



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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AS READ

THE DILEMMA AND CHALLENGE IN EAST WEST RELATIONS

By
MAX M. KAMPELMAN

TARGET SEATTLE: SOVIET REALITIES

November 1, 1983

Seattle, Washington

It is with a profound sense of purpose that I spend this, my first day in the State of Washington since the untimely death of one of the nation's most valuable public servants of our century, Senator Henry Jackson. We can do his memory no greater service than to rededicate ourselves to the preservation and strengthening of American democracy.

It is only seven weeks since Madrid ended, but it is time for me to begin to shift my focus away from the fascinating details and intricacies of my three years in Madrid and direct them to the more significant broader picture of which Madrid was a part, the intensely troubling East-West picture.

In recent months, Yuri Andropov, in addressing his Communist Party cadres, urged them to remember that there was a vital battle underway "for the hearts and minds of billions of people on this planet." Madrid for us was a serious battlefield in that struggle. We were able in that forum, working with a united West, to demonstrate for all who would listen that Soviet violations of the noble Helsinki standards were threatening the peace and stability of Europe.

A united Western group of nations, speaking in many languages but in one voice, documented the Soviet record of slave labor camps; the use of psychiatric hospitals as political punishment; government-sponsored anti-Semitism; armed aggression in Afghanistan and Poland; religious persecution of evangelical Christians, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, Catholics; strangulation of scientific freedom; the decimation of cultural and national heritages; the defiance of agreements against the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The question has been raised by some as to whether this kind of blunk talk is consistent with serious negotiation. Our side has not always been clear on this question. When the U.S. delegation, at Belgrade which preceded Madrid in 1977, mentioned the names of six victims of Soviet repression, there was great concern as to the propriety and desirability of such an approach. In Madrid, the United States was not alone. We were among 14 states to mention the names of dissidents. And a total of 131 victims of repression were mentioned at our meetings. The first state to mention the name of a victim was Sweden, which mentioned Raoul Wallenberg. The first state to discuss Soviet anti-semitism was Belgium.

Negotiation without confrontation, where the objective facts require blunt talk, is not a serious negotiation at all; it is a charade. A purpose of negotiation is obviously to reach agreement. Survival may be at stake. Where difficult issues are involved, however, that agreement may not be possible in the short run. Equally important, therefore, the negotiating process must be used to communicate concerns where they exist, so as to make later agreement more likely. Absent this clarity, there is no reason for the other side to take seriously the depth of our commitments and our requirements.

I spoke of a united Western group in Madrid. This was an indispensable condition for whatever effectiveness we demonstrated there. Prior to the opening of Madrid, we met with our allies to discuss our approach to the Madrid meeting. Among the points we made was our decision to mention the names of dissidents in order to highlight that issue. How could we go on to new discussions and possible new agreements without noting that old promises were not being kept. I hoped that, unlike Belgrade, we would be supported and emulated in this approach. We were, in fact, supported. But my West German colleague expressed the reluctance of his government. His country's approach, effective with the Soviet Union, he insisted, was to negotiate quietly. They were in this manner able to obtain the release from behind the Iron Curtain of many whose freedom they sought. We talked, and I remember

saying that I did not want to recommend any policy which would keep a single human being in bondage who would otherwise be released. But, like a symphony orchestra, the score required someone to bang the drums and another to blow the trumpet, while somebody else plays the harp or touches the piano keys softly. What is important is that we make music together.

We did make music together at Madrid. This required effort on all of our parts. Our NATO group met three and four times a week, and sometimes three and four times a day when necessary. We consulted on all aspects of the meeting and kept one another fully informed. We worked closely with our neutral friends who shared our values. The West is stronger in dealing with the Soviet Union when it speaks with one voice and gives one consistent message.

There is today sensitivity within the NATO alliance. Crises are ever present. There is always the potential for divisiveness when 16 free and sovereign states, governed by democratic principles and with differing histories and cultural backgrounds, attempt to formulate common policy. What is necessary is constantly to keep in mind that it is our values, indispensable to our being, that tie us together and that it is those values that are under attack and must be preserved. In a real sense our task is to raise the vision of the West

above the minutiae of our relations, important as they may appear to be at any moment. Let us hope we can prevail in that effort in the face of a massive Soviet onslaught to divide and weaken the alliance.

Let me now make an assertion about dealing with the Soviet Union that is based on personal conviction and experience. The Soviet Union respects military strength. Its incentive for negotiating an agreement is greater when the positions taken by its negotiating partner have the added dignity of being supported by that strength.

The leadership of the Soviet Union is serious. Its diplomats are serious and well-trained. The comment of one Soviet diplomat to one of our arms-control negotiators: "We are neither philanthropists nor fools" tells much of their seriousness of purpose. Their response in a negotiation is motivated by one primary consideration: their perceived national self-interest.

There is a responsible view in our society which questions the effectiveness and desirability of our negotiating with the Soviet Union. It appreciates that one of the troubling international changes of the past decade has been the achievement by the Soviet Union of at least nuclear parity with us.

It believes, with good reason, that the Soviet Union remains committed to the Leninist principle that violence is both necessary and justified in the pursuit of their Communist destiny. Thus, the Soviet Union is the major threat to our security and values -- an aggressive society seeking, with its massive military and police power, to expand its influence; and a repressive society determined to defend its totalitarian power, whatever the human cost.

This view has no confidence in the bona fides of Soviet protestations for disarmament and peace. It knows that after the Second World War, while we and our allies rapidly demobilized, the Soviet Union preferred to keep its troops on a war-time footing, maintaining a large conscript army and large reserve forces. It knows that as we disarmed, the Soviets engaged in the most massive military build-up in the history of the world.

It is not useful to deny this reality. The task is, rather, how constructively to face this reality. I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this challenge. The integrity and character and strength of our society and of our people will undergo the greatest challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain a peace consistent with our ideals.

We still look upon ourselves as a young and developing society, even though we are now one of the oldest, stable systems in the world. We did not seek the role of world leadership, and our people today still tend to shy away from it. At the end of the Second World War, however, our relative geographic isolation, our pursuit of liberty, our bountiful natural resources, and our productive people made us strong. By the end of the war, we were somewhat like a young giant among nations. And, being a giant is not easy. It is not easy living with a giant, and our friends are learning that. It is hard to find shoes to fit if you are a giant; and the bed is always too short. Being strong, the giant can afford to be gentle, but he is also, at times, awkward. His good intentions are not always so interpreted by others.

We make mistakes because we are unaccustomed to and hesitant about the responsibilities of leadership. As a result, our behavior is at times one of fits and starts that frequently bedevil our foreign policy and confuse others.

We talk a great deal about values and about liberty. Some of our more sophisticated friends see this linkage of abstract values with world real-politik as a form of naivete. We, of course, talk about the values of liberty because, to us, they are not abstract. We also know they are not abstract to those unable to enjoy them. They are the distinguishing characteristic between ourselves and the totalitarians and authoritarians of the world.

As we talk of human dignity, however, we must understand that we thereby implicitly threaten the Soviet Union. Like any dictatorship, the Soviet ruling class is deeply concerned about the subversion of their power -- power accumulated not by agreement but by military and police force alone. Where there is no legitimacy; where there is repression coupled with traditional national and cultural differences; where there is an obvious failure of the system to meet the needs of its peoples -these obviously contribute to Soviet insecurity. The very fact that there are neighboring free societies creates a powerful draw and attraction for those who live under totalitarian rule. By example, democracies inevitably tend to subvert Soviet authority.

Thus, the dilemma, the challenge, the danger, the threat, the opportunity. There are some who may respond to the danger to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view can be fatal to us as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

All responsible people understand that we must define our objectives consistent with Hobbes' first law of nature: "to seek peace and to follow it." We must engage in that pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence, regardless of provocation. Thus, in Madrid, we attended, talked, debated, negotiated, argued, dined, condemned, talked some more. We achieved some results in words. We have not yet achieved a change in patterns of behavior. That will only come, if it ever does come, when the Soviet Union concludes that it is in its interest to change, and when its leadership decides that it can best keep itself in power if the pattern is changed.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening," or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus. Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the deterrence that comes from military strength, through dialogue, through criticism, through negotiation -- to persist in the search for understanding, agreement, peace.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, who comprise hundreds of different nationalities, share the same values of human dignity as we. They are as dedicated to the elimination of war as any other peoples. They have no wish to be isolated from their neighbors and from the forward movement of civilization. This creates a fear on the part of Soviet authorities, who then go to great lengths to fence in their own citizens.

Rarely in history has a nation lost so many of its greatest scientists, writers, artists, musicians and scholars through exile, imprisonment and execution. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated and many more would leave if they were permitted to do so. We know of many hundreds of ordinary people who have taken incredible risks to defect when they saw an opportunity to do so.

The "correlation of forces" has moved against the Soviet Union. The credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people. "The gas has largely escaped from its ideological balloon."

Our objectives are clear. How to realize them is less so. How do we persuade Soviet authorities, who have a stake in stability, to comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security? Will they come to understand the need to disprove that cruelty is an indispensable part of their system? Are they capable of understanding that the Leninist aim of achieving Communism through violence has no relevance in this nuclear age? Dare we hope that an evolving Soviet leadership will in the long run see that it cannot survive without humanizing its controls and its image in the world?

I suggest that in our message and program, there must be the understanding that new opportunities for cooperation with us on all levels can open widely if Moscow will live up to its

international responsibilities so clearly delineated in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Madrid Concluding Document, whose words they accepted. What we made clear to the Soviets in Madrid, and what I trust they are pondering, is that just as their deeds undermined our confidence in their intentions, so must their deeds, and not just their words, begin to restore that confidence.

The word "negotiating" must be the dominant word of international relations. There is an ingredient to that word that must be highlighted. Negotiation means more than talking. It means listening as well. It is particularly important for the United States to understand and to let others know we understand that our super-power status does not necessarily confer super wisdom on us. We have national interests, and we do define and advance them. We have views, and it is our right to assert them. But other countries have their national interests which must be respected if we are to achieve understanding.

A major difficulty in US-USSR negotiations is a feeling by both of us that the other is not listening. They want us to listen to their security needs. We want them to appreciate our's and to appreciate as well that no country's national security interests can be fostered through aggression and through a lack of respect for the sovereignty of their neighbors. This process requires patience to match our firmness.

Today, the prospects for understanding seem remote. Soviet leadership appears frantic and somewhat disorganized. Threats, coupled with infrequent smiles, are traditional instruments of Soviet political power. This time, however, the threats seem more shrill.

- They threaten to destroy more civilian aircraft.
- They threaten Turkey with becoming a "nuclear cemetery."
- They threaten Japan with a "national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago."
- They threaten the Scandinavian countries by warning they will "burn in the fire of nuclear war in the name of 'Atlantic solidarity.'"
- And Yuri Andropov threatens Chancellor Kohl that if the Western missiles are deployed "the military threat to West Germany will grow manifold....As Germans ... look at one another through thick palisades of missiles."

All of this accompanied by an aggrandizement of the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police, of the sort not heard for decades. A week ago, Pravda lauded these "fighters on the secret front," saying: "we don't know you but we have boundless faith in you. You are needed as the air and the sun. Just be clearsighted as ever and we will always help you."

These threats will intimidate some, as intended. They will not prevail. We can prevail if we will be steadfast. We can prevail if we will be consistent. We can prevail if we will be patient. Our cause, after all, is the superior one.

We know that the future lies with freedom because there can be no lasting stability in societies that would deny it. Only freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching new heights. A human being has the capacity to aspire, to achieve, to dream, and to do. He cannot be permanently prevented from stretching his muscles to exercise his freedom and achieve ambitions for himself and his children.

We can and will prevail because the human dignity, the peace with liberty that we seek, these values are consistent with the innermost aspirations of "the hearts and minds" of the billions of people on this planet who understand that these values are requirements for our evolving civilization.

Thank you.

TARGET SEATTLE SOVIET REALITIES

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

909-4th Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98104
(206) 382-5011

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U.S. Rep. Don Bonker
Dr. Frank B. Brouillett
U.S. Rep. Rod Chandler
U.S. Rep. Norm Dicks
Daniel J. Evans
Mary H. Gates
Sen. Slade Gorton
Sen. Henry M. Jackson
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Prof. Kenneth Stickers
The Very Rev. Cabell Tennis
Ann Voorhees
Jeri Ware
Vern Williams
Roger Yockey

Staff

Metrocenter YMCA
Jarlath Hume
Bill Sieverling
Linda Staheli

October 29: "Soviet Realities/U.S. Choices: What Next?"

Symposium, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
Paramount Theater, 907 Pine

Speakers: Dr. Murray Feshbach, Center for Population Research, Georgetown University
Prof. William Taubman, Amherst College
Prof. Jerry Hough, Duke University
Midge Decter, Executive Director, The Committee for the Free World
Admiral Noel Gayler, USN (Ret.), former commander, U.S. Pacific Forces
Richard Barnet, senior fellow, Institute for Policy Studies

Tickets: \$5, general
\$3, students, senior citizens, unemployed, low-income

Outlets: Ticketmaster, Metrocenter YMCA, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle University, University of Washington

October 30: Town Meetings in homes, churches and other meeting places.
Focus: American attitudes toward the USSR
6 to 8 p.m.

October 31: "Global Realities"

Noon. Plymouth Congregational Church, 6th & University
Speakers: James S. Munn, Seattle attorney and chairman, Washington State Reagan presidential campaign, 1980
Arthur Macy Cox, former CIA official and diplomat, author of Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game

7:30 p.m. Room 130, Kane Hall, University of Washington

Speaker: William Ury, co-author of Getting to Yes; leader of Harvard Negotiations Project

November 1: "Political Realities"

Noon. Broadway Performance Hall, Seattle Central Community College, 1625 Broadway

Speaker: Max Kampelman, Ambassador and Chairman, U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

7:30 p.m. Room 120, Kane Hall, University of Washington

Speaker: Prof. Donald Treadgold, University of Washington

November 2: "Economic Realities"

Noon. Plymouth Congregational Church, 6th & University



Speakers: Dr. Edward A. Hewett, senior fellow, The Brookings Institution

Dr. Judith Thornton, professor of economics, University of Washington

7:30 p.m. Room 130, Kane Hall, University of Washington

Speakers: Dr. William Hoehn, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy

Dr. Edward A. Hewett, senior fellow, The Brookings Institution

November 3: "Military Realities"

11:15 a.m. First Congregational Church, Bellevue

Speakers: Dr. William Hoehn, deputy assistant secretary of defense; chief assistant to Richard Perle

Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, USN (Ret.), director, Center for Defense Information

7:30 p.m. Room 130, Kane Hall, University of Washington

Speaker: Robert Scheer, former Los Angeles Times reporter and author of With Enough Shovels

Second speaker, to be announced.

November 4: "PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR: Realistic Choices"

Noon. Plymouth Congregational Church. 6th & University

Speakers: Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State, European Affairs

Jane Wales, National Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility

2 to 5 p.m. Workshops. Plymouth Congregational Church

Topics: Comprehensive test-ban treaty, arms control, supra-national institutions, constitutional war-making powers and other related topics

November 5: "Understanding the Soviets through Literature"

8 p.m. Broadway Performance Hall, 1625 Broadway

Dramatic readings from Russian literature

November 6: 6 to 8 p.m. Town Meetings in homes, churches and other meeting places.

Focus: Policy choices and individual action

NOTE: Except for symposium on Saturday, October 29, all events are free and open to the public on a first-come, first-served basis.

TARGET SEATTLE SOVIET REALITIES

October 26, 1983

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Staff

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Linda Staheli

Dear Mr. Kampelman,

Welcome to Seattle, and thank you for your participation in Target Seattle/Soviet Realities.

There is growing public and media interest in this project, and we anticipate each event will be well-attended. Your part in its total success is greatly appreciated.

This packet of materials contains your final Itinerary, some project materials, and information about Seattle. Please review the Itinerary for the details of your schedule during your stay. We have tried to make the most of your visit, due to the interest of the Seattle community in what you bring to the project, while providing for you some free time whenever possible.

Target Seattle/Soviet Realities has been fortunate in receiving complementary lodging for our out-of-town guests from two local hotels. We desire to reimburse you for your meals during your stay. You will need to obtain the bill for your incidentals when you check out on Wednesday, November 2. (Check out time at the Sorrento Hotel is noon.) Our accounting section needs receipts, as I'm sure you understand; so, you need only send us all receipts for your meals, and we will reimburse you as soon as possible.

I am looking forward to meeting you during your time with us, and to hearing you speak on "Political Realities".

Sincerely,



Alden Bell

Co-Chairman

Target Seattle/Soviet Realities