



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

Office of the Dean

October 27, 1983

The Hon. Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Max:

Great seeing you again last Thursday, fresh after your visit with Muriel. Connie was terribly sorry to miss you, but it begins to look as though she will get out by November 6. They are calibrating the medication (Scoop had same ailment: myasthenia gravis and took medication for 30 years. God, do we need him.).

On behalf of Ted Eliot and all of us at The Fletcher School, thank you for your tremendous contribution to the understanding of Madrid and Helsinki. Both students and faculty as well as the assembled foreign diplomats, I am certain, benefitted from your skillful summary and thought-provoking analysis of the problems encountered dealing with adherents of a radically different political culture for whom negotiations is a weapons-system.

With affectionate regards to Maggie from us both.

Yours,

John P. Roche

jc

FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & KAMPELMAN

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

SUITE 1000

600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

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MAX M. KAMPELMAN, P.C.
202-342-3520


October 24, 1983

Professor John P. Roche
The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy
Tufts University
Medford, Massachusetts 02155


Dear John:

I want to tell you how deeply grateful I am to you for your courtesy during my brief visit to your school. Everybody was kind, courteous and attentive. I was particularly impressed with the time you gave me in the light of the tremendous pressures that you've been under. Would you therefore please send to Connie my love and Maggie's.

Sincerely,


Max M. Kampelman

MMK:nct



THE FLETCHER SCHOOL
1983-1984
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER

"THE LESSONS OF THE MADRID NEGOTIATIONS"

THE HONORABLE MAX M. KAMPELMAN
AMBASSADOR AND CHAIRMAN,
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1983

8:00 P.M.

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
ASEAN AUDITORIUM

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is honored to welcome The Honorable Max M. Kampelman to give a Charles Francis Adams lecture as part of the Negotiating World Order Project, directed by Professor Alan K. Henrikson. A feature of the observance of the fiftieth anniversary of The Fletcher School, this effort will bring to The Fletcher School persons of international experience who have worked to combine theoretical "world order" thinking and skill in diplomatic negotiation.

Ambassador Kampelman received the presidential appointment to head the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1980. A partner of the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Ambassador Kampelman is also inter alia the Chairman of Freedom House (New York), Chairman of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Jerusalem), a member of the Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He serves as well on the board of a number of universities, including Georgetown.

A native New Yorker, Ambassador Kampelman received his bachelor of arts degree from New York University, where he subsequently earned the degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1945. He then studied politics at the University of Minnesota, where he received the master and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science. In 1982, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

In keeping with his varied professional and academic experiences, Ambassador Kampelman is the author of numerous publications on topics ranging from "I.V.A. Labor Relations" to "The Helsinki Process Is in Danger." One of his recent publications is entitled "Negotiating with the Soviets in Madrid," World Affairs (Spring 1982).

All members of the Fletcher and Tufts communities, and interested public, are invited to attend the lecture and to participate in the discussion that will follow.

For further information, please telephone 628-7010, ext. 2711. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is located on the campus of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155.

PLEASE POST

Max:

I apologize, but I have to
rush - it was great seeing
you again - Thank you
very much. I will
tell my son Michael
to send you his new
CV - he really
wants to work in the
tax-estates field & has
suddenly "blossomed"
in it.

Bless you

Avi



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
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"FORMATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY"
OCTOBER 19 - 21, 1983

A seminar for selected foreign diplomats given by The Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy and The Executive Council on Foreign Diplomats

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1983

- 9:30 a.m. Coffee (C701)
9:45 - 10:45 a.m. LIVING WITH U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A 30 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (C702)
The Hon. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
11:00 - 12:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT (C702)
Academic Dean John P. Roche
12:30 - 2:00 p.m. Reception (C701) & Luncheon (C703)
2:00 - 3:30 p.m. SOURCES OF POLICY PLANNING: A VIEW FROM OUTSIDE (C702)
Professor Alan K. Henrikson
3:45 - 5:00 p.m. SOURCES OF POLICY PLANNING: A VIEW FROM INSIDE (C703)
The Hon. Leonard Unger
5:30 p.m. Reception hosted by Dean Eliot (20 Professors Row)
7:00 p.m. Dinner (C703)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1983

- 9:00 a.m. Coffee (C701)
9:30 - 10:45 a.m. CONGRESS AND THE LOBBIES (C702)
Research Associate William G. Miller
11:00 - 12:00 noon THE BUDGET (C702)
Chief Economist Van Ooms, House Budget Committee
12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Reception (C701) & Luncheon (C703)
1:30 - 2:45 p.m. U.S. TRADE POLICY (C702)
Professor William S. Barnes
3:00 - 4:30 p.m. U.S. MONETARY POLICY (C702)
Professor Robert S. Dohner
4:45 - 5:30 p.m. Reception with faculty & students (Cabot 2nd floor)

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1983

- 9:00 a.m. Coffee (C701)
9:30 - 12:00 noon IS THERE AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? -- Roundtable Discussion (C702)
The Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,
and The Hon. John D. Scanlan
12:00 - 2:00 p.m. Luncheon & Informal Discussion (C703)
U.S. DECISION-MAKING: THE HELSINKI PROCESS
The Hon. Max M. Kampelman
2:00 - 3:45 p.m. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY (C702)
The Hon. Hewson A. Ryan
3:45 - 4:00 p.m. Closing Remarks & Adjourn
4:00 p.m. Depart

October 31, 1983 - The Fletcher School

Mr. Richard Hill
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Bank of Boston
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Mr. Ira Stepanian
President
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Boston, Massachusetts 02110

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Cabot Corporation
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Mr. John G.L. Cabot
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The Honorable Herbert Abrams
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Mr. William O. Taylor
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Boston, Massachusetts 02107

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Professor Uri Ra'anan
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Ms. Susan Chandler
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Ms. Stephanie Connor
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
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Medford, Massachusetts 02155

Professor Harold J. Berman
Harvard Law School
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
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October 7, 1983

Ms. Sharon Martin
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Ms. Martin:

To follow up on our telephone conversations regarding Ambassador Kampelman's visit to The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on October 20th and 21st, I list below the general schedule of events.

<u>October 20th</u>	Arrive Hyatt Regency, Cambridge (guaranteed reservation) Late Afternoon
5:30 p.m. approx.	Arrive The Fletcher School Meet with Dean Roche, Cabot 402A
6:00 p.m.	Reception, 7th floor, Cabot Intercultural Center
6:45 p.m.	Dinner honoring Ambassador Kampelman
8:00 p.m.	Charles Francis Adams Lecture/NWOP [*] in ASEAN Auditorium "The Lessons of the Madrid Negotiations" The Hon. Max M. Kampelman (Questions following lecture)
<u>October 21st</u>	Arrive The Fletcher School
11:00 a.m. approx.	Join Roundtable discussion in progress, Cabot 702 "Is There <u>An</u> American Foreign Policy?" (See enclosure.)
12:00 noon	Luncheon & informal lecture with discussion, Cabot 703 "U.S. Decision-Making: The Helsinki Process" The Hon. Max M. Kampelman
2:00 p.m.	Depart

I am enclosing two programs for the foreign diplomats seminar -- a short and a long version. The shorter version does not reflect the evening lecture on the 20th, as it is a separate event. The long program gives you some background on the participating Fletcher faculty. There is also a list of foreign diplomats and their countries, and finally, the invitation list for the dinner in Ambassador Kampelman's honor.


Ms. Sharon Martin

- 2 -

October 7, 1983

Please do not hesitate to call (ext. 2711), if you have any questions. All of the Fletcher community is indeed looking forward to Ambassador Kampelman's visit.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Eugenia Dyess".

Eugenia C. Dyess, Director
Special Educational Programs

jc

enclosures

** negotiating World Order Project*

FLETCHER

Calendar of Events

OCTOBER 1983

- SYMPOSIUM ON MODERN SPAIN, sponsored by The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, ext. 3436, each Wednesday in October.
- OCTOBER 5 3:30 p.m. Sr. Fernando Postigo, Journalist, "Terrorism in Spain: A Threat to Democracy," Mugar 232.
- OCTOBER 6-8 CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA, sponsored by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta), and The Asia Society; The Hon. Leonard Unger, Conference Chmn., ext. 3065.
- OCTOBER 6 8:30 p.m. H.E. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," ASEAN Auditorium.

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT

The Charles
Francis Adams
Lecture Series

The John M. Olin
Distinguished Lecture
Series in International
Business

The Maurice S.
Segal Lecture

As part of the observance of the Fiftieth Anniversary of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, lectures will be given by leading figures who have played distinguished roles in "Negotiating World Order" in various spheres of international activity, particularly involving multilateral diplomacy. Professor Alan K. Henrikson, Chairman of the Negotiating World Order Project, will select a number of lectures for publication in an edited volume.

- OCTOBER 13 11:30 a.m. JOHN M. OLIN DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Mr. John C. Marous, Jr., President, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, "How U.S. Companies Can Compete in the Global Marketplace," ASEAN Auditorium.
- OCTOBER 20 8:00 p.m. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS LECTURE/NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT
The Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Chief U.S. Representative to the Conference on Security and Cooperation, "The Lessons of the Madrid Negotiations," ASEAN Auditorium.
- OCTOBER 25 4:30 p.m. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS LECTURE/NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT
Dr. Robert D. Hormats F'66, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, "The 'Economic Summit' Meetings," Cabot 702.
- OCTOBER 31 6:00 p.m. MAURICE S. SEGAL LECTURE/NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT
The Hon. John Roberts, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada, "The Diplomacy of Acid Rain: The North American Experience in Global Perspective," ASEAN Auditorium.

For further information: Ms. Eugenia C. Dyess, Director of Special Educational Programs, 628-7010, ext. 2711.

PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

"FORMATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY"

A seminar for selected foreign diplomats given by The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and The Executive Council on Foreign Diplomats

OCTOBER 19 -21, 1983

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1983

9:30 a.m.	Coffee
9:45 - 10:45 a.m.	FOREIGN POLICY
11:00 - 12:30 p.m.	THE PRESIDENT
12:30 p.m.	Luncheon with participating faculty
2:00 - 3:30 p.m.	SOURCES OF POLICY PLANNING
3:45 - 5:00 p.m.	SOURCES OF POLICY PLANNING
5:30 p.m.	Reception hosted by Dean Eliot
7:00 p.m.	Dinner with faculty & guests

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1983

9:00 a.m.	Coffee
9:30 - 10:45 a.m.	CONGRESS, THE BUDGET AND LOBBIES
11:00 - 12:00 noon	CONGRESS, THE BUDGET AND LOBBIES
12:00 noon	Luncheon with participating faculty
1:30 - 2:45 p.m.	U.S. MONETARY POLICY
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	U.S. TRADE POLICY
4:45 - 5:30 p.m.	Reception with Fletcher faculty & students

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1983

9:00 a.m.	Coffee
9:30 - 12:00 noon	THE MEDIA & HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
12:15 - 2:00 p.m.	Luncheon with Guest Speaker & participating faculty
	Lecture by The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
2:00 p.m.	Closing Remarks
	Adjourn

9/7/83



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

Office of the Dean

September 7, 1983

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Max:

We were delighted to learn that you can come to Fletcher for the events of October 20 and 21. The evening of the 20th we would have a small (25-30) dinner for you with as interesting a group as we can round up in the area (anyone you would suggest?), followed by a public address in the auditorium. As a tentative title I would suggest "The Lessons of the Madrid Negotiations." It would be the usual format-- 30-40 minutes followed by questions and answers.

6pm dinner
8pm speech
formal

On the morning of the 21st, we hope you would join the panel discussion (see enclosed schedule) for the 25 selected foreign diplomats and give a luncheon talk on, say, the inputs to American handling of the "Helsinki process." We can juggle the time to have you out by two and at that time of day it is twenty minutes to the airport.

9:30am
12:15-2
speech lunch
5pm dinner

Our financial straits limit the honorarium to \$1000, plus expenses. We will be glad to book your reservation for the night of the 20th at the Hyatt Regency in Cambridge, a short cab ride from here. I hope this is agreeable--we look forward with delight to having you here.

Congratulations on the Madrid job. For once our old adversaries ran into somebody who knew the political value of sitzfleisch! I wish I knew what was going on in the Politburo: when they blindsided Troyanovsky at the U.N. on what the line on KAL 007 is, it begins to look as though there was knifework behind the drapes.

With warm wishes,

Yours

John P. Roche
John P. Roche

Jean Adrien
Jean Callahan

cc: Dean Eliot

P.S. Saw Edgar Berman on tv flogging new book. How has he so long escaped the men in the white suits?

Medford, Massachusetts 02155
617 628-7010
Cable: FLETCHER

Hyatt Regency Cambridge
617-492-1234

10/21

Fletcher School

August 29, 1983

Mr. Robert V. Lindsay
23 Wall Street
New York, New York 10015

Dear Mr. Lindsay:

Thank you very much for your most gracious letter of August 12. I did tell John Roche that I would make every effort to appear at your program in October, and I have put the dates down on my calendar in that expectation. It is my recollection that he suggested a noon luncheon talk on the 21st of October. There was also to be an additional function the previous evening, and I imagine I will hear about it in due time.

Thank you very much for forwarding to me the information about your program. It is clearly an important one.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:pg

*23 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.
10015*

RECEIVED
AUG 19 1983

August 12, 1983

ROBERT V. LINDSAY

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037


Dear Ambassador Kampelman:

Dean John P. Roche of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has recently invited you to participate in the seminar "Formation of United States Foreign Policy" to be held at The Fletcher School in October. As Chairman of the Board of Overseers of the Executive Council on Foreign Diplomats, which is sponsoring the program, I would like to join him in this invitation.

The seminar will brief newly arrived foreign diplomats on foreign policy making in the United States. The Council has received Secretary of State George Shultz's personal endorsement as an effective means of better acquainting foreign diplomats with the American people and system, and the Department of State is quite enthusiastic about this briefing program.

Your knowledge of the United States foreign policy process would make a valuable contribution to a better understanding of this country, and I hope you can accept our invitation to participate. Americans themselves benefit when foreign diplomats report our country accurately, and your willingness to contribute your expertise would greatly advance this goal. A diplomat of your stature can offer extremely useful insights into the formation of United States foreign policy.

Sincerely,



"FORMATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY"
and
NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL BRIEFING PROGRAM

Understanding how U.S. foreign policy is formulated is difficult even for most Americans. For foreign diplomats the process can appear even more confusing and sometimes contradictory, yet diplomats are expected to work within the Washington system every day. To assist in a better understanding of the American foreign policy process, foreign diplomats recently posted in the United States are invited to attend the seminar "Formation of United States Foreign Policy" and the New England Regional Briefing Program to be held October 19-23, 1983.

Hosted by the Executive Council on Foreign Diplomats and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the seminar will be held at Fletcher's new conference facilities on the Tufts University campus near Boston. Participation is limited to twenty diplomats.

Seminar topics will include the separation of powers, the roles of media and lobbies, and the importance of the budget process. Speakers will include three former U.S. ambassadors and a former Special Consultant to the President, as well as other scholars and government officials. A former high-ranking government official will give a special address on the last day of the seminar.

For the Regional Briefing Program following the Fletcher seminar, diplomats will stay with host families in the area. Diplomats and their spouses will see colorful New England autumn foliage as well as historic sites in Boston and surrounding towns.

The seminar and the Regional Briefing Program are made possible in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The Executive Council assumes airfare, accommodation, meals and conference costs, at no charge to diplomats or their spouses. Spouses interested in joining the diplomats will arrive in Boston on Friday to participate in the regional program.

PRELIMINARY ITINERARY

October 18

Late afternoon departure from Washington, D.C., for Westin Hotel in historic Copley Square, downtown Boston.

October 19

Morning session: Foreign Policy and the role of the President.

Afternoon session: Sources of American Policy Planning

Evening: Dean's Reception and Dinner with Boston business executives and Fletcher School faculty.

October 20

Morning session: The Congress and the Role of Lobbies.

Afternoon session: The Budget and U.S. Trade Policy

Reception with Fletcher students and faculty.

Evening: Dinner and visits in restored areas of old Boston.

October 21

Morning session: The Media and High Government Officials.

Luncheon and Afternoon: Special session with guest speaker.

Evening, October 21-October 23

Regional Briefing Program: Visits to sites in New England and stay with local host families. (Spouses to join diplomats on Friday.)

Late afternoon departure, October 23, for Washington, D.C.

10/22
10/21

August 29, 1983

Mr. John P. Roche
Tufts University
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Medford, Massachusetts 02155

Dear John:

Just a quick note to respond to your letter of August 17. I am looking forward to being at Tufts on the evening of October 20 through noon of October 21. I have an appointment in New York that evening.

Maggie will not be joining me in Boston, but I look forward to seeing both you and Connie and to participating in your program. I assume I will be receiving further details about it.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:de



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Office of the Dean

August 17, 1983

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Max:

Excuse the belated, and delighted, reply to your letter of August 4. I do hope you can get up on the 20th and make the event a double-header. I enclose a brand new catalog so you can get a sense of the place. On page 79 there is a body which I wish you would consider joining--the Advisory Committee on Security Studies. Uri Ra'anani and Bob Pfaltzgraff have developed a fine program. I believe he will be writing you on this subject (i.e. Uri).

In any case, we would love to see you, and Maggie if she can make it; may be this time we can find the right strategy for winning the 1968 election. (For starters, deep-six George Ball!). And do try to clear your schedule for both events--I think they will be fun.

I'll call right after Labor Day and see how things look. (By the way, did you hear that two of the "Palestinians" killed in the Beirut affair were Japanese and three were Korean?

Yours,

John P. Roche

enclosures

cc: Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Dean

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

To:

Max

Date

9/7/83

We plan to tape
your address and
include it in the
"Negotiating World Order"
volume -

John

SHAW
SOM SPEECH
TC H.M.



MMK
Tufts
Speech file

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

October 21, 1983

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Kampelman:

On behalf of the "Negotiating World Order Project," I would like to thank you warmly for sharing with us, in a written paper and in fascinating oral elaborations, your retrospective on the Madrid CSCE negotiations in relation to American foreign policy and in relation to the whole problem of coming to grips with Soviet power.

Your paper, a copy of which you gave me, will be a fine basis for a chapter in the proposed volume, Negotiating World Order, which I shall edit. I enclose a partial list of speakers who will be contributing during the course of the 1983-84 academic year.

At this point, it would not be efficient for me to suggest any particular revisions of the text,*the basic outline of which is good. I do have a tape of the discussion, during which you elaborated some points, and I had the pleasure of attending the luncheon with you today, at which you augmented your comments on a number of new issues. These further materials--the tape and my notes--I shall retain mainly for my own editorial use. We shall work from the text you provided.

My one general observation (which you also made in a comment after your talk), is that your paper didn't really say much about the substance of the Helsinki and Madrid documents. Probably your final, edited version should briefly explain the content of some of the agreements--most readers will need this. Your comments at lunch today about the difficulty of deciding what are the "accomplishments" of the Madrid meeting were very helpful to me in explaining why you did not stress the Madrid concluding-agreement more. While retaining this perspective on the problem, which is a valuable one (partly as a corrective to professional diplomats' curious legalistic "agreement"-mindedness), we can, I think, fit in some factual material on the texts that have issued from the Helsinki-Madrid processes.

Your skepticism of the "world order" concept, incidentally, is very much "in order" for our investigation, whose purpose is in part to discover whether there is such a thing and, if so, whether governments and negotiators can accurately and successfully aim at it (hence my query about "planning" before the Madrid meeting).


*as I shall want to see what shape some of the future papers take, so that
Medford, Massachusetts 02155 I can edit to increase the "comparability"
617 628-7010 of the contributions, on disparate
Cable: FLETCHER subjects.

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL
1983-1984
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR

At lunch today you mentioned that your speeches and newsletters have been printed up by the State Department and by Freedom House. It occurs to me that these materials would be very useful in seeing how some of the substantive details could be fitted in, using your own characteristic language for doing so. Would you send me copies, if you have a spare set in your office? I would be most grateful to have them.

It was a pleasure to meet you, and I look forward to our literary collaboration. I do not believe it will be onerous for either of us!

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Alan K. Henrikson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Alan K. Henrikson
Chairman
Negotiating World Order Project

Enclosures

P.S. I shall be interested to know if the article I wrote on a multilateral follow-up to the Korean airliner episode, plus the information about what the ICAO is evidently considering, dovetails in any way with discussions of the problem at (and following) Madrid. There is an opportunity for coordination here, it would seem.



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT, 1983-1984

Outline of Topics

I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD ORDER

- A. Controlling Proliferation
 - 1. Nonproliferation Treaty
 - 2. International Atomic Energy Authority
- B. Ending the Superpower Arms Race (SALT/START, INF, "nuclear freeze")
- C. "Living With Nuclear Weapons": Prospects for a Nuclear Order?

II. GLOBAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND REGIONAL ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

- A. Global
 - 1. The Problem of "World Order" in Historical Perspective
 - 2. The U.N. (and League), Collective Security, and Peacekeeping
 - 3. The I.C.J. and Dispute-Settling Mechanisms
- B. Regional
 - 1. NATO
 - 2. ASEAN
 - 3. OAS
 - 4. OAU
 - 5. "Comprehensive" Peace in the Middle East
 - 6. Warsaw Pact

III. WORLD ECONOMIC ORDERING (Currency, Finance, Trade, Development, Business)

- A. Global
 - 1. Economic Summits (Bretton Woods, etc.)
 - 2. International Economic Organizations
 - a. UNCTAD
 - b. "NIEO"
 - 3. LDC Debt-Rescheduling Negotiations
 - 4. Law of the Sea Conference
- B. "Regional"
 - 1. OECD
 - 2. GATT
 - 3. EEC
 - 4. OPEC
 - 5. CMEA
 - 6. New Inter-Regional Combinations?

IV. PROTECTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

- A. The Stockholm Convention and UNEP
- B. Transborder Pollution Control (e.g., acid rain)
- C. Multinational Corporations, Exploitation of Natural Resources, and Waste Disposal

V. WORLD HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND AGRICULTURE

- A. International Agreements in Health, Nutrition, and Agriculture
- B. International Organizations
 - 1. WHO
 - 2. FAO
 - 3. UNICEF
- C. Nongovernmental Relief Agencies
 - 1. CARE
 - 2. Oxfam

VI. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

- A. International Law and Organization Concerning Human Rights
- B. The "Helsinki" Process/Madrid Negotiations
- C. Private "Watch" Organizations
 - 1. Amnesty International

VII. OTHER AREAS

- A. The International "Diplomatic System"
- B. International Transportation and Aviation
- C. International Communication, Satellite Broadcasting, News Censorship -- a "New International Information Order"?
- D. Technology Transfer and Protection of Intellectual Property
- E. International Control of Migration -- Refugees and Workers
- F. International Education and Cultural Promotion
- G. International Regulation and Use of Outer Space



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NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER PROJECT

1983-1984

Partial List of Speakers

Alan K. Henrikson, September 19: "Negotiating World Order": The Concept and the Project

Jean Mayer, September 22: International Agreements in the Fields of Food, Agriculture, and Health

Max M. Kampelman, October 20: The Lessons of the Madrid Negotiations Concerning Human Rights

Gamani Corea (accepted; date yet to be fixed): The Negotiation of an International Program for Primary Commodities

John Roberts, October 31: The Diplomacy of "Acid Rain"--The North American Experience in Global Perspective

Tommy T. B. Koh, February 23: The Diplomacy of the Law of the Sea Conference, with Particular Reference to the Deep Seabed Mining Issue

Brian Urquhart (invited): The United Nations, "Collective Security," and the Diplomacy of International Peacekeeping

Alan K. Henrikson, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a Form of "World Order"

Leonard Unger, The Creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Leo Gross (invited): The International Court of Justice and the Need for Dispute-Settling Mechanisms in Multilateral Organizations

Gerard C. Smith, February 2: Soviet-American Relations and the SALT Process

George F. Kennan (invited), May 19: The Problem of "World Order" in Historical Perspective

10/17/83

MMK
speeches
Tufts Univ.

October 15, 1983

Ms. Eugenie C. Dyess, Director
Special Educational Programs
Tufts University
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Medford, Massachusetts 02155

Dear Ms. Dyess:

Mrs. Martin shared with me your letter of October 7. There are three points I would like to make in connection with it. You should know that I am arriving in Boston from Minneapolis on Northwest Flight No. 42 at 5:17 p.m. I assume I will be met, although I could take a taxi directly to the Hyatt Regency. It is quite clear, however, with that schedule that I am not likely to get to the Fletcher School before 6:30.

You should be aware of the fact that I have a breakfast appointment on the morning of October 21 with a group of representatives of the Jewish community. That breakfast begins at 8:30 and will probably take a couple of hours. In looking at the program, it is my opinion I should not participate in the morning round table. Three separate talks within less than 24 hours strikes me as a bit much for me and the audience. I trust John Roche will not be too unhappy about that. I could arrive late and sit in, but in some ways I would rather walk around campus.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:sm



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

November 14, 1983

Dear M. Kampelman,

Thank you for sending
the printed copies of your
addresses — which will be
very useful to me.

Your presentation for the
"Negotiating World Order Project"
continues to stir interest here.

I enclose, e.g., a couple of copies
of an excerpt from your remarks
in the Christian Science Monitor.

Medford, Massachusetts

617 628-7010

Cable: FLETCHER

(Dick Catteni was in
the archive.)

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL
1903-1983
FIFTIETH-ANNIVERSARY YEAR

Yours truly, Allen J. Lemmon

AS READ

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: A VIEW FROM MADRID
By
MAX M. KAMPELMAN

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

October 20, 1983

Medford, Mass.

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the challenge you presented to me with your invitation that I participate in your Negotiating World Order project. It is only six weeks since Madrid has ended, but I welcome the opportunity to begin now to shift the focus of my attention away from the fascinating details and intricacies of my three years in Madrid and direct them to the more significant broader picture of which Madrid was a part. This evening, I will begin that thought process with you.

[Two points should now be injected. First, Europe is now enjoying the longest period of absence from war on its territory since Roman days. Second, the preoccupation with calamitous predictions of nuclear war is mind distorting rather than constructive in the search for peace and stability. Fear is paralyzing and a poor political advisor.]

The first public policy question to face me after I was asked to head the American Delegation to the Madrid meeting on Security and Cooperation in Europe was whether the United States should participate in the meeting. This was soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The preparatory sessions to

arrange for the agenda and modalities were scheduled to open in September 1980.

-- One Presidential candidate agreed with a nationally syndicated columnist that since we were not sending our athletes to Moscow, we should not be sending our diplomats to Madrid.

-- Two former senior diplomats, widely known, both of whom had independently participated actively in the development of the Helsinki Final Act separately urged me not to go to Madrid.

The case was a good one. The origins of the Helsinki Final Act could be traced to the Soviet Union's proposal for a European Security Conference, which would exclude the United States and Canada. The Soviets also wanted the Conference to provide legitimacy for their post-war boundaries. These goals were not realized by them, but they were able to sell Helsinki on the notion that the East and West were moving decisively into an era of "detente." The West in turn was able to gain a major humanitarian component in the Agreement which helped turn it into a vehicle for Western values. But by the time Madrid was preparing to meet, it was unmistakable that the Soviets were acting as if the humanitarian provisions were non-existent. Why, therefore, ran the argument, dignify the Agreement and Soviet participation in it as if they were real? But there were other factors to consider.

The basic Western notion that prevailed in Helsinki was that lasting peace means more than the absence of war, cherished as that is. The absence of war is only the reflection of a moment in history that can quickly pass, whereas peace has a more lasting and fundamental aspect to it. The West successfully argued that peace had to encompass the totality of the relationship of the states negotiating towards that peace. The Helsinki Final Act reflected that totality. In addition to provisions on vital issue of military security, there were provisions for trade, for the exchange of peoples, for cultural exchanges. The commitment to human rights, unique in its breadth, became a major component of this search for peace. Its underlying premise was that a state that declares war against its own people cannot be trusted not to declare war on its neighbors. Our non-attendance in Madrid would have ended the Helsinki Final Act and with it the force of these Western values.

To absent ourselves, furthermore, would have made us appear disinterested in the negotiating process with the East. It would have separated us from our allies whose political requirements insisted upon negotiations as an indispensable part of their diplomacy. We would have been blamed for destroying the Helsinki process, rather than the Soviets, whose disdain was

undermining the integrity of the accords.

We knew we could not permit the meeting and our attendance to serve as a form of implicit tolerance of Soviet irresponsibility. We also knew it would be shortsighted to deny ourselves the use of Madrid as an available forum for our case. Our decision was to prove at Madrid that Soviet violations of the noble Helsinki standards were threatening the peace and stability of Europe.

And then, on the eve of our meeting, a dramatic churning for liberty gave rise to the birth of the Solidarity movement in Poland. We were preparing to leave Washington for Madrid when we learned that among the first demands of Solidarity was that the Helsinki Final Act be republished in the Polish press so that the Polish people could be reminded of their human rights under the accords. We knew then unmistakably that we belonged in Madrid; that the Helsinki process was also important to the aspirations and morale of the men and women behind the Iron Curtain.

In recent months, Yuri Andropov, in addressing his Communist Party Cadres, urged them to remember that there was an ongoing vital battle underway "for the hearts and minds of billions of people on this planet." We in Madrid never forgot the importance of that battle.

One of the accomplishments of Madrid was that it provided an opportunity for the most thorough review of the Soviet Union and its crimes against humanity that has ever taken place in any international forum. A united Western group of nations, speaking in many languages but in one voice, documented the Soviet record of slave labor camps; the use of psychiatric hospitals as political punishment; government-sponsored anti-Semitism; armed aggression in Afghanistan and Poland; religious persecution of evangelical Christians, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, Catholics; strangulation of scientific freedom; the decimation of cultural and national heritages; the defiance of agreements against the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Our statements were not only made to the representatives of the 35 states at our sessions. They were also widely disseminated through the electronic and print media. In this "battle for hearts and minds," we had to reach people. We were not content with making allegations, we provided the evidence for those conclusions. Stories from Madrid reached Eastern Europe daily through the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. My own appearances on BBC and Deutchewelle were constant. They were frequently supplemented by endless numbers of appearances on radio and television stations throughout Europe. The communications we received from the East, as well as from the West, proved the desirability of this activity.

Our uniform message was that the Soviet Union had to comply with the agreement they made in 1975 if they wished to be accepted as a responsible member of the international community.

The question might now well be raised in this forum as to whether confrontation is consistent with serious negotiation. Our side has not always been clear on this question. When the U.S. delegation, at Belgrade in 1977, mentioned the names of six victims of Soviet repression, there was great concern as to the propriety and desirability of such an approach. In Madrid, the United States was only one of 14 states to mention the names of dissidents. And a total of 131 victims of repression were mentioned at our meetings.

Negotiation without confrontation, where the objective facts require blunt talk, is not a serious negotiation at all; it is a charade. A purpose of negotiation is obviously to reach agreement. Where difficult issues are involved, however, that agreement may not be possible in the short run. Equally important, therefore, the negotiating process must be used to communicate concerns where they exist, so as to lessen the likelihood of ambiguity. This clarity could, in turn, lead to desirable changes in behavior pattern. Absent this clarity, there is no reason for the other side to take seriously the depth of our commitments and our perceptions.

In a more limited sense, let me share with you three illustrations to demonstrate my point. My first serious substantial presentation at our main meeting was in November 1980. I spoke of the fact that the United States and Russia had never fought in a war against one another. I discussed cultural and historic similarities between our two peoples, referring to Cossacks and cowboys. In then analyzing the deterioration of our relationships, I spoke firmly and critically of the Leninist threat to world stability and of Soviet aggression and repression. A few weeks later at a dinner, the head of an eastern European delegation, whose discretion lost the battle against vodka, quietly took me aside to talk about that speech, and to say that he was taking it home at Christmas to share with friends and family members.

On another occasion, in early 1981, I spoke with great specificity about the Soviet arms build-up and its potential threat against the peace of Europe. At the end of that morning session, another head of an Eastern European delegation came up to me and said: "I never knew those facts, Max, until this morning." He did not question their accuracy.

In late 1981, the head of the Soviet delegation and I engaged in the most serious confrontation that had yet taken place between us. He started with an abuse against our Government that I could not tolerate. Since my briefcase was filled with data to be used when appropriate, I responded fully in

what a friend later characterized as a devastating fashion. He replied angrily and I again responded with sharpness and with facts. That ended the exchange. At that point, I could see two colleagues from neutral countries approaching me with great concern and sad countenance. They knew I had not started the exchange, but would the Soviets now walk out of the meeting? What did this mean? I informed them that I was due at the Soviet Ambassador's residence for lunch in an hour and would learn if they were indeed angry by noting if the door would be locked against me.

The lunch took place. It was pleasant and even constructive. My host made no reference to the argument. As a guest, and since I had the last word in the morning, I did not bring the issue up. At the very end, as my host walked me to the door, he said that what he liked about dealing with me was that we could -- and the word was finally translated as "exchange pleasantries" in the morning -- and then engage in serious, business-like discussions in the afternoon.

I spoke of a united Western group in Madrid. This was an indispensable condition for whatever effectiveness we demonstrated there. Prior to the opening of Madrid, I made two trips to Europe to meet with our allies and to discuss our approach to the Madrid meeting. Among the points I made was our decision to mention the names of dissidents because, as a lawyer, I said, I knew of no better way to illustrate a point

than to use examples. I hoped that, unlike Belgrade, we would be supported and emulated in this approach. You, of course, know from what I have said that we were. But one colleague said to me that he could not do so. His country's approach, effective with the Soviet Union, he insisted, was to negotiate quietly. They were in this manner able to obtain the release from behind the Iron Curtain of many whose freedom they sought. We talked, and I remember saying that I did not want to recommend any policy which would keep a single human being in bondage who would otherwise be released. But, like a symphony orchestra, someone must bang the drums and blow the trumpet, while somebody else plays the harp or touches the piano keys softly. What is important is that we make music together.

We did make music together at Madrid. This required effort on all of our parts. Our NATO group met three and four times a week, and sometimes three and four times a day when necessary. We consulted on all aspects of the meeting and kept one another fully informed. We worked closely with our neutral friends who shared our values and we met with them, too, on many occasions. The West is stronger in dealing with the Soviet Union when it speaks with one voice and gives one consistent message.

There is today sensitivity within the NATO alliance. Crises are ever present. There is always the potential for

divisiveness when 16 free and sovereign states, governed by democratic principles and with differing histories and cultural backgrounds, attempt to formulate common policy. What is necessary is constantly to keep in mind that it is our values, indispensable to our being, that tie us together and that it is those values that are under attack and must be preserved. In a real sense our task is to raise the vision of the West above the minutiae of our relations, important as they may appear to be at any moment.

Let me now make an assertion about dealing with the Soviet Union that is based on conviction and on my experience. The Soviet Union respects military strength. Its incentive for negotiating an agreement is greater when the positions taken by its negotiating partner have the added dignity of being supported by that strength.

The leadership of the Soviet Union is serious. Its diplomats are serious and well-trained, and they appear to be ideologically committed to Leninism. The comment of one Soviet diplomat to one of our arms control negotiators: "We are neither philanthropists nor fools" tells much of their seriousness of purpose. Their response in a negotiation is motivated by one primary consideration: their perceived national self-interest.

The word "negotiatin" is the dominant word of tonight and of the series of lectures and studies that are now part o your intellectual effort. There is an ingredient to that word that must be highlighted. Negotiation means more than talking. It means listening as well. It is particularly important for the United States to understand and to let others know we understand that our super-power status does not necessarily confer super wisdom on us. We have national interests, and we do define and advance them. We have views, and it is our right to assert them. But other countries, including our friends as well as our enemies, have their national interests which must be respected if we are to achieve understanding. This is particularly important in our relationship to our NATO allies.

A major difficultry in US-USSR negotiation is a feeling by both of us that the other is not listening. They want us to listen to their security needs. We want them to appreciate our's and to appreciate as well that no country's national security interests can be fostered through aggression and through a lack of repsect for the sovereignty of their neighbors. In Madrid, I spend more than 350 hours in private discussions and negotiations with my Soviet colleagues outside of our formal meetings. I listened a great deal and understood more as a result of that listening. I believe they finally began to listen too. We were able to come to an agreement on

words. I trust they are pondering our further message in Madrid that, just as their deeds undermined our confidence in their intentions, so must their deeds, and not just their words, begin to restore that confidence.

There is a responsible view in our society which questions the effectiveness and desirability of our negotiating with the Soviet Union. It appreciates that one of the great international changes of the past decade has been the achievement by the Soviet Union of at least nuclear parity with us. It believes, with good reason, that the Soviet Union remains committed to the Leninist principle that violence is both necessary and justified in the pursuit of their Communist destiny. Thus, the Soviet Union is the major threat to our security and values -- an aggressive society seeking, with its massive military and police power, to expand its influence; and a repressive society determined to defend its totalitarian power, whatever the human cost.

This view has no confidence in the bona fides of Soviet protestations for disarmament and peace. It knows that after the Second World War, while we and our allies rapidly demobilized, the Soviet Union preferred to keep its troops on a war-time footing, maintaining a large conscript army and large reserve forces. It knows that as we disarmed, the Soviets engaged in the most massive military build-up in the history of the world.

It is not useful to deny this reality. The task is, rather, how constructively to face this reality. I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this challenge. The integrity and character and strength of our society and of our people will undergo the greatest challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain the peace as we remain constant in our ideals.

We still look upon ourselves as a young and developing society, even though we are now one of the oldest, stable systems in the world. We did not seek the role of world leadership, and our people today still tend to shy away from it. At the end of the Second World War, however, our relative geographic isolation, our pursuit of liberty, our bountiful natural resources, and our productive people made us strong. By the end of the war, we were somewhat like a young giant among nations. And, being a giant is not easy. It is not easy living with a giant, and our friends are learning that. It is hard to find shoes to fit if you are a giant; and the bed is always too short. Being strong, the giant can afford to be gentle, but he is also, at times, awkward. His good intentions are not always so interpreted by others.

We make mistakes because we are unaccustomed to and hesitant about the responsibilities of leadership. As a result,

our policy is at times one of fits and starts that frequently bedevils our foreign policy and confuses others.

We talk a great deal about values and about liberty. Some of our more sophisticated friends see this linkage of values with world real-politik as a form of naivete. We, of course, talk about the values of liberty because, to us, they are not abstract. We also know they are not abstract to those unable to enjoy them. They are the distinguishing characteristic between ourselves and the totalitarians and authoritarians of the world. We feel, therefore, that this is our strength.

We know that the future lies with freedom because there can be no lasting stability in societies that would deny it. Only freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching new heights. A human being has the capacity to aspire, to achieve, to dream, and to do. He cannot be permanently prevented from stretching his muscles to exercise his freedom and achieve ambitions for himself and his children.

This is our faith, and this is what we should talk about.

As we do so, however, we must understand that we thereby implicitly threaten the Soviet Union. Like any dictatorship, the Soviet ruling class is deeply concerned about the subversion of their power -- power accumulated not by agreement but by military and police force alone. Where there is no legiti-

macy; where there is repression coupled with traditional, national and cultural differences; where there is an obvious failure of the system to meet the needs of its peoples -- these obviously contribute to Soviet insecurity. The very fact that there are neighboring free societies creates a powerful draw and attraction for those who live under totalitarian rule. By example, democracies inevitably tend to subvert Soviet authority.

Thus, the dilemma, the challenge, the danger, the threat, the opportunity. There are some who may respond to the danger to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view carries with it the seeds of tragedy as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

All responsible people understand that we must define our objectives consistent with Hobbes' first law of nature: "to seek peace and to follow it." We must engage in that pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence, regardless of provocation. Thus, in Madrid, we attended, talked,

debated, negotiated, argued, dined, condemned, talked some more. We achieved some results in words. We have not yet achieved a change in patterns of behavior. That will only come, if it ever does come, when the Soviet Union concludes that it is in its interest to change, and when its leadership decides that it can best keep itself in power if the pattern is changed.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening," or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus. Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the deterrence that comes from military strength, through dialogue, through criticism, through negotiation -- to persist in the search for understanding, agreement, peace. The attainment of these goals requires conformity with the agreed upon rules of responsible international behavior.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, who comprise hundreds of different nationalities, share the same values of human dignity that we proclaim. They are as dedicated to the elimination of war as any other peoples. They have no wish to be isolated from their neighbors and from the forward movement of civilization. This creates a fear on the part of Soviet authorities, who then go to great lengths to fence in their own citizens, lengths not before equaled in the history of the world.

Rarely in history has a nation lost so many of its greatest scientists, writers, artists, musicians and scholars through

exile, imprisonment and execution. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated and many more would leave if they were permitted to do so. We know of many hundreds of ordinary people who have taken incredible risks to defect when they saw an opportunity to do so.

The "correlation of forces" has moved against the Soviet Union. The credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people. "The gas has largely escaped from its ideological balloon."

It is time for Soviet authorities to comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security. We hope they will come to understand the need to show the rest of us that cruelty is not an indispensable part of their system and is, indeed, thoroughly counter-productive to their aims. It is true that a system unrestrained by public control tends to ignore the popular good and be blind to the misery experienced by those who do not receive honors and privileges from such a state. But, just as the Leninist aim of achieving world Communism has no relevance in this nuclear age, so must it be understood by an evolving Soviet leadership that in the long run it cannot survive without humanizing its controls and its image in the world.

So often the excuse has been that one cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. That is true, but Soviet leadership

must come to understand that the road they have been following is filled with broken eggshells and we have yet to see the first omelet. Included in our message and program, therefore, must be the understanding that new opportunities for cooperation with us on all levels are unlimited if Moscow will live up to its international responsibilities so clearly delineated in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Madrid Concluding Document, whose words they accepted.

We, therefore, return again to negotiation. We have nothing to fear and everything to gain from an open relationship with the Soviet Union. This is what we were doing for three years in Madrid; this is what we must be prepared to continue to do wherever the opportunity for exchange and negotiation is open to us.

We also must be prepared to visit. I mention this because I was recently struck by the realization that neither of the present leaders of the two superpowers has ever set foot in the sphere of the other. We must never forget the impact on Khrushchev of the sight of an American grain field and how it was tilled and managed.

This morning I was in Minneapolis speaking at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. I conclude with a thought stimulated by the career of that noble human being. Hubert Humphrey is thought of as a politician. Those

who fear the pejorative in the association with a politician call him a statesman. He was indeed one of our history's most dedicated and effective public servants. But, for me and perhaps for Dr. John Roche, who worked with him intimately, his greatness as an American was that his public service combined his strengths and experience as a teacher, a preacher of sorts, and a politician. I suggest that those qualities are a treasured combination.

The complete human being has values that are an integral part of his personality and his life. They are a motivating factor in his behavior. They are a part of his skills. In this school dedicated to diplomacy and public service, I respectfully suggest that service for one's country means dedication to its values as well.

Thank you.