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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Third Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and
Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia, Namibia and
South Africa

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

Vice President Walter F. Mondale

Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department
of State

Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN

Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler

Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President

Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (Note taker)

South Africa

Prime Minister B. J. Vorster

Foreign Minister Botha

General van den Bergh

South African Ambassador to the United States Sole

Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

PLACE: Hofburg Conference Room, Vienna, Austria

DATE: Friday, May 20, 1977

The meeting began at 0805.

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E.O. 12958
DEC 4/27/06 NSC/HR/NLJC-06-016
DATE 5/9/06

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What are your thoughts about the language I proposed yesterday concerning Rhodesia?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have studied it, and can accept it. But first, we should add, "Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence."

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What about adding, following "independence in 1978" the following: "and peace. We believe that negotiation offers the best hope of reducing violence".

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Those words are neutral. We feel strongly about this and you're looking to me to sell it to Smith. I need some ammunition to do the shooting.

MR. LAKE: Let me explain why we have proposed our language. We believe that it is through negotiation that peace may be attained and that it is unlikely that violence can be measurably reduced by other means.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We hope for peace.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Those are pious words if there are no steps to implement it.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I agree. But we explained what we mean.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: On 24 September, Smith did exactly what you asked through Ambassador Bowdler. It was difficult to accept this language.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: None of this is easy.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If you cannot accept this language my hands are tied and Smith will laugh in my face.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Smith earlier had insisted that all violence had to stop.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What about, "... independence in 1978 and peace. We agree that the negotiating process offers the best hope for reducing violence, and that efforts should be made to this end."

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What about: "Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and we believe that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end." Does the 1978 date pre-suppose a constitution by then?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Yes. Let's adjourn for a couple of minutes.

The meeting adjourned for 15 minutes.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Okay, we can accept that language.

MR. AARON: It would read: "The South African Government agrees to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an Independence Constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence, and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end".

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Who are "all"?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Who are "we"?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Constitution will describe that.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: We seem to be interfering in that process.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We prefer universal suffrage but we still leave it to the Constitution.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let's qualify "all" to say "as defined in the Constitution".

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If we don't use "all", some may feel its replacement is a buzz word for other than universal suffrage. Everything we do is greeted with suspicion.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: My press will ask what I mean by "all", and I will have to tell them.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That's alright, but it is easier for me as is.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Alright, as long as your Ambassador understands.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our position is that it means universal suffrage, and we presume that the Constitution will say that.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I can't presume that. The press will play us off against each other.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Not really.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Let us not prescribe ahead of time what the Constitution will say.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understand what you're saying, but "all" to us means universal suffrage.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We each will be giving our own interpretation.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I hope that you will convey to Smith our desire for universal suffrage.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: One can't prescribe to Smith.

FOREIGN MINISTER VORSTER: That's the surest way to kill any hope of getting anywhere with him.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understand your position concerning "all". It is slightly different from ours but not inconsistent.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Don't blame me later for saying this publicly.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I'm a limited man, Mr. Prime Minister. My dad said, "at least tell the truth, even if you're dumb". This is a good step we're taking.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let us discuss South Africa now. What are you quarreling with me about?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In my statement following the meeting, I will discuss this paragraph on Rhodesia, and will refer to the contact group.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: We have language we have prepared.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It reads: "Cognizance was taken of the outcome of the discussions between the South African Government and the Representatives of the five Security Council members (Canada, France, FRG, U.K., U.S.) which had taken place in Capetown last month. It was noted that progress had been made and that further discussions would take place in Capetown at an early date."

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understood that we had agreed to meet in South Africa by the end of May, at a date promptly to be determined. That meeting will discuss the nature of the central authority, prisoners, and the withdrawal of instrumentalities. A statement which we would work up could include those elements without going any further.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is only to be a general statement. Let's say that the meeting will discuss "outstanding points".

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: No, let's specify them.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is better not to.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I don't want to injure the negotiating track, but agreement has been reached concerning national elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It hasn't yet. The five governments must come back to us. The five told us they could not finalize this until they received instructions.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is better to spell out what the contact group is going to discuss. Questions will arise and it is better to deal with them.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Mr. McHenry had said in Capetown that this document was a nonpaper. That's not my phrase, it's an Americanism.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The phrase came from Germany. The language on Rhodesia represents progress. On Namibia, let us be neutral on progress. It is helpful that we have agreed to meet. It would be advantageous to describe some of the issues we intend to discuss, but joint language is not really necessary.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: If you make a fuss about the administrative authority, it will make it very difficult domestically for us in South West Africa and South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let us set this aside. Major questions clearly remain.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: But is that true? On the major issues, we are in accord. South Africa has moved. Look at our record on U.N. demands.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: This really depends on the definition of the central administering authority. We would hope that it would be neutral, non-prejudicial, and perform necessary functions before the new government comes to power. But we are not convinced that agreement exists. Rather than trying to resolve that question here, I suggested yesterday that we agree to have the contact group return to Capetown. Maybe it can't solve the problems. I'm hopeful, but not sure. But we can't describe the problems that remain as minor.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let's add to my statement the following: "It was noted that whilst certain progress had been made, further discussion on certain major issues would be continued in South Africa in the near future". If you wish, we could add, "hopefully, before the end of May".

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We'll draft something while we turn to other matters. In your letter to President Carter, you expressed a desire to discuss "Southern Africa", in an effort to end disputes. Since receiving that letter, we have put in a lot of time in order to be able to reply to you in good faith. This is a difficult and emotional question. It is our hope that relations between our two countries will improve. We prefer cooperation to difficulties. This meeting may be an historic one since the President wanted me, in a spirit not of confrontation or threats, but with clarity, to describe how we view the questions of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia and, to convey to you that our policy requires progress as we view it, on all three issues. Progress on any one would be welcomed and we will acknowledge it. Fundamental differences

of perception remain between us concerning justice and the requirements for stability. We don't believe apartheid or separateness is workable or just. Progressive transformation is necessary. Basic elements of that transformation are an elimination of discrimination -- for us, this includes separateness. We have had our own history with "separate but equal" facilities. This was a question of our own history for 100 years. Also, a political society cannot be a healthy democracy if there is no full and equal participation in the affairs of its national government. It would be valuable if there could be a prompt initiation of dialogue between the South African Government and the real non-white leaders. I don't want to list specific legislation, but the repeal of laws such as the Pass Laws will be helpful. Further, the banishment of Winnie Mandela was harmful to the relations existing between us. We believe that the situation in South Africa will lead to increased violence, and greater international pressure. More in sorrow than in anger, our policies will go their separate ways. The choice is yours. We believe change is in your interest, and we pray for it. We understand the complexities. Yesterday, I told you of the fundamental enduring nature of our commitment. I want you to know that United States policy on human rights is permanent. There is nothing more central to our policy. And the history of Africa shows what we are talking about. Minority governments have disappeared, violence has increased, and the Soviets, with their pernicious interests, have been quick to take advantage. Frustrations and injustices are there and will be exploited. But our position, while we regret this communist opportunism, is that it would not be there were the opportunity not being created for it. Our feelings about your situation are founded not on our attitude toward communism but based upon fundamental principles affecting human rights. I want to stress that we seek good relations with you. I speak to you with the authority of the President, and not in a confrontational way. We wanted to convey to you with clarity and in all good will the elements of our foreign policy so that in your policy formulation, you would not have any questions. We will be grateful and commendatory when progress comes. We are hopeful on Rhodesia and Namibia. If progress is made, we will publicly commend it and our relations will improve. But progress also must come in South Africa. I have no road map or check list, but I do have the authority of the President to outline our objectives.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is a shame that I have such little time to speak because of your departure. What you have said causes me enormous suffering. Yesterday, I told you of our progress. You mustn't equate the situation in America to that

in South Africa, since they are totally different, as I will try again to tell you. Your black man -- Mr. McHenry, for instance, -- I regard not as a black man but as an American. Your blacks came to the United States as immigrant slaves. I just read Roots recently.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is required reading for us now.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You have divested your blacks of their background.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: And it is shameful.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We don't interfere in your own society. But it is better to understand the situation by comparing our blacks with your Indians. Neither was ever a slave. We met our blacks 140-150 years after we arrived in South Africa. Some of us settled here, some there. We never took their land. There were fewer than two million blacks when we arrived.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: 300,000.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We brought peace, and now there are 16 million of them. We don't comment on your Indians.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our record on that is shameful.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Africans don't regard themselves as members of my nation. Buthelezi has created his Inkarta to speak for the Zulus, not for us. We could have gotten along differently, and it perhaps would have been our aim to do so if Britain had not annexed the black nations during the last century. But now, those in the homelands speak their own language, have their own anthem, fly their own flag. They have self-government, cabinets, ministers, laws, and budgets. They are people apart and live where they originally settled. In 1935, at white expense, 7-1/4 million morgan of land were given to the Africans, since their population was increasing so. The life of the black in South Africa is more viable than that of 40-50 UN members; their standard of living and literacy are higher. Whether you agree with it or not, this is the situation. We are leading people to independence as the Transkei has become, and on 5 December the Tswanas will become independent too. This is a real and workable policy. There are blacks in our civil service. It is true that black doctors are paid less: it always has been so. But my government has identified this and acknowledged that it

is wrong. Equal wages should be paid for equal work. We are trying to close the gaps. I have asked the civil service to list categories to eliminate. We don't have enough money to do that right now. It is not necessary to talk to us about it: this is the situation. You have called for dialogue. Under my Government, there has been more dialogue in two years between blacks and myself than all my predecessors since 1900. If that's not progress, what is? We also created adult suffrage. Not only do black South Africans come to our cities but hundreds of thousands of other blacks also come to South Africa. Lesotho took you for a ride at the UNO concerning border posts which weren't, in fact, closed. Lesotho never was our property. Yet, there are 140 thousand people from Lesotho in South Africa since they have no employment at home. There are tens of thousands of Swazis and people from Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique. If we told the 80 thousand workers from Mozambique to leave, 300 million rand would be lost to Mozambique, with whom we don't even have a labor agreement. We cannot depart from our plans for independence of the homelands. And after independence we will continue our monetary aid. If you think we should scrap governments and introduce one-man and one-vote in a central parliament, I tell you it can't be done. South Africa is multinational and not multi-racial. We have 4 million Zulus, and 3 million Xhosas. The Xhosas are as proud of their language as you and I. If we had one central parliament, we would need 10 official languages. We don't want to govern anyone. In the future I see the black people becoming independent, and the remainder of our territory shared by whites, coloreds and Indians. We need a modus vivendi and are working on it, but time doesn't allow an elaboration on this now. Mrs. Mandela is a Xhosa, a subject of Transkei, where she can go tomorrow. A daughter of hers is marrying a son of King Sobhuza of Swaziland. The king is a very virile man: he has over 100 children. Mrs. Mandela can go to attend the wedding and remain in Swaziland or in Transkei. But no one else can prescribe our law and order. All that has happened to her is that she is restricted to an area where she can practice nursing but she can't do what her husband did. Nelson Mandela wrote a thesis on "How to be a Good Communist". I can send you a copy. General Van den Bergh can tell you more; he's been fighting the question since the early 1960s. We could lock these people up but, for humanitarian reasons, we confine them in order not to inflame the situation. The Pass Laws were conceived by the British and we have continued them for good reason. The same situation exists in our cities as does in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam. The people flock to the

cities where insufficient facilities exist to accommodate them. If 50 thousand people moved to Capetown, there would be huge problems with health risks and other dangers. Therefore, it is our policy to control influx for jobs. Two years ago I discussed this question with 8 black leaders. They all agreed that it was a problem. You can't allow 40 thousand people into a city if there are only 10 thousand jobs -- they understood that. I told them, you devise the rules and regulations to solve my problem. They are still working on it. If a solution is reached which can solve my problem, I'll scrap my program. 2-1/2 percent of our labor force has job restrictions applied. There are certain poorer blacks and whites with limited education, who have asked for our protection against their being swamped with competition, by untrained blacks. There is a Parliamentary Commission now studying whether these restrictions still are necessary. If they recommend I scrap them, I will. We are not as white as we are painted. If only you accept this, progress can come. In a friendly spirit I dare you to tell me which African country to accept as a model. Then we can discuss the whole question.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We don't see injustice in relative terms. Injustice in one place doesn't justify it elsewhere. That is why I wanted to convey to you our principles, not details. A just society means the absence of discrimination, and separation imposed as policy is discrimination. We call for an end to discrimination and for full participation leading to a healthy, just, and secure society. These are our beliefs, our feelings about human rights, and our principles. Each nation works its own will. We wanted you to understand our views.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Before my Government came to power, the Indians had no say. Except for several thousand there were no blacks in the Cape. There were only 44 thousand cape colored males. Blacks had no vote outside the Cape. Now, there is no man who doesn't have the vote or who cannot participate. They all are participating. Perhaps this is not as you have in the United States with the Guamese (sic), who are subservient and don't vote for Congress.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Your story about the King with 100 sons reminds me of the story of a farmer with 15 kids. There was a county fair in town, and his kids wanted desperately to go but he told them that they had no money and couldn't. The kids

said they needed no money. All they wanted to do was to have a look. The father agreed, with the stipulation that since they had no money they could not go to any of the concessions. The father also went to the fair and saw a concession with a prize bull. He had 10 cents in his pocket and was very tempted by the barker's encouragement to enter. But the father explained that he had 15 children and no money. The barker then said he wished he had known, because with the farmer having 15 children he would have liked to have brought out the bull to meet the farmer.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: There are other complications. Buthelezi is a Zulu and Zulus have a king. If we had one central parliament, and the Zulus were included, South Africa would have to become a kingdom.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Let's get down to the bone of the matter. South Africa has been there for 300 years. How can we accept a solution that means our own destruction? There is no independence in Africa and when I say that, it is not racialism. The question at hand is the survival of my people.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I can't tell you enough of the joy we feel over our strengthened cultural and economic health. The daughter of our President attends a public school in Washington where she is one of only 4-5 whites.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Yes, but they all speak English.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let me tell you of our program of bilingualism. The transformation which we have undergone has strengthened our cultural identity. The arts have flourished. We have many Poles in America. They are proud and they have protections. With guarantees, all of this can come about. Due process is necessary. My father was a preacher and I am a religious person. But sermons are not particularly helpful. I do speak to you with candor. We are ashamed of the treatment we have accorded to our blacks and Indians. It is an indefensible part of American history. In Minnesota we created Chippewa, Navajo and Apache nations on land carefully selected. The land we gave the Navajos turned out to be sitting on a field of oil. The head of Phillips a couple of years ago was an Indian. There is no part of our history with more despair. It is a curse. But we don't gloss over it: we are hopeful of change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: What if you had percentage wise the equivalent of 1 billion Indians? Africa has rejected the Westminster system.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our Indians wanted it.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: In such a system, where will we vote?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In Minnesota, the city with the highest number of urban blacks is Minneapolis. We have no Pass Laws, even though we have fewer jobs than people.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Zulus have their own government. Buthelezi is their Prime Minister. He asked South Africa to outlaw opposition parties in Zululand, and still asks that we do so. I have refused. But that's the way Africa is going. Discrimination will be eradicated in South Africa. But we must agree to differ, since we do not regard separation as discrimination.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Have you seen this American Indian Review Commission report which calls for the restoration of rights to the Indians?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That's a good recommendation. But the Indians have full voting rights and we will continue to work to eliminate discrimination.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: A U.S. Court has levied a 400 thousand dollar fine on an Indian tribe refusing to move.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But we will be getting a decision to give them half of Maine and a Federal Court decision to give them unlimited hunting and fishing rights in Northern Minnesota.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I'm giving you some books, Mr. McHenry, which I hope will help you to understand the complexity of our society better and conclude that we're not as white as you paint us.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I never heard that phrase before. That completes our work. I appreciate your meeting me and I pray for the beginning of improved relations. I hope that a dialogue will intensify. I am hopeful concerning Rhodesia's path to independence and for the efforts of the contact group. I hope that this clarification has been a good basis for judging where we go from here.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I appreciate it too. Whether or not we agree, the clarification has cleared the air. It is better to meet around the table than to shout. There is nothing better I would like than improved relations with the U.S. but it cannot all come from one side. I don't say this in a recriminatory sense, but we don't seem to be getting credit from people where we expect it. We are of the West and I regard you as my leader. I can take kicks in the pants but don't kick me in the teeth.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We will commend your progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Our relations thereby can improve. My prayer is that from this historic meeting progress may result.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What of the communique following this meeting?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I plan to give a general description, with specific mention of Rhodesia as we agreed, and answer questions. One of the matters to be dealt with will be the nature of the central authority in Namibia.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I will tell the press of my commitment on that matter.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is better that we all be honest.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Do you have any thoughts of our meeting again?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: No, not at this time.

The meeting adjourned at 1030.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER (FORster)

May 19

ADDRESSED AS: MR. PRIME MINISTER

Balthazar Johannes Vorster

TALKING POINTS (Rhodesia):

Change is in South Africa's own interest.

Owen initiative. US supports. New round beginning. Negotiations will be difficult. Need for post-election stability is a key problem.

Constitution. Process should include democratic elections, universal adult suffrage, permanent enforceable safeguards for basic human rights for all.

South Africa has a crucial role. Assuring Smith abides by his own commitments is not enough. We and UK will work on Front Line and nationalists. We favor no one leader. We oppose internal solution. South Africa should:

- impress upon Smith his predicament. No US bail-out;
 - possibly make public statement supporting Owen initiative and independence with majority rule in 1978;
 - if possible, make public statement of willingness to influence Smith and to support a fairly chosen government of independent Zimbabwe.
- US will recognize positive South African action publicly.

Zimbabwe Development Fund. Congress.

TELEGRAM

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INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

	FROM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET /NODIS		
E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION:	GDS PFOR, OVIP (MONDALE, WALTER F.), US, SF, RH, WA THIRD MEETING BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, MORNING MAY 20 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE			7
S/S 10 VP 2 D/CHRON	SECRET BELGRADE 3282 NODIS			
	DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE, ATTENTION: DR. BRZEZINSKI SUMMARY: Vice President Mondale called on Vorster to move to end apartheid and set goal of full and equal political participation in South Africa. Vorster countered that apartheid did not con- stitute discrimination, and that he had no intention of altering goals of separate development policy. Agreement was reached on Rhodesian language for statement to press, and South Africans confirmed willingness to receive contact group on Namibia in late May. END SUMMARY. 1. <u>Southern Rhodesia:</u> Vorster agreed to accept language Vice President had proposed afternoon May 19 concerning Rhodesia, with a South African amendment, original form of which we modified. Statement as amended: "The South African Government agrees to support British-			
DRAFTED BY: JKATZEN:mas	DRAFTING DATE 5/21/77	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: THE VICE PRESIDENT <i>W. J. [Signature]</i>	
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E.O. 12958
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American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence, and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end." Both sides agreed that that language would be included in the Vice President's statement to the press following the morning meeting. There was a difference in interpretation by the two sides concerning the implication of "all" in the phrase concerning participation in elections. Vice President Mondale said that for us, it meant universal suffrage; Vorster and Botha argued that that interpretation would prejudice eventual constitutional provisions.

2. Namibia.

South African efforts to push language concerning Namibia were not successful, in view of South African objection to specifying in statement those questions which remain to be resolved. Vice President reiterated our position that central administering authority in Namibia should be neutral and not prejudice the shape of the independence government. Vorster did confirm willingness to discuss outstanding points, including nature of central authority with contact group in Capetown, during late May.

3. South Africa

Vice President cited Vorster's March 23 message to President Carter, in which Vorster expressed desire to discuss "the problems of Southern Africa." If we are to discuss this question, we want to do so in good faith, the Vice President said. The problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself all are involved. We know the question of change in South Africa is difficult and emotional. But we hope for an improvement in our relations: this is the spirit in which President Carter wanted me, in his name, to conduct this historic meeting. Without threats, but with clarity, we wished to set forth in Vienna our views on Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. The Vice President observed that South African progress in any of these areas would be welcomed, and we would acknowledge it. But, we sought progress on all three questions. Concerning South Africa, we do not believe apartheid to be workable or just. We believe there should be a progressive transformation of South African society. Involved in that transformation would be an end to separate development, which we consider to be discrimination, and full and equal participation by all in the affairs of their national government.

4. As steps in this direction, said the Vice President, it would be valuable were there to be a prompt initiation of dialogue between the SAG and genuine black leaders. The repeal of legislation such as the "Pass Laws" also would be helpful. The banishment of

Winnie-Mandela-is-harmful-to-

Winnie Mandela is harmful to the good bilateral relations which we seek. We believe that South African failure to move at home will lead to escalating violence and increased international pressures. This, in turn, would lead us, more in sorrow than in anger, to go our separate way, based on our commitment to fundamental human rights.

5. The choice is South Africa's. We pray for change. It is in South Africa's interest. Our commitment to human rights is a permanent one. The history of Africa shows the ^{impermanence} ~~impermanence~~ of minority white and colonial regimes. Frustration, injustice, and resulting violence will be exploited by the Soviets. The Vice President implied that in such a situation, we will be guided by our commitment to ^{fundamental} ~~fundamental~~ principles. We want good relations. We are stating our policy clearly to the South Africans in order that there may be no misunderstanding as SAG makes its own plans. We have no road maps or check lists. But we do seek progress in South Africa, in Rhodesia, and Namibia--all three.

6. Vorster replied that this message caused him "enormous suffering." He returned to well-known South African script: American blacks are not the same as South African blacks; American blacks came to us as slaves and have been divested of their African background. Vorster said that South African blacks are far more like our Indians, and commented adversely on U.S. treatment of Indians. The Vice President agreed that our treatment has been "shameful," which led Vorster later to

turn instead to the Guamese (sic) as representing people not able to participate fully in the American political process.

7. Vorster then went into lengthy defense of South African racial policies, supporting homelands, alluding to his efforts to achieve equal pay for blacks, adding that he had met often with black leaders over past two years. He told of workers coming to South Africa from independent black African states, to seek work. South Africa is not multiracial; it is multinational. "If you think we should scrap (homeland) governments and introduce one-man, one-vote in the central parliament, I say it can't be done." Vorster's arguments weakened still further, viz: How could one have such a parliament when its members could speak ten different languages? The Zulus are governed by a king; were there to be equality in a central parliament, South Africa would become a kingdom! No, Vorster countered, South Africa will pursue the Bantustan policy, and modus vivendi will be worked out for sharing remainder of territory among whites, coloreds, and Indians.

8. Vorster defended transfer to Orange Free State of Mrs. Mandela, charging her husband had written thesis on "How to be a Good Communist." If Mrs. Mandela wishes to go to Swaziland or Transkei, she can, and she can remain there, he argued. For humanitarian reasons, SAG does not jail "such people", it only "confines" them.

9. Pass laws, Vorster continued, were conceived by the British;

They are aimed at preventing urban housing and unemployment problems. "If a better solution is proposed, I will scrap" this system. Vorster observed that a parliamentary commission now is studying whether job restrictions still are necessary for the two and one-half percent of the labor force to whom they apply. Vorster then appealed, "We are not as white as we are painted: if only you accept this, progress is possible." Vorster dared us to name an African country SAG should accept as a model.

10. Vice President Mondale told Vorster that we did not believe injustice in one country justified it elsewhere. He repeated for SAG the depth of our commitment and our belief that an end to discrimination, and full political participation by all in South Africa could lead to a healthy, just, and security society.

11. Botha then "got down to the bone" (his words). South Africa, he said, has existed for 300 years. How can it accept a solution which means its destruction? "The question is the survival of our people." The Vice President retorted that our own transformation had brought us joy and strength economically, politically, and culturally. With proper guarantees, including due process, and the application of those guarantees, a society can flourish. Vorster noted that discrimination in South Africa would be eradicated, but not apartheid, which is not regarded by SAG to be discrimination.

12. The Vice President expressed appreciation for meeting, and hope that dialogue and progress would occur in South Africa,

Rhodesia, and Namibia. Vorster replied that he, too, was grateful for the meeting: "Whether or not we agree, the clarification has cleared the air." It is better to meet around the table than to shout at one another. There is nothing South Africa wants more than better relations with U.S., he added. But all concessions cannot come from one side. We don't get credit from people from whom we expect it. We are of the West and I regard you as my leader. "I can take kicks in the pants, but don't kick me in the teeth."

12. The Vice President once again told Vorster of our preference for improved relations. Vorster asked whether the Vice President planned to meet with him again in near future. The Vice President said that he had no plans to. Leaving the room, he reiterated to Vorster that were progress on South Africa's part not forthcoming, consequences would follow. Vorster acknowledged this, without comment.


YORK

TELEGRAM

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	FROM AMEMBASSY VIENNA	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT:	GDS PFOR, OVIP (MONDALE, Walter F.), US, SF, RH First Meeting between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster, Morning, May 19		
ACTION:	SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE		
INFO:	USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE		
	<u>SECRET-VIENNA</u> 4122		
	<u>NODIS</u> DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE, ATT.: DR. BRZEZINSKI <u>GENEVA EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY VANCE</u>		
	<u>SUMMARY:</u> During initial session, on Rhodesia, Vice President Mondale set forth U.S. support for Owen initiative and efforts to draft a constitution with clear guarantees for all, which will lead to free elections with full participation, and independence for Zimbabwe during 1978. Vorster stated that he had not known of change in U.S. attitude concerning concept of Zimbabwe Development Fund and that South Africa would now have to reserve its position. Vorster blamed nationalists for violence and failure of earlier efforts to reach Rhodesian settlement. END SUMMARY. 1. Following initial photo session at Hofburg Conference Room, Vice President Mondale, joined by Aaron, and		
DRAFTED BY: JKKatzen:aw	DRAFTING DATE 5/19/77	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: VPWF Mondale

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 BY **62** NARA DATE **5/9/06**

Prime Minister Vorster, joined by Botha, met privately as per earlier agreement. During that session, Vorster which lasted approximately 35 minutes, ~~Botha~~ opened by criticizing President Carter's statement earlier this week on the need for change in Southern Africa, then turned to a request for more C-130's and Shackleton spare parts.

2. Principals then returned to open session. On South African side were, in addition to Vorster and Botha, Van den Bergh, Fourie, Sole, Franklin, and Eksteen. With the Vice President and Aaron were Ambassadors Bowdler and McHenry, Lake, Clift, Johnson, and Katzen. As agreed, opening session was devoted to discussion of Rhodesia, and lasted 2 hours.

3. Southern Rhodesia: Vice President Mondale set forth USG support for Foreign Secretary Owens' initiative and efforts to draft a constitution which will lead to free elections and independence for Zimbabwe during 1978. While the original suggestion was to have a ^{constitutional} ~~constitutional~~ conference as part of the process, he said we now are beginning bilateral consultations with the hope that a consensus will result concerning a constitution. We have appointed a senior American diplomat, Ambassador Low, to participate in the process. We hope that South Africa will

encourage Smith to work with the process, supporting free elections with all participating, and an independent government in Zimbabwe in 1978.

We have not developed details concerning the constitution; these are for the consultative process to determine. The consultative group will be in Salisbury, May 22-23.

4. Vorster reviewed earlier Smith efforts to reach a solution, beginning in 1973. He outlined South African steps to bring the parties together, including the liberation of Nkomo and Sithole. South Africa at all times has been prepared to help, and is prepared now. Smith is willing to find a solution; he will accept majority rule, which means black rule. But with whom is he to negotiate? Geneva showed how split the Nationalists are. Mugabe has a 2-3 percent following; Nkomo 10-12 percent, Muzorewa 70 percent; and Chirau, the rest. South Africa, though, will not stand in the way of a solution. Indicative of that were Vorster's "confidential" talks with Chivanduka in Cape Town, two months ago.

5. Vice President ^{Mondale} ~~Anderson~~ commented that precisely because of the many different groups having different objectives, it was desirable to proceed now with a process which

would lead to a constitution and government.

But, we do not wish to choose the leaders. Vorster interjected that if an election were held tomorrow in Rhodesia, Muzorewa would be elected overwhelmingly. Vice President Mondale replied that the crucial element is not who is elected but that the elections are held, in a spirit of fairness, equality, and integrity. This is our objective, and we believe it will lead to the creation of a moderate government. He again appealed to South Africa to influence Smith to accept the process and the results of fair elections. We will encourage those with whom we have influence.

6. Vorster stated that Smith already had accepted the process, which had caused a rebellion within his own political party. ^{The} ~~the~~ question remains: to whom should he turn over power? The ideal would be a referendum among blacks to choose a leader who, in turn, would negotiate the turnover with Smith. ^{Vice President} ~~Nondale~~ said that the blacks have already rejected this "internal option," and the Owen mission seeks to circumvent that very process. We reject the internal option. We are not as sure as Vorster that Smith has fully accepted the process. Vorster replied that in Smith's and Kissinger's presence, he, Vorster, had specifically said that if Smith did not ^{Smith} ~~had~~ adhere to the five points/~~had~~ had accepted, Vorster

would "drop" him. Vorster added that he also had said he would guarantee Smith honored his commitments. "I can't do any more", he added. "If Smith agrees to the election process, I will support the results".

7. The Vice President concluded that agreement seemed to exist now on that point. He added that while we seek majority rule, we do not say that this ^{necessarily} means black majority rule. Blacks often are elected in primarily white electorates and vice versa, in the United States. Vorster was quick to respond that one could not equate the United States situation to that existing in either Rhodesia or South Africa.

8. Vorster added that a guarantee still was needed for whites and asked for it from the Vice President or Owen. The Vice President replied that the more prompt the progress to honest majority government, with constitutional protection of personal liberties, property, religion, and individual choice, with an independent judiciary, the more attractive it would be for all to remain in Rhodesia. These rights would guarantee what the whites seek. Vorster responded that such constitutional guarantees would not mean anything, but that if the Americans stated that their objectives included such constitutional guarantees, the white Rhodesians and the majority of black Rhodesians would accept. So would

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the SAG. Such assurances, coupled with implementation of the Zimbabwe Fund (and its inclusion in the constitution) would lead to a settlement. "If you can guarantee Nkomo and Mugabe fall into line," he said, "I will guarantee Smith does."

9. The Vice President replied that while we can't guarantee results, our objective is to pursue the Owen mission and, as part of the process try to gain Front and Line support, do what we can to support an independent government once it is established. Specifically we ask Vorster:EMX

A) For SAG support, hopefully publicly, for the Owen EMX/mission;

B) To press Smith to negotiate for majority rule, attained through fair elections, in 1978;

C) To obtain Smith's agreement to independence at that date;

D) For South Africa to work as we will with a Zimbabwe government thus chosen;

E) To help in reducing tensions which tear at that process.

10. Vorster came up sharply, saying that he did not like the word "pressure," that he had never pressed Smith; instead, "I talk sense to him." Vorster

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~~Vorster~~ reiterated that the problem in Rhodesia is not Smith, but the Nationalists. He returned to his argument favoring an internal settlement in Rhodesia then, feigning compromise, said he would accept his second choice, which would be along the lines of Owen's proposal. But, the constitution, ^{the} he repeated, would have to include all elements/Vice President had described and US/UK guarantees that the elected government would be upheld and not be overthrown from the outside, and that sanctions would be lifted.

11. Returning to the question of the Zimbabwe Fund, the Vice President said that he envisaged it as helping in economic development, growth, infrastructure, and training: that was the path to economic stability. We are prepared to consider other kinds of help to strengthen against the fears and threats Vorster has mentioned. We cannot guarantee that the people of Zimbabwe will choose a government that will renounce all public ^{constitution} ownership. But, the/~~sanctions~~ would incorporate guarantees on confiscation. The Fund itself cannot be used simply to buy out whites.

12. Botha reacted in a patently over-dramatic fashion. He described agreements as having been reached in the Department whereby the Fund was to have a compensatory function. He said that South Africa had been told there

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were to be formal guarantees that a "sliding scale" of compensations would be paid if things went badly and white Rhodesians wanted to leave.

The Vice President confirmed that the U.S. Government had changed its thinking on this. Botha claimed this was the first time he had heard of it, that he had told the Prime Minister that the Fund was "still alive". The Vice President replied that it is, but that it is not a safety net or a "buy out" Fund; instead, the Fund would be used to help ensure fair treatment and build confidence. Congress would not support a "buy out" Fund. Botha retorted that this was "a dramatic and radical change". Lake and Aaron then outlined our philosophy of the Fund. The South Africans replied that the British had not told them of any change. Botha and Vorster went on at length about how this "change" put the whole question of a Rhodesia settlement in jeopardy.

13. The Vice President agreed to look into the question at lunch time, and turned to ^{the} matter of incursions by Smith forces. Vorster acknowledged that both sides were escalating the violence and stressed that on many occasions South ^{Africa} /~~AFRICA~~ had served as channel to communicate appeals to Smith.

But, Vorster added, Rhodesia has responsibility

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to protect its own population, and Front Line states must do their part to restrain Nationalists. Vice President said that as practical matter, the situation will not improve unless there is progress toward elections and independence. Vice President and Vorster agreed that U.S. and SAG would use what influence they have on both sides. Before breaking for lunch, Vice President and Vorster agreed not to speak to press at this time.

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