



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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REMARKS BY  
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HISTORY IS MARKED BY PIVOTAL TURNING POINTS -- TIMES WHEN KEY DECISIONS ARE MADE, OR NOT MADE, AND OUR LIVES ARE FOREVER CHANGED AS A RESULT. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AT MUNICH IN 1939; KENNEDY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; NASSER AND THE CRUCIAL MISCALCULATIONS WHICH LED TO THE SIX DAY WAR; THE SAUDIS IN THEIR DECISION TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT OPEC BY RESTRAINING THEIR OIL PRODUCTION -- THESE ARE JUST A FEW EXAMPLES.

THE UNITED STATES IS APPROACHING ONE OF THESE TURNING POINTS, THE TIME WHEN SOME INTEREST CRUCIAL TO OUR NATIONAL WELL-BEING WILL BE CHALLENGED AND WE WILL HAVE TO ACT OR SUFFER THE SUBSTANTIAL CONSEQUENCES. THE CHALLENGER IS THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS THROUGH PROXY. THE ARENA IS VERY LIKELY SOMEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE ANYWHERE. THE ONLY VIABLE RESPONSE, I FEAR, IS TO SEEK TO DETER BY THE PRESENCE OF A CREDIBLE THREAT TO USE MILITARY FORCE. IN THAT WAY WE WOULD HOPE TO AVOID THE USE OF THAT FORCE.

WE JEWS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN SCHIZOPHRENIC REGARDING DEFENSE POLICY. ON THE ONE HAND, WE HAVE SUPPORTED POLICIES BOLSTERING THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF ISRAEL, ARGUING THAT ISRAEL

IS IMPORTANT TO OUR OWN STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY JEWS HAVE OPPOSED EXPANDED MILITARY SPENDING AT HOME, PREFERRING TO DEVOTE THE RESOURCES TO LIBERAL DOMESTIC POLICIES. THIS TENDENCY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT POLICY-MAKERS IN KEY POSITIONS WERE FULL OF HIGH HOPES FOR DETENTE, THE MILITARY WAS STILL HARVESTING THE FRUITS OF PAST INVESTMENTS IN DEFENSE, AND, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE GETTING STRONGER, MANY ARGUED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ALLOW THE U.S.S.R. TO REACH MILITARY PARITY WITH THE U.S., SO THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GET OVER THE INFERIORITY COMPLEX THEY HAD ALLEGEDLY SUFFERED SINCE THEIR HUMILIATION IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

THE SOVIETS REACHED MILITARY PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT THAT DID NOT STOP THEIR MILITARY BUILDUP. SOON, U.S. POLICYMAKERS BEGAN REFERRING TO "ROUGH EQUIVALENCE" INSTEAD OF "EQUIVALENCE". STILL THE SOVIETS DIDN'T SLOW THEIR PACE. IN THE WORDS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN:

/ "SOVIET [MILITARY] SPENDING HAS NOT RESPONDED TO U.S. RESTRAINT. WHEN WE BUILT, THEY BUILT, WHEN WE CUT BACK OUR SPENDING, THEY CONTINUED TO BUILD."

AND NOW, WE ARE AT A TURNING POINT, ONE NOT OF OUR OWN MAKING.

IN EARLY DECEMBER, WHEN I FIRST TALKED TO YOU ABOUT THIS VITAL PROBLEM, I HAD THREE OBJECTIVES:

/ FIRST, TO ESTABLISH THAT THE RUSSIANS THREATENED U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE VALUES WE HOLD DEAR;

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( SECOND, TO SHOW THAT WE COULD NOT RELY ON INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES;

( THIRD, TO ILLUSTRATE HOW ILL-PREPARED WE WERE TO DEAL WITH SOVIET AGGRESSION, PARTICULARLY AT A MILITARY LEVEL, AND TO DESCRIBE WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE.

WHILE THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE <sup>EIGHT</sup>~~SIX~~ WEEKS AGO WHO SERIOUSLY DOUBTED WHETHER THE SOVIETS REALLY POSED A THREAT TO AMERICAN INTERESTS, THEIR NUMBERS HAVE DWINDLED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE IRANIAN REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HOSTAGES, AND THE RECENT SOVIET CRACKDOWN ON INTERNAL DISSIDENTS, INCLUDING ANDRE SAKHAROV.

TO INFORMED OBSERVERS, NONE OF THESE EVENTS CAME AS A SURPRISE. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS THE CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT PRO-SOVIET OPPRESSIVE REGIMES, REGIMES WHICH HAVE ALLOWED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET MILITARY FOOTHOLD IN THAT COUNTRY. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE RADICAL FORCES HOLDING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN WAS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OBJECTIVE TO ENCOURAGE INSTABILITY IN THAT COUNTRY AND THUS FURTHER THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIRDLY, THE CRACKDOWN ON SOVIET DISSIDENTS LIKE SAKHAROV IS A CONTINUATION OF A POLICY WHICH EARLIER SAW THE IMPRISONMENT OF ANATOLY SCHARANSKY AND VICTOR ORLOV, A POLICY WHICH HAS REPEATEDLY ILLUSTRATED THE SELF-DECEPTION OF MANY WHO THOUGHT THAT DETENTE WOULD LEAD TO INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION.

DETENTE HAS BEEN A DANGEROUS ILLUSION, A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE PREACHING DISARMAMENT, HAS INCREASED ITS MILITARY SPENDING TO 160% OF AMERICAN LEVELS. LET ME NOW QUOTE FROM THE FOREMOST ARCHITECT OF THE DETENTE POLICY, FORMER / SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER:

THERE IS NOW GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ... IMPROVEMENTS IN MISSILE ACCURACY AND WARHEAD TECHNOLOGY WILL PUT THE SOVIETS IN A POSITION TO DESTROY OUR LAND-BASED FORCES OF MINUTEMEN ICBMs BY 1982....

THE REVOLUTION IN THAT STRATEGIC BALANCE IS AGGRAVATED BY A COMPARABLE BUILDUP OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, AND THEATER BASED NUCLEAR FORCES, TO A POINT WHERE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER STRIKING FORCES IS UPON US.

ALL OF THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WHILE THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAS GROWN, AND WHILE THE REACH OF SOVIET POWER HAS BEEN EXTENDED ENORMOUSLY BY THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY, AN EXPANDING LONG-RANGE AIRLIFT CAPABILITY, THE ACQUISITION OF SOVIET BASES IN COUNTRIES LIKE SOUTH YEMEN AND VIETNAM, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VAST SOVIET ARMS DEPOTS IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, WHICH WILL ENABLE THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE ITS OWN OR PROXY TROOPS RAPIDLY TO THEIR PREPOSITIONED WEAPONS.

/ RARELY IN HISTORY HAS A NATION SO PASSIVELY ACCEPTED SUCH A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY BALANCE....



Bill Kober

THE EVENTS OF THE LAST SIX WEEKS HAVE ALSO ILLUSTRATED CONVINCINGLY THAT WE CANNOT DEPEND UPON INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVIETS ARE STILL IN AFGHANISTAN AND, THE OLYMPICS NOTWITHSTANDING, YOU CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL NOT BE OUT BY FEBRUARY 20. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE HOLDING BY IRAN OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AS HOSTAGES WERE BOTH VETOED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WHATEVER VALUE THE U.N. MAY HAVE AS AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING PLACE, AND THAT VALUE HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED BY THE RADICAL PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WHICH THE ORGANIZATION HAS SERVED IN RECENT TIMES, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE U.N. IS IN NO CONDITION, WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS INVOLVED, TO PERFORM THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE ROLE WHICH ITS OPTIMISTIC FOUNDERS FORESAW FOR IT IN THE 1940's.

~~OF MY THREE OBJECTIVES, THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE.~~ <sup>LEFT</sup> LET ME NOW TURN TO THE THIRD OBJECTIVE, TO ILLUSTRATE HOW POORLY PREPARED THE UNITED STATES IS TO DEAL WITH SOVIET MILITARY AGGRESSION.

LET'S LOOK FIRST AT STRATEGIC FORCES. BY STRATEGIC FORCES, I MEAN THE INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN THE MAINSTAY OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIETS SINCE WORLD WAR II. THERE IS TODAY WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST

THE UNITED STATES BY 1982, AND THAT THIS CAPABILITY WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX MISSILE, HOPEFULLY BY 1986. BY FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY, MILITARY PLANNERS MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DESTROY ALMOST ALL OF OUR ICBMs, MOST OF OUR BOMBERS, AND ALL OF THE SUBMARINES IN PORT WITH THE EXPENDITURE OF LESS THAN ONE-HALF OF THEIR SS18 MISSILES. THEY WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO RETALIATE AGAINST OUR CITIES IN A FAR GREATER WAY IF THE PRESIDENT RETALIATED FOR THAT FIRST STRIKE. (THAT RETALIATION BY THE U.S., A SECOND STRIKE AFTER THE RUSSIAN FIRST, WOULD BE TO LAUNCH OUR MISSILES ON WARNING, A POLICY WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND WHICH WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR.)

THE DANGER FROM THE SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY IS NOT NECESSARILY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACTUALLY LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE TO WHICH WE DONOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE BECAUSE IT WOULD ASSURE THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR CITIES. RATHER, THE PRINCIPAL RISK IS THAT THEY WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OR TO COMMIT CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AGGRESSION WITH IMPUNITY. FOR MANY YEARS THE UNITED STATES USED THE POWER OF ITS NUCLEAR UMBRELLA TO COUNTER-BALANCE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CERTAIN REGIONS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE TO OUR DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY GREATLY REDUCES THE CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN DETERENCE TO CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE.

HOW DID THE SOVIETS ACHIEVE THIS PREEMINENT POSITION?  
THE ANSWER IS THAT, IN THE LAST DECADE, THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVOTED TWO-AND-A-HALF TO THREE TIMES THE RESOURCES THAT WE HAVE TOWARD THE PROCURING OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE WE WERE LONG ABLE TO DEPEND UPON SUPERIORITY IN U.S. NUCLEAR ACCURACY TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE LARGER SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET ACCURACY IN RECENT YEARS HAS LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH BOTH HEAVIER AND NEARLY AS ACCURATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SINCE JUNE 1975, WE HAVE DEPLOYED NO ADDITIONAL ICBMs; OVER THE SAME PERIOD, THE SOVIETS, MAKING UP FOR THEIR LATE START IN PUTTING MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAVE DEPLOYED OVER 500 ICBMs OF NEW OR IMPROVED TYPES. BY 1985, THE SOVIET UNION'S ICBM MEGATONNAGE -- THAT IS, THE DELIVERABLE EXPLOSIVE POWER OF THEIR ICBMs -- WILL EXCEED THAT OF THE U.S. BY BETWEEN 3 AND 4-TO-1.

NOW, SOME MAY RESPOND TO THIS BY POINTING OUT THAT OUR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES WILL STILL BE RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE TO ATTACK DURING THIS PERIOD, LEAVING THE UNITED STATES WITH A SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THERE ARE SEVERAL FLAWS IN THIS LOGIC. FIRST OF ALL, AT ANY GIVEN TIME, HALF OF OUR SUBMARINES CARRYING BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE IN PORT AND WILL BE VULNERABLE TO A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE. FURTHERMORE, THE ACCURACY OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES IS MUCH LESS, WHICH MEANS THAT THEY ARE PRIMARILY OF USE AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS, LIKE CITIES. I SUGGEST THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT LIKELY TO RESPOND TO A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE ON



MILITARY TARGETS BY ATTACKING SOVIET CITIES, GIVEN THE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO MOUNT A SECOND STRIKE AND UTTERLY DESTROY OUR OWN CITIES. SUCH A THREAT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INCREDIBLE IN LIGHT OF THE SUPERIOR SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS, SINCE OUR LOSSES FROM SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD BE MUCH GREATER THAN THEIRS.

FRANKLY, THERE IS VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO IN THE SHORT-TERM ABOUT THIS NEW SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY. FROM 1981 TO 1985, IN PARTICULAR, THE U.S. WILL BE ESPECIALLY SUBJECT TO SOVIET NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED IS THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX MOBILE MISSILE. THAT DEPLOYMENT IS HOPEFULLY TO BEGIN BY 1986. UNTIL THEN, WE MUST LIVE WITH THE RISKS GENERATED BY OUR PAST MISTAKES.

JUST IN CASE ALL OF THIS "THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE", AS HERMAN KAHN ONCE DESCRIBED NUCLEAR STRATEGYMAKING, SEEMS A LITTLE TOO ABSTRACT AS WELL AS COLD, LET'S LOOK AT AN AREA OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY WHICH POSES A MORE CURRENT THREAT, THE SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. HERE IS A SET OF FACTS I THINK YOU'LL FIND INTERESTING:

- ✓ 1. THE RUSSIANS ARE STOCKPILING HIGHLY ADVANCED WEAPONS IN THEIR CLIENT STATE OF SOUTH YEMEN, WEAPONS WHICH ARE TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR THEIR YEMEN ALLIES TO USE. THESE WEAPONS INCLUDE THE HIGHLY ADVANCED T62 BATTLE TANKS.
- ✓ 2. THE RUSSIAN BRIGADE IN CUBA IS TRAINING CUBANS TO USE THE T62 BATTLE TANKS, WHICH ARE FAR NEWER THAN THE T34s THE CUBANS USED IN ANGOLA.

✓ 3. THE RUSSIANS ARE BUILDING AN AIR BASE IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS THE CAPACITY TO HANDLE LONG-RANGE TRANSPORTS.

✓ 4. THE RUSSIANS ENTERED INTO A FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH SOUTH YEMEN ON OCTOBER 25, A DEFENSE TREATY DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE WARSAW PACT. IT APPEARS AS IF SOUTH YEMEN'S ARMED FORCES HAVE IN EFFECT BECOME INTEGRATED INTO A SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE WARSAW PACT UNDER ITS BUDAPEST COMMAND, THE FIRST TIME A NON-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY HAS BEEN SO INVOLVED. SOUTH YEMENI OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE BUDAPEST HEADQUARTERS AND THE NUMBER OF CUBAN AND RUSSIAN "ADVISERS" IN SOUTH YEMEN HAS BEEN INCREASED. ACCORDING TO SAUDI INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIAN PILOTS ARE FLYING BOMBERS BASED AT ADEN IN SOUTH YEMEN.

✓ 5. IN LATE AUGUST, THE SOVIETS HELD MILITARY MANEUVERS IN SOUTH YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA WHICH INVOLVED THE AIRLIFTING OF PARTS OF SEVEN DIVISIONS TO THAT AREA. THESE DIVISIONS MAKE UP THE SOVIET UNION'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. ISRAELI ANALYSTS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW CAPABLE OF AIRLIFTING TWO FULLY EQUIPED ARMIES TO SOUTH YEMEN OR ETHIOPIA IN 36 TO 72 HOURS. ACCORDING TO FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ADMIRAL ELMO ZUMWALT, TWO DIVISIONS OF SOVIET TROOPS COULD BE DROPPED INTO SAUDI ARABIA IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS, OR 4 DIVISIONS IN 48 HOURS. IN COMPARISON, SECRETARY BROWN HAS SAID IT WOULD TAKE 10 DAYS TO MOVE ONE

SECRETARY BROWN HAS SAID IT WOULD TAKE 10 DAYS TO MOVE ONE AMERICAN DIVISION FROM THE U.S. TO THE PERSIAN GULF; AND WE'RE NOT READY TO GET MUCH BEYOND THAT.

6. SOUTH YEMEN IS RIGHT NEXT DOOR TO OMAN, WHICH BORDERS ON THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ARE THE BOTTLENECK THROUGH WHICH NEARLY ALL PERSIAN GULF OIL HEADING FOR THE WEST MUST PASS. THIS BOTTLENECK IS VULNERABLE TO SABOTAGE OR TERRORIST ATTACK, CUTTING OFF WESTERN OIL SUPPLIES.

IT DOESN'T REQUIRE ANY GREAT STRATEGIST TO DEDUCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PILING UP ALL THAT ADVANCED HARDWARE IN SOUTH YEMEN TO PROTECT THEIR YEMENI ALLIES FROM OUTSIDE INVADERS. IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A QUICK-REACTION CONTINGENCY FORCE. ACCORDING TO ADMIRAL ZUMWALT, AS PRESENTLY PLANNED, THAT FORCE WILL NOT REACH USEFUL CAPABILITIES BEFORE THE MID-1980s. UNTIL THAT TIME, WE FACE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO DEPLOY OUR FORCES TO PROTECT THE MIDDLE EAST OIL FIELDS AGAINST INCURSIONS BY THE SOVIETS OR THEIR ALLIES.

IT IS TRUE THAT OUR PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE EXACERBATED BECAUSE THE COUNTRIES IN QUESTION ARE SO MUCH CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS MIRRORED ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.

TAKE WESTERN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE. IN THE LAST DECADE, THE SOVIETS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A MAJOR ARMS BUILDUP OPPOSITE NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. PREVIOUSLY, THE CLEAR QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY

OF NATO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES COUNTER-BALANCED THE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS OF WEAPONS. THIS BALANCE HAS BEEN NULLIFIED BY THE EXTENSIVE MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET FORCES AND BY THE ADDITION OF APPROXIMATELY 150,000 MEN IN THE LAST DECADE TO THE SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN EASTERN EUROPE. UNLIKE THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA, THE SOVIET FORCES ARE PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR OFFENSIVE USE, AND ARE TRAINED TO USE BLITZKRIEG TACTICS LIKE THOSE WHICH WERE DEVELOPED BY NAZI GERMANY.

IN THE LAST DECADE, THE WARSAW PACT HAS INTRODUCED NEARLY 12,000 MAJOR COMBATANT WEAPONS INTO CENTRAL EUROPE. IN ALMOST EVERY MAJOR WEAPONS CATEGORY WHERE THEY HAD A LEAD THEY HAVE INCREASED IT; IN MOST AREAS WHERE THE WARSAW PACT WAS BEHIND, THEY HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD, BOTH IN NUMBERS AND QUALITY OF WEAPONS.

IN NORTH AND CENTRAL EUROPE, 680,000 NATO COMBAT AND DIRECT SUPPORT TROOPS FACE 945,000 WARSAW PACT TROOPS; 7,000 NATO TANKS FACE 20,500 WARSAW PACT TANKS, 2,085 OPERATIONAL NATO AIRCRAFT FACE 4,230 OPERATIONAL WARSAW PACT AIRCRAFT; SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES HAVE BEEN VASTLY IMPROVED. EVEN IN MANY DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, THE WARSAW PACT IS SUPERIOR TO NATO. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY USED CHEMICAL WARFARE, MOST RECENTLY IN ETHIOPIA AND REPORTEDLY IN AFGHANISTAN, NATO FORCES ARE NOT PROPERLY EQUIPPED TO DEFEND AGAINST SUCH WEAPONS. AND A HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE FOUND THAT, BECAUSE OF SHORTAGES OF AMMUNITION AND REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT IN EUROPE, NATO FORCES WOULD EXHAUST THEIR EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION IN WAR IN A MATTER OF DAYS RATHER THAN WEEKS OR MONTHS.



NATO MEMBER NATIONS ARE NOW MAKING EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO UPGRADE THE CAPABILITIES OF NATO. BUT THIS IS A COME-FROM-BEHIND EFFORT, ONE WHICH REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN SPENDING BY ALL NATO MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. WITHOUT SUCH EXPENDITURES, RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INTO PURSUING SOVIET-DICTATED POLICIES CAN ONLY INCREASE.

EVEN IN THE AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD A TRADITIONAL SUPERIORITY, SUCH AS IN NAVAL FORCES, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MAKING SUBSTANTIAL GAINS. THE U.S. NEEDS A SUPERIOR NAVY TO THAT OF THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE THE U.S. IS A WORLD ISLAND, THE CENTER OF A VAST MARITIME ALLIANCE. WE MUST HAVE CONTROL OF THE SEALANES IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO REINFORCE OUR ALLIES AND SAFEGUARD IMPORTS OF ENERGY AND RARE STRATEGIC MINERALS AND NATURAL RESOURCES. IN ITS SIMPLEST FORM, WE MUST BE ABLE TO SEE THAT AN OIL TANKER GETS ALL THE WAY FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO THE PORT OF NEW YORK, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION ONLY HAS TO SINK THAT TANKER ONCE.

RECENTLY, IN ORDER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE U.S. HAD TO STRIP OUR NAVAL FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND MEDITERRANEAN SEA SO THAT WE COULD DISPATCH VESSELS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE MEMORY OF PENTAGON OFFICIALS, THE U.S. IS LEFT WITH NO CARRIER DEFENDING THE SOUTH KOREANS AND THE JAPANESE IN NORTHEAST ASIA; AND ONLY ONE CARRIER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. MOREOVER, OF THE THREE AIRCRAFT



CARRIERS NOW IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, TWO OF THEM ARE OVER 20 YEARS OLD AND ARE APPARENTLY EXPERIENCING MECHANICAL PROBLEMS, BECAUSE, AS ONE PENTAGON ANALYST SAID, "THEY ARE BEING PUSHED TO THE POINT OF EXHAUSTION!"

MEANWHILE, THE SOVIET UNION IS BUILDING ITS FIRST NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK CARRIER AND IS EXPECTED TO BUILD 4 OR 5. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO COME OUT WITH FOUR NEW CLASSES OF NUCLEAR POWERED CRUISERS, A NEW SUBMARINE WHICH CAN DIVE TO 2 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DEPTHS OF U.S. SUBS AND CAN STEAM AT 42 KNOTS (FASTER THAN ANY VESSEL IN THE U.S. FLEET) AND A NEW CLASS OF NEW HEAVILY ARMED LOGISTIC VESSELS. THE SOVIETS ARE, FURTHERMORE, MAKING A HEAVY INVESTMENT IN SHIPYARD EXPANSION, INDICATING INCREASED SOVIET NAVAL GROWTH IN THE FUTURE.

ADDITIONALLY, ALTHOUGH SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS ARE ON THE AVERAGE SMALLER THAN THE U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THE SOVIET VESSELS EMPHASIZE SPEED AND HAVE GREATER FIREPOWER. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS HAVE EXPLOITED THE TECHNOLOGY OF SUBMARINES AND OF CRUISE MISSILES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ATTACK CAPABILITY WHICH, I AM TOLD, COULD COMPLETELY DECIMATE THE U.S. SURFACE FORCES IN A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK. THE U.S. DOES NOT YET HAVE ANY SHIPBORNE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS THAT HAVE A HIGH CAPABILITY AGAINST MULTIPLE ATTACKS BY SUCH MISSILES. FURTHERMORE, THE GROWING FORCE OF CRUISE MISSILE CAPABLE BACKFIRE BOMBERS ASSIGNED TO SOVIET NAVAL AIR FORCES IS BECOMING A SERIOUS THREAT TO OUR NAVAL FORCES.

AGAIN, THESE NUMBERS MAY ALL SOUND TERRIBLY ABSTRACT. WE CAN BRING THE POINT HOME BY REMINDING OURSELVES THAT, DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, THE UNITED STATES WAS ONLY ABLE TO DEPLOY 65 AMERICAN WARSHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, FACING 98 SOVIET WARSHIPS THERE. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT HAS WRITTEN OF THAT PERIOD: "I KNOW OF NO COMPETENT AUTHORITY IN THE BUSINESS AT THE TIME WHO DID NOT SHARE MY VIEW THAT HAD WE GONE TO WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THAT CONFRONTATION, THE UNITED STATES NAVY WOULD HAVE BEEN DEFEATED." THE DISPARITY IS TODAY FAR WORSE.

THERE IS NO NEED TO PROLONG THE PRESENTATION WITH ADDITIONAL DATA. WE HAVE BEEN CUTTING OUR MILITARY SPENDING FOR THE LAST DECADE, WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INCREASING THEIRS. WE HOPED THAT WHEN THEY REACHED PARITY WITH US, THEY WOULD STOP. THEY HAVEN'T. NOW WE ARE CAUGHT IN THE UNFORTUNATE POSITION WHERE OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS ARE AT RISK. WE HAVE COLLECTIVELY DONE IT TO OURSELVES. WE MUST STEEL OURSELVES TO THE FACT THAT MILITARY SPENDING IS GOING TO BE DRASTICALLY INCREASED. WE CAN AFFORD IT -- AT 4.6% OF THE GNP IN 1979, COMPARED WITH 8.8% IN 1960, OUR RELATIVE COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE SPENDING IS LOWER THAN IT HAS BEEN SINCE BEFORE THE KOREAN WAR.

WE ARE ALSO GOING TO HAVE TO CONSIDER DOING SOME OTHER THINGS THAT WE DON'T LIKE TO THINK ABOUT, LIKE REINSTITUTING THE DRAFT. FROM 1970 TO 1979, SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER INCREASED TO 4.3 MILLION WHILE U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER FELL FROM 3.1 MILLION TO 2.1 MILLION. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LET THAT DISPARITY CONTINUE. THIS IS ALL PART OF THE PRICE WE WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR HAVING LIVED

WITH AN ILLUSION FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS. BUT IF WE CAN LIVE THROUGH THIS PERIOD WITHOUT PAYING A MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRICE FOR OUR PAST MISTAKES, WE CAN BE GRATEFUL, IRONICALLY, TO THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS FOR ALERTING US IN TIMELY FASHION.