . and are far more able to protect themselves against any future subversion or aggression.

In South Vietnam itself, a Constitution has been written . . . elections have been held . . . land reform and anti-corruption

and refugee measures have been stepped up . . . and the South Vietnamese army has increased its size and capacity, and improved its equipment, training and performance—just as the Korean army did during the latter stages of the Korean war.

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We see a stronger Southeast Asia.

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To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations. It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already made.

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What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the defense of their own country.

That would be an immediate objective of the Humphrey-Muskie Administration as it sought to end the war.

If the South Vietnamese army maintains its present rate of improvement, I believe this will be possible next year—without endangering either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.

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30-minute television statement
taped in Salt Lake City, Utah

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While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, several things have happened.

Other nations of Southeast Asia -- given the time we have bought for them -- have strengthened themselves ... have begun to work together ... and are far more able to protect themselves against any future subversion or aggression.

In South Vietnam itself, a Constitution has been written ... elections have been held ... land reform and anti-corruption and refugee measures have been stepped up ... and the South Vietnamese Army has increased its size and capacity, and improved its equipment, training and performance -- just as the Korean Army did during the latter stages of the Korean War.

So -- in sharp contrast to a few months ago -- we see peace negotiations going on.

We see a stronger Southeast Asia.

We see a stronger South Vietnam.

Those are the new circumstances which a new President will face in January.

* * * *

In light of those circumstances -- and assuming no marked change in the present situation -- how would I proceed as President?

6:35 → let me first make clear what I would not do.
6:16

I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal.

To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations.

It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already made.

It would be an open invitation to more violence ... more aggression ... more instability.

And it would, at this time of tension in Europe, cast doubt on the integrity of our word under treaty and alliance.

Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal.

Nor would I escalate the level of violence in either North or South Vietnam. We must seek to de-escalate.

The platform of ^{*The Democratic*} ~~my~~ party says that the President should take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam. I shall do so.

North Vietnam, according to its own statements and those of others, has said it will proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if we stop the present limited bombing of the North.

We must always think of the protection of our troops.

As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success in the negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection for our troops.

In weighing that risk -- and before taking action --
I would place key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect,
by deed or word -- of Communist willingness to restore the
Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam.

If the Government of North Vietnam were to show
bad faith, I would reserve the right to resume the bombing.

Secondly, I would take the risk that the South
Vietnamese would meet the obligations they say they are now
ready to assume in their own self-defense.

I would move toward de-Americanization of the war.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam
to set a specific timetable by which American forces could be
systematically reduced while South Vietnamese forces took over
more and more of the burden.

The schedule must be a realistic one -- one that would not weaken the overall allied defense posture. I am convinced such action would be as much in South Vietnam's interest as in ours.

9:40
9/15

What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the defense of their own country.

That would be an immediate objective of the Humphrey-Muskie Administration as I sought to end the war.

∠ If the South Vietnamese Army maintains its present rate of improvement, I believe this will be possible next year -- without endangering either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.

∠ I do not say this lightly. I have studied this matter carefully.

Third, I would propose once more an immediate
cease-fire -- with United Nations or other international supervision
and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

American troops are fighting in numbers in South
Vietnam today only because North Vietnamese forces were sent
to impose Hanoi's will on the South Vietnamese people by
aggression.

→ We can agree to bring home our forces from South
Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese agree to bring theirs home at
the same time. 11:00 10:41

↙ External forces assisting both sides could and should
leave at the same time, and should not be replaced.

The ultimate key to an honorable solution must be free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people, including members of the National Liberation Front and other dissident groups, able to participate in those elections if they were willing to abide by peaceful processes.

↳ That, too, would mean some risk.

But I have never feared the risk of one man, one vote.
I say: Let the people speak. ↳ And accept their judgment, whatever it is.

↳ The Government of South Vietnam should not be imposed by force from Hanoi or by pressure from Washington. It should be freely chosen by all the South Vietnamese people.

-- A stopping of the bombing of the North -- taking account of Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good-faith negotiations and -- keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the Communists show bad faith.

--- Careful, systematic reduction of American troops in South Vietnam -- a de-Americanization of the war -- turning over to the South Vietnamese Army a greater share of the defense of its own country.

--- An internationally supervised cease-fire --- and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

--- Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing to follow the peaceful process.

∠ Those are risks I would take for peace.

∠ I do not believe any of these risks would jeopardize our security or be contrary to our national interest.

13:10
12/51 ∠ There is, of course, no guarantee that all these things could be successfully done.

Certainly, none of them could be done if North Vietnam were to show bad faith.

But I believe there is a good chance these steps could be carried out.

I believe these steps could be undertaken with safety for our men in Vietnam.

As President, I would be dedicated to carrying them out -- as I would ~~be dedicated to urging~~ *continue to urge* the Government of South Vietnam to expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to broadening popular participation, including high priority to land reform . . . more attention to the suffering of refugees . . . and constant government pressure against inflation and corruption.

I believe all of these steps could lead to an honorable and lasting settlement serving both our own national interest and the interests of the independent nations of Southeast Asia.

* * *

∠ We have learned a lesson from Vietnam.

The lesson is not that we should turn our backs on Southeast Asia -- or on other nations or peoples in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood.

∠ The lesson is, rather, that we should carefully define our goals and priorities . . . and within those goals and priorities, that we should formulate policies which will fit new American guidelines.

∠ Applying the lesson of Vietnam, I would insist as President that we review other commitments made in other times . . . 15:00
that we carefully decide what is, and is not, in our national interest.

∠ I do not condemn any past commitment.

∠ I do not judge the decisions of past Presidents when, in good conscience, they made those decisions in what they thought
were the interests of the American people. 15:04

∠ But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this
nation to bring our men and resources in Vietnam back to America
where we need them so badly . . . and to be sure we put first things
first in the future.

∠ Let me be clear: I do not counsel withdrawal from
the world.

==

∟ I do not swerve from international responsibility.

∟ I only say that, as President, I would undertake a new strategy for peace in this world, based not on American omnipotence, but on American leadership -- not only military and economic, but moral. 16:05 15:57

∟ That new Strategy for Peace would emphasize working through the United Nations . . . strengthening and maintaining our key alliances for mutual security, particularly including NATO . . . supporting international peacekeeping machinery. . . and working with other nations to build new institutions and instruments for cooperation.

∟ In a troubled and dangerous world we should seek ^{to} not march alone, but to lead in such a way that others will wish to join us.

* * *

└ Even as we seek peace in Vietnam, we must for our own security and wellbeing seek to halt and turn back the costly and even more dangerous arms race.

└ Five nations now have nuclear bombs.

└ The United States and the Soviet Union already possess enough weapons to burn and destroy every human being on this earth.

└ Unless we stop the arms race ... unless we stop 15 to 20 more nations from getting nuclear bombs and nuclear bomb technology within the next few years, this generation may be the last.

└ For 20 years we have lived under the constant threat that some irresponsible action or even some great miscalculation could blow us all up in the wink of an eye.

There is danger that we have become so used to the idea that we no longer think it abnormal -- forgetting that our whole world structure depends for its stability on the precarious architecture of what Winston Churchill called the "balance of terror." This is no longer an adequate safeguard for peace.

There is a treaty now before the Senate which would stop the spread of nuclear weapons. That treaty must be ratified now.

If this nation cannot muster the courage to ratify this treaty -- a treaty which in no way endangers our national security, but adds to it by keeping these weapons out of the hands of a Nasser . . . a Castro . . . and many others -- then there can be little hope for our future in this world.

We must ratify this treaty.

∠ I also believe that we must have the courage -- while keeping our guard up and fulfilling our commitments to NATO -- to talk with the Soviet Union as soon as possible about a freeze and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear missiles systems. 19805 1946

∠ To escalate the nuclear missile arms race is to raise the level of danger and total destruction. ∠ It is costly, menacing, fearsome and offers no genuine defense.

∠ Beyond that, if I am President, I shall take the initiative to find the way -- under carefully safe-guarded, mutually-acceptable international inspection -- to reduce arms budgets and military expenditures systematically among all countries of the world.

∠ Our country's military budget this year is 80 billion dollars.

∠ It is an investment we have to make under existing circumstances. It protects our freedom.

∠ But if we can work with other nations so that we can all reduce our military expenditures together, with proper safeguards and inspection, then it will be a great day for humanity.

∠ All of us will have moved further away from self-destruction. And all of us will have billions of dollars with which to help people live better lives.

* * * *

∠ The American people must choose the one man they believe can best face these great issues.

∠ I would hope that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Wallace and I could express our views on Vietnam not only individually, but *from* the same public platform.

~~I call for this because~~ - On the basis of our past records and past careers -- there are great differences between our policies and programs.

↳ Those views of Governor Wallace which I have seen reported indicate that he would sharply escalate the war.

↳ Mr. Nixon's past record reveals his probable future policies.

2/10/57 In 1954 -- at the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu ^{and} he advocated American armed intervention in Vietnam in aid of French colonialism. It was necessary for President Eisenhower to repudiate his proposal.

↳ Since then, he has taken a line on Vietnam policy which I believe could lead to greater escalation of the war.

In January of this year, Mr. Nixon described as "bunk" the idea that free elections in South Vietnam were of importance.

↳ In February of this year, when questioned about the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said that a general "has to take the position that he cannot rule out the use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations that might develop."

↳ Since then, he has indicated he has a plan to end the war in Vietnam, but will not disclose it until he becomes President. 22-00 2157

↳ If he has such a plan, he has an obligation to so inform President Johnson and the American people.

↳ A few days ago the Republican Vice Presidential nominee said there is not now and never has been a Nixon-Agnew plan for peace in Vietnam. It was, he said, a ploy "to maintain suspense."

And then he said: "Isn't that the way campaigns are run?"

↳ I think we need some answers about this from Mr. Nixon.

↳ ~~Mr. Nixon's~~ public record shows, also, consistent opposition to measures for nuclear arms control.

↳ He attacked Adlai Stevenson and myself for advocating a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- a treaty to stop radioactive fallout from poisoning and crippling people the world over. He called our plan "a cruel hoax." We can be thankful that President Kennedy and the Congress did not follow his advice.

↳ Today, he is asking for delay of ratification of a treaty carefully negotiated over several years and signed by 80 nations -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Once again he fails to see the danger of the nuclear arms race.

I speak plainly: I do not believe the American Presidency can afford a return to leadership which would increase tension in the world ... which would, on the basis of past statements, escalate the Vietnam war ... and which would turn the clock back on progress that has been made at great sacrifice to bring the great powers of the world into a saner relationship in this nuclear age. 27-00

On the great issues of Vietnam ... ~~of~~ the arms race ... and human rights in America -- I have clear differences with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace. 24-12

I call on both of these men to join me in open debate before the American people

Let us put our ideas before the people. Let us offer ourselves for their judgment -- as men and as leaders.

Let us appear together -- in front of the same audiences or on the same television screens, and at the same time, to give the people a choice.

We must not let a President be elected by the size of his advertising budget.

We cannot let a President be elected without having met the issues before the people.

I am willing to put myself . . . my programs . . . my capacity for leadership before the American people for their judgment.

I ask the Republican nominee and the Third Party candidate to do the same.

I ask, before Election Day that we be heard together as you have heard me alone tonight.

↳ I appeal to the people -- as citizens of a nation whose compassion and sense of decency and fair play have made it what Lincoln called "the last best hope on earth."

↳ I appeal to you as a person who wants his children to grow up in that kind of country.

↳ I appeal to you to express and vote your hopes and not your hates.

25-50
25-47
↳ I intend, in these five weeks, to wage a vigorous ...
tireless ... and forthright campaign for the Presidency.

↳ I shall not spare myself, or those who will stand with me.

↳ I have prepared myself. I know the problems facing this nation.

↳ I do not shrink from those problems.

↳ I challenge them.

They were made by men. I believe they can be
solved by men.

If you will give me your confidence and support,
together we shall build a better America.

#

26:40

26:43

CONFIDENTIAL

q My fellow Americans, I speak to you tonight on the subject which is uppermost in our hearts, minds and consciences -- Vietnam. I speak to you as a leader of the Democratic Party ... as a candidate.

As I said to you in accepting my party's nomination, "the necessity for peace in Vietnam is the first reality that confronts this nation."

Two Presidents have been faced in Vietnam with painful decisions. I participated with President Johnson in many of the discussions that preceded his decisions. I stated to him my own views.

But the President was the one who, under our Constitution, had to make those decisions. He is the Commander-in-Chief and he will be the one who will make the decisions between now and January 20th.

I have supported the President's decisions once he has made them. That is the essence of the American system -- there is at one time only one President of the United States.

Among you Americans to whom I am talking tonight, I know there are many differing views, for the issues of Vietnam are those on which reasonable men can and do disagree. But reasonable men do not disagree on the necessity for peace, on the need to bring about the conditions that will bring our soldiers home so that they can devote themselves not to killing but to the urgent tasks confronting this country.

You, I, all Americans of good faith fervently hope that during the remainder of his term, President Johnson can bring about the peace we all desire. And there is a great deal working on our side. We have helped buy time for the Asian nations to strengthen themselves. The enemy is suffering staggering losses. The strategic balance in Southeast Asia has clearly begun to tilt in our favor. And the President has taken brave steps to make peace possible. He has cut back the bombing of North Vietnam to a single strip of territory in the South that serves as the Communist staging ground for the battlefield. He has removed himself from politics to give the search for peace his undivided attention.

We should not, therefore, be disheartened. As Vice President, I know what our intelligence reports tell us and what one can read from all the other evidence. I have recently talked with Ambassador Harriman, and only last night I reviewed the situation fully with Ambassador George Ball, who has been intimately involved in the Vietnamese problem for seven years.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I feel encouraged. I think there is a good chance that President Johnson can, in the remaining months of his Administration, bring about a breakthrough in the Paris negotiations that will move us well down the road toward an honorable peace.

And I can and should tell you this -- that if we are not well on the way toward an honorable peace by noon on January 20, I will, as your next President, do everything in my power to bring about an honorable peace as soon as any many

That is all any responsible candidate can honestly tell you.

Neither Mr. Nixon nor I will be President for the next four months, so the questions is not what either of us would do about Vietnam today. The question is what each of us would do about Vietnam as President.

I propose to talkewith you tonight about how I would meet this agonizing problem if entrusted with the nation's leadership next January.

Our troops are fighting in South Vietnam today because North Vietnam has sought to impose its will on a country we are bound, by solemn commitments and treaty obligations to defend.

We Americans do not welch on our promises.

How then can we make a peace that fulfills them?

These are the principles I will follow if I am President after January 20:

First, we will agree to bring home our forces from South Vietnam if the North Vietnamese agree to bring theirs home. Troops on both sides can and should leave at the same time and no more should be sent.

Thus, an agreement for mutual withdrawal can be a key to peace in South Vietnam.

Second, after North Vietnamese forces and out troops are withdrawn, what happens among the South Vietnamese is fundamentally their business.

For a long period there was political chaos in that country. But that is not the case today. A broad-based constitutional government has been built. The troops and the people have a new self-confidence, a new spirit, a new pride. They still have much to do in stopping corruption and getting on with necessary social and economic reforms -- and I will insist that they do it. But they have made great progress and they can carry an increasing share of the load.

Thus if the peace has not been achieved when my administration takes over I will do everything possible to speed the process of de-Americanizing the war.

As soon as I take office, I shall meet with the leaders of the South Vietnamese Government and, with the advice of our own military experts, I shall work out with them a realistic schedule for shifting the military burden progressively to the South Vietnamese.

And now with respect to the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, let me say simply this. This is only one element in a highly complicated and sensitive negotiation now under way in Paris. It is only one move on the chessboard. Stopping the bombing will not produce miracles. It will not -- as some people seem to suggest -- bring instant peace.

Until January, President Johnson must make the hard decisions as to how the chess game is played. He must decide what risks to take and nobody looking over his shoulder is entitled to tell him.

In the four months from now to January 20 the situation may change materially. And if I become President at that time I will make the decisions on the basis of the conditions as I then find them.

Thus all I can -- or should -- say at this time is this: Of course I would not take any action that would endanger the lives of our troops -- but if I determine under the conditions that then exist that stopping the bombing will advance negotiations for an honorable peace and shorten the war I will regard that as the best way to save the lives of our American boys.

I believe that we must be prepared to take small risks for peace as we take large risks in war.

As President -- in weighing the risks -- I would place key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word -- of Communist willingness to evacuate and respect the Demilitarized Zone.

If you choose me as your President, I will dedicate every effort and resource at my command to bring about the early peace for which we yearn. I will approach the task in accordance with the principles and policies I have outlined to you this evening.

My friends, there are only five more weeks before we must choose our next President. This is a critical decision. We must approach it solemnly and only after weighing both candidate's views. To make that decision properly all Americans should hear the most forthright discussion of the issues facing this country. I am prepared to debate these issues.

#####

I do not mean by this just the issue of Vietnam but all the great issues that we are likely to face during the term of the next President -- issues filled both with danger and opportunity.

In Western Europe, for example, a new generation will be taking over with fresh, yet not clearly formed ideas. The shape of the new Europe cannot yet be perceived.

Will it resume its move toward unity with Britain playing an important role? Or will it remain weak and fragmented without the modern structure necessary for either its economic or political fulfillment?

The United States can help affect this decision by the policies we follow.

Eastern Europe is changing also, and we must watch it with the greatest attention. Lying as it does so near the center of world power, it is an area of vast potential danger.

After all, let us never forget that the two greatest wars of modern times had their origins in Eastern Europe.

The brutal Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should have brought this home to everyone. This callous act was one of the most ominous events of the whole post-war period. It holds the gravest implications for the future.

What this action tells us is that the Soviet empire -- which includes the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states it dominates by force -- is suffering severe strains and pressures as winds of knowledge and freedom blow more freely through a tattered iron curtain. What the invasion of Czechoslovakia represents as a reaction of the Soviet empire against internal pressures threatening to blow it apart.

I do not mean by this that the Soviet Empire is going to disintegrate overnight; Soviet military power is too great and the Soviet leaders are prepared to use it ruthlessly. Nor will I have any part in offering the Eastern European people fraudulent promises of liberation, as Mr. Nixon did a decade and a half ago. But I do think that over the long pull, the processes of change and erosion that have been set in motion will continue -- thus, bringing hope to many but posing dangers for all.

For when Soviet control is challenged, the Kremlin strikes out recklessly.

Already we see the effort to make West Germany a scapegoat not only to excuse Soviet outrages but to frighten the Eastern European countries with a common bogeyman.

And if this practice is carried too far -- particularly with a new generation coming into power in Germany --it could result in serious disruption.

There is also another meaning to the Czechoslovakian invasion that we should ponder deeply. It has shown that we are not going to achieve an agreement with the Communist world that will make it easier for us to live without tension nearly as rapidly as some had hoped.

Nevertheless --although we must be continually on guard -- we cannot afford to neglect any opportunities to find areas of common interest and concern with the Soviet Union. There are cases where parallel courses of action work clearly to our benefit --and mature leadership will not be rigid and doctrinaire, but will seize the advantages that are offered.

We have, for example, been able to work in parallel directions with the Soviet Union on the knotty problem of Kashmir. And, most recently, we have worked together in developing and negotiating an agreement to stop the spread of atomic weapons.

This Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is of exceptional importance and we dare not lose the momentum we have achieved in putting it into effect.

It is now before the Senate and we must get on with ratification as rapidly as possible.

For quite irrelevant reasons Mr. Nixon says that, though he favors the agreement, he thinks we should hold up its ratification because Governor Rockefeller thinks we should. In this way, he argues, we could somehow show our displeasure with the Soviet Union. But this is childish in the extreme. To postpone the treaty for this reason would be like cutting off the water when your house is burning because you do not like your neighbor who is helping you use the hose.

In the life and death matters that concern nuclear weapons no one can afford to take chances; once we have let those weapons spread, we will never get the genie back in the bottle again.

Let us not forget what kind of a world this is. For twenty years now we have lived under conditions where some irresponsible action or even some great miscalculation could blow us all up in the wink of an eye. We have got used to it, forgetting that our whole world structure depends for its stability on the precious architecture of what Winston Churchill called the "balance of terror."

But, my friends, that is fragile security - so long, particularly, as we continue to gamble in a senseless arms race between the two greatest powers in the world.

During my years in the Senate, I devoted a great deal of my time to the problems of arms control. I know from long study that if our children are to have a secure and prosperous life, we must work out some safe arrangements with the Soviet Union in the nuclear weapon negotiations that, I hope, will get started very soon. For unless we succeed we will waste enormous resources in trying to build the most highly sophisticated anti-ballistic missiles. And there will be no end of it because programs of that kind develop a life and momentum of their own.

Thus, if we cannot find the means to stop this arms escalation, then, even when ~~we~~ get fully out of Vietnam, our military budgets will continue to eat up a larger and larger share of our national income.

Given all the science and imagination at our command, it should not be beyond our ability to devise the safe arrangements that are necessary. Both we and the Soviet Union have compelling reasons for wanting to avoid this anti-ballistic contest, and they can afford it even less than we. Thus, if the United States has wise and determined leadership, we should find the way to work this out safely.

I have not heard Mr. Nixon say much of anything about this problem. He simply says we should build more and more weapons. Apparently he does not take much account of the costs and the risks.

A top priority in any administration will be the search for safe and effective ways to stop the arms race.

The next President of the United States will be elected for four years and, like it or not, it will not be an easy or tranquil period. The Middle East crisis is still unsettled and sooner or later it threatens to explode again in a dangerous military clash in a strategic part of the world. China's troubles have increased the bellicosity of a nation that contains one-fourth the human race. And the needs of the emerging people are growing even more urgent and clamorous.

Thus, we cannot afford a holiday from responsibility. The world we live in is simply too complex. Events are churning at accelerating speed. Science is giving us capabilities we do not know fully how to use or control.
are
And men/as far as ever from learning how to live together in peace.

Thus we cannot turn our eyes from the world. We did that once before three or four decades ago and found ourselves dragged into a savage global war we had done little to prevent.

Yet, already I begin to hear complaining voices with overtones of that outworn isolationism that has proved so disastrous in the past.

This will not be the theme of my Administration. I shall do everything possible to keep America from another war. I shall look with great caution at any new treaty commitments of American power -- treaties committing us to defend other nations -- treaties that during Mr. Nixon's terms as Vice President were multiplied fourfold (ck.).

Of course, we should not try to be the world's policeman, but neither can we ignore crime when it threatens the peace of the world community. Let there be no mistake about it. And the Administration I head will not give up America's role of leadership -- leadership in the prevention of war. For experience has shown that there is no other nation capable of playing that role, which is as essential to our own safety as to the security of the world.

VIETNAM: TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND
PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I make this statement on Vietnam as a candidate for the
Presidency of the United States.

Our American involvement in Vietnam has been the subject
of increasing public discussion and debate since its inception in 1954.

It has been the judgment of three Administrations that, were
the aggression in Vietnam to succeed, it would have a definite and
detrimental effect on the internal stability of neighboring nations
and, thus, be adverse to our national interest.

I have shared that judgment.

The scale of the struggle has over the years increased far
beyond what might have been originally foreseen. However, those
responsible for gaging the various policy options have at each stage
felt that the consequences of involvement in Vietnam were preferable
to the consequences of withdrawal.

Our national objective throughout all these years has been a
negotiated, political settlement which might add to long-term stability
in the area.

Now we are at a point where such a settlement seems possible.

The President's address of March 31, 1968, marked a turning point in the search for such a settlement -- based not on surrender but on mutual understanding, political and military reality and a revitalization of the Geneva accords.

I will not say or do anything that might jeopardize the Paris peace talks. The fate of a small and tragically besieged nation as well as the lives of too many men -- American, Vietnamese and Allied -- depend on the success of these talks.

There seem to be two basic questions:

What should we do now in Vietnam? What should we do after the Vietnam war has stopped?

Most Americans now agree that two solutions are unrealistic:

A) A unilateral withdrawal which would allow North Vietnamese aggression to succeed, and

B) A total military victory -- which would require the Communists' unconditional surrender.

In these circumstances I propose the following -- all designed to improve the atmosphere of the peace negotiations and add to long-term stability in Southeast Asia:

- 1) Bombing. Stop all remaining bombing of North Vietnam when our negotiators believe that restraint and reasonable response have been obtained from North Vietnam. This would be a significant mutual de-escalation.

- 2) Cease-Fire; Reduction of Hostilities. Immediate reduction or termination of hostilities with mutually agreed upon, phased withdrawal of all forces from outside the country, including U.S. forces and those infiltrated from North Vietnam.
- 3) Election of Postwar Government. Encourage all parties and interests to agree that the choice of postwar government of South Vietnam should be determined by free elections, internationally safeguarded and open to all of the South Vietnamese people willing to abide by peaceful political processes. All parties should agree to accept the result of this election, whatever it might be.
- 4) Interim Defense and Reform Measures. Until the fighting stops, accelerate our efforts to transfer systematically the main burden of defense from U.S. and allied forces to South Vietnamese forces and to promote internal reform in South Vietnam.

- 5) Future Policies. To avoid future Vietnams, make clear that we do not intend to turn our backs on Southeast Asia, but intend to play a selective, carefully conceived role complementing the individual and regional self-help efforts of Southeast Asian nations themselves. Our objective should be a family of nations in that area inoculated and strengthened by their own efforts against subversion and aggression and cooperating across national boundaries for the economic and social betterment of their peoples.

I.

Bombing

We have been told many times by the North Vietnamese -- and others -- that an essential condition to substantive peace negotiations is for us to stop all bombing of North Vietnam. We took a long step in that direction on March 31, and since then we have not bombed above the 19th Parallel, which means that 78 percent of the land area and about 90 percent of the population of North Vietnam have been immune from air attacks.

Until mid-June the other side intensified the war, and launched a second wave of attacks against Saigon. So long as it was evident from Communist behavior that there was no response to our action of March 31, there could be, in my view, no question of stopping the bombing.

I, for one, am willing to take that step now if North Vietnam is willing to offer, as interpreted by our negotiators, restraint and reasonable response.

I further propose that, after this mutual de-escalation, necessary steps be taken at once to restore the demilitarized status of the zone separating North and South Vietnam with the admission of international inspectors as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva Accords. This would safeguard lives and reduce the possibilities of covert escalation by the North.

II.

Cease-Fire; Reduction of Hostilities

I favor an immediate reduction or termination of hostilities with mutually agreed upon, phased withdrawal of all forces from outside the country, including United States forces and those infiltrated from North Vietnam.

For the period after the fighting stops and prior to free postwar elections, I would propose the introduction of an international presence to police the cease-fire and withdrawal, to assist in arrangements for and in safeguarding the elections, and to take other interim actions with the help of both sides designed to facilitate the exercise of self-determination of all the South Vietnamese people. Such an international presence might be under the auspices of the United Nations and should include maximum representation from Asian nations.

III.

Election of Postwar Government

I believe the people of South Vietnam should have the opportunity to determine their own destiny without force or coercion. We want no bases, no continued military presence, and no political role in Vietnam affairs.

The Communists, on the other hand, want to control the country. They demand that they be permitted to organize the country under their own program through a coalition government which they would dominate.

This is unacceptable, as are proposals in our own country for immediate imposition of a coalition government upon the Vietnamese people.

Yet all Vietnamese groups should be entitled to participate peacefully in the political life of South Vietnam and to demonstrate the extent of their support.

The kind of settlement I favor would permit the contest for the political future of South Vietnam to be settled by the ballot, not the bullet -- a settlement that would unite and not divide the war-weary people of South Vietnam.

As I said in April: "If the South Vietnamese decide in their own way that in order to bring peace to their country they have to have some kind of coalition . . . that is self-determination."

I stand by that. I am prepared to accept the free decision of the South Vietnamese, whatever that decision might be.

These should be elections in which voting or running for office would be open to all who are prepared to accept the peaceful political process and none debarred for political reasons; one man, one vote: That should be the basic principle. There should be elections

-- in which there are guarantees and international inspection against fraud and intimidation;

-- and in which every political, ethnic and religious group willing to take part in a peaceful political process can play its full role.

IV.

Interim Defense and Reform Measures

Meanwhile, until peace can be restored, we should continue our efforts to strengthen the fighting capability of the Army of South Vietnam and systematically transfer the burden of defense from U.S. and allied forces to South Vietnamese forces. I favor giving the highest priority to providing these forces with the needed training and equipment. As the South Vietnamese are able to take over more of the burden, we should develop a schedule for the programmed cutback of U.S. military involvement.

I would also urge that the Government of South Vietnam intensify efforts already begun in the following areas:

- To broaden its base by actively soliciting support of other nationalist political groups and religious groups.
- To give higher priority to land reform.
- To eliminate corruption.
- To foster grassroots participation and institutions which will engage the people of South Vietnam in self-government.
- To improve the care and resettlement of refugees.

But as I indicated before, these are decisions for Vietnamese to make. We are prepared to do our share and to seek help from the international community.

My essential object is to find a way to end the fighting in Vietnam on a just and honorable basis, to stop the killing, and thus to release energies for the great tasks of peace and regional development that lie ahead -- tasks to which far more resources can be devoted if there is reconciliation between those who are now adversaries.

V.

Future Policies

This brings me to the question of our future policies.

How do we both avoid future Vietnams and help to secure a lasting peace in Southeast Asia? Let me deal with these two issues separately.

Avoiding future Vietnams does not mean turning our back on Southeast Asia -- or on nations or peoples in any other part of the world whose freedom is threatened. It does mean redefining the character of the U.S. role and exercising our power cautiously and critically.

We should follow three basic guidelines of security policy in meeting future threats to Asian peace: (1) self-help; (2) regional and multilateral responsibility; (3) selective U.S. assistance.

Self-help in achieving national security means that Southeast Asian nations must demonstrate their willingness to assume primary responsibility for meeting aggression and externally-supported insurgency.

Regional and multilateral responsibility means that Southeast Asian nations must concern themselves with each other's security in the future and must develop means to deal with externally-supported insurgencies. The U.S. should continue to encourage regional cooperation among these countries. Unilateral action by the great powers should be avoided and assistance first sought from international sources, if and when external aggression should break out.

Selective U.S. assistance means that the U.S. should be prepared to fulfill specific and clearly defined mutual defense commitments but should not seek to do what Asian nations are not prepared to do for themselves. Our military presence in a troubled area should be kept at the minimum level required to meet our responsibilities.

These three principles -- self-help, regional and multilateral cooperation, and selective U.S. assistance -- should represent the basic guidelines for U.S. security policy in Southeast Asia.

In helping to promote needed progress, as well as to avoid conflict, these three principles can provide the basis for a new phase in our relations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. They also have significant implications for our domestic scene. As we are able to scale down our military efforts abroad, I am determined to devote the resources which are saved -- and I firmly believe that resources can and will be saved -- to meeting our urgent domestic needs.

These remarks state briefly my views on Vietnam. The platforms of the nation's political parties must certainly cover this subject frankly and explicitly. As for my own party, I fully expect and intend to seek a full and open discussion of the Vietnam issue, with complete opportunity for all groups to make their views known.

VI.

The Long-Term View of Asia

No discussion of Vietnam would be meaningful without its being placed in the wider context of U.S. policy toward Asia.

No settlement of the Vietnam question will be meaningful unless it is a settlement which adds to the long-term stability of a wider geographic area.

Therefore, I believe that any statement concerning Vietnam policy must be tied directly to a statement of principle concerning our long-term goals and objectives in that wider area.

I believe our Asian policy in the future should be conceived and lie within these basic objectives:

1. The building of increasingly secure and self-sustaining nations on the Asian continent. I speak not only of military security, but of the far more important and lasting security which stems from economic and social progress and political institutions which are responsive to ordinary citizens.

Such progress, I believe, can be speeded up through channeling of aid through the World Bank family and the Asian Development Bank, and through cooperating groups of nations such as the one now helping Indonesia. We should also encourage greater participation in such cooperative programs by Japan and the countries of Western Europe.

2. The reduction of tensions between ourselves and Mainland China.

National isolation breeds national neurosis. We must do all within our power to help break the Chinese people out of their self-imposed isolation, however long it may take. As a first step, I favor ending of the trade embargo on shipment of non-strategic goods to China; scientific, educational and cultural exchange; and widening diplomatic contact.

3. The encouragement in Asia, as elsewhere, of a reduction and eventual ending of the international arms race.

China, and almost all the nations of Asia, presently devote manpower and desperately-needed resources to weaponry and to military forces. If and when agreement could be reached to mutually reduce such weaponry, both security and peaceful development would be immeasurably aided.

Most specifically -- following our pending discussions with the Soviet Union on reduction of offensive and defensive weapon systems -- I favor direct discussions with Mainland China on the same subject.

I believe it is possible, within the term of office of the next President, to bring to a halt not only costly investments in ICBM and ABM systems, but also a mutual thinning out of troops around the world, and a consonant reduction, world-wide, of military expenditures.

If these policy objectives are pursued, I believe that America's business on the Asian continent, as elsewhere, can in the future be almost exclusively that of peaceful nation-building and human development -- undertaken not only with allies but with nations which today are adversaries and antagonists.

The achievement of such objectives will require both patience and sacrifice on behalf of the American people. I do not doubt, however, that they will be able to meet this challenge. If honored with the Presidency, I pledge my active leadership in pursuit of these goals as well as the most rapid possible peaceful, political settlement to the immediate conflict in Vietnam.

#

TUES P.M.

For Salt Lake City

910 - 925 - 525)

Ed Abriand

Statement of Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey

Ignorance is an alien force in America--the enemy of everything we seek, everything we stand for. Poverty, the disadvantages faced by minority groups, hunger, disease, crime, violence are all traceable in some measure to educational deficiencies in groups and in individuals. We cannot expect a man to build his own life if we refuse him the most essential tools with which to do it.

But I think I am telling you something you already know.

The people of Utah have ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ shown a ~~dedicated~~ commitment
to education that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ wealthier/^{more populous} states would do well to copy.
~~xxx~~
Your education level is one of the highest in the nation. Your
per family expenditures for education and your per capita expen-
ditures for higher education lead the country.

You know that a complete education opportunity means much more than the chance to sit in a classroom for twelve years.

---It means an education relevant to each ~~xx~~ student---one which nourishes the individuality of every child, white or black, rich or poor, urban or rural.

---It means an education which increases ~~the capacity~~ a student's capacity not only to know facts, but to understand them. It means remedial education for the disadvantaged and the handicapped. It means special opportunities for the ~~gifted~~ gifted.

---It means educational opportunity that stretches from pre-school through college and is based on the individual's ability to learn rather than his parents' ability to pay.

---It means teachers, well-trained and well-educated. It means schools and colleges that are well-equipped and uncrowded.

But you also know that the cost of education is high and that the burden is heavy. Local and state governments can and should contribute a good deal--as yours do--to ward education, but they cannot do it all. The federal government must also make a strong commitment to education.

Under the ~~present administration~~ ^{Democrats} that is what we have done. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Higher Education Act, the Vocational Education Act and the aid to ~~XXXXXXX~~ federally impacted ~~XXXXXX~~ have made a difference in Utah. A big difference.

The cost of a full education for every American must be recognized as an investment that will be fully repaid. It is a cost ~~x~~ far less than we now ~~pay~~ pay for ignorance, incompetence, frustration and alienation. It is a price we cannot afford not to pay.

But let's also remember that the ~~the~~
 Nixon - Republican fought these measures--
 let's remember that ^{in 1960} as Vice President
 Mr. Nixon refused to break a tie ~~that~~
~~was~~ on a bill that would have
 authorized over \$1 billion ~~is~~ for
 local school construction and ~~for~~
 teacher salary support.

TONIGHT I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS AS A CITIZEN AND AS A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UXXX UNITED STATES. (1)

I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT I THINK ABOUT GREAT ISSUES WHICH I BELIEVE FACE THIS NATION.

I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT VIETNAM, AND ABOUT ANOTHER GREAT ISSUE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD -- THE ISSUE OF STOPPING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AFTER I HAVE TOLD YOU WHAT I THINK, I WANT YOU 888888XXXXXX TO THINK.

AND IF YOU AGREE WITH ME, I WANT YUXXX YOU TO HELP ME.

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, I HAVE TRIED TO TELL YOU WHAT WAS IN MY HEART AND ON MY MIND.

BUT SOMETIMES THAT MESSAGE HAS BEEN DROWNED OUT BY THE VOICES OF PROTESTERS AND DEMONSTRATORS.

I SHALL NOT LET THE VIOLENCE AND DISORDER OF A NOISY FEW DENY ME THE RIGHT TO SPEAK OR TO DESTROY THE ORDERLY DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

I HAVE PAID FOR THIS TLEXXX TELEVISION TIME THIS EVENING TO TELL YOU YXXX MY STORY UNINTERRUPTED BY NOISE...BY PROTEST... OR BY SECOND-HAND INTERPRETATION.

: : :

WHEN I ACCEPTED THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S NOMINATION AND PLATFORM, I SAID THAT THE FIRST REALITY THAT CONFRONTED THIS NATION WAS THE NEED FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM.

I HAVE PLEDGED THAT MY FIRST PRIORITY AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE TO END THE WAR AND OBTAIN AN HONORABLE PEACE.

FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS I HAVE SPOKEN MY MIND ABOUT VIETNAM, FRANKLY AND WITHOUT RESRXXX RESERVATION, IN THE CABINET AND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- AND DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE TXXX HIS DECISIONS, I HAVE SUPPORTED THEM. XXXX THEM.

HE HAS BEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. IT HAS BEEN HIS JOB TO DECIDE THE CHOICES HAVE NOT BEEN SIMPLE OR EASY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL CONTINUE -- UNTIL JANUARY 20, 1969 -- TO MAKE THE DECISIONS IN VIETNAM. THE VIXXX VOICE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE MUST BE HIS. I SHALL NOT COMPETE WITH THAT VOICE. I SHALL COOPERATE AND HELP.

WE ALL PRAY THAT HIS EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WILL SUCCEED.

BUT, 112 DAYS FROM NOW, THERE WILL BE A NEW PRESIDENT...A NEW ADMINISTRATION...AND NEW ADVISERS.

IF THERE IS NO PEACE BY THE, IT MUST BE THEIR
RESPONSIBLXXX RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE A COMPLETE
REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM -- TO SEE WHERE
WE STAND AND TO JUDGE WHAT WE MUST DO.

(2)

AS I SAID IN MY ACCEPTANCE SPEECH:

THE POLICIES OF TOMORROW NEED NOT BE LIMITED BY THE
POLICIES OF YESTERDAY.

WE MUST LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

FOR NEIGHXXX NEITHER VINDICATIONNORXXXX VINDICATION NOR
REPUDIATION OF OUR ROLE IN VIETNAM WILL BRING PEACE OR BE
WORTHY OF OUR COUNTRY.

: : :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVDXXX HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT
I WOULD DO -- IF I AM PRESIDENT -- AFTERJXXX JANUARY 20, 1969,
TO KEEP MY PLEDGE TO HONORABLY END THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE?

THE END OF THE WAR IS NOT YET IN SIGHT. BUT OUR
CHANCES FOR PEACE ARE FAR BETTER TODAY THAN THEY WERE A
YEAR OR EVEN A MONTH AGO.

ON MARCH 31, THE WAR TOOK ON AN ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSION. (3)

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY ONE COURAGEOUS ACT REMOVED THE THRETXXX THREAT OF BOMBING FROM 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE, AND 78 PERCENT OF THE LAND AREA, OF NORTH VIETNAM.

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON SACRIFICED HIS OWN POLITICAL CAREER INORDER TO BRING NEGOTIATION THAT COULD LEAD TO PEACE.

UNTIL THAT IME, THE STRUGGLE WAS ONLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE FACE TO FACE ACROSS THE TABLE WITH NEGOTIATORS FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

A PROCESS HAS BEEN SET IN COURSE. AND, LEST THAT PROCESS BE SET BACK, OUR PERSEVEAXXX PERSEVERANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE MUST BE AS GREAT AS OUR COURAGE HAS BEEN IN THE WAR.

THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER CHANGES DURING THESE PAST FEW MONTHS.

THE ORIGINAL VIETNAM DECISION -- MADE BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER -- WAS MADE FOR ONE BASIC REASON.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER BELIEVED IT WAS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST THAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT SUCCEED IN VIETNAM.

IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT -- AND THE JUDGEMENT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON SINCE THEN -- THAT IF AGGRESSION DID SUCCEED IN VIETNAM, THERE WAS A DANGER THAT WE WOULD BE BECOME INVOLVED ON A FAR MORE DANGEROUS SCALE IN A WIDER AREA OF SOUTHEAST AIXXX ASIA.

WHILE WE HAVE STOOD WITH OUR ALLIES IN VIETNAM, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED.

OTHER NTXXX NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST AIXXX ASIA -- GIVEN THE TIME WE HAVE BOUGHT FOR THEM -

--HAVE STRENGTHENED THEMSELVES...HAVE BEGUN TO WORK TOGETHER...AND ARE FAR MORE ABLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST ANY FUTURE SUBVERSION OR AGGRESSION.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM ITSELF, A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN WRITTEN...ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD...LAND REFORM AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AND REFUGEE EXXX MEASURES HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP...AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAS INCREASED ITS SIZE AND CAPACITY, AND IMPROVED ITS EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE -- JUST AS THE KOREAN ARMY DID DURING THE LATTER STAGES OF THE KOREAN WAR.

SO -- IN SHARP CONTRAST TO A FEW MONTHS AGO -- WE SEE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTH VIETNAM.

THOSE ARE THE NEW CIRCUMSTNAXXX CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH A NEW PRESIDENT WILL FACE IN JANUARY.

: : :

IN LIGHT OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND ASSUMING NO MARKED CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION -- HOW WOULD I PROCEED AS PRESIDENT?

LET ME FIRST MAKE CLEAR WHAT I WOULD NOT DO.

I WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL.

TO WITHDRAW WOULD NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE SAFETY OF OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONXXX NATIONS. IT WOULD MAKE MEANINGLESS THE SACRIFICES WE HAVE ALREADY AMDEXXX MADE.

IT WOULD BE AN OPEN INVITATION TO MORE VIOLENCE...MORE AGGRESSION... MORE INSTABILITY.

AND IT WOULD, AT HIS TIME OF TENSION IN EUROPE, CAST DOUBT ON THE INTEGRITY OF OUR WORD UNDER TRAXXX TREATY AND ALLIANCE.

PEACE WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY WEAKNESS OR WITHDRAWAL.

NOWXXX NOR WOULD I ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN EITHER NORHT XXX NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM. WE MUST SEEK TO DE-ESCALATE.

THE PLATFORM OF MY PARTY SAYS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE REASONABLE RISKS TO FIND PEACE IN VIETMAXXX VIETNAM. I SAHLL DO SO.

NORTH VIETNAM, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN STATEMENT AND THOSE OF OTHERS, HAS SAID IT WILL PROCEED TO PROMPT AND GOOD DXXX FAITH NEGOTIATIONS IF WE STOP THE PRESENT LIMITED BOMBINBXXX BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

WE MUST ALWAYS THINK OF THE PROTECTION OF OUR TROOPS.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE WILLING TO STOP THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH AS A XXX AN ACCEPTABEL RISK FOR PEACE BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT COULD LEAD TO SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND A SHORTER EXXX WAR. THIS WOULD BE THE BEST PROTECION FOR OUR TROOPS.

IN WEIGHING THAT RISK -- AND BEOFREXXX BEFORE TAKING ACTION -- I WOULD PLACE KEY IMPORTANCE ON EVIDENCE -- DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BY DEED OR WORD -- OF COMMUNIST WILLNXXX WILLINGNESS TO RESPXXX RESTORE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

IF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD FAITH, I WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RESUME THE BOMBING.

SECONDLY, I WOULD TAKE THE RISK THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD MEET THE OBIXXX OBLIGATIONS THEY SAY THEY ARE NOW READY TO ASSUME IN THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENSE.

I WOULD MOVE TOWARD DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR.

I WOULD SIT DOWN WITH THE LEADER OS SOUTH VIETNAM TO SET A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE BY WHICH AMERICAN FORCES COULD BE SYSTEMATICALLY REDUCED WHILE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREXXX FORCES TOOK OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE UXXX BURGXXX BURDEN.

THE SCHEDULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I CONIXXX CONVINCED SUCH ACTION WXXXXXXXXX 8 DISREGARD THIS PARA.

THE SCHECULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OEVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I AM CONVINCED SUCH ACTION ACTIONXXX WOULD BE ASMUCH IN SOUTH VIETNAM7S INTEREST AS NXXX INOURS.

WHAT I AMPROPOSIN IN THAT IT SHOUDXXX SHOULD BE BASIC TO OUTXXX OUR POLICY NINXXXXX IN VEXXX VIETNAM THAT THE TXXXSOUTH VIETNAMESE TAKING OVER MORE AND OMORE THE EXXXXXX DISREGARD THIS LINE

TAKING OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. 5

THAT WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THE HUMPHREY-MUSKIE ADMINISTRATION AS IS OUGHT TO END THE WAR.

IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY MAINTAINS ITS PRESENT RATE OF IMPROVEMENT., I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE NEXT YEAR -- WITHOUT ENDANTXXX ENDANGERING EITHER OUR REMAINING TROOPS OR THE SAFETY OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

I DO NOT SAY THIS LIGHTLY. I HAVE STUDIED THIS MATTER CAREFULLY.

THIRD, I WOULD PROPOSE ONCE MORE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE--WITH UNITED NATIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

AMERICAN TROOPS ARE FIGHTING IN NUMBERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY ONLY BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE SENT TO IMPOSE HANOI7S WILL ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BY AGGRESSION.

WE CAN AGREE TO BRING HOME OUR FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGREE TO BRING THEIRS HOME AT THE SAME TIME.

EXTERNAL FORCES ASSISTING BOTH SIDES COULD AND SHOULD LEAVE AT THE SAME TIME, AND SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED.

THE ULTIMATE KEY TO AN HONORABLE SOLUTION MUST BE FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM--WITH ALL PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS, ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE ELECTIONS IF THEY WERE WILLING TO ABIDE BY PEACEFUL PROCESSES.

THAT, TOO, WOULD MEAN SOME RISK.
BUT I HAVE NEVER FEARED THE RISK OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE. I SAY:
LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK. AND ACCEPT THEIR JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT IS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE FROM HANOI OR BY PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON. IT SHOULD BE FREELY CHOSEN BY ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

---A STOPPING OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH--TAKING ACCOUNT OF HANOI7S ACTIONS AND ASSURANCES OF PROMPT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS AND KEEPING THE OPTION OF RESUMING THAT BOMBING IF THE COMMUNISTS SHOW BAD FAITH.

---CAREFUL, SYSTEMATIC REDUCTION OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM -- A DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR -- TURNING OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY A GREATER SHARE OF THE DEFENSE OF ITS OWN COUNTRY.

---AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRE --- AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

---FREE ELECTIONS, INCLUDING ALL PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILLING TO FOLLOW THE PEACEFUL PROCESS.

THOSE ARE RISKS I WOULD TAKE FOR PEACE.

I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THESE RISKS WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR SECURITY OR BE CONTRARY TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO GUARANTEE THAT ALL THESE THINGS COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY DONE.

CERTAINLY, NONE OF THEM COULD BE DONE IF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD FAITH.

BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THESE STEPS COULD BE CARRIED OUT.

I BELIEVE THESE STEPS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH SAFETY FOR OUR EX MEN IN VIETNAM.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO CARRYING THEM OUT--AS I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO URGING THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO EXPEDITE ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS ESSENTIAL TO BROADENING POPULAR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING HIGH PRIORITY TO LAND REFORM . . . MORE ATTENTION TO THE SUFFERING OF REFUGEES . . . AND CONSTANT GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AGAINST INFLATION AND CORRUPTION.

I BELIEVE ALL OF THESE STEPS COULD LEAD TO AN HONORABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT SERVING BOTH OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

: : :

WE HAVE LEARNED A LESSON FROM VIETNAM.

THE LESSON IS NOT THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR BACKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA -- OR ON OTHER NATIONS OR PEOPLE IN LESS FAMILIAR PARTS OF THE WORLD NEIGHBORHOOD.

THE LESSON IS, RATHER, THAT WE SHOULD CAREFULLY DEFINE OUR GOALS AND PRIORITIES...AND WITHIN THOSE GOALS AND PRIORITIES, THAT WE SHOULD FORMULATE POLICIES WHICH WILL FIT NEW AMERICAN GUIDELINES.

APPLYING THE LESSON OF VIETNAM, I WOULD INSIST AS PRESIDENT THAT WE REVIEW OTHER COMMITMENTS MADE IN OTHER TIMES...THAT WE CAREFULLY DECIDE WHAT IS, AND IS NOT, IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

I DO NOT CONDEMN ANY PAST COMMITMENT.

I DO JUDGE THE DECISIONS OF PAST PRESIDENTS WHEN, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, THEY MADE THOSE DECISIONS IN WHAT THEY THOUGHTXXX THOUGHT WERE THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

BUT I DO SAY, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I OWE IT TO THIS NATION TO BRING OUR MEN AND RESOURCES IN VIETNAM BACK TO AMERICA WHERE WE NEED THEM SO BADLY...AND TO BE SURE WE PUT FURXXX FIRST THINGS FIRST IN THE FUTURE.

LET ME BE CLEAR: I DO NOT CONXXX COUNDXXX COUNSEL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD.

I DO NOT SWERVE FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

I ONLY SAY THAT, AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD UNDERTAKE A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN THIS WORLD, BASED NOT ON AMERICAN OMNIPOTENCE, BUT ON AMERICAN LEADERSHIP -- NOT ONLY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BUT MORAL.

THAT NEW STAXXX STRATEGY FOR PEACE WOULD EMPHASIZE WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS...STRENGTHENING AND MAINTAINING OUR KEY ALLIANCES FOR MUTUAL SECURITY PARTICULARLY INCLUDING NATO...SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL PEACEFUXXX PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY... AND WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR COOPERATION.

IN A TROUBLED AND DEXXX DANGEROUS WORLD WE SHOULD SEEK NOT MARCH ALONE, BUT TO LEAD IN SCXXX SUCH A WAY THAT TXXX OTHERS WILL WISH TO JOIN US.

: : : :

EVEN AS WEE SEEXXXXXXXXXX

(8)

EVEN AS WE SEEK PEACE IN VIETNAM, WE MUST FOR OUR WON SECURITY AND WELLBEING SEEK TO HALT AND TURN BACK THE COSTLY AND AEXXX EVEN MORE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE.

FIVE NATIONS NOW HAV XXXX HAVE NUCLEAR BOMBS.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY POSSESS ENOUGH WEAPONS TO BURN AND DESTROY EVERY HUMAN BEING ON THIS EARTH.

UNLESS WE STOP THE ARMS RACE...UNLESS WE STOP 15 TO 20 MORE NATIONS FROM GETTING NUCLEAR BOMBS AND NUCLEAR BOMB TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THIS GENERATION MAY BE THE LAST.

FOR 20 YEARS WE HVXXX HAVE LIVED UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT THAT SOME IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION OR EVEN SOME GREAT MISCALCULATION COULD BLOW US ALL UP IN THE WINK OF AN EYE.

THERE IS DANGER THAT WE HAVE BECOME SO USED TO THE IDEA THAT WE NO LONGER THINK IT ABNORMAL -- FORGETTING THAT OUR WHOLE WORLD STRUCTURE DEPENDS FOR ITS STABILITY ON THE PRECARIOUS ACXXX ARCHITECTUXX XXX ARCHITECTURE OF WHAT WINSTON CHURCHILL CALLED THE 2BALANCE OF TERROR.2 THIS IS NO LONGER AN ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE.

THERE IS A TREATY NOW BEOXXX BEFORE THE SENATE WHICH WOULD STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT TREATY MUST BE RATIFUXXX RATIFIED NOW.

(9)

IF THIS NATION CANNOT MUSTER THE COURAGE TO RATIFY
THIS TREATY -- A TREATY WHICH IN NO WAY ENDANGERS OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY, BUT ADDS TO IT BY KEEPING THESE WEAPONS OUT
OF THE HANDS OF A NASSER...A CASTRO...AND MANY OTHERS -- THEN
THERE CAN BE LITTLE HOPE FOR OUR FUTURE IN THIS WORLD.

WE MUST RATIFY THIS TREATY.

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MUST HAVE THDXXX THE COURAGE -- WHILE
KEEPING OUR GUARD UP AND FULFILLING OUR COMMITMENTS TO NATO --
TO TALK WITH THE SOVIET UIXXX UNION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT
A FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES
SYSTEMS.

TO ESCALATE THE NUCLEAR IXXX MISSILE ARMS RACE IS TO RAISE THE
LEVEL OF DANGER AND TOALXXX TOTAL DESTRUCTION. IT IS COSTLY,
MENACING, FEARSOME AND OFFERS NO GENUINE DEFENSE.

BEYNXXX BEYOND THAT, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I SHALL TAKE THE
INITIATIV XXX INITIATIVE TO FIND THE WAY -- UNDER CAREFULLY
SAFE-GUARDED, MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION --
TO REDUCE ARMS BUDGETS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES SYSTEMATICALLY
AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

OUR COUNTRY7S MLXXX MILITARY BUDGET THIS YEAR IS 80 MIXXX BILLION
DAOLLXXX DOLLARS.

IT IS AN INVESTMENT WE HAGXXX HAVE TO MAKE UNDER EXISTING
CIRCUMSTANCES. IT PROTECTS OUR FREEDOM.

BUT IF WE CAN WORK WITH OTHER NATIONS OXXX SO THAT WE CAN ALL
REDUCE OUR JXXX MILITARY EXPENDITURES TOGETHER, WITH PROPER
SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTION, THE, IT WILL BE A GREAT DAY FOR
HUMANITY.

ALL OF US WILL HAVE MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM SELF-DESTRUCTION.
AND ALL OF US WILL HAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH WHICH TO
HELP PEOPLE LIVE BETTER LIEXXX LIVES.

: : :: :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST CHOOSE THE ONE MAN THEY BELIEVE CAN BEST FACE
THESE GREAT ISSUES.

I WOULD HOPE THAT ME.XXX MR. NIXON, MR. WALLACE AND I COULD
EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON VIETNAM NOT ONLY INDIVIDUALLY, BUT ON THE
SAME PUBLIC PLATFORM.

I CALL FOR THIS BECAUSE -- ON THE BASIS OF OURPAST RECORDS AND
PAST CAREERS -- THERE RXXX AFXXX ARE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS.

THOSE VIEWS OF GOVERNOR WALLACE WHICH I HAVE SEEN REPORTED
INDICATE THAT HE WOULD SHARPLY ESCALATE THE WAR. (10)

MR. NIXON'S PAST RECORD REVEALS HIS PROBABLY FUTURE POLICIES.

IN 1954 -- AT THE TIME OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIENBIENPHU -- HE ADVOCATED AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN
VIETNAM IN AID OF FRENCH COLONIALISM. IT WAS NECESSARY
FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO REPUDIATE HIS PROPOSAL.

SINCE THEN, HE HAS TAKEN A LINE ON VIETNAM POLICY WHICH I BELIEVE
COULD LEAD TO GREATER ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, MR. NIXON DESCRIBED AS 2BUNK2 XXXXX BUNK
THE IDEA THAT FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE OF IMPORTANCE.

IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN QUESTIONED ANXXX ABOUT
THE USE OF U XXX NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM, MR. NIXON SAID THAT A
GENERAL 2 HAS TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT TXXX HE CANNOT RULE OUT
THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EXTREME SITUATIONS THAT MIGHT DEVELOP. 2

SINCE THEN, HASXXX HE HAS INDICATED HE HAS A PLAN TO END THE EXXX WAR
IN VIETNAM, BUT WILL NOT DISCLOSE IT UNTIL HE BECOMES PRESIDENT.

IF HE HAS SUCH A PLAN, HAS HADXXX HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SO INFORM
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

A FEW DAYS AGO THE REPUBLICAN VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE SAID THERE
ISNXXX IS NOT NOW AND NEVER HAS BEEN A NIXON-AGNEW PLAN FOR PEACE
IN VIETNAM. IT WAS, HE SAID, A PLOY 2 TO MAINTAIN SUSPENSE. 2

AND THEN HE SAID : 2 ISN'T THAT THE WAY CAMPAIGNS ARE RUN? 2

I THINK WE NEED SOME ANSWERS ABOUT THIS FROM MR. NIXON.

MR. NIXON'S PUBLIC RECORD SHOWS, ALSO, CONSISTENT
OPPOSITION TO MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

HE ATTACKED ADLAI STEVENSON AND MYSELF FOR ADVOCATING
A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY -- A TREATY TO STOP RADIOACTIVE
FALLOUT FROM POISONING AND CRIPPLING PEOPLE THE WORLD OVER. HE
CALLED OUR PLAN 2 A CRUEL HOAX. 2 WE CAN BE THANKFUL THAT PRESIDENT
KENNEDY AND THE CONGRESS DID NOT FOLLOW HIS
ADVICE.

TODAY, HE IS ASKING FOR DELAY OF RATIFICATION OF A TREATY
CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED OVER SEVERAL YEARS AND SIGNED BY
80 NATIONS -- THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DESIGNED TO
STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(11)
I SPEAK PLAINLY: I DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY CAN AFFORD A RETURN TO LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD INCREASE TENSION IN THE WORLD...WHICH WOULD, ON THE BASIS OF PAST STATEMENT, ESCALATE THE VIETNAM WAR...AND WHICH WOULD TURN THE CLOCK BACK ON PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE AT GREAT SACRIFICE TO BRING THE GREAT POWERS OF THE WORLD INTO A SANER RELATIONSHIP IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE.

ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF VIETNAM...OF THE ARMS RACE...AND OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA -- I HAVE LEARNED DIFFERENCES WITH MR. NIXON AND MR. WALLACE.

I CALL ON BOTH OF THESE MEN TO JOIN ME IN OPEN DEBATE BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US PUT OUR IDEAS BEFORE THE PEOPLE. LET US OFFER OURSELVES FOR THEIR JUDGMENT -- AS MEN AND AS LEADERS.

LET US APPEAR TOGETHER -- IN FRONT OF THE SAME AUDIENCES OR ON THE SAME TELEVISION SCREENS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A CHOICE.

WE MUST NOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED BY THE SIZE OF HIS ADVERTISING BUDGET.

WE CANNOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED WITHOUT HAVING MET THE ISSUES BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

I AM WILLING TO PUT MYSELF...MY PROGRAMS... MY CAPACITY FOR LEADERSHIP BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR JUDGMENT.

I ASK THE REPUBLICAN NOMINEE AND THE THIRD PARTY CANDIDATE TO DO THE SAME.

I ASK, BEFORE ELECTION DAY THAT WE BE HEARD TOGETHER AS YOU HAVE HEARD ME ALONE TONIGHT.

A APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE -- AS CITIZENS OF A NATION WHOSE COMPASSION AND SENSE OF DECENCY AND FAIR PLAY HAVE MADE IT WHAT LINCOLN CALLED 2 THE LAST BEST HOPE ON EARTH. 2

I APPEAL TO YOU AS A PERSON WHO WANTS HIS CHILDREN TO GROW UP IN THAT KIND OF COUNTRY.

I APPEAL TO YOU TO EXPRESS AND VOTE YOUR HOPES AND NOT YOUR HATES.

I INTEND, IN THESE FIVE WEEKS, TO WAGE A VIGOROUS...TIRELESS... AND FORTHRIGHT CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

I SHALL NOT SPARE MYSELF, OR THOSE WHO WILL STAND WITH ME.

I HAVE PREPARED MYSELF. I KNOW THE PROBLEMS FACING THIS NATION.

I DO NOT SHRINK FROM THOSE PROBLEMS.

I CHALLENGE THEM.

THEY WERE MADE BY MEN. I BELIEVE THEY CAN BE SOLVED BY MEN.

IF YOU WILL GIVE ME YOUR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT, TOGETHER WE SHALL BUILD A BETTER AMERICA.

Vietnam

100
9/29/68

Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and as a candidate for President of the United States.

I want to talk with you about Vietnam, and about the search for peace in the world. I want to talk with you about this Presidential election -- and what it can mean for our country.

~~First Vietnam.~~ When I accepted the Democratic party's nomination *Platform* for President, I said that the first reality that confronted this nation *was the need for* is peace in Vietnam.

I have pledged I pledge to you that my first priority as President *shall* ~~would therefore~~ be to *end the war and obtain an honorable peace.* ~~honorably and that peace.~~

* * * *

For fourteen years this country has had a growing involvement in Vietnam.

For the past four years I have spoken my mind about ~~a~~ Vietnam, frankly and without reservation, in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council, and directly to the President ~~in agreement and disagreement.~~

~~I have always been heard.~~

~~My advice has not always been taken. But the President has always~~ listened.

the President When ~~he~~ has made his decisions, I have supported them. *(Sincerely)*

~~That is the nature of things.~~

~~There is only one President at a time.~~

The President *Johnson* is the Commander-in-chief. *under constitutional system* ~~And he must be~~

20th the one to make the decisions regarding war and peace -- and the

negotiations in Paris -- *between* ~~and and~~ now and January 20, 1969 >

7 deny me the right to speak, ~~convince you and~~
~~distray the peaceful~~ ⁻²⁻ ~~providently democratic~~
process. Dissent yes, but I wonder NO!

But I also know that I have believed... and worked... and given
myself to the people for far too many years to do anything less than
stand up for the principles in which I believe.

For the past several weeks I have tried to tell you what was
in my heart ~~and on my mind.~~

But, ~~by the nature of things,~~ ^{sometimes} that message has been drowned
out by the voices of protestors and demonstrators. ~~I shall not let the~~
~~violence and the disorder of a policy few of us are aware of~~
I have also found that many in the press have been far more
interested in what my differences might be with President Johnson
than in what my differences are -- and they are strong differences --
with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace.

I have paid for this television time this evening to tell you
my story uninterrupted by noise... by protest... or by second-hand
interpretation ~~by the press.~~

* * * *

VIETNAM

I have served my President loyally and faithfully for the
past four years.

I have spoken my mind frankly and without reservation in the
Cabinet and in the National Security Council - ~~in agreement and disagreement.~~

~~I know he I hope I pray that his effort to find peace the~~
-2-

There will be a new President - a new team - new

~~But at the same time~~ the American people have a right
to know what I would do -- if I am President -- after January 20, 1969
to keep my pledge to honorably end the war in Vietnam,

* * * *

What are the chances for peace?

The end of the war is not yet in sight. But our chances for peace
are far better today than they were a year, a month, or even a week
ago.

On March 31 the war took on an entirely new dimension. On that
date President Johnson sacrificed his own political career in order
to begin negotiations in Paris.

Just as war has its own built-in escalation, so do peace talks.

have their own built-in escalation. And there can be no question
of backing off the peace talks in Paris or of turning backward into

a deeper war. There have been other changes in Vietnam and
in Southeast Asia.

The original decision -- made by President Eisenhower -- to become involved
in Vietnam was made for one basic reason. President Eisenhower
believed it was in our national interest that aggression should not succeed in
Vietnam. It was his feeling -- and the feeling of President Kennedy
and President Johnson since then -- that if aggression did succeed in
Vietnam there was a danger that we would become involved later on,
on a far wider and more dangerous scale in Southeast Asia.

advisors
who must
make
a complete
Reassessment
of the situation
in Vietnam
when must and
+ What
we
must do.
as I said in
my recent
speech --
Repeal
Vietnam

what was up until that time, a struggle on the battlefield
has now become both a military & diplomatic
confrontation.

our perseverance at the
conflict must be as great as our courage to end the war.

We have proven our courage and determination
in battle; we must ~~also~~ show an
even greater perseverance + ~~for~~ resolve
at the Peace table. We must not
listen to those, various ~~kind~~ of frustration
who demand either to broaden
the war or quit the negotiations.
Both are dangerous ~~and~~
~~sticking~~.

I have always been heard.

The President has always listened.

When he has made his decisions, I have supported them.

That is the nature of things.

There is only one President at a time.

And, believe me, that President has far too many burdens without adding to them the disloyalty of his Vice President.

I have defended my President's position on Vietnam.

I have done so without apology.

Insert!
I have done so because I have believed that President Johnson -- and President Eisenhower and President Kennedy before him -- have always been ^{guided} ~~limited~~ in their policies by circumstances that tragically forced them into decisions ^{on} in Vietnam which were the lesser of two evils.

~~When President Eisenhower first made the decision to give American help in Vietnam, he did so in the belief that not to help would~~

~~weaken and endanger other countries in Southeast Asia.~~ ^{and our own security} *No one could*

have foreseen the developments that have brought
~~Since then, "help" has meant an increasing number of troops, of money, and of blood.~~ ^{commitment of money, men and material}

I wish I could tell you how hard I have searched my heart for some simple answer that would save us the men, the money, and the blood.

There have been and are no simple answers. To withdraw ~~and~~ would not only sacrifice the freedom of S. Vietnam and the safety of

L. E. A. in, but would make meaningless the ~~the~~ sacrifices we have already made ~~in the League and~~. It would be an open invitation to more violence - more aggression - more instability. And it would, at this ~~dangerous~~ time of danger in Europe, ~~and~~ cast doubt on ~~the~~ the integrity of our ~~Common~~ sword under Treaty and alliance. Pearl would not be served by weakness or withdrawal.

~~The feeling of our President was and has been this: That it was better to fight a limited war now in Vietnam than to risk the threat of World War III later on.~~

While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, ~~we have~~ several things have happened. ~~The most important thing has been this: Other nations of Southeast Asia -- given this breathing space -- have strengthened themselves... have begun to work together... and are far more able to protect themselves against any future subversion or aggression.~~ *as time we have bought for them* ~~Substantiated.~~

In South Vietnam itself, a Constitution has been written... elections have been held... and the South Vietnamese Army has increased its size and capacity, *equipment, training* and improved its performance -- just as the Korean Army did during the latter stages of the Korean War.

So -- in sharp contrast to a few months ago -- we see peace negotiations going on..

We see a stronger Southeast Asia.

We see a stronger South Vietnam. ~~Substantiated~~

Those are the ^{now} circumstances which ~~will~~ *will face* a new President next January 20. ~~Substantiated~~

* * * *

In light of those circumstances -- and assuming no sharp change in the present situation -- how would I proceed as President?

The platform of my party says that the President ~~sh~~ould take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam.

enclosed?

But I must in all honesty tell you that I have found no such answers. I must tell you that I feel tonight -- as I have always felt -- that to withdraw from Vietnam short of genuine peace and stability would hurt Asia and would endanger America.

So to those who share my concern for the war... to those who say that the killing must stop, I can only say: Of course. But to do it we must have an honest peace.

To have less than an honest peace would only invite bigger trouble later on.

* * * *

But Until January 20, 1969, the decisions in Vietnam must be those of President Johnson. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I will not compete with that voice.

*Keep
Simpson*

But, as candidate of my party, I have an obligation to tell the American people what I would do on January 21, 1969 if I were President.

The platform of my party says that the President should take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam.

If I am President, I shall take those risks.

would
I ~~shall~~ take the risk that North Vietnam will keep its word, and
~~the~~
hasten negotiating process, if we stop the remaining limited
bombing of the North.

Smart
If the government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I
would reserve the right to resume the bombing.

to
But I would stop the bombing of the North as a measured risk
for peace. *As* President -- in weighing that risk -- I would place
key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word --
of Communist willingness to evacuate ^{and} respect ~~the~~ the demilitarized
zone between North and South Vietnam,

That zone is supposed to be free of troops. But the Communists
^{until now}
have consistently violated that agreement.

I would take the risk that the South Vietnamese would keep their
word when they say that they are ^{better off} ~~now~~ ready to defend themselves *and*
thereby permit reduction in American forces.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to determine
^{systematically}
a way in which our forces could be reduced while South Vietnam
took over ^a greater share of the burden *of self defense.*

I would do this so that it would ~~not~~ ^{either} not endanger our
^{the}
remaining troops or safety of South Vietnam. *There* are other
steps which I would take.

I would ask once more for an immediate cease-fire -- with United
Nations or other international supervision.

I would call for free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people,

would
I shall take the risk that North Vietnam *according to its own statements* will keep its word, and *and the statements of others will proceed to serious negotiations* hasten the negotiating process, if we stop the bombing of the North.

Insert 2
~~Of course, if the Government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, and increase the level of the war, I would reserve the right to resume the bombing.~~ *Insert 3*

But I would stop the bombing of the North as *unacceptable* a risk for peace.

I would take the risk that the South Vietnamese would keep their word when they say that they are now ready to *take on more of the burden of* defend *their own country* ~~themselves~~.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to determine a way in which our forces could be gradually reduced while South Vietnam forces took over a greater share of their ~~own~~ *burden of self defense*.

If the South Vietnamese Army maintains its present rate of improvement, I believe this will be possible ~~early~~ next year -- without endangering either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.

I would ask once more for an immediate cease fire--with United Nations supervision of that cease-fire.

I would call for free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people, including the National Liberation Front, able to participate in those elections if they were willing to abide by the peaceful processes.

That would mean some risk. But I have never feared the risk of one man one-vote. I say: Let the people speak. And accept their judgment, whatever it is. *The Govt for SV should not be imposed by force from Hanoi or by pressure from Washington.*

including members of the National Liberation Front, able to participate in those elections if they are willing to abide by the peaceful processes.

That would mean some risk. ~~BUT~~ I have never feared the risk of one man, one vote. I say: Let the people speak. And accept their judgment whatever it is.

~~So those are the risks I would take for peace:~~ A stopping of the bombing of the North -- keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the Communists ~~stopped up their attacks~~. *showed bad faith*

- Careful reduction of American troops in South Vietnam -- turning over ~~an increased burden~~ *the defense of their own country* to the South Vietnamese Army *to carry a greater share of*

- An internationally supervised cease-fire -- followed by withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

- Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing to follow the peaceful processes. ~~These are the total steps to peace.~~

These are risks I would take for peace.

None of these steps (Mr. Park)
There is, of course, no guarantee that all these things could be successfully done.

Certainly, none of them ~~can~~ *could* be taken if North Vietnam ~~shows~~ *refuses to show* bad faith. We must always look to the safety of our ~~boys~~ *men* in Vietnam --

and we must be sure that any peace settlement does not jeopardize ~~the stability of Southeast Asia - which is the reason we got involved~~ *independence of S. Vietnam and the* *away the reason for* *independence* in Vietnam in the first place.

^{Have stop}
~~none~~ ⁶ would jeopardize our security and
none are contrary to our national interests

But I believe that there is a good chance that these steps could
be carried out. As President, I would be dedicated to carrying them
out.

Review
Because I feel strongly that, ^{as} President, it is ^{my} obligation to bring this
war to an honorable end... to bring our boys and our resources back
to America where we need them so badly... and to be sure that in the
future we put first things first, ^{reassessing all our priorities and}
~~commitments at home and abroad~~
I do not condemn any past commitment.

I do not judge the decisions of previous Presidents ~~when~~ Those decisions
were made in good conscience and in other circumstances.

they do
We must learn from the past. But when new conditions exist -- as
exist now in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia -- we must be ready to
conceive new ^{relevant} policies to meet ^{them} those new conditions.

You may remember the plaque on President Truman's desk which
read: "The buck stops here."

That plaque told what it means to be President of the United States.

If I am President, I will seek the opinions and judgments of all
my advisors, just as President Johnson has sought mine.

I will listen carefully to those opinions and judgments.

But, as President, I will make the decisions. I will follow the
course that I think is right.

And the policy I execute will be the policy not of someone else,
but of President Hubert Humphrey.

I do not shirk that responsibility.

I welcome it.

I have spent my entire adult life preparing for service to my country.

There is no higher honor than having final decision for the peace and welfare of ^{our} people. Nor is there any higher responsibility.

I will meet that responsibility. And I pledge to you that, as President, I will do everything within my power to find an honest end to the war... to restore a sense of balance to our country... and to reassert ^{our} moral leadership in this world... *and to put our men and resources to work where they are so badly needed in America.*

Finally, there are choices this country must make in November -- choices about men and about policy. ^{act} You have heard tonight how I would ~~intend~~ to end the war in Vietnam.

I believe the American people have a right to hear Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace express their views on the same subject.

Several months ago Mr. Nixon said he had a plan to end the war in ~~the~~ Vietnam. But he would not disclose it until after he became President.

I believe that ^{if} Mr. Nixon has such a plan, he should present it now both to President Johnson -- who is responsible until January 20 for the peace negotiations, ^{and} to the American people.

ONE AMERICA:

I hear people laugh today at the American dream.

I hear people say that this nation is too deeply divided to become anything but two or more Americas--a country where people will look out only for themselves...and where separatism and suspicion will become things we simply have to accept and live with.

I still believe in the American dream.

I do not believe that a nation of immigrants -- ~~and we are all immigrants or the sons and daughters of immigrants~~ -- should now in its wealth give up the dream conceived in its poverty.

Nor do I believe that this nation can no longer settle its differences through peaceful ~~and through the~~ democratic processes.

I believe there is goodness in the American people.

I believe that, in their hearts, there is more love than hate

I believe they are willing to pay the price -- and it will be high -- to make this once and for all "One nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

I hear law and order used in this campaign as a code word for something else -- and let us spell it out.

I hear law and order used as a phrase that too often means "keep the Negroes down" or I've got mine. You get yours."

We are better people than that.

Our whole society is nothing if it is not based on law and order.

But all law and order must ultimately be based on a firm foundation of justice.

No one quarrels with absolute necessity in this country for safety in our streets and neighborhoods. I am willing to pay the bill for that safety.

But I say this: Anyone who tells you we can have law and order without paying our police... without having modern equipment... without giving our police professional training and support... that person is misleading the American people.

And anyone in this campaign who says that poverty and crime -- as Mr. Nixon has said -- that poverty and crime have nothing to do with each other is fooling you and himself.

Poverty breeds crime. You know it and I know it. Poor people commit the most crimes. And poor people have the most crime committed against them.

It's high time we had equal law enforcement in neighborhoods of poverty in America -- where everyone knows there is less police protection than anywhere else.

And anyone who tells you we can have law and order in America

Law & order rally
74 10/10/68

while a share of our people are victims of poverty and discrimination, he is fooling himself.

Take a black American child.

Put that child in a house without a father... in an apartment without heat... in a school without books... in a neighborhood without playgrounds... in a street without safety... and in a society where doors are closed if his face is black, and what do you expect of that child?

But take that same child. Give him a nursery and Head Start... put him in a school where education is the best and where the teachers care... give him a chance for fresh air and open space... give him training for an honest job... and let him know that the color of his face doesn't mean a thing.

~~You will have a tax payer.~~ You will have an honest, decent citizen. You will have a man who will do something for this country -- for you and me as well as for himself.

We have to tell it like it is.

We are going to have to face now the fact that America is not One America today -- and that unless it becomes One America we are all condemned to an endless exhaustion of mind and spirit.

I am told: Don't frighten the home owner. Don't frighten the man with the mortgage. Don't frighten the man with a second car and

^{so}
to inform the American people.

Let us appear together, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace, in front of the same audience, or on the same television screens, to give the people a choice.

Let them judge our ideas. Let them judge us as men.

I am willing to put myself in that position now.

And I ask that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace join me in a debate of one ~~hour~~ hour or longer on the great international issues.

If the people ~~which~~ judge Mr. Nixon or Mr. Wallace to be ^{better qualified} ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ ~~better~~ President -- as a result of that debate -- I accept their decision.

But I ask now the chance for us to be heard together as you have heard me alone tonight.

Thank you for your time and attention.

Goodnight.

#

A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and as a candidate for President of the United States.

I want to tell you what I think about the great issues which I believe face this nation. I want to talk ^{with you} about Vietnam ^{and} about the search for peace in the world. I want to talk with you about making this One America, where all of us can live together without tension or fear.

After I have told you what I think, I hope you will think. And if you agree with me, I ^{want} ~~am going to ask~~ you to help me.

I am behind Mr. Nixon ^{in this campaign.} The national polls say that I am well behind. Other polls in the various states -- including some of the large electoral states -- say that I am ahead or narrowly behind.

But I don't argue ~~with the general sense~~ that I am behind.

There are many reasons for this. I am told that I am a ^{progressive} liberal when the sense of the country is more and more conservative. I know that the struggle within my own Democratic party -- and the trouble at the Convention in Chicago -- did not help me.

But I also know that I have believed...and worked...and given myself to the people for far too many years to do anything less than stand up for the principles ⁱⁿ which I believe.

For the past several weeks I have tried to tell you what was in my heart.

But, by the nature of things, that message has been drowned out by the voices of protestors and demonstrators.

I have also found that many ⁱⁿ of the press have been far more interested in what my differences might be with President Johnson than in what my differences are -- and they are strong differences -- with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace.

~~I am not a rich man.~~ But I have paid for this television time this evening to tell you my story uninterrupted by noise... by protest... or by second hand interpretations by the press.

* * * * *

VIETNAM. I have served my President loyally and faithfully for the past four years. ~~I have not always agreed with all the policies of his administration.~~ But I have spoken my mind frankly and without reservation in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~agreement and in disagreement.~~ I have always been heard. The President has always listened. And when he has made his decisions, I have ~~always~~ supported them. That is the nature of things. There is only one President at a time. And, believe me, that President has far too many burdens without adding to them the disloyalty of his Vice President. I have defended my President's position on Vietnam. I have done so without apology. I have done so because I have believed that President Johnson -- and President Eisenhower and President Kennedy before him -- have always been limited in their policies ^{circumstances} ~~and in their positions~~ by accidents of history that tragically forced them ^{in Vietnam} into decisions which were the lesser of two evils.

When President Eisenhower first made the decision to give American help in Vietnam, he did so in the belief that not to help would weaken and endanger other countries in Southeast Asia.

Since then, "help" has meant an increasing number of troops, of money, and of blood. ~~I wish I could tell you how this has torn at me.~~
I wish I could tell you how hard I have searched my heart for some ^{simple} answer that would save us the men, the money, and the blood.

But I must in all honesty tell you that I have ~~found~~ ^{such} no other answer. I must tell you that I feel ~~today~~ ^{tonight} -- as I have always felt -- that to withdraw from Vietnam short of genuine peace and stability would hurt Asia and would endanger America.

~~I have been asked: Why don't you renounce President Johnson?
Why don't you renounce the war? Why don't you resign as Vice President?~~

~~I can only say this: I know that President Johnson wants peace. He has given his political life in the search for peace. I hate this war. But I cannot renounce what has happened without being dishonest with myself. I still believe good men have done their best to find peace in Vietnam.~~
~~I will not renounce him. No man wants war. No can I~~
~~the war~~
~~three assistants~~

~~Now can I in good conscience
resign as Vice President. The American people elected me to that office. I have a responsibility to them. Were I to resign, what reason would they have to believe that I would not do some new act for political expediency or convenience once I became President? I could have no faith in someone who did that.~~

~~So to~~
So to those who share my concern for the war... to those who say that the killing must stop, I can only say: Of course. But to do it we must have an honest peace.

To have less than an honest peace would only invite bigger trouble later on.

Until January 20, 1969, the decisions in Vietnam must be those of President Johnson. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I will not compete with that voice.

But, as candidate of my party, I have an obligation ~~as well~~ to tell the American people what I would do on January 21, 1969 if I were President.

The platform of my party says that the President should take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam.

If I am President, I shall take those risks.

I shall take the risk that North Vietnam will keep its word, ^{and hasten the negotiating process,} if ^{we} ~~I~~ stop the bombing of the North.

Of course, ^{were to show} if the Government of North Vietnam ~~shows~~ bad faith, and increases the level of the war, I would reserve the right to resume to bombing.

But I would stop the bombing of the North as a risk for peace.

I would take the risk that the South Vietnamese would keep their word when they say that they are now ready to defend themselves.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to determine a ~~prudent~~ way in which our forces could be gradually reduced while South Vietnam forces took over a greater share of their own burden.

~~Given~~ ^{Army} ~~If the South Vietnamese maintains their present rate~~ ^{of improvement, I believe this will be possible early next year --} ~~They are doing this now. I know they want to do more of it. We~~ ^{without endangering} ~~should help them to do it.~~ ^{either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam}

I would ask once more for an immediate cease fire -- with United Nations supervision of that cease-fire.

I would call for free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people, including the National Liberation Front, able to participate in those elections

if they were willing to abide by the peaceful processes.

That would mean some risk. But I have never ^{feared} ~~felt~~ the risk of one man ~~one~~ -vote. I say: Let the people speak ^A and accept their judgment, whatever it is.

^{Having learned} And, ~~learning~~ the lessons of Vietnam, I would insist that ~~this nation~~ ^{other} ~~put first things first...~~ ^{made in other times} ~~that we review all past commitments in this world~~ ...that we carefully decide what is, and is not, in our national interest. . . And that we set new national priorities on that basis.

I do not condemn any past commitment. ^{I do not judge any man's} ~~I do not judge~~ decisions when, in good conscience, he made ~~those~~ those decisions in what he thought was the interest of the American people.

But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this nation to bring this war to an honorable end. ~~And then~~ ^{...} to bring our boys and our money back to America where we need them so badly... ^{and to be sure we put first things first ~~from~~ in the future.}

Let me be clear: I do not counsel withdrawal from the world. ^I ~~I~~ do not swerve from international responsibility. ^I ~~I~~ only say that, as President, I would ~~undertake~~ [?] ~~new~~ ^{new} strategy for peace in this world, based not on ~~an~~ America of omnipotence, but on American leadership -- not only military and economic, but moral. ^I ~~I~~ would place first priority all around the world in doing our work through the United Nations... through international peace keeping machinery... ^{through} ~~through~~ and in cooperation with other nations, ^{rather than alone.}

With ~~Vietnam~~ ^{Vietnam} behind us, I would place my first international priority on control of the arms race.

Five nations now have nuclear bombs. That is five nations too ^{many.} ~~much.~~

The United States and the Soviet Union already possess enough weapons to burn, ^{and} ~~and~~ destroy and ^{main} ~~main~~ every human being and blade of grass on this

Unless we stop the arms race.. unless we stop ~~fifteen-to-twenty~~ ^{may} nations from getting nuclear bombs and nuclear bomb technology within the next few years, ~~I have no doubt that~~ this generation ~~will~~ be the last.

There is a treaty now before the Senate which would stop the spread of these bombs. That ~~treaty~~ must be ratified now.

I believe that if this nation cannot muster the courage to ratify this treaty -- a treaty which in no way endangers our national security, but adds to it by keeping bombs out of the hands of Nasser... Castro... and of many other people, then there can be little hope for our future in this world.

We must ratify this treaty.

I also believe that we must have the ~~courage~~ ^{as soon as possible} courage -- while keeping our guard up -- to talk with the Soviet Union ~~immediately~~ about reduction of the offensive and defensive nuclear bombs we both already have.

Beyond that, if I am President, I shall take the initiative to reduce arms budgets and military expenditures systematically ~~against~~ ^{among} all countries of the world, with careful inspection.

Our country's military budget this year is 80 billion dollars.

It is an investment we have to make. It protects our freedom.

But if we can work with other nations of the world so that we can ^{with proper safeguards and inspection,} all reduce our military expenditures together, then it will be a great day for human beings everywhere. ~~And~~ ^{we} all of us will ~~have~~ ^{have} moved further ~~backwards~~ ^{away} from self-destruction. And all of ^{us} will have billions of dollars with which to help people live better lives.

In American this can mean better education for our children... building ~~a~~ new cities across the open spaces of this country... bringing happiness

9/23

My fellow Americans, I speak to you tonight on the subject which is uppermost in our hearts, minds and consciences--Vietnam. I speak to you...as an individual...as a citizen...as a leader of the Democratic Party...as a candidate.

As I said to you in accepting my party's nomination for highest office, "the necessity for peace in Vietnam" is the "first reality that confronts this nation."

The President has been faced in Vietnam with some of the most painful decisions any President has had to make. I participated in many of the discussions preceding these decisions. I heard the arguments on both sides of close issues that torment men's souls. I stated my own views to the President.

From this experience, I have come to appreciate fully two simple facts: the key decisions must finally be the President's alone, and any President in these times bears awesome responsibility. The decisions which must be made between now and January 20th will properly continue to be the President's.

Once made, I have supported the President's decisions. I say this in the full knowledge that these are issues on which good and reasonable men disagree now and in the past.

But there is no disagreement in our longing for peace, our longing for the conditions which will permit American soldiers to come home, our longing for the time when youth and resources can be devoted to the vitally urgent tasks here at home and not to the cruel processes of war.

It is my fervent hope that during the remainder of his term in office President Johnson will achieve the peace we all desire and to which he has dedicated his energies. Through patient and firm policies that he has pursued, I believe already we have seen the strategic balance in Asia beginning to tilt in our favor. On March 31 he took a long step in that direction by cutting back the bombing to the Southern portion of North Vietnam which serves as the Communist staging area for the battlefield. And he removed himself from politics to give the search for peace his undivided attention. I know you will join my prayer tonight that this effort will lead to peace.

But if peace is not achieved by noon January 20th, a new President must make peace his first priority. There will be new decisions by new leadership.

Neither Mr. Nixon nor I will be President for the next four months. The issue in this campaign is not what Mr. Nixon or I would do about Vietnam today. It is not what either of us have said about Vietnam in the past, for both the war and negotiations present an ever changing scene.

The real question is what each of us would do about Vietnam as President.

Neither of us would permit a camouflaged surrender, a unilateral withdrawal, or an abdication of our commitment to self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

Neither of us would undermine the position of our negotiators at Paris by indicating now or next year any weakening of American will.

? [But neither of us should be content to stand on these generalities. No candidate can be silent on an issue of this importance to the Republic.

I have decided to speak out on these questions tonight in order that the American people may know how I propose to meet this agonizing problem if entrusted with the nation's leadership next January.

? [No candidate has the right to expect the confidence and support of the American people if he remains silent, or resorts only to generalities.

I pledge to you again, my fellow citizens, if elected I shall do everything within my power and energies to make the peace negotiations succeed and to bring a prompt and honorable end to this terrible war.

In my view our Vietnam policies should always be based on two basic but often forgotten principles which the American people can support with pride and morality:

--United States troops are fighting in South Vietnam today in accordance with treaty obligations only because North Vietnamese forces were sent there to impose Hanoi's will on the South Vietnamese people by extending aggression; and

--The future of South Vietnam should be determined only by the people of South Vietnam.

From these fundamental principles, important considerations for the future follow:

First. The heart of any peace settlement must be the withdrawal of all external forces from South Vietnam. If the North Vietnamese are willing to withdraw their forces from South Vietnam and neighboring Laos and Cambodia, where they have no right to be, our troops can and should return home at the same time. This process need not be lengthy. The withdrawals could begin and end simultaneously on an agreed schedule which would give neither side an unfair advantage.

Agreement on mutual withdrawal could be the key to peace in South Vietnam. If such an agreement can be reached, I would favor an immediate cease fire to assist orderly troop withdrawals. The twin goals of mutual withdrawal and cease fire would be given highest precedence in a Humphrey Administration.

which first?

Second. After withdrawal of external forces, what happens among the South Vietnamese is fundamentally their business, not ours. As the Democratic platform stated: "We want no bases in South Vietnam, no continued military presence and no political role in Vietnamese affairs. If and when the Communists understand our basic commitment and limited goals and are willing to take their chances, as we are, on letting the choice of the post-war government of South Vietnam be determined freely and peacefully by all the South Vietnamese people, then the bloodshed and the tragedy can stop."

That the South Vietnamese should determine their own future is, after all, what the war is all about.

Peace depends on a settlement acceptable to the people of South Vietnam. We have no more right than Hanoi to impose a settlement on South Vietnam or to negotiate the future of the sixteen million South Vietnamese people.

But the converse of this proposition is equally true. To establish a durable peace the Government of South Vietnam is going to have to find appropriate ways to bring dissident South Vietnamese elements in the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong into its political processes. All of the people of South Vietnam should be entitled to have a voice in the peaceful determination of their country's future. One man, one vote must be a constant goal.

Clearly we must encourage our allies in Saigon to face up to this problem and to put out the necessary communications of reconciliation to their countrymen that will assure the broadest base for South Vietnam's post-war government.

Just as clearly we will not permit Hanoi to resolve this problem for South Vietnam; nor should we attempt to do so.

No Presidential candidate can guarantee he will succeed in the search for peace. He can only pledge his best efforts and make clear his objectives.

What if Hanoi refuses a fair plan for mutual withdrawal? What if it insists on continuing its persistent efforts to determine by force the future of South Vietnam?

If this proves to be the case, our involvement in the war will continue longer than any of us wish or desire. But such an eventuality does not mean we should abandon our objectives or that they are unattainable later. Nor does it mean that we cannot bring home some of our troops in the near future and reduce U.S. troop combat involvement as the South Vietnamese continue to improve their own military position.

As President Kennedy stated shortly before his death, primarily the defense of South Vietnam must be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. I made this point in 1964 and again in 1965 in asserting that in the long run it is their future which is at stake. We and others are there as allies to assist them to repel external aggression. Because of early political chaos, because of the difficulties of past South Vietnamese governments in gaining wide support of the people despite the huge majority who have consistently opposed rule by Hanoi, and because we have faced a determined adversary, it has fallen to the lot of the United States to do much more of the fighting than we would have wished or chosen.

Let me say bluntly that had we not done so, the South Vietnamese never would have had a chance to survive. *yes*

But the situation has been gradually improving. Broad-based constitutional and political processes have developed. As a result of strenuous actions taken by us to improve training their performance in battle has grown steadily. New self-confidence and pride is evident in their leadership. We gave the South Vietnamese a chance to survive. I believe they are taking advantage of it.

It must be the policy of the new Administration to do everything in its power to speed these processes.

The Government of South Vietnam must expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to building support at home.

This includes a higher priority for land reform, more resources to alleviate the suffering of refugees, and constant governmental pressure against inflation and corruption. Our commitment to economic assistance and development will help.

repetitive [The South Vietnamese armed forces must take over more and more of the fighting. I believe the South Vietnamese accept and welcome these growing responsibilities. They should and must. And we have the right to insist upon it.]

I wish to emphasize with utmost seriousness the South Vietnamese can and must increase their role in their own defense. They have the resources and the manpower to do so. They also have the will. We cannot and should not be expected to do the job for them. We will not do so. With terrible sacrifices we have proven the seriousness of our commitment to freedom. They must prove still further the seriousness of theirs.

Deamericanization of the war can and must be made a present reality, not just a future goal.

(MORE)

It is because of South Vietnamese progress already made and further possible progress which we must insist on that I believe we can look forward to the gradual but substantial reduction of US forces starting in 1969.

It would be unwise today to state publicly an exact timetable for such reduction or its extent. No man can foresee the circumstances which will prevail by early next year. But I can promise that my administration will do everything in its power to bring about such action.

Based on our best assessment of South Vietnamese capabilities to increase its own defenses I intend soon after taking office, to meet with the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam to discuss and arrange a realistic schedule for U.S. troop reductions. The schedule must be a realistic one; one that would not weaken the overall allied defense posture if Saigon improved its own posture as it would then be in a position to do. I am convinced such action would be as much in their interest as in ours.

Let me be clear that what I am proposing contains no encouragement for Hanoi in its aggression. Overall allied defense posture will remain every bit as strong and effective as it is today. What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the defense of their country. And this can and should make possible the reduction of US forces. That will be the immediate objective of the Humphrey administration as we seek to end this war.

In the timing of a gradual reduction of US forces before settlement is reached, we would not lose sight of our primary goals of improving the chances of a successful negotiation between the US and Hanoi on the basis of the mutual withdrawal of all of our forces and all of theirs, and of encouraging the South Vietnamese, including those now fighting with the Viet Cong, to settle their differences peacefully.

* * * *

With respect to the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, let me say simply this. This is peculiarly a Presidential decision. Whether or not such action is possible depends on the President's own overall determination, as Commander-in-Chief, as to whether Hanoi would seek to take military advantage of it. Obviously this involves a balancing of all of the risks.

No one should expect the President to cease bombing at a time when, in his best judgment, the lives of our men would thereby be placed in greater danger. But the objective of the United States Government is to find an early acceptable way to stop the bombing as soon as this will lead to peace.

No one can now predict what the situation will be in January. As President I would stop the bombing if I believed the overall balance of risks was acceptable.

Clearly we must always think of the protection of our men in the field. But we are also engaged in peace negotiations and if stopping the bombing could lead to success in the negotiations, thus shortening the war, that would be the best form of protection for all Americans in South Vietnam.

In weighing the risks of cessation as President I would place key importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized status of the DMZ. I would be prepared to issue the necessary stop bombing orders if it were reasonable to assume that demilitarization of the DMZ would follow. Of course the North Vietnamese would not be free to take other actions inconsistent with serious peace talks, but we would be willing to rely on our own good and sufficient means of meeting other risks.

I believe one must be prepared to take risks for peace. But I have learned too that the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the safety of his men in the field is a heavy burden. It is one thing to give advice and another to have the responsibility for final decision.

Many of you will remember the plaque on President Harry Truman's desk which read: "The buck stops here." This simple phrase captures the essence of what it means to be President of the United States.

In a Humphrey-Muskie Administration, we would make the decisions . . . we would propose the policies of this government--both foreign and domestic . . . and we would accept full responsibility for these decisions.

If you honor me as your choice for President, I will dedicate every effort and resource at my command to bring about the early peace for which we yearn. It will be a peace in which the peoples of South Vietnam and the other non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia continue to have the essential freedoms for which we have paid such an enormous price in blood and treasure. The quest for peace will be my foremost preoccupation, and I will approach the task in accordance with the principles and policies I have outlined to you this evening.

In less than six weeks, the American people must choose their next President. This will be a fateful decision--one which should be made only after the most forthright discussion of the issues now facing this country.

Mr. Nixon, I am prepared to debate the question of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

I am, Mr. Nixon, prepared to debate the other great questions of peace, particularly the question of controlling the nuclear arms race--an area where there is substantial disagreement between us.

I am prepared to debate all major questions--foreign and domestic--which have been raised in this campaign.

The stakes are too high--the risks are too great--to withhold from the American people their opportunity to hear the candidates for the Presidency debate these issues.

Mr. Nixon, where do you stand?

In all of this, the question of peace will remain paramount. As I said in my acceptance speech: "... the search for peace is not for the timid or the weak, it must come from a nation of high purpose--firm without being belligerent, resolute without being bellicose, strong without being arrogant. And that's the kind of America that will help build the peace."

This is my pledge to you.

Thank you and goodnight.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 24, 1968

Urgent To The Vice President
From Larry O'Brien

Recommended rewritten draft of Vietnam statement.

My Fellow Americans:

I speak to you tonight on the subject which is uppermost in our hearts and in our minds--Vietnam. I do so after having given considerable thought and deliberation to this most paramount problem of our times. I speak to you not as the Vice President of the United States, but as the Democratic party's candidate for President and a concerned citizen and ~~an~~ ^{human being.} individual.

For the last four years I have served in the Administration. The policies of this Administration will be in effect for four more months and I do not intend to suggest a different policy for that period.

However, as I stated in accepting my party's nomination for our highest office, "the necessity for peace in Vietnam" is the "first reality that confronts this nation" and as I further said, "The policies of the past do not necessarily limit the policies of the future."

The issue before us is not what either Richard Nixon or I would do about Vietnam if we were President today; for neither of us is President today. The real question is what each of us would do about Vietnam as President after noon on the 20th of January, 1969.

There is no disagreement in this country in our longing for peace, our longing for the conditions which will permit American soldiers to come home, our longing for the time when our youth and our resources can be devoted to the vitally urgent tasks here at home and not to the cruel wastes of war.

It is my fervent hope that during the remainder of his term in office President Johnson will achieve the peace we all desire and to which he has dedicated his energies. On March 31, he took a long step in that direction by cutting back the bombing to the Southern portion of North Vietnam. And he removed himself from politics to give the search for peace his undivided attention.

But if peace is not achieved by noon on January 20th, a new President must make peace his first priority. There must be new decisions by new leadership.

Neither Mr. Nixon nor I would permit a camouflaged surrender, a unilateral withdrawal, or an abdication of our commitment to self determination. Neither of us would undermine the position of our negotiators at Paris by indicating now or next year any weakening of American will or ^{unmerited} ~~unusual~~ concessions.

At the same time, neither Mr. Nixon nor I can be content to stand on generalities. No candidate can be silent on an issue of this importance to America.

There are basic questions to be answered on which the American people deserve to know now the different positions of the candidates. I have decided to speak out on these matters tonight so that you will know how I propose to meet these ~~agonizing~~ challenges if I am entrusted with our nation's leadership next January.

No candidate has the right to expect the confidence and support of the American people if he remains silent, or resorts only to vague generalities.

My purpose is to outline the future policies of the future Administration of which I hope to be the leader.

In light of new conditions,
First--I believe we should cut back on United States military involvement in Vietnam, and I therefore pledge to bring many American servicemen home in 1969. I favor a gradual but substantial reduction of United States forces starting in 1969.

In light of the sharply improved performance of South Vietnamese forces,
My first order of business after taking office as President would be to meet with South Vietnamese officials and our own military chiefs to work out a specific timetable for ^{pending} American troop withdrawals. Our timetable ^{would} ~~will~~ be a realistic one--one that would not weaken the overall allied defense posture, *at endanger our remaining troops, or jeopardize South Vietnamese security.* ^{would} It ~~will~~ mean that the South Vietnamese ~~will~~ take over more and more of the defense of their own country.

I am convinced that South Vietnam is capable of *doing this*. ~~increasing its own defenses.~~ Therefore I pledge that a Humphrey Administration would bring significant numbers of American fighting men home next year.)

Will Mr. Nixon pledge the same?

Second--An equally important step by a Humphrey Administration on January 20th would be to direct our military leaders to limit the bombing of North Vietnam to air strikes essential to the tactical protection of American troops. This

* Too chance
- Protection of men
- Response by Hanoi
to help negotiation.

means that bombing would be limited to that area immediately north of the demilitarized zone and bombing in other areas to the North would be stopped. This further limitation of bombing would make it clear that we do not seek territory; we seek only to protect our fighting men.

I pledge to accomplish this tactical limitation on bombing as an essential element in bringing about a total bombing halt. I pledge a total halt in bombing as soon as we can insure the safety of our own troops immediately south of the DMZ.

Whether Hanoi will wish to endure the present bombing until then, or whether the present Administration will wish to continue it until then, are decisions unlikely to be influenced by what either Mr. Nixon or I say, as the North Vietnamese have recently made clear.

In short, neither Mr. Nixon nor I can pledge or bring about a halt to the bombing in 1968, but I can and hereby do pledge to further limit the bombing in 1969 and to bring about a total bombing halt as soon as we can do so without sacrificing the lives of American men.

Will Mr. Nixon pledge the same?

Cease-fire
first?

Third--If Hanoi responds to the steps I have just outlined, we can expect a meaningful negotiating position at the Paris peace talks that will soon bring a decrease in hostilities and casualties. The task then will be to negotiate a mutual withdrawal in safety of all foreign troops from South Vietnam, both allied and North Vietnamese. This could well be both a prolonged and painful process, with pressures rising in

this country to seek a military solution through new escalation.

Neither Mr. Nixon nor I will bear the decision-making responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief in 1968; but in 1969, if the fighting still rages in Vietnam, I pledge every effort to find a fair and realistic negotiated settlement as quickly as possible, with no further U.S. escalation, no increase in U.S. troops, no use of nuclear weapons, no extension of our forces into other areas and, in short, no wider war. I pledge to work with all the resources at my command for agreement on mutual troop withdrawals and, once that is accomplished, to achieve an immediate cease fire to assist orderly withdrawal of the troops.

Which
order?
1) Cease fire
2) Staged
withdrawals

Will Mr. Nixon pledge the same?

Fourth--The reconciliation and reconstruction of South Vietnam is the responsibility of all its citizens and political groups, with aid but no interference from whatever outsiders are so requested--including a multi-lateral economic aid effort in which we should share.

The United States should neither dictate the terms of this internal process nor give to the Saigon government a veto over the terms of the Paris peace settlement.

As the Democratic platform stated: "We want no bases in South Vietnam, no continued military presence and no political role in Vietnamese affairs. If and when the Communists understand our basic commitment and limited goals and are willing to take their chances, as we are, on letting

the choice of the post-war government of South Vietnam be determined freely and peacefully by all the South Vietnamese people, then the bloodshed and the tragedy can stop."

That the South Vietnamese should determine their own future is, after all, what the war is all about. Peace depends on a settlement acceptable to the people of South Vietnam. We have no more right than Hanoi to impose a settlement on South Vietnam or to negotiate the future of the 16 million South Vietnamese people.

But the converse is equally true. To establish a durable peace the Government of South Vietnam is going to have to find appropriate ways to bring dissident South Vietnamese elements in the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong into its political processes. *Progress has already been made in this regard.* All of the people of South Vietnam should be entitled to have a voice in the peaceful determination of their country's future. One man, one vote, must be a constant goal.

Clearly we must encourage our allies in Saigon to face up to this problem and to put out the necessary communications of reconciliation to their countrymen that will assure the broadest bases for South Vietnam's post-war government. Just as clearly we will not permit Hanoi to resolve this problem for South Vietnam; nor should we attempt to do so ourselves.

Therefore, I pledge to you that a Humphrey Administration in 1969 would adopt a non-interference policy in

*willing to abide by
the peaceful processes*

the reconciliation and reconstruction of South Vietnam. I pledge that while we would not give the Saigon Government a veto over the terms of the Paris peace settlement, we also would not dictate to Saigon what its post-war government should be and we would not permit Hanoi to do so.

Will Mr. Nixon pledge the same?

These are my four basic pledges on our Vietnam policy for the future. The positions I have outlined, while clearly authorized by the majority plank on Vietnam adopted by our party's Convention, are also consistent to a large degree with the minority plank for which some 40% of our delegates voted. 7

The situation in Vietnam has been gradually improving. Broad-based constitutional and political processes have been developing. As a result of strenuous actions taken by us to improve the quality of military training, their performance in battle has grown steadily. New self-confidence and pride is evident in their leadership. We gave the South Vietnamese a chance to survive. I believe they are taking advantage of it.

It will be the policy of the Humphrey Administration in 1969 to speed these processes. The Government of South Vietnam must expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to building support at home. This includes a higher priority for land reform, more resources to alleviate the suffering of refugees, and constant governmental pressure

against inflation and corruption. Our commitment to economic assistance and development will be of real help.

The South Vietnamese forces must take over more and more of the fighting. I believe the South Vietnamese accept and welcome these growing responsibilities. They should and must. And we have the right to insist upon it.

The policy on Vietnam that I have spelled out to you tonight means that we will de-americanize the war. This is the theme of my proposals.

I believe one must be prepared to take risks for peace. But I have learned, too, that the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the safety of his men in the field is a heavy burden. It is one thing to give advice and another to have the responsibility for final decisions.

Many of you will remember the plaque on President Harry Truman's desk which read: "The buck stops here." This simple phrase captures the essence of what it means to be President of the United States.

In a Humphrey-Muskie Administration, ^Iwe would make the decisions... ^Iwe would propose the policies of this government--both foreign and domestic--and ^Iwe would accept full responsibilities for these decisions.

If you choose me as your President I will dedicate every effort and resource at my command to bring about the early, ^{honorable} peace for which we yearn. The quest for peace will be

foremost in my Administration and we will approach the task in accordance with the principles and policies I have outlined to you.

In less than six weeks, the American people must choose their next President. This will be a monumental decision--one which should be made only after the most forthright discussions of the issues now facing this country.

I have given you my stand on the most crucial of all issues: achieving peace ^{in Vietnam}. But nowhere can I find a specific position for peace in the evasive, ambiguous and inconsistent Republican platform plank, and I challenge Mr. Nixon to tell us where he stands on the four - vital Vietnam policy positions I have enumerated tonight.

As I said in my acceptance speech: "...the search for peace is not for the timid or the weak, it must come from a nation of high purpose--firm without being belligerent, resolute without being bellicose, strong without being arrogant. And that's the kind of America that will help build peace."

This is my commitment to you.

Thank you and goodnight.

ONLY COPY
A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

TV Broadcast

TONIGHT I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS AS A CITIZEN AND AS A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT I THINK ABOUT GREAT ISSUES WHICH I BELIEVE FACE THIS NATION.

I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT VIETNAM, AND ABOUT ANOTHER GREAT ISSUE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD -- THE ISSUE OF STOPPING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AFTER I HAVE TOLD YOU WHAT I THINK, I WANT YOU TO THINK.

AND IF YOU AGREE WITH ME, I WANT YOU TO HELP ME.

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, I HAVE TRIED TO TELL YOU WHAT WAS IN MY HEART AND ON MY MIND.

BUT SOMETIMES THAT MESSAGE HAS BEEN DROWNED OUT BY THE VOICES OF PROTESTERS AND DEMONSTRATORS.

I SHALL NOT LET THE VIOLENCE AND DISORDER OF A NOISY FEW DENY ME THE RIGHT TO SPEAK OR TO DESTROY THE ORDERLY DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

I HAVE PAID FOR THIS TELEVISION TIME THIS EVENING TO TELL YOU MY STORY UNINTERRUPTED BY NOISE...BY PROTEST...OR BY SECOND-HAND INTERPRETATION.

: : :

WHEN I ACCEPTED THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S NOMINATION AND PLATFORM, I SAID THAT THE FIRST REALITY THAT CONFRONTED THIS NATION WAS THE NEED FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM.

I HAVE PLEDGED THAT MY FIRST PRIORITY AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE TO END THE WAR AND OBTAIN AN HONORABLE PEACE.

FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS I HAVE SPOKEN MY MIND ABOUT VIETNAM, FRANKLY AND WITHOUT RESERVATION, IN THE CABINET AND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- AND DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS DECISIONS, I HAVE SUPPORTED THEM.

HE HAS BEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. IT HAS BEEN HIS JOB TO DECIDE THE CHOICES HAVE NOT BEEN SIMPLE OR EASY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL CONTINUE -- UNTIL JANUARY 20, 1969 -- TO MAKE THE DECISIONS IN VIETNAM. THE VOICE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE MUST BE HIS. I SHALL NOT COMPETE WITH THAT VOICE. I SHALL COOPERATE AND HELP.

WE ALL PRAY THAT HIS EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WILL SUCCEED.

BUT, 112 DAYS FROM NOW, THERE WILL BE A NEW PRESIDENT...A NEW ADMINISTRATION...AND NEW ADVISERS.

IF THERE IS NO PEACE BY THE, IT MUST BE THEIR
RESPONSIBLXXX RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE A COMPLETE
REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM -- TO SEE WHERE
WE STAND AND TO JUDGE WHAT WE MUST DO.

AS I SAID IN MY ACCEPTANCE SPEECH:

THE POLICIES OF TOMORROW NEED NOT BE LIMITED BY THE
POLICIES OF YESTERDAY.

WE MUST LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

FOR NEIGHXXX NEITHER VINDICATIONNORXXX VINDICATION NOR
REPUDIATION OF OUR ROLE IN VIETNAM WILL BRING PEACE OR BE
WORTHY OF OUR COUNTRY.

: : :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVDXXX HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT
I WOULD DO -- IF I AM PRESIDENT -- AFTERJXXX JANUARY 20, 1969,
TO KEEP MY PLEDGE TO HONORABLY END THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE?

THE END OF THE WAR IS NOT YET IN SIGHT. BUT OUR
CHANCES FOR PEACE ARE FAR BETTER TODAY THAN THEY WERE A
YEAR OR EVEN A MONTH AGO.

ON MARCH 31, THE WAR TOOK ON AN ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSION.

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY ONE COURAGEOUS ACT REMOVED THE THREAT OF BOMBING FROM 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE, AND 78 PERCENT OF THE LAND AREA, OF NORTH VIETNAM.

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON SACRIFICED HIS OWN POLITICAL CAREER IN ORDER TO BRING NEGOTIATION THAT COULD LEAD TO PEACE.

UNTIL THAT TIME, THE STRUGGLE WAS ONLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE FACE TO FACE ACROSS THE TABLE WITH NEGOTIATORS FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

A PROCESS HAS BEEN SET IN COURSE. AND, LEST THAT PROCESS BE SET BACK, OUR PERSEVERANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE MUST BE AS GREAT AS OUR COURAGE HAS BEEN IN THE WAR.

THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER CHANGES DURING THESE PAST FEW MONTHS.

THE ORIGINAL VIETNAM DECISION -- MADE BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER -- WAS MADE FOR ONE BASIC REASON.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER BELIEVED IT WAS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST THAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT SUCCEED IN VIETNAM.

IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT -- AND THE JUDGMENT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON SINCE THEN -- THAT IF AGGRESSION DID SUCCEED IN VIETNAM, THERE WAS A DANGER THAT WE WOULD BE BECOME INVOLVED ON A FAR MORE DANGEROUS SCALE IN A WIDER AREA OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WHILE WE HAVE STOOD WITH OUR ALLIES IN VIETNAM, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED.

OTHER NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA -- GIVEN THE TIME WE HAVE BOUGHT FOR THEM --

-- HAVE STRENGTHENED THEMSELVES... HAVE BEGUN TO WORK TOGETHER... AND ARE FAR MORE ABLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST ANY FUTURE SUBVERSION OR AGGRESSION.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM ITSELF, A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN WRITTEN... ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD... LAND REFORM AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AND REFUGEE MEASURES HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP... AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAS INCREASED ITS SIZE AND CAPACITY, AND IMPROVED ITS EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE -- JUST AS THE KOREAN ARMY DID DURING THE LATTER STAGES OF THE KOREAN WAR.

SO -- IN SHARP CONTRAST TO A FEW MONTHS AGO -- WE SEE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTH VIETNAM.

THOSE ARE THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH A NEW PRESIDENT WILL FACE IN JANUARY.

:::

IN LIGHT OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND ASSUMING NO MARKED CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION -- HOW WOULD I PROCEED AS PRESIDENT?

I WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL. 4

TO WITHDRAW WOULD NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE SAFETY OF OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONXXX NATIONS. IT WOULD MAKE MEANINGLESS THE SACRIFICES WE HAVE ALREADY AMDEXXX MADE.

IT WOULD BE AN OPEN INVITATION TO MORE VIOLENCE...MORE AGGRESSION... MORE INSTABILITY.

AND IT WOULD, AT HIS TIME OF TENSION IN EUROPE, CAST DOUBT ON THE INTEGRITY OF OUR WORD UNDER TRAXXX TREATY AND ALLIANCE.

PEACE WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY WEAKNESS OR WITHDRAWAL.

NOWXXX NOR WOULD I ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN EITHER NORTH XXX NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM. WE MUST SEEK TO DE-ESCALATE.

THE PLATFORM OF MY PARTY SAYS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE REASONABLE RISKS TO FIND PEACE IN VIETMAXXX VIETNAM. I SAHLL DO SO.

NORTH VIETNAM, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN STATEMENT AND THOSE OF OTHERS, HAS SAID IT WILL PROCEED TO PROMPT AND GOOD DXXX FAITH NEGOTIATIONS IF WE STOP THE PRESENT LIMITED BOMBINEXXX BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

WE MUST ALWAYS THINK OF THE PROTECTION OF OUR TROOPS.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD ~~BE WILLING TO~~ STOP THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH AS A XXX AN ACCEPTABEL RISK FOR PEACE BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT COULD LEAD TO SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND A SHORTER EXXX WAR. THIS WOULD BE THE BEST PROTECTION FOR OUR TROOPS.

IN WEIGHING THAT RISK -- AND BEOFREXXX BEFORE TAKING ACTION -- I WOULD PLACE KEY IMPORTANCE ON EVIDENCE -- DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BY DEED OR WORD -- OF COMMUNIST WILLNXXX WILLINGNESS TO RESPXXX RESTORE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

IF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD FAITH, I WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RESUME THE BOMBING.

SECONDLY, I WOULD TAKE THE RISK THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD MEET THE OBIXXX OBLIGATIONS THEY SAY THEY ARE NOW READY TO ASSUME IN THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENSE.

I WOULD MOVE TOWARD DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR.

I WOULD SIT DOWN WITH THE LEADER OS SOUTH VIETNAM TO SET A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE BY WHICH AMERICAN FORCES COULD BE SYSTEMATICALLY REDUCED WHILE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREXXX FORCES TOOK OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE UXXX BURGXXX BURDEN.

THE SCHEDULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I CONIXXX CONVINCED SUCH ACTION WXXXXXXXXXXXXX 8 DISREGARD THIS PARA.

THE SCHECULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OEVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I AM CONVINCED SUCH ACTION ACTIONXXX WOULD BE ASMUCH IN SOUTH VIETNAM7S INTEREST AS NXXX INOURS.

WHAT I AMPROPOSIN IN THAT IT SHOUDXXX SHOULD BE BASIC TO OUTXXX OUR POLICY NINXXXXX IN VEXXX VIETNAM THAT THE TXXXSOUTH VIETNAMESE TAKING OVER MORE AND OMORE THE EXXXXXX DISREGARD THIS LINE

TAKING OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE DEFENSE OF THEIRXXX THEIR OWN COUNTRY. (5)

THAT WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE OJXXX OBJECTIVE OF THE HUMPHREY-MUSKIE ADMINISTRATION AS IS OUGHT TO END THE WAR.

IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY MAINTAINS ITS PRESENT RATE OF IMPROVEMENT., I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE NEX T YEAR -- WITHOUT ENDANTXXX ENDANGERING EITHER OUR REMAINING TROOPS OR THE SAFETY OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

I DO NOT SAY THIS LIGHTLY. I HAVE STUDIED THIS MATTER CAREFULLY.

THIRD, I WOULD PROPOSE ONCE MORE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE--WITH UNITED NATIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAW XXXXXX WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

AMERICAN TROOPS ARE FIGHTING IN NUMBERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY ONLY BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE SENT TO IMPOSE HANOI7S WILL ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BY AGGRESSION.

WE CAN AGREE TO BRING HOME OUR FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGREE TO BRING THEIRS HOME AT THE SAME TIME.

EXTERNAL FORCES ASSISTING BOTH SIDES COULD AND SHOULD LEAVE AT THE SAME TIME, AND SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED.

THE ULTIMATE KEY TO AN HONORABLE SOLUTION MUST BE FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM--WITH ALL PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS, ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE ELECTIONS IF THEY WERE WILLING TO ABIDE BY PEACEFUL PROCESSES.

THAT, TOO, WOULD MEAN SOME RISK.
BUT I HAVE NEVER FEARED THE RISK OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE. I SAY:
LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK. AND ACCEPT THEIR JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT IS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE FROM HANOI OR BY PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON. IT SHOULD BE FREELY CHOSEN BY ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

---A STOPPING OF THE DOMBING OF THE NORTH--TAKING ACCOUNT OF HANOI7S ACTIONS AND ASSURANCES OF PROMPT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS AND KEEPING THE OPTION OF RESUMING THAT BOMBING IF THE COMMUNISTS SHOW BAD FAITH.

---CAREFUL, SYSTEMATIC REDUCTION OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM -- A DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR -- TURNING OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY A GREATER SHARE OF THE DEFENSE OF ITS OWN COUNTRY.

---AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRE --- AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

---FREE ELECTIONS, INCLUDING ALL PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILLING TO FOLLOW THE PEACEFUL PROCESS.

THOSE ARE RISKS I WOULD TAKE FOR PEACE. (6)

I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THESE RISKS WOULD JEOPARDIZE OURXXX OUR SECURITY OR BE CONTRARY TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO GUARANTEE THAT ALL THESE THINGS COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY DONE.

CERTAINLY, NONE OF THEM COULD BE DONE IF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD FAITH.

BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THESE STEPS OX COULD BE CARRIED OUT.

I BELIEVE THESE STEPS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH SAFETY FOR OUR EX MEN IN VIETNAM.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO CARRYING THEM OUT--AS I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO URGING THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO EXPEDITE ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS ESSENTIAL TO BROADENING POPULAR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING HIGH PRIORITY TO LAND REFORM . . . ,ORE ATTENTION TO THE SUFFERING OF REFUGEES . . . AND CONSTANT GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AGAINST INFLATION AND CORRUPTION.

I BELIEVE ALL OF THESE STEPS COULD LEAD TO AN HONORABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT SEVXXX SERVING BOTH OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

: : :

WE HAVE LEARNED A LESSIXXX LESSON FROM VIETNAM.

THE LESSON IS NOT HXXX THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR BACKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA -- OR ON OTHER NATIONS OR PEOPLE IN LESS FAMILIAR PARTS OF THWXXX THE WORLD NEIGHBORHOOD.

THE LESSON IS, RATHER, THAT WESHOULD CAREFULLY DEFINE OUR GOALS AND PRIORITIES...AND IWITHIN THOSE GOALS AND PRIORITIES, THAT WE SHOULD FORMULATE POLICIES WHICH WILL FIT NEW AMERICAN GUIDELINES.

APPLYING THELESSON OF VIETNAM, I WOULD INSIST AS PRESIDENT THAT WE REVIEW OTHER COMMITMENTS MADE IN OTHER TIMES...THAT WE CAREFULLY DECIDE WHAT IS, AND IS NOT, INOUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

I DO NOT CONDEMN ANY PAST COMMITMENT.

I DO JUDGE THE DECISIONS OF PAST PRESIDENTS WHEN, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, THEY MADE THOSE DECISIONS IN WHAT THEY THOUGHTXXX THOUGHT WERE THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

BUT I DO SAY, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I OWE IT TO THIS NATION TO BRING OUR MEN AND RESOURCES IN VIETNAM BACK TO AMERICA WHERE WE NEED THEM SO BADLY...AND TO BE SURE WE PUT FURXXX FIRST THINGS FIRST IN THE FUTURE.

LET ME BE CLEAR: I DO NOT CONXXX COUNDXXX COUNSEL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD.

I DO NOT SWERVE FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

I ONLY SAY THAT, AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD UNDERTAKE A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN THIS WORLD, BASED NOT ON AMERICAN OMNIPOTENCE, BUT ON AMERICAN LEADERSHIP -- NOT ONLY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BUT MORAL.

THAT NEW STAXXX STRATEGY FOR PEACE WOULD EMPHASIZE WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS...STRENGTHENING AND MAINTAINING OUR KEY ALLIANCES FOR MUTUAL SECURITY PARTICULARLY INCLUDING NATO...SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL PEACEFUXXX PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY... AND WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR COOPERATION.

IN A TROUBLED AND DEXXX DANGEROUS WORLD WE SHOULD SEEK NOT MARCH ALONE, BUT TO LEAD IN SCXXX SUCH A WAY THAT TXXX OTHERS WILL WISH TO JOIN US.

: : : :

EVEN AS WEE SEEXXXXXXXXXX

8

EVEN AS WE SEEK PEACE IN VIETNAM, WE MUST FOR OUR WON SECURITY AND WELLBEING SEEK TO HALT AND TURN BACK THE COSTLY AND AEXXX EVEN MORE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE.

FIVE NATIONS NOW HAV XXXX HAVE NUCLEAR BOMBS.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY POSSESS ENOUGH WEAPONS TO BURN AND DESTROY EVERY HUMAN BEING ON THIS EARTH.

UNLESS WE STOP THE ARMS RACE...UNLESS WE STOP 15 TO 20 MORE NATIONS FROM GETTING NUCLEAR BOMBS AND NUCLEAR BOMB TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THIS GENERATION MAY BE THE LAST.

FOR 20 YEARS WE HVXXX HAVE LIVED UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT THAT SOME IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION OR EVEN SOME GREAT MISCALCULATION COULD BLOW US ALL UP IN THE WINK OF AN EYE.

THERE IS DANGER THAT WE HAVE BECOME SO USED TO THE IDEA THAT WE NO LONGER THINK IT ABNORMAL -- FORGETTING THAT OUR WHOLE WORLD STRUCTURE DEPENDS FOR ITS STABILITY ON THE PRECARIOUS ACXXX ARCHITECTUXX XXX ARCHITECTURE OF WHAT WINSTON CHURCHILL CALLED THE 2BALANCE OF TERROR.2 THIS IS NO LONGER AN ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE.

THERE IS A TREATY NOW BEOXXX BEFORE THE SENATE WHICH WOULD STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT TREATY MUST BE RATIFUXXX RATIFIED NOW.

19
IF THIS NATION CANNOT MUSTER THE COURAGE TO RATIFY
THIS TREATY -- A TREATY WHICH IN NO WAY ENDANGERS OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY, BUT ADDS TO IT BY KEEPING THESE WEAPONS OUT
OF THE HANDS OF A NASSER...A CASTRO...AND MANY OTHERS -- THEN
THERE CAN BE LITTLE HOPE FOR OUR FUTURE IN THIS WORLD.

WE MUST RATIFY THIS TREATY.

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MUST HAVE THE COURAGE -- WHILE
KEEPING OUR GUARD UP AND FULFILLING OUR COMMITMENTS TO NATO --
TO TALK WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT
A FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES
SYSTEMS.

TO ESCALATE THE NUCLEAR MISSILE ARMS RACE IS TO RAISE THE
LEVEL OF DANGER AND TOALXXX TOTAL DESTRUCTION. IT IS COSTLY,
MENACING, FEARSOME AND OFFERS NO GENUINE DEFENSE.

BEYONXXX BEYOND THAT, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I SHALL TAKE THE
INITIATIV XXX INITIATIVE TO FIND THE WAY -- UNDER CAREFULLY
SAFE-GUARDED, MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION --
TO REDUCE ARMS BUDGETS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES SYSTEMATICALLY
AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

OUR COUNTRY'S MLXXX MILITARY BUDGET THIS YEAR IS 80 MIXXX BILLION
DAOLLXXX DOLLARS.

IT IS AN INVESTMENT WE HAVXXX HAVE TO MAKE UNDER EXISTING
CIRCUMSTANCES. IT PROTECTS OUR FREEDOM.

BUT IF WE CAN WORK WITH OTHER NATIONS OXXX SO THAT WE CAN ALL
REDUCE OUR JXXX MILITARY EXPENDITURES TOGETHER, WITH PROPER
SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTION, THEN IT WILL BE A GREAT DAY FOR
HUMANITY.

ALL OF US WILL HAVE MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM SELF-DESTRUCTION.
AND ALL OF US WILL HAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH WHICH TO
HELP PEOPLE LIVE BETTER LIEXXX LIVES.

: : : :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST CHOOSE THE ONE MAN THEY BELIEVE CAN BEST FACE
THESE GREAT ISSUES.

I WOULD HOPE THAT ME.XXX MR. NIXON, MR. WALLACE AND I COULD
EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON VIETNAM NOT ONLY INDIVIDUALLY, BUT ON THE
SAME PUBLIC PLATFORM.

I CALL FOR THIS BECAUSE -- ON THE BASIS OF OUR PAST RECORDS AND
PAST CAREERS -- THERE RXXX AFXXX ARE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS.

THOSE VIEWS OF GOVERNOR WALLACE WHICH I HAVE SEEN REPORTED
INDICATE THAT HE WOULD SHARPLY ESCALATE THE WAR. (1)

MR. NIXON'S PAST RECORD REVEALS HIS PROBABLY FUTURE POLICIES.

IN 1954 -- AT THE TIME OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIENBIENPHU -- HE ADVOCATED AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN
VIETNAM IN AID OF FRENCH COLONIALISM. IT WAS NECESSARY
FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO REPUDIATE HIS PROPOSAL.

SINCE THEN, HE HAS TAKEN A LINE ON VIETNAM POLICY WHICH I BELIEVE
COULD LEAD TO GREATER ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, MR. NIXON DESCRIBED AS 2BUNK2 XXXXX BUNK
THE IDEA THAT FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE OF IMPORTANCE.

IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN QUESTIONED ANXXX ABOUT
THE USE OF U XXX NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM, MR. NIXON SAID THAT A
GENERAL 2 HAS TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT TXXX HE CANNOT RULE OUT
THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EXTREME SITUATIONS THAT MIGHT DEVELOP. 2

SINCE THEN, HASXXX HE HAS INDICATED HE HAS A PLAN TO END THE EXXX WAR
IN VIETNAM, BUT WILL NOT DISCLOSE IT UNTIL HE BECOMES PRESIDENT.

IF HE HAS SUCH A PLAN, HAS HADXXX HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SO INFORM
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

A FEW DAYS AGO THE REPUBLICAN VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE SAID THERE
ISNXXX IS NOT NOW AND NEVER HAS BEEN A NIXON-AGNEW PLAN FOR PEACE
IN VIETNAM. IT WAS, HE SAID, A PLOY 2 TO MAINTAIN SUSPENSE. 2

AND THEN HE SAID : 2 ISN'T THAT THE WAY CAMPAIGNS ARE RUN? 2

I THINK WE NEED SOME ANSWERS ABOUT THIS FROM MR. NIXON.

MR. NIXON'S PUBLIC RECORD SHOWS, ALSO, CONSISTENT
OPPOSITION TO MEASURES FOR NEXXXNXXX NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

HE ATTACKED ADLAI STEVENSON AND MYSELF FOR ADVOCATING
A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY -- A TREATY TO STOP RADIOACTIVE
FALLOUT FROM POISONING AND CRIPPLING PEOPLE THE WORLD OVER. HE
CALLED OUR PLAN 2 A CRUEL HOAX. 2 WE CAN BE THANKFUL THAT PREXXX
PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THE CONGRESS DID NOT FOLLOW HIS
ADVICE.

TODAY, HE IS ASKING FOR DELAY OF RATIFICATION OF A TREATY
CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED OVER SEVERAL YEARS AND SIGNED BY
80 NATIONS -- THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DESIGNED TO
STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

11
I SPEAK PLAINLY: I DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
CAN AFFORD A RETURN TO LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD INCREASE TENSION
IN THE WORLD...WHICH WOULD, ON THE BASIS OF PAST STATEMENT,
ESCALATE THE VIETNAM WAR...AND WHICH WOULD TURN
THE CLOCK BACK ON PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE AT GREAT
SACRIFICE TO BRING THE GREAT POWERS OF THE WORLD INTO A SANER
RELATIONSHIP IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE.

ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF VIETNAM...OF THE ARMS RACE...AND OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA -- I HAVE LEARNED DIFFERENCES WITH MR. NIXON
AND MR. WALLACE.

I CALL ON BOTH OF THESE MEN TO JOIN ME IN OPEN DEBATE BEFORE
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US PUT OUR IDEAS BEFORE THE PEOPLE. LET US OFFER
OURSELVES FOR THEIR JUDGMENT -- AS MEN AND AS LEADERS.

LET US APPEAR TOGETHER -- IN FRONT OF THE SAME AUDIENCES
OR ON THE SAME TELEVISION SCREENS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, TO GIVE
THE PEOPLE A CHOICE.

WE MUST NOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED BY THE SIZE OF HIS
ADVERTISING BUDGET.

WE CANNOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED WITHOUT HAVING
MET THE ISSUES BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

I AM WILLING TO PUT MYSELF...MY PROGRAMS...
MY CAPACITY FOR LEADERSHIP BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR
JUDGMENT.

I ASK THE REPUBLICAN NOMINEE AND THE THIRD PARTY CANDIDATE TO DO
THE SAME.

I ASK, BEFORE ELECTION DAY THAT WE BE HEARD TOGETHER AS
YOU HAVE HEARD ME ALONE TONIGHT.

A APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE -- AS CITIZENS OF A NATION WHOSE
COMPASSION AND SENSE OF DECENCY AND FAIR PLAY HAVE MADE IT WHAT
LINCOLN CALLED THE LAST BEST HOPE ON EARTH. 2

I APPEAL TO YOU AS A PERSON WHO WANTS HIS CHILDREN TO
GROW UP IN THAT KIND OF COUNTRY.

I APPEAL TO YOU TO EXPRESS AND VOTE YOUR HOPES AND NOT YOUR HATES.

I INTEND, IN THESE FIVE WEEKS, TO WAGE A VIGOROUS...TIRELESS...
AND FORTHRIGHT CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

I SHALL NOT SPARE MYSELF, OR THOSE WHO WILL STAND WITH ME.

I HAVE PREPARED MYSELF. I KNOW THE PROBLEMS
FACING THIS NATION.

I DO NOT SHRINK FROM THOSE PROBLEMS.

I CHALLENGE THEM.

THEY WERE MADE BY MEN. I BELIEVE THEY CAN BE SOLVED BY MEN.

IF YOU WILL GIVE ME YOUR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT, TOGETHER WE SHALL
BUILD A BETTER AMERICA.



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