Mr. President:

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today approved S. Res. 221, a resolution that was introduced by Senator Pastore and myself last July. This measure is designed to express the very deep sense of concern in the Senate and this country about the sale of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear weapons nations.

This past June, West Germany entered into an agreement with Brazil which could result in the construction of a plutonium reprocessing plant in Latin America. It was the first agreement to fully provide for construction of such a plant in a non-nuclear weapon country. The agreement was concluded despite the serious objections of the United States.

I believe our government was rightly concerned about the consequences of this transaction. Studies show that there is no economic justification for Brazil, whose nuclear energy industry is in infancy to construct such a plant. Even in the United States, with scores of reactors in operation, we do not have a single plant licensed to reprocess plutonium for commercial uses.

There is a valid reason for delay in developing a commercial plutonium reprocessing industry for there is substantial doubt about the thoroughness of safeguards and physical security measures that have been proposed to govern these plants.

Why does Brazil want to assume the risks and the significant costs involved in building such a plant? No adequate economic justification has been provided and, since Brazil has never ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is cause to suspect their motives.
A second plutonium reprocessing transaction has now come to light. This is the agreement for transfer by France of a reprocessing facility to South Korea. In this case, the potential military motivation of the sale is even more obvious and more alarming. I hope that the leadership in South Korea understands that the US would view as an extremely serious matter any attempt to use this technology for production of an explosive device.

As a result of these transactions, and others that may follow involving the sale of similar equipment to Argentina, Pakistan or countries in the Middle East, the effectiveness of the regime to control nuclear weapons spread is now in question.

Once countries can manufacture plutonium in even modest quantities, they can without much difficulty take the added step of manufacturing an explosive device that is indistinguishable from a nuclear bomb.

What checks exist to prevent such action? Many countries have yet to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For such nations, there are no constraints other than the limitations placed by suppliers on available technology and the effectiveness of safeguards required by suppliers including those enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA is now rushing to develop a program capable of preventing diversion of special nuclear materials from uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing equipment. But the effectiveness of these safeguards has not been fully tested. Many experts question whether this sensitive technology should be transferred to non-nuclear weapons countries under any circumstances. Others believe that a fully effective safeguards program can be devised only if these facilities are developed as large, regional, rather than smaller national plants,
and placed under multinational control.

A study of regional fuel cycle centers was, in fact, one of the recommendations of the NPT review conference earlier this year. Since that session, the United States has been meeting with other countries that supply nuclear equipment and technology to strengthen the controls over dissemination of technology for production of special nuclear materials. While some progress has not been made, this issue has still not received the high level attention it deserves among the nuclear suppliers, including the United States. It was argued, for example, that the failure of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to mention the Brazilian sale when West German President Walter Scheel visited the United States last spring was interpreted by the West Germans as a signal that this was not an issue of major importance to the United States.

The purpose of the resolution approved by the Foreign Relations Committee today is to put the full weight of the Senate behind the effort to strengthen and broaden the IAEA safeguards program, and to urge the utmost restraint in the transfer of sensitive equipment and technology, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities until a fully effective program can be achieved. It is meant to tell all suppliers, including the French and West Germans, that unless regionalization of plants is provided through multinational centers, they should not provide reprocessing or enrichment equipment to any non-nuclear weapons state.

As unsatisfactory as the present international system to limit nuclear weapons proliferation may be, it has taken more than a decade to reach this point. Efforts during this period to ensure safeguards over the spread of nuclear technology were made with one principle objective in mind, to
prevent the chaos that would result if every nation decided to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability. The transfer of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities to non-nuclear weapons states now threatens to undermine all of the progress that has been made to this date. The result would be a new and a much more dangerous era for the United States and for the world community.

We cannot allow that to happen. I am hopeful that this resolution will therefore receive prompt and favorable consideration by the Senate.
Mr. President:

The Senate is today considering S. Res. 221, a resolution that was introduced by Senator Pastore and myself last July. This measure is designed to express the very deep sense of concern in the Senate, and in this country, about the sale of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear weapons nations.

This past June, West Germany entered into an agreement with Brazil which could result in the construction of a plutonium reprocessing plant in Latin America. It was the first agreement for construction of such a plant in a non-nuclear weapons country. The agreement was concluded despite the strong objections of the United States. I believe our government was rightly concerned about the consequences of this transaction. Studies show that there is no economic justification for Brazil, whose nuclear energy industry is in infancy, to construct such a plant. Even in the United States, with scores of reactors in operation, we have yet to license our first plant to reprocess plutonium for commercial uses. There is a valid reason for delay in developing a commercial plutonium reprocessing industry, for there is profound doubt about the adequacy of safeguards that have been proposed to govern these plants. Why does Brazil want to assume the risks and costs of such a plant. No adequate answer has been given, and since Brazil has never ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is every reason for suspicion.

A second plutonium reprocessing transaction has now come to light. This is the agreement for transfer by France of a reprocessing facility to South Korea. In this case, the potential military motivation of the sale is even more obvious and more alarming.
As a result of these transactions, and others that may follow involving the sale of similar equipment to countries like Argentina, Pakistan and, most especially, the Middle East, the entire regime to control nuclear weapons spread is now endangered. 

Once countries can manufacture plutonium in even modest quantities, they can without much difficulty take the added step of manufacturing an explosive device that is indistinguishable from a nuclear bomb.

What kind of checks exist to prevent such action? Many countries have yet to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For such nations, there are no constraints other than the limitations on available technology and the effectiveness of safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The I.A.E.A. is rushing to develop a program capable of preventing diversion of special nuclear materials from uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing equipment. But the effectiveness of these safeguards has not been tested adequately, and many experts question whether a fully effective program could be devised unless the plants themselves were regionalized and placed under multinational control.

Regional control was, in fact, one of the recommendations of the NPT review conference earlier this year. Since that session, the United States, together with other countries that supply nuclear equipment and technology, have been meeting to attempt to strengthen the controls over dissemination of technology for production of special nuclear materials. While some progress has been made, in many countries, including the United States, this issue has still not received the high level consideration it deserves.

The purpose of the resolution before the Senate today is to put the full weight of the Senate behind the effort to strengthen the safeguard program and
to urge the utmost restraint in the transfer of advanced equipment and technology until a fully effective program has been achieved. It is meant to tell the French and the West Germans that unless regionalization of plants is provided with multilateral control, they should not provide reprocessing equipment to Brazil and South Korea.

It has taken more than a decade to secure approval by a majority of nations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to ensure that adequate safeguards are applied to the transfer of nuclear reactors. These efforts were made with one principle objective in mind -- to prevent the chaos that would result if every nation decided to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability. In the absence of effective controls, the transfer of plutonium separation and uranium enrichment facilities now threatens to undermine all of the progress that has been made to this point and to create a new era of instability.

We cannot allow that to happen. I am hopeful that this resolution will therefore receive unanimous approval by the Senate.
or other uses that would jeopardize world peace and security.

Mr. MONDALE, Mr. President, I am today submitting a revised version of a resolution—Senate Resolution 199—which I submitted in the Senate a week ago. This resolution expresses the opposition of the Senate to the proposed sale of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants to non-nuclear weapons countries.

Since the resolution was first proposed, 20 Members of the Senate have joined as cosponsors of the modified version. A number of other Senators, while they have chosen not to cosponsor, have made clear to me their strong support for the objectives of this measure.

The reason that there is such deep concern over the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment is that there is no effective mechanism for control over the spread of nuclear weapons capability once countries acquire the means to produce plutonium. Furthermore, there is no reason for the sale of plutonium separation plants since they have not proven to be commercially viable even in the United States.

West Germany is currently negotiating with Brazil for the sale of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This would be the first such sale ever to take place. German officials contend that the sale represents a major breakthrough and would be a step forward and sponsor a new initiative and make a new and equally bold proposal.

In recent years and months there has been a growing number of nations already producing nuclear weapons, and thus far lived up to their agreements.

In recent months, however, recognition of the baleful consequences of intense commercial rivalry in the sale of atomic plants has begun to galvanize nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency, and for years, has been functioning with the nonproliferation treaty. The United Nations already producing nuclear weapons, has been adopted, and thus far lived up to its agreements.

In recent years and months, however, recognition of the baleful consequences of intense commercial rivalry in the sale of atomic plants has begun to galvanize nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency, and for years, has been functioning with the nonproliferation treaty. The United Nations already producing nuclear weapons, has been adopted, and thus far lived up to its agreements.

In recent years and months, however, recognition of the baleful consequences of intense commercial rivalry in the sale of atomic plants has begun to galvanize nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency, and for years, has been functioning with the nonproliferation treaty. The United Nations already producing nuclear weapons, has been adopted, and thus far lived up to its agreements.
June 26, 1975

processor of the spent fuel from the "safe" atomic power plants. The agency should be the operator of the separation plants, plants that still lie in the future. Those wastes are now being stored but safely disposing of them is still an unsolved and neglected technical problem. The agency should also have an exclusive mandate over fabrication of plutonium.

It is definitely not the atomic electric plant but the purification or recycling of its ashes that constitutes the threat of a further acceleration of the atomic weapons race. And over these wastes and their processing the agency, at present, has no control.

The only sure way to provide such control is to give the agency a monopoly over the extraction of these dangerous materials in its own internationally manned plants in several places in the world. A demonstration plant near Vienna, the home of the agency, might be a good place to start.

It was rivalry between nations that led the United States, in the Acheson-Lilienthal report of 1946, to propose an international agency to monopolize those aspects of the atom described as dangerous. We then concluded that inspection alone would not be a sufficient safeguard, for reasons agreed to by distinguished scientists and engineers.

But now it is the rivalry and competition between salesmen or processing and recycling plants that is most dangerous and could only be guarded against by an international agency having a monopoly of that processing operation.

This bare outline of a proposal may prove to be more acceptable as a basis for international action than was the nonproliferation treaty, for example. The proposal is timely since processing of this ghastly radioactive waste material is presently neither technically operable nor profitable, and is not likely to be in the near future.

These deadly wastes are accumulating at an alarming rate throughout the United States in over fifty atomic power plants, and in many plants elsewhere in the world.

The citizenry of all countries will not indefinitely accept official assurances that all is well. Storing is no longer sensible, tolerable, and in another five years will be an international and national scandal.

Mr. MANSFIELD subsequently said:

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a resolution submitted by Senator Mondale and others, relative to international nuclear safeguards, be referred jointly to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Dr. Wright Porter

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Symptoms described, good progress.

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- See last page
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Beden

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Beden

So the only secure system + prevent the division into war is for the US + won the proliferation.
I, therefore, elected to adopt the strategy of focusing on the core components of the project. This approach allowed me to break down the problem into manageable chunks, which in turn facilitated a more structured and efficient development process. I believe this method contributed significantly to the success of the project.

In terms of the implementation, I prioritized user interface design and functionality, ensuring that the final product is intuitive and user-friendly. This focus helped in gaining the necessary feedback from potential users, which further refined the product.

Overall, the project was a collaborative effort, with contributions from various team members. I'm proud of the outcome, and I believe it sets a strong foundation for future endeavors.
STATEMENT BY
SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON (D-MO)
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY
AGreements OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
ON THE WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR INVOLVEMENT
ROOM 4221, DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1975

WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR INVOLVEMENT

Mr. Chairman:

This morning the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations resumes its inquiry into the problem of nuclear proliferation—a problem of unparalleled importance for the future security of the world, for if many more states and possibly even sub-national groups gain nuclear weapons, there will be no security for anyone, despite all efforts of the present nuclear weapons states to curb their arms race.

Yet with the recent conclusion of an unprecedented, multi-billion dollar nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil, efforts at curbing nuclear weapons proliferation have definitely been set back.

This accord marks the first time that any nation capable of supplying nuclear materials has agreed to provide another nation with a complete fuel cycle—in other words, with all the equipment, fuel and technology needed to develop nuclear weapons—and, moreover, the recipient nation has refused to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, what is more, possesses extensive uranium deposits.

By the terms of this agreement Brazil has consented to inspection procedures in accordance with the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency; but it is now clearly apparent that if Brazil or any other nation which possesses a complete nuclear fuel cycle should decide to become a nuclear weapons power, there would be nothing the Agency could do to prevent such a development. It has no powers of either prevention or enforcement.

(MORE)
What this Subcommittee seeks to examine this morning are certain background aspects of the German-Brazilian accord, which as we understand, first involved negotiations between Brazil and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and only later, companies in West Germany.

The Subcommittee also notes that last month the Department of State testified that the United States had tried to stop West Germany from concluding this potentially dangerous accord with Brazil, but could not succeed; yet later the same month, the Chancellor of West Germany stated at a news conference in Bonn that the American Government "has not expressed a word of criticism to us."

This morning's testimony should help us in understanding the position of the Westinghouse Corporation during the early delicate negotiations relating to Brazil's achievement of a full nuclear fuel cycle. We shall also examine developments in the nuclear field related to the Common Market's reported turn to the Soviet Union for enriched uranium which it has in the past purchased almost exclusively from the United States.

Next week this Subcommittee will receive testimony on these matters from Administration witnesses.

# # # # #
To Fill a Need

U.S. Quietly Allows Uranium Shipments To Soviet Union for Processing Into Fuel

By BARRY KRUIER
Staff correspondent of the Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON—The United States alone is unable to meet the growing demand for nuclear fuels in the Soviet Union. Large-scale shipments of American uranium to the Soviet Union for processing into fuel for power stations in other countries.

The cold war had prevented such shipments since the dawn of the atomic age. But the government recently decided that sending American uranium to the Soviets for processing would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S. and its allies.

So said a letter from the State Department last week to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The letter, signed by Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, says: "The United States has decided to allow the shipment of uranium to the Soviet Union for processing into fuel for power stations in other countries."

The letter was written in response to a request by the European nations for the United States to supply uranium for use in their nuclear power stations. The United States is the major supplier of uranium to the world, and the decision to allow the shipment of uranium to the Soviet Union was seen as a significant step toward improving relations between the two nations.

The letter stated that the United States would continue to monitor the situation closely and would take action to ensure that the shipment of uranium was in the best interests of the United States and its allies.

The letter also noted that the United States would continue to work with its allies to ensure that the shipment of uranium was in line with international law and that it would continue to support efforts to improve the stability and security of the region.

The decision to allow the shipment of uranium to the Soviet Union was seen as an important step toward improving relations between the United States and its allies, and it was expected to be welcomed by many nations in the region.
Nuclear Power Campaign Is On

Industry Advocates Try to Turn Tide of Opposition

By REGINALD STUART

The nuclear power industry, which has lost most of its influence in the Federal Government and is under increasing public criticism, has begun a strong campaign to try to turn the tide of opposition to atomic power. The campaign is starting at a time when Congress is considering major issues affecting the future of nuclear power in the United States.

At stake is nearly $80-billion invested in nuclear-power generating facilities and manufacturing plants and equipment since the mid-1950's. Also at stake is $100-billion expected to be spent during the next 10 years by the electric utility industry and the Government if the industry has its way.

Through its campaign, which officially began in Washington at a recent gathering of advocates at a Nuclear Power Assembly, the industry will argue that the nation must embrace nuclear power in its program to lessen dependence on foreign fuels, to meet the nation's energy needs and that the risks involved are not as great as some antinuclear people contend.

Craig Hosmer, a Republican who was a Representative from California in the House for more than 20 years and was a strong supporter of nuclear power as a member of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has been recruited by the industry as its answer to Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate who has been waging a somewhat successful campaign with the support of various citizens' groups against nuclear power. Mr. Nader argues that nuclear power is unsafe and uneconomical. He is seeking to have future development halted and existing nuclear facilities phased out.

Mr. Hosmer, who retired from Congress last year, will head the American Nuclear Energy Council, an organization that will represent nuclear power plant manufacturers, engineers and electric utilities. The new organization, which will have a budget this year of about $250,000, is a spin-off of the Atomic Industrial Forum, which represents a broader spectrum of nuclear power advocates.

George Gleason, who has been with the Atomic Industrial Forum for six years, will leave that organization soon to become general counsel and executive vice president of the council, which will be registered in Washington as a lobbying organization.

Meanwhile, the forum, which has increased its public relations budget this year to $1.2-million from $600,000, is changing its status to a trade association from an educational organization, allowing it more flexibility in its activities. Prior to establishment of the council, the forum had been the voice of advocates of nuclear power.

"We plan to demonstrate and persuade our decision makers that nuclear power is essential," Mr. Gleason said.

Continued on Page 22, Column 4
Continued From Page 21

The council has the backing of many of the nation’s electric utilities and their trade association, the Edison Electric Institute. Other prime backers are the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the nation’s largest manufacturer of nuclear plants, and the General Electric Company, second to Westinghouse in this field.

Although G.E. officials declined to comment on the organization’s role, Robert E. Kirby, chairman of Westinghouse, said the objective of the organization would be to “educate the people.” He said:

“I think the new Congress is highly receptive to people making the most noise in their territory, and there’s no question that people can get quite emotional over this. It’s highly emotional, probably because nuclear energy was introduced to us as a bomb.”

Proponents of nuclear power are in trouble as far as influence with official agencies is concerned. Their situation was expressed in a recent statement by the Atomic Industrial Forum:

“Not since the nuclear industry came into being through enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has the establishment that guides and regulates the industry been so thoroughly shaken up as it was in 1974.”

The shake-up came in the Congressional elections, which brought 102 new faces to Congress, many with serious questions about nuclear power.

It is also reflected in the abolition of the Atomic Energy Commission, which prior to last year had almost exclusive authority over the research, development and regulation of nuclear power. Now those responsibilities are divided among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration and several other agencies.

The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, having lost Mr. Hosmer and another long-time nuclear advocate, Chet Holifield, who was a Democratic Representative from California, has had much of its say over nuclear matters stripped through reorganization of committees in Congress and reassignment of responsibilities.

Antinuclear forces have been taking full advantage of this new situation. In addition to state-level campaigns aimed at getting regulatory agencies to impose moratoriums on the construction of nuclear plants for generating electricity, they have been asking members of Congress, through personal visits and Congressional testimony, to turn thumbs down on three key issues that will determine whether the Government will embrace nuclear energy.

One issue deals with the use of plutonium as a substitute for uranium as a basic fuel for nuclear reactors.

Another issue concerns continuing the Government’s involvement in a program that partially subsidizes the cost of insuring utilities against the event of a major reactor accident.

The third issue deals with continuing support for the nation’s first demonstrator breeder reactor on the Clinch River in eastern Tennessee.

In recent weeks, several utilities have sent reports to members of legislatures in their states advocating that they endorse nuclear power. And a number of companies in the industry have issued public statements endorsing the nuclear concept.
As I see it, there are several key points that should be considered in this debate:

1. **The Deterrent Argument**: The deterrence strategy relies on the assumption that nations will not use nuclear weapons because of the potential for catastrophic destruction. However, this strategy is based on the unrealistic assumption that states will act rationally and in their own self-interest.

2. **The Escalation Dynamics**: Nuclear weapons can lead to a spiral of escalation, where a small incident can escalate into a full-fledged nuclear war due to mutual perceptions of aggression.

3. **The Impact on Stability**: The possession of nuclear weapons can alter regional balances of power, leading to increased tensions and conflicts.

4. **Diffusion Concerns**: The spread of nuclear technology and weapons poses a serious threat to global security, as it can lead to an arms race and proliferation.

5. **The Risk of意外**: Nuclear accidents or unauthorized launches can result in serious consequences, including the spread of nuclear material.

6. **The Ethical Considerations**: Using nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions about the morality and justice of such actions.

In conclusion, the decision to go nuclear must be approached with great caution and consideration of all these factors. The potential benefits must be weighed against the monumental risks and consequences.

Meg Greenfield
Deputy Editor, The New Yorker
Dear Colleague:

On June 18th I introduced a Senate resolution urging the President to seek an international moratorium on the sale of uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment until effective safeguards can be implemented to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capability. Enclosed you will find a copy of that proposal together with my introductory remarks.

The resolution was prompted by reports that Germany is on the verge of selling plutonium separation equipment to Brazil and that France is negotiating similar sales with Argentina and Pakistan.

The United States and other nuclear suppliers have until now refused to sell plutonium separation facilities to non-nuclear weapons countries because there are no effective safeguards to prevent recipient nations from manufacturing weapons once they have acquired the means to produce plutonium. In addition, the sheer problem of physical security in dealing with one of the most dangerous substances known to man led the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States to recommend a 3-year delay on commercial plutonium separation. If we -- with three decades of experience in production of plutonium for military uses -- cannot safely authorize commercial plutonium manufacture, can we expect countries that are only now acquiring this advanced technology to adequately protect against the risk of theft by terrorists and other criminal elements?

I believe there is no question of greater importance to the hope of international peace and security than the consequences of the French and German sales. If they are completed as planned, the entire system of international control over atomic weapons proliferation could be jeopardized.

My resolution urges the President to make clear to other nuclear supplying countries the seriousness with which the Senate regards this issue. It calls upon him to seek immediate suspension of the sale of enrichment and reprocessing facilities until effective international safeguards have been implemented.
Because I believe action is essential before June 27th -- when West Germany is scheduled to sign the contract with Brazil -- I hope that you will join me in cosponsoring the resolution. With the support of a majority in the Senate, I hope it might be taken up on the floor next week.

If you would like to cosponsor or if you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Gail Harrison of my staff at x5641. Given the time constraints, I would appreciate your response not later than noon Tuesday, June 24th.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

Walter F. Mondale