VIETNAM

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1967
of the child was a model of Macalester. After Vice President Humphrey and Senator Robert Kennedy urged a Democratic victory in the race, Romney emphasized that his own campaign for the states was at an end. Thus he reminds Republicans outside of Michigan again, as he did in 1966, that he is not only one of them, but for them. His fellow Republicans. Party functionaries consider this important in a presidential candidate, which Romney is.

The Republican victory has narrower, more immediate political implications. Romney's tax reform plans have passed the Senate. In a closely divided Senate, Licata's support of the Romney proposals will be helpful.

THE NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN OF VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, modern warfare, however limited in purpose, necessarily affects combatants and non-combatants alike. Nowhere in recent times has the ugly fact been more evident than in South Vietnam. Thousands of children have been left homeless and without parents in the crises now gripping their country. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Senate to invite the attention of the Senate to a person-to-person, voluntary effort to relieve the terror and tragedy which has befallen the children in Vietnam.

Beginning last fall a nongovernmental, nongovernmental effort was organized by Lt. William Van Doren II, of Edina, Minn., who is stationed in Vietnam, and his fiancée, Susan Gardner, who is a student at Macalester College, in St. Paul, Minn. Together they forged a link between the children of Can Tho and Macalester College.

While Lieutenant Van Doren and other U.S. servicemen worked with the children, Susan and her cochairman, Carol O'Connor, of Cleveland, Ohio, another Macalester student, organized the effort to provide the money and supplies which were needed to meet the needs of the children. Other student members of the task force included John Doren II, of Edina, Susan Kuyper, Huong Norton, and Andy Sarvis.

To date, through the work and cooperation of students, faculty and members of the community over $3,800 has been raised, and large quantities of supplies have been collected.

Mr. President, Can Tho is a city of about 85,000 people on one of the mouths of the Mekong River, at the broader end of an area still considered the strongest remaining Vietcong-controlled portion of South Vietnam. Can Tho is the capital, and the largest city in the province.

Owing to its size and location, it has become a vast refugee center. Can Tho has two orphanages jointly operated by the Sisters of Charity. Aid to this orphanage is the goal of the Mac-Tho Relief Fund.

The Can Tho Children's Relief Fund was begun under Lieutenant Will Van Doren, a former Macalester student stationed in Vietnam, under whose leadership the various military, missionary, and orphanage officials decided to consolidate their efforts. The Relief Fund is represented at Mac by Susan Gardner, a Mac senior, Susan, as chairman of the student committee to aid the children of Can Tho. She is accompanied by John Doren II, of Edina, whose parents have been lost in the fight for that nation's liberty.

Mr. President, the best hope of every nation rests with its children. I am, therefore, highly encouraged and deeply proud of the interest and deep personal concern for the children of Can Tho.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

May 25, 1967

S 7467

Sue's Involvement

The campus of Macalester College, St. Paul, recently was the scene of a piano-playing marathon, a "slave market" in which coeds did laundry and washing, a car wash, auctioned dinners by faculty members, and other like events. It was all part of student-liked drive for funds to aid South Vietnam orphans at Can Tho.

The idea originated with a former Macalester student, Lt. William Van Doren II of Newhall, Calif., who wrote his fiancée—Sue Gardner, Macalester senior from Milwaukee, Wis.—and asked her to organize an on-campus drive. She got the entire campus into the act, including all seven Macalester dormitories. The original drive was to have been for one week, with a goal of $1,000, but it went so well that it will be continued to the end of the term.

Sue Van Doren said that she is now open to everyone. Interested persons may address their checks or money orders, payable to Can Tho Children's Relief Fund, c/o Macalester's Chapter, Office, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn.

Van Doren's initial idea was to raise enough money to build an addition to the orphanage at Can Tho, but the increased amount will permit a larger addition with more furnishings and equipment. The faculty raised $300, including $55 from auctioning a Persian dinner for four couples at the home of Prof. Tahya Armajani and $16 from a car wash organized by the Macalester College Women's Auxiliary.

We know of no other college community in the country that has been so united in any cause so worthy.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND A CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, last Friday, following the United Nations action in the Middle East crisis, my colleague from Minnesota [Mr. Mondale] wrote to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. In his letter Senator Mondale noted the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing tensions. He urged that Ambassador Goldberg take advantage of the present mood and renew our efforts with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Mondale's letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

June 9, 1967.

Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg,
U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: Please accept my warmest congratulations and gratitude for the manner in which you have carried out a most difficult assignment in the U.N. deliberations on the crisis in the Middle East. All Americans are justifiably proud of the clear and forceful way in which you have represented our country during these trying days.

One hopeful sign has emerged from this tragic military confrontation. With world peace at stake in a live war, the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to cooperate in the United Nations and between themselves to reduce tensions and diminish the danger.

The result is a U.N. resolution to end hostilities that does not limit the basis for future negotiations. It is only a beginning, but it is that. Although the future may be difficult, it is at least possible now.

This success was made both possible and necessary by the grave danger of world conflict. We all have a fresh awareness of the catastrophe of all-out war and a new appreciation of the urgent need to work diligently to avoid it. What might have happened in the Middle East might happen anywhere, and the world is now intensely aware of that fact.

This new climate, it seems to me, provides us with a unique opportunity to renew our efforts with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam as well. If we could agree on a similar unlimited resolution to end the fighting in Southeast Asia in the name of world peace, the contribution to the safety of the world would be enormous.

I therefore urge you to use every means at your disposal to take advantage of the present mood. The details of the two situations differ, I know. The chances of success may be remote. But the opportunity must not be lost, for we are all newly aware that the overriding consideration is the necessity to avert world catastrophe.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a number of Senators have suggested during the past few days that the United Nations should take up the question of the war in Vietnam as soon as possible after this coming Sunday's elections. I commend this initiative, and I wish to join it today.

Early in June, I wrote to Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to express my hope that the climate created by a successful cease-fire effort in the Middle East could lead to a similar resolution for Vietnam. As a result of the current discussion of possible U.N. involvement in the Vietnam crisis, I have written again to Ambassador Goldberg to suggest that U.N. discussions might help create a climate in which a means could be found to allow the new South Vietnamese Government to develop without the tragic environment of war.

I know that there are great problems to be solved if productive discussions on Vietnam are to take place in the United Nations. But our private initiatives remain unproductive, and the danger of international catastrophe has increased since June. I believe we ought to make another attempt in the United Nations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter to Ambassador Goldberg dated today be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Hon. ARTHUR GOLDBERG,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG: Early in June, I wrote to you to urge your effort to bring about a U.N. cease-fire in Vietnam as well. I appreciated your kind response and assurance that you would remain alert to any possibilities which might develop.

During the past week, a number of my colleagues in the Senate have urged that the United Nations take up the question of the war in Vietnam as soon as possible after the new South Vietnamese government takes office. While I recognize the many difficulties that such consideration would face in the Security Council or the General Assembly, I do want to repeat my own feeling that this conflict deserves attention in the highest available forum.

Even inconclusive debate in the body which represents the world's hope for peace through law would add something, I believe, to consideration of this vital question. But I remain hopeful that a formal hearing before an independent forum might create a climate in which a means could be found to allow this new South Vietnamese government to develop without the terrible and tragic environment of pitched battle.

I also understand the risk that weeks or months of mutual recrimination might worsen the cleavage that presently exists. But I believe we must be prepared to take that risk, since private initiatives continue to be unproductive in results.

I suggested in my previous letter that the overriding consideration is the necessity to avert world catastrophe. I also indicated my belief that an agreement to end the fighting in Southeast Asia in the name of world peace would be an enormous contribution to the safety of the world. The danger has increased since then, and so, therefore, has the potential contribution of U.N. consideration to world safety.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I am extremely disappointed by yesterday's television statements of the new South Vietnamese president about the conduct of the war in Vietnam. I do not believe he understands the concern many of us have about the new government and the war effort in that country.

General Thiéu said yesterday that he thought a proper division of the missions of the effort in Vietnam would be for the United States to bear the brunt of the heavy fighting and for the South Vietnamese to carry on the pacification effort.

My own view is that it should be the other way around—and the sooner the better. It is time for the South Vietnamese to begin showing us that they are interested in becoming an independent nation. Unless they will fight hard, there is little we can do to help the new government to develop.

The fact is that the United States is now fighting most of the war in Vietnam. American troops bear the brunt of the fighting and the casualties, as the weekly listings show so graphically. American planes carry the entire load of attack on supply routes and industrial centers in North Vietnam.

Many Americans have severe doubts about our involvement in Vietnam. Many of the doubts have stemmed in part from the minor role of South Vietnamese forces in this major military effort. Many of the questions that have been raised focus on a single concern. How can a South Vietnamese Government mean anything if the South Vietnamese cannot be persuaded to carry on the aggressive military action which their preservation requires?

Mr. President, South Vietnam has just had elections, and more are scheduled. I have looked forward to these elections and the development of a workable South Vietnamese Government.

I believe it is time now to test whether the South Vietnamese commitment is as sincere as the American commitment, which speaks for itself in the dedication of lives, material, and money.

The best interests of both nations require that the South Vietnamese take over more of the military and political initiative of the war. General Thiéu should be as much interested in this as any of us.
senting states which have filed treble damage suits against substantially the same defense contractors as did Virginia, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin, now have pending in the Chicago court Dredge's self defense suit against the Department of Justice. The suit was part of a coordinated effort by Senator A. Hart, of Michigan, in hearings of the Antitrust Committee of the Senate, and made available to the federal court.

The result of the conspiracy or conspiracies involved consisted of substituting library editions for trade editions sold to libraries and schools, and by this and other means eliminating previous trade discounts ranging from ten to forty percent. (Some of us who have been investigating this feel that the average loss of discount approximates 35% but we cannot state from our present knowledge exactly how close this figure is to the actual damages resulting therefrom.)

The practices which are the subject of your investigation undoubtedly significantly affect a substantial portion of school districts and public libraries in states throughout the nation. As you know, under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, more than one hundred million dollars of federal money were made available for the improvement of libraries and school libraries, and this is only one source of funds allegedly overcharged by the conspirators. The subject of the interest was substantially all of these, and other public funds such as federal library funds, are affected by the conspiratorial diminution or elimination of trade discounts to public schools and libraries. The effectiveness of at least two major federal programs was, therefore, diminished.

In addition to the five states and numerous local municipalities which have already filed treble damage suits, federal, state, and local authorities and agencies are currently investigating claims of violations of antitrust laws. It is evident that the efforts of the Departments of Justice and Agriculture to make these investigations have been inadequate in many cases. The result is that the absolute conspiracy that the federal government has been seeking to expose is now facing a wave of suits by local authorities.

In preparing for that session, I tried to come to grips with the dissent over the war. I wanted to describe my own position with regard to Vietnam policy as well as I could, and I wanted to try to put the war into a broader perspective of America's responsibilities abroad and at home. I also wanted to speak to Minnesota's young Democrats about political power and political parties and their responsibilities to the nation.

My remarks offered a number of conclusions:

First. The differences in position among responsible people who discuss Vietnam policy are smaller in fact than they are made to seem through the polarized views that is taking place.

Second. The courses open to us in Vietnam have implications far beyond Vietnam. They include Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and some of you, re-asserted the desire to end the war. We have often disagreed. In fact, we have been the first to hold them to the highest standard in the nation on issues, ethics, and the competence and dedication of public leaders have gone beyond that, and the unique function of the American government.

It is impossible to deal with the issue of Vietnam in a few words, and especially not in speeches. It is enough to say that it involves analysis of many factors and many features. But I have tried to set down, as best I can, where I stand on Vietnam, why I stand there, and why I think you should stand there, too.

Some agree with me—there is another Senator from Minnesota who takes a different view, and I respect him as a sincere and effective public servant. In our party and in American political life, we have gone beyond that, and the unique function of the American government.

We have often disagreed. In fact, we have a party comprised of such conviction that it is impossible to agree altogether. When we finished last year's battle, we had proved that we really believe that there are more important things than winning. And only this year, you Young Democrats have told the nation young Democrats to chuck it and some of you have organized to defeat the incumbent President and Vice President of the United States. That includes Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota—whom I believe to be one of America's greatest citizens.

It may be that factionalism is the price of support. And yet, if the product of their political party is to translate ideas into political power and to legislate that power into vindication, we will have to hold on to them. When you are out of office, We are out of office in Minnesota, and some of you, re-elect me to the same thing.

I just can't believe that makes sense. Nor can I join those who would withdraw from Vietnam or pursue other policies that amount to the same thing. It would be wonderful to see that great issue is solved, clearly, but it frequently, to couple my deep distress over the Vietnam tragedy with a plea or demand for a single dramatic act that would bring it to
an end. But there is no way to wave a magic wand and have the issue disappear. There is no way to sweep it under the rug, or shut it out, or march it out of existence.

I am all too conscious that my position is not popular. But there are two kinds of crusaders in this debate, and I just can't join either kind.

I subscribe to a domino theory or a monolithic communism theory. I cannot subscribe to either a demon theory or a sanguinary theory anymore. I fear the passion which assigns significance to narrow distinction. As a young Democrat I watched another crusade—over loyalty. Like the South Vietnamese I believe there are two kinds of crusaders this time, I feel that this debate is on the verge of running into a life of its own and sweeping us before it.

As I try to tell you what I think about Vietnam, I also want to try to put that struggle into a larger perspective. Our involvement in Vietnam is only one of our problems, and some of our others are at least as important to America and to those of us—to those of you—who must lead it. For whatever we do, there is a way that we shape with whatever we do today. First of all, I am terribly concerned about our foreign policy and our involvement in Vietnam. If I doubt Vietnam and the war, and broadening it beyond Vietnam is unthinkable. Yet there are Americans who strongly favor this approach—a policy that seems to me to be an attempt to end the war in Vietnam by starting World War III.

A second major dissenting group calls itself as vocally for immediate and unilateral withdrawal of our military presence in Vietnam. It goes without saying that this immediate withdrawal of American military force is a political necessity as well. As Edwin Reischauer says in his new book, Beyond Vietnam, such an邊 withdraw is more than step, but surely it is not so much attractive. Congressman Lumborg considers this to be a minor disadvantage that all the rest, believe us when we say we will proceed to tendrá the Viet Cong and eventually the North Vietnamese. He considers it insignificant that the United States would lose that and even suggests that we might be better off in our relations with other nations if we were not so powerful and prestigious.

We have made errors before in domestic and international affairs, however. But the history of our involvement and the errors we have made in Vietnam have become vast and a lesson for far too many.

Of course we need to be concerned about how we got there, what our commitments were, what better alternatives there might have been. But even if we could agree on anything, it would not be worth our most serious consideration.

We must examine our presence in Vietnam in the light of the past. Even if we assume that we could have done something else, something better, let us look at our present involvement and consider what we might do now.

Vietnam will end sometime. When will it?

Some of our mistakes in Vietnam were made while we fought in Korea. What mistakes are we making elsewhere in the world and might we repeat them in Vietnam?

We have half a million men in Vietnam today, fighting a live war. A newly elected government in South Vietnam is fighting for its life. The National Liberation Front, which desires to take control of South Vietnam, is also threatened by the United States. I doubt that the United States government, which is bringing troops and supplies to the South, intends to be North Vietnamese. The supplies are not for South Vietnamese people. North Vietnam is being carried by the military struggle against both the NLF and the North Vietnamese. The United States agrees that both the NLF and the North Vietnamese are Fascists, and they are fighting for the same thing: to diminish the movement of troops and supplies to the South.

The South Vietnamese government has been fighting for years to make a meaningful military effort, although there have been some very fine South Vietnamese forces involved, and the United States agreement of their efforts should not be pushed farther. The South Vietnamese government has also not been very successful in mobilizing a popular public support in the area under their control.

A marrow also recognizes the effects, as well as military and political effects. Remembering that we have made mistakes in Vietnam, some of which are easily put to bed, and that we do not do it. The questions of policy affect South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Asia, and the rest of the world. One of the major dissenting groups in this country suggests the kind of escalation of military effort, carrying the North Vietnamese NLF to their knees to some sort of abject surrender. The Administration does not seek such unlimited escalation, so this is a sort of argument. The policy suggestions of these dissenters are dangerous, I believe. For the Chinese and for the Viet Cong. We are facing the end of the war, and broadening it beyond Vietnam is unthinkable. Yet there are Americans who strongly favor this approach—a policy that seems to me to be an attempt to end the war in Vietnam by starting World War III.

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But Reischauer says, in his book of study and experience in Asia provide some reason for us to take him seriously, says that there could be disastrous psychological consequences of withdrawal. It would, he says, send a massive psychological tremor through all of these countries (of South and Southeast Asia), further threatening their stability and perhaps sharply shifting their present international orientation.

In addition, he says, it increases the likelihood of wars of national liberation in the less developed countries in the world. He points out that national liberation movements in Asia, almost uniformly, are fearful that they too might be visited by guerrilla warfare or that the Chinese might decide to cut a path to their way of withdrawing from South Vietnam the Viet Cong and the NLF. At this point, when the stakes are high and there is no way to be easy, the Administration is causing us to withdraw; that the "high risk" politicians in the Communist world would have proved their case and the now nearly forgotten theory that communism is the "Wave of the Future" would be revived; and the prudent politicians in the Communist apparatus would lose much of their influence because they would be proved wrong.

Reischauer points out that there is something to be said for the simple psychological sense in which it is typically put. In the countries closest to Vietnam, he says, there is some strong appeal to this. The Administration is causing us to withdraw; to withdraw from the war in Vietnam, however skillfully we might try to conceal the withdrawal, would probably be an increase in instability in much of Asia and a decrease in the influence of the Communist world. It would contribute to the healthy growth of Asia. These adverse consequences might be felt in much of Asia for years to come.

Besides changing the political climate of Asia for the worse, Reischauer speculates that withdrawal from an American commitment for whatever reasons—political, strategic, moral—could encourage doubts in such nations as Japan and our European Allies about the reliability of commitments they have in Vietnam and to the policy of nuclear proliferation. What is involved here, he says, is not the loss of face, but the loss of faith.

Nuclear proliferation happens to be very much a central concern of peace in our world community. We hope and pray that the re­luctance of the United States to proliferate nuclear power will receive the support of nations which are now not a part of the nuclear community. If our commitments that we have made in Vietnam over and over again—despite what may have been the wisdom of those commitments—prove to be commitments that we are willing to forget, how can these nations, India and the rest, believe us when we say we will protect them from nuclear war and not contribute to the nuclear community of nations?

I must suggest to you. You may have to judge our policy in Vietnam as mistaken. You may have to happen to think that two of them have been worth our most serious consideration.

Today, fighting a war in Vietnam. It is also threatened by the United States. I doubt that the United States government, which is bringing troops and supplies to the South, intends to be North Vietnamese. The supplies are not for South Vietnamese people. North Vietnam is being carried by the military struggle against both the NLF and the North Vietnamese. The United States agrees that both the NLF and the North Vietnamese are Fascists, and they are fighting for the same thing: to diminish the movement of troops and supplies to the South.

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Nuclear proliferation happens to be very much a central concern of peace in our world community. We hope and pray that the reluctance of the United States to proliferate nuclear power will receive the support of nations which are now not a part of the nuclear community. If our commitments that we have made in Vietnam over and over again—despite what may have been the wisdom of those commitments—prove to be commitments that we are willing to forget, how can these nations, India and the rest, believe us when we say we will protect them from nuclear war and not contribute to the nuclear community of nations?
First, our involvement in Vietnam is not a matter strictly between us, Saigon, the NLF, and Hanoi. What we do make a difference elsewhere. Any major action must be weighed in the light of its consequences—both those which are obvious and those which are not.

Second, I have taken other considerations in addition to history and morality which may be important to the policy of a nation involved in a tremendously complex network of interests throughout the world. Just as we cannot think only of our pride and our prestige in discussing the war in Vietnam, I cannot think only of our errors and our guilt.

No doubt this is one reason for the gap between the real differences and the imagined differences in position on Vietnam among public figures in America. A few weeks ago, in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, one of the analysts reported that the emotional gap in Vietnam seemed to be far broader than the factual gap in differences of point of view. I think there is indeed an emotion gap, one that stems from assigning broad significance to narrow distinctions.

For example, one universal point of view is that the Senate critics of Vietnam to the Administration. Senator Church, I believe, has publicly advocated immediate unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. When I say immediate unilateral withdrawal in Vietnam accepts the fact that our presence will be required for the foreseeable future.

There is no great joy among Administration critics over this fact of life, but they all know what precipitous action would mean. I have said publicly that the war should be fought as much as possible by the single nation, or any Individual, should be reduced a few days ago, which 57 Senators used to bring about negotiations. I suppose it is the responsibility of critics over this fact of life, but they know that the United States cannot act without considering all of these consequences. Take one example of the past and the present, that there are no magic wands. Their suggestions are limited to lesser which they believe can be taken with consequence. But the passionate and less reasonable recommendations otherwise, with far too little serious analysis of differing positions and far too much wish-fulfillment. Let me use myself as an example.

I have said publicly that the Administration is to the Administration policy, but I feel free to criticize, and I have done so when I felt our policy to be in error.

I have said publicly that I think we were wrong to go beyond bombing supply lines, railroads, bridges, and the like, to the bombing of Vietnamese homes, to the effort to destroy the will of that nature. I believe that we should stay away from targets which raise the risk of inflicted civilian casualties. I have said that we must be willing to take a chance to see a hint of better accommodation by the North Vietnamese before I take that chance. I have said that the article written by Wilfred Burchett, who has traditionally been used by the Hanoi government to disclose its position, about ten years ago. I pointed out that even if we cease bombing at this time, Hanoi is not interested—If he put it—even in talks, until the bombing of North Vietnam stops finally and completely. The only steps that would lead to talks—not negotiations—would be for us to stop bombing North Vietnam, cease all military activity, and withdraw our troops from South Vietnam. Then they would begin talks, Burchett suggests. Negotiations might follow.

I don't know for sure whether stopping the bombing is better than continuing, and neither does anyone else. But as I said, I would like to see a stronger hint on the part of the Hanoi government and the NLF that they will negotiate.

That desire for negotiation does not separate the Administration from opponents of the Administration, except in the eyes of those who seek to over simplify the confrontations of that group that is not in favor of negotiations now or any time, but they are the dissenters who believe in complete military victory.

Who those will discuss the war must be certain to make the real distinctions. They must be careful not to magnify differences or create them where they do not exist.

There is much more than Vietnam policy involved. I am somewhat concerned about the climate I see, that polarizes gradual differences in views on Vietnam and focuses the attention of all other problems. Tom Wicker described it recently in the New York Times as an agony that has overtaken the nation. "What is the weather it was summed up in a picture widely printed in the European press—the contorted face of the young American soldier, the sad expression of the old man, the veins of a passionate contempt outlined in his neck, his fists clenched under a policeman's riot club. It is a spectacle that is, so fierce and so despairing, so the violence and cruelty of men in iron helmets?"

Wicker asks, "Is it possible that perhaps the war in Vietnam had nothing to do with the rest of the world?" But I think the rest of the world might have had to be invented. "Something," he said, "was needed to symbolize, and thus to give focus and energy to, a profound but voiceless discontent with the land of the free and the home of the brave—to a deep sense that something was wrong, some failure was distorting and perverting the idea of America."

And it's true that the waving of the new in America, this disillusionment over contradiction. Righting the wrongs of past and present, whatever they may be, is essential to the development and leadership of our nation. But as Wicker said, "there is something repugnant in it, too, in the insolence with which it is done, in the ferocity with which these failures have troubled us from the beginning—they troubled Jefferson and Lincoln and Bryan and Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. Our present failures go beyond Vietnam, and the danger is that in the distress over Vietnam we will lose sight of their magnitude.

Vietnam is such an obsessive, emotional struggle that it is making us incapable of preserving ourselves in the world. I cannot see a world with only one issue and one position that can be taken on this.

Despite my deep frustration over Vietnam, I have always spoken of the war, my countrymen and I have always spoken of this deeply that in all of its tragedy, our present course is the best that we have to pursue. And I cannot bring myself to make further reservations to the point where they would be seen—inaccurately, but probably enthusiastically—as a fundamental objection to our policies in Vietnam.

I would ask you, instead, to devote some of your attention to our other problems, where your energy and your talent and your imagination can be applied much more effectively. To the problems of the world that we would permit them to be treated. And the fact that we have fallen miserably short of that promise, too. And this is the reason powerful Senators are proposing protectionist legislation that rivals the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the early 1930's.

Beyond that, we are stripping the underdeveloped nations of their skilled talents— their doctors and engineers and that thin
veneer of professional leadership that is absolutely indispensable to them if they are to have any chance for growth.

Moreover, there is a growing area of trade where we have willingly entered into development efforts, along with every other developed country. We have welcomed the underdeveloped nations of the world to the international arms race.

What the exhibition has increased is its grants and sales of arms to developing countries from $804.8 million in that year to $880.9 million last year, and almost threefold increase has been in sales, which are now more than six times as great as in 1962. The crusade for international development is as fundamental an issue as any of us face.

As a great failure, at least as important as the first, is our inability to develop the kind of workable international institution to which we must look for the order we have willingly entered into development. The League of Nations, one of the truly tragic stories in American history. We are coming very close to repeating it in the United Nations.

We must do far more to strengthen that institution, to contribute to its resources, to ratify it, to call upon this organization to deal with the broad, fundamental issues which this world faces. Without an international organization, there is some hope for keeping the peace, the chances of preventing Armageddon are dim indeed.

We face problems confined to international affairs. We face domestic problems of fantastic proportions for which we have yet to develop solutions, and even then we face solutions that are almost insurmountable. This despite the fact that we are in the 81st month of the longest, most vibrant period of economic growth in this nation's history, war or no war.

We now have a Gross National Product nearing $900 billion. In the United States alone, the people have only $43 billion; all of South Asia only about $50 billion. Last year the economy of the United States grew by $160 billion. Yet the full economy of all the nations of Antarctica produced, excluding South Africa.

Some of us will still reserve Gunnar Myrdal's judgment in Challenge to Affluence that there is an ugly smell rising from the basement of the stately American mansion. That smell is in the air. It mingles with the bitter odors of gunpowder and charred ruins in American cities across the land.

Our failure to convince the fact that our domestic mistakes of the past have reaped racial bitterness, human frustration and alienation of millions of American citizens who are trapped in American ghettos. Like the solution to the Vietnamese problem, the solution to the urban crisis defies simple identification.

Racial patterns of living are more deeply entrenched than ever before, and they are nationwide. As the chief author of the federal Fair Housing bill, I find nothing more disturbing than the frustrating trend in bringing to raise this issue—which for the first time involves Northerners, not just Southern residents. This nation's solution to the urban crisis defies simple identification.

I am proud as a Democrat, and I think you should be proud as Young Democrats that this week the first Negro was elected mayor of a major city in this country—and he bears our party label. And we can be proud of the elections in the Senate. But there is a darker side of those elections that none of us can ignore.

In cities like Chicago, only one out of four white Democrats voted for Stokes. The other three jumped over the Republicans. In Gary, Indiana, only 37 per cent of the white voters voted for Mr. Hatchett. Those ought to be sobering statistics.

There is another question of substance. We have a profound moral issue in this country, the question of whether we really believe in the other as people regardless of color. It is fundamental and basic and far from resolved.

Millions of Americans have educational systems hardly worthy of the word.

Ineffective law enforcement officers, inadequate public services, and an apathetic American public have created a new generation of bitterness and cynicism and hate, with leaders who see violence as an accepted method of settling grievances.

What has been our response? Too often there has been too much sympathy and too little action. We have run away from war, from suppression; a reverse violence which could make this nation even more divided.

Now, we must insist upon order unless you have justice. And the objective of a liberal, objective of a decent American, must be the accomplishment of order.

And yet this is a country where the poverty program is being virtually dismantled. We will be fortunate if we keep the structure of these programs, and we are almost certain to see only minimal increases in funding. A profoundly wealthy country, after it has made promise after promise of greater opportunity, after it has gone through one explosion after another, after it has been laid out for all of us to see, may yet turn its back on the poverty program.

We have salvaged only $10 billion, for rental supplements, $13.5 billion for the Teacher Corps, and about half of what the President asked for Model Cities.

Our efforts to create an emergency public jobs program lost in the Senate by 54 to 28. A program to fight rats in American cities was laughed down in the House of Representatives.

As I have said, we found money this year for space programs, and expanded arms credit sales to poor nations. But we barely saved new and beginning innovative programs for the cities.

There is no perfect correlation between attitudes toward the United States and the way people vote. Some of those who have made the argument that we can't afford guns and we must cut back ourselves have always voted against those same social programs.

What is basic in dealing with problems of the scene and the deterioration of resources going to Vietnam, although that clearly complicates it. There is a fundamental problem of the will to see it through, to do the programs the American people want to alleviate human problems at home and abroad.

The will that will require your effort, your involvement in this political party, your success at the polls.

We must see the need not to build flags or draft cards, or to convert decent human beings into demons and seek to destroy them. Hating is easy and self-righteousness is satisfying, but this course destroys more than it builds. It steers people from the forces of progress, further weights the balance in favor of reactionary, insensitive, and selfish, who already have the upper hand.

We are to generate full opportunity for all Americans. We will need resources in unprecedented proportions.

This will require a political coalition that can push the leadership of the Congress and at all levels of government. Where will the moral, Intellectual and material requirements be found that can save this program?

What hope is there that we can accomplish this goal of full opportunity?

If I am right, it rests in a genuine commitment. Much has been said about the Generation Gap. I personally believe there is a difference in your generation—deeper commitment to more honest, personal, moral and intellectual standards. If my appraisal is correct, I hope you never grow up—never adjust to the apathetic compromises that deprive the nation of the committed idealism that we must have.

Our party cannot continue to translate idealism to power at the polls. We must convince the Congress and at all levels of government. Where will the moral, Intellectual and material requirements be found that can save this program?

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The party and its ultimate success are the only hope for millions of people in this country and in the world who hope for opportunity, who want to succeed and care deeply about the issues. We cannot succeed without you.

You are here on the specific issue of Vietnam. Let me deal with it as best you can. It’s all right, all right. But I would ask that you decide two things:

First, make your decisions about Vietnam with full knowledge of the present and as much insight into the future possibilities as you can. We can be extremely blessed or extremely unfortunate by the multitude of voices. See the distinctions as they are, not as you’d like them to be.

Second, what is the kind of world and nation we want? What do we want to place in power? For you can’t get out of the world, and it’s not a pastoral dream. It is an attitude, it is an environment, it is a willingness to be involved that’s at stake here.

I see precious little chance that it is going to come from the other political party. If it comes at all, it will almost invariably come from the left. I am not arguing for perfection. But I think it makes an awful lot of difference whether you are willing to try; whether your dreams are still important enough to make a special effort. It is an attitude, it is a commitment, it is a willingness to be involved that’s at stake here.

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fully that the bill completely omits the
provisions of the convention, or-point and substitutes State legislatures at every step of the proposal and ratification process. For example, State legislatures, not the U.S. Congress or the courts, would ratify the proposals and have the final say on whether the state applications are valid, and it is foolish, for it leaves to local interests the exercise of a vital function of the nation.

Sections 3(c) and 13(b), which may conveniently be grouped together, provide that the state governors shall have no voice either in the state legislative decision to apply for a constitutional convention, or in the legislation created by the state legislature of such proposals as come out of the convention. Except on the questionable question of whether Congress has power to fix the law on these matters, these provisions are nullities. On that assumption, the provisions embody strange policy choices indeed. The amendment process is the most solemn one in our government; in it we discern ultimate power. Why should Congress elect positively to ordain that each state is to take two crucial steps in that process without a safeguard—substantial support from its governor, which would be necessary in the case of a bill regulating the working-hours of intramural workers by the Senate, and not creditable to the draftsmen of the bill. Governors are elected statewide; no governing or otherwise, unless their being responsible to the whole people of the state. Something roughly—though only very roughly—like the democratic principle would be introduced. If the governor had to approve, Governors, too, are likely to be people of relatively high intelligence and integrity. Their action would be visible. What is wanted, obviously, is to make the Constitution of the United States amendable by the state legislature; the membership of the state legislatures, with no check of any kind. Do the state legislatures, as we know them, really deserve such confidence?

I have already pointed out the futility
Section 6(a), where the attempt is made to make it the "duty" of the House of Congress to call a convention of a prescribed form, whatever the current judgment of Congress or the two-thirds vote of Congress, or as to the wise manner of constituting such a convention. One other thing needs to be noticed. The House of Representa­tives provides for issuance of a convention call by "concurrent" resolution, eliminating the step of submission to the President and possible veto of him, if any. There is nothing like the face of a constitutional text (Article I, § 7) not calling for interpretation, it is that "every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." The concurrent resolution, notforably, for this bypassing of the President would be the 1786 case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia, where (in an opinion which can be appreciated by anyone who cares to look at the report, to be inadequately reasoned), the Court held that the Constitution was constituting the Bill in Congress, and passed by the same two-thirds as is needed to override a veto, need not be presented to the President, a point which could have been given for this decision obviously has no application to the calling of a convention by the concurrent resolution method. The point is not the shakiest ground for holding such a measure unenamenable to Presidential veto, but the language of Article I, § 7, it is astounding—or, I am ashamed to say, it is astounding—that people who...