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File

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I want to express my sincere appreciation for your participation in PEOPLE'S PLATFORM on Sunday, July 8th, 1951.

It was the consensus of opinion, judging from the reactions of our listeners, that the discussion achieved a high degree of clarity. I am enclosing a transcript of the broadcast for your files.

Thanks again for joining us on the program. I hope we will have the pleasure of welcoming you back to our C.B.S. microphone soon in the future.

Cordially,

Anita Chester

Anita Chester

PEOPLE'S PLATFORM

Sunday, July 8, 1951
12:00-12:30 P.M.

ANNC'R: CBS and its affiliated stations invite you to another session of PEOPLE'S PLATFORM, with Stuart Novins. Today we'll examine the vital question: After the MacArthur hearings, what? Our guests are Senator Francis Case, Republican, from South Dakota and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat, from Minnesota.

Here, to begin the discussion, is chairman Stuart Novins.

NOVINS: During the last twenty-four hours, in the tiny town of Kaesong, in Korea, the three United Nations military spokesmen talked with their communist opposite numbers, exchanged credentials and conferred on arrangements for the first real meeting to take place tomorrow and Tuesday. Thus, the first overtures may have sounded for peace or, at least, a cease-fire in the bitter Korean conflict. Korea has been important. We've lost many lives and learned many lessons, but Korea is only a part of the over-all problem of Asia and the Far East. Here in Washington, as you know, Congress conducted searching inquiries and hearings into our broad Far Eastern policy. The so-called MacArthur hearings produced more written testimony and publicized the views of more top-flight government officials than perhaps any other single Congressional investigation. In the light of those hearings, that testimony, where do we go? What have we learned to help us formulate a wise and effective policy?

Senators Case and Humphrey, you're both familiar, of course, with the testimony as given in the hearings. And now I ask the question: After the MacArthur hearings, what? Would you start, please, Senator Case.

CASE: Thank you, Mr. Novins. Well, the obvious answer, to put it very briefly, is that we have to go on from where we are; that is, the Mac Arthur firing itself is really not the issue we must face now. The crudeness with which the Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces was advised of his dismissal, getting the word from his wife, who got it from a maid who got

it from the radio, that really isn't going to help us with what we face. But I do think that the crudity of it, that the man who had been twice Chief of Staff, who had been liberator of the Philippines, who had taken the surrender at Tokyo, who had set up the new order in Japan, who, at seventy, took a handful of green, peacetime, teen-age troops and stopped the North Koreans on their own terrain, ~~whose~~ who planned and executed the Inchon landings and reversed the whole tide of the Korean war, and who last October did that, then, this spring, to be dismissed as he was, I think that that has ~~unfit~~ furnished an unfortunate backdrop for the problems that we face. It was ~~highly~~ highlighted by the dignity of MacArthur himself, the hearings. For, when he was asked whether or not he questioned the authority of the President to dismiss him, he said, absolutely not. And he didn't dwell upon the dismissal; he dwelt upon the problem ahead. And I think that he posed a whole great question for us very clearly, when in the hearings he made this statement: "Now, recently, the Russian has probably had a new vision opened. That vision is no longer confined to the warm water of the Mediterranean or Europe. It is the possibility of reaching the warm waters of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean." And then MacArthur warned: "If by any combination Russia could extend down to the Indian Ocean, she would not only outflank the Mediterranean, of course, but it would place her, fair and flush, upon the Continent of Africa, which for the next one hundred years, with its enormous industrial potential, is something that attracts all commerce and industry, whatever its nationality might be." In short, the problem we now face is: How can we secure safety for the future, if we leave Communism in command in North Korea and in China, as the cease-fire order apparently will do?

NOVINS: Well, I thank you, Senator Case. Now, Senator Humphrey, please!

HUMPHREY: Well, it appears to me that the greatest contribution of the MacArthur hearings is the placing of American foreign policy in proper focus. General MacArthur has said that the Communist threat was global. And I want to reemphasize that very statement. The Communist threat to world peace and

security and freedom is global. Now, that means that our policy, the policy of this government and its allies, must be global in its context and in its conception. General MacArthur placed a great deal of emphasis upon our policy in the Far East, and, I think, appropriately so. But I listened to him in the hearings when he said that he was not either equipped by experience or background to make a comment upon our policy in Western Europe. I think that reveals a portion or a part of global strategy which we need to clearly understand; namely, that when you talk of a world, you don't just talk of the Far Eastern sector; you talk also of the Western European sector, where there is great industrial not only potential but productivity, ready productivity, where there is at least 300 million people that are skilled and trained and who can make powerful allies either for the cause of freedom or powerful satellites in the cause of enslavement that the Soviet has as its program. Now, I would summarize our position at the present as follows - speaking now of where do we go from here: The MacArthur hearing has proven to us ~~it~~ beyond shadow of a doubt that our policy must be greatly strengthened and that we, the American people, with our allies must be willing to resist and ready to resist Communist aggression wherever it rears its ugly head. Likewise, we must take certain preventive action. We must have a positive program, as well as merely a defensive program. I would suggest for the Far East the following items as an agenda for a program that will least afford us a means of checking the Communist growth. First of all, the speedy conclusion of a treaty with Japan, permitting the Japanese to build up their own defenses, with American supervision and with American bases. Secondly, the building up of our own bases in the Far Eastern area, such as at Okinawa, in Guam, and in the Philippines; and, thirdly, a Pacific pact with those nations that are willing to join with us, such as the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and any other, keeping the pact open, an open impact. Fourthly, economic aid along the lines of the Marshall Plan, particularly to those countries that have the beginnings of industrial development. Fifthly, military assistance to every country in the

south and southeast Asiatic area that has demonstrated any willingness to resist Communist infiltration at home and Communist aggression from without. And I emphasize that point, because it will be utterly impossible for the United States of America alone to garrison every single state, to give protection to every single nation and all the peoples in the Asiatic area. We must look to them to strengthen their own armed forces with our assistance. And, finally, I believe the most important point of our entire Far Eastern policy is the long-range program, the program of scientific and technological assistance, of psychological warfare, of economic, cultural and educational assistance. This is known as the Point 4 program. This means, by limited economic and scientific and technological aid from our country and other members of the United Nations, that nations such as India, such as Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and other countries in the Asiatic area will build their own economy; getting our technical assistance, our scientific help, train their own people to lift their own standards of living. And I submit that if we can do that, we have struck a real blow at Communist infiltration, because Communism grows in the soil of poverty and unemployment and lack of opportunity.

CASE: Well, Senator Humphrey, I don't know that I would quarrel with your last statement. I think Communism does grow in those quarters. But, summing up all that you have suggested as a program, it occurs to me that what you are saying, in effect, is ~~x~~ that what the MacArthur hearings taught us was that we should reverse the policies that were initiated under the Truman Administration since 1945; in other words, you are proposing that we now try to restore the balance of power that we fought to destroy during World War II. You say: have a peace treaty with Japan, build her up militarily. And I'd go you one farther on that. I'd say that in a proper understanding of this global problem that we have, that calls also for a peace treaty with Germany and at the earliest possible date. We have followed too long a policy of trying to beat nations into the ground and to create ... we have created a

power vacuum which has invited Russian Communistic expansion, both in the East and in the West.

HUMPHREY: Well, Senator Case, I think you're just being a little bit too harsh on the American people, this Government and its military power. We didn't creat a power vacuum. World War II created the power vacuum. And I take sharp exception to these continuous comments that come, that, somehow or another, all the problems in the world are due to the Truman Administration. Apparently some people have a convenient lack of memory. They forget that we had a world war that lasted from 1939 to 1945. The power vacuum in Germany is due to the defeat of the Nazi German power in World War No. 2 ...

(interruption) ... The Morgenthau Plan was, of course, never put into effect. The power vacuum in Japan was due to the defeat of the Japanese militaristic regime in World War No. 2. Now, I likewise submit that the program that I've enunciated or outlined here is a program to which this Administration has been committed and has been working ceaselessly. For example, the Point 4 program, the Pacific Pact, the Economic Aid. Every one of these has been programs that were initiated within the last three to five years and have been promulgated and have been pushed forward by the men in the Congress who believe that our global defense is vital, Western Europe and the Far East working together.

CASE: Well, Senator Humphrey what you have brilliantly demonstrated is that the MacArthur hearings are forcing a reversal of the policy that we followed in the Far East. You are pointing out that what we are now seeking to do is to build back the strength we had there in 1945, before we attempted to get Russia into Korea, before we brought Russia into Manchuria. We once had a position of strength, when we had the friendship of potentially the strongest power in Asia. And that was China. We had the friendship of the Chinese people. We threw it away by selling out the agreement that had been made at Cairo, and brought the Russians into Manchuria, we brought them into North Korea, we brought them into Port Arthur and Dairen, and it was the bringing of them in there, as a result of the Yalta and the Potsdam Agreements, that

created the situation which made it possible for the North Koreans to act as their puppets in the aggression. Now, the necessity of correcting that has been demonstrated, surely, by the MacArthur hearings. And I'm not going to quarrel with you about the Point 4 program, because I think we've got to do something to make amends for the terrible mess that we've got. We're trying to get back ...

HUMPHREY: Of course, Senator, you would like now to give our radio audience a little testimonial as to the vote in the Senate on the Point 4 program. Is it not true that the chief champions of the MacArthur position were likewise the chief enemies of the Point 4 program?

CASE: Well, I wouldn't ...

HUMPHREY: The vote was 36 to 37.

CASE: I wouldn't say that that was so.

HUMPHREY: I would. I was there.

CASE: Well, I don't know just when ...

HUMPHREY: In the second session of the 81st Congress.

CASE: Well, I was in the House at that time, and I'm not familiar with the particular vote that you refer to.

NOVINS: Well, gentlemen, there's been a lot of looking backward and a lot of recrimination and a lot of accusation, and I'm wondering now can we look forward a little bit and see if we can eliminate some of these things which have been ...

HUMPHREY: Well, just a minute. I was going to say that we ought to look forward. I didn't want to fight over the MacArthur hearing again. I think that ... may I just say? ... I gathered from the MacArthur hearing that the Chinese question didn't end up so well on the MacArthur side. But I'm not wanting to bring out old linen here. I think what we're trying to talk about is where do we go from here? Isn't that what we were talking about?

CASE: Senator Humphrey, don't you think that the MacArthur hearing has dissipated the idea that we're going to agree to the admission of Red China

into the United Nations?

HUMPHREY: Nobody ever ... you know, these straw men that people set up! First of all, who ever said we were going to agree to Red China in the United Nations? (interruption) ... the Senator talk about Potsdam, Cairo and Yalta...

CASE: I think it's pretty well accepted that the British had in mind that Red China might be admitted to the United Nations ...

HUMPHREY: But this is the United States.

CASE: Hong Kong - and, further, our attitude on Formosa certainly has been reversed, from the statements that Secretary Acheson made. And, by the way, that suggests one very constructive thing that I think we could start off with - and we could start off right here. During the past week Senator Humphrey has demonstrated, Mr. Novins, great persuasive powers with the President on the matter of appointments.

NOVINS: Very good, sir!

CASE: And I admire him for it. I think that Governor Youngdahl is a high-grade man. I'm glad to see him come into the Federal Government in such a position.

HUMPHREY: Further testimonial of the bipartisan spirit of the Administration, may I say.

CASE: Well, I should take your persuasive powers ... Now, I'm going to suggest a constructive thing, to go on from here, and I'll lay it right squarely before you. If you will persuade President Truman to name a successor to Secretary Acheson who will be as well qualified for his job as Governor Youngdahl is for the job to which he's been appointed, you will have made a distinct contribution to the development of confidence in the country and to the development of a real bipartisan approach to our foreign policy.

NOVINS: Senator Humphrey, we'll give you an opportunity to formulate your plans in that direction. (SPEAK SIMULTANEOUSLY) ... meantime, let's talk about Chiang Kai-shek.

HUMPHREY: I have a very good plan. I was just simply going to say that

it appears to me that we don't need a successor for Secretary Acheson. Secretary Acheson has proven his ability in the hearing, he's proven his ability as a master designer of a great foreign policy. And I would say to my friend, Senator Case, that if we spent a little less time trying to run Secretary Acheson out of Washington and a little more time trying to stop the Communist growth in Asia and in Europe, we'd be making far better headway on our foreign policy.

NOVINS: All right, now, gentlemen, let's talk about China and let's talk about Chiang Kai-shek.... (speak simultaneously)

CASE: except that I think that this is clear, that the basic thing that the country needs today is confidence in its foreign policy.

NOVINS: Well, let's talk about that foreign policy, Senator, so we know what we're going to have confidence in. What shall we do with Chiang Kai-shek now? Do we need to give him further assistance? What shall we do about Formosa? Shall we continue to block it up, as we have done?

CASE: My own feeling is, Mr. Novins, that we ... as to Chiang Kai-shek, that we should take the wraps off from Chiang Kai-shek and let him do whatever he wants to do. I don't mean by that that we should suggest to him that we're going to support him in whatever he proposes to do, but I'd take the wraps off him and let him do whatever he wants to do.

NOVINS: Is there any possibility, do you think, that there is a strong enough guerrilla force in what is now Communist China so that it can be an effective underground force?

CASE: I do. I recall that when General MacArthur was testifying that he did not suggest that Chiang Kai-shek be encouraged or asked or directed to make a raid upon the mainland of China or to go to Korea, but it was his suggestion to let him do whatever he wanted to do. And, undoubtedly, Chiang Kai-shek has access to the underground in China better than any other leader that you can name.

NOVINS: Would that put us in a position of being committed in a war against Communist China any more openly than we are currently committed?

CASE: Well, I don't see that it necessarily would. But how can you say that we're not in war with Red China, when their people are killing ours?

NOVINS: I don't say we're not. I said "more openly than we are," Senator. Senator Humphrey, may we have an opinion from you on that?

HUMPHREY: Yes, I think this is a basic matter of policy as to just how we should pursue our hostilities or war activities in the Far East. The Administration has felt that we ought to limit this war to the Korean Peninsula. I think that's a wise decision. I think it's wise in terms of our own power buildup, in the strength of our allies, and in the threat that exists all over this world. For example, let's just take a look at a new threat, in Iran. How ridiculous it would be for our Government to commit, let us say, a million troops, or a million and a half troops in the Far East, when the powder keg may very well be in the Near East. And I think we have to be very adept and we have to be very careful as we plan the utilization of our forces and of our economic and military power. I go back to MacArthur's great statement that this is a global threat, and it is ridiculous in a global threat to commit the balance or the majority of your power in any one particular sector.

CASE: Well, I'm not going to quarrel with Senator Humphrey on that. But I want to point out the quarrel between two statements that he's made. Earlier in his remarks he said, "we should resist to Communism wherever it rears its ugly head." Then he says, "we must avoid making a commitment somewhere that would prevent us meeting the situation in Iran."

HUMPHREY: That isn't what the Senator... that isn't what Senator Humphrey said at all. What Senator Humphrey said was that we ought not to commit the majority of our forces. And that is exactly what we would have to do if we were going to get the all-out total victory that we would like to have to satisfy our national ego in the Chinese area. What we've had ...

(M O R E)

that we ought not to commit the majority of our forces and that is exactly what we would have to do if we were going to get the all-out total victory that we would like to have to satisfy our national ego in the Chinese area. What we've had is a limited war and the best we're going to get out of it is a limited victory.

CASE: That's unfortunately true and you're not

HUMPHREY: I don't think it's unfortunately true. It's unfortunately true that we can't have victory. It's certainly unfortunately true that we can't destroy the capacity of the aggressor to aggress again in the direction of India or to come on down in South Korea for, certainly, no one will maintain that we're going to have an easy truce in Korea. If we reestablish the line at the 38th Parallel what is to prevent another aggression? It is unfortunate that

NOVINS: Senator Case, would you consider establishing a line somewhere along the 38th or any other artificial line as a victory for the United Nations forces as has been described?

CASE: I wouldn't consider it a victory which leaves the aggressor the victim of the aggression more punished than the aggressor. For today Korea is probably the most punished ... South Korea the most punished people in the history of the world and that statement, I think, was made by Mr. Kingsley, the Agent General of the U. N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, on the twenty-first of May. He said: "I doubt that ever in the history of the world, since perhaps the sacking of Carthage, has been ... has there been such complete destruction as has occurred in Korea." Ridgway said about the same thing last January.

NOVINS: Senator Humphrey!

HUMPHREY: Well, I can plainly see that Senator Case and I have an entirely different conception of the nature of the struggle. This war ... this struggle between Communism on the one hand and the forces of freedom on the other is not going to be settled in any one small sector and what the Sena-

tor from South Dakota feels is that we must win the great victory in the Korean area.

CASE: No! No! What I (inter.) what the Senator from Minnesota

HUMPHREY: (both speaking) says unfortunately we have to accept the situation, that we cannot have a victory.....

CASE: All right! All right!

HUMPHREY: Then it was a wise decision, was it not, to have a limited war rather than to permit it to get out of all control? Our major enemy is not North Korea. Our major enemy is not Communist China. Our major enemy is the Soviet Union and I submit that as long as that is the case that it is ridiculous to have a policy to try to fight the fingertips of this octopus or the ends of the tentacles rather than try to strike a dagger blow and a lethal blow at the very heart and the core of the octopus.

CASE: It is certainly unfortunate that that conviction wasn't registered in the White House when we went into Korea in the first place with ground troops.

HUMPHREY: Well, may I say that that conviction has always been in the White House. That is exactly why we had a program of military assistance of the North Atlantic Pact and the Marshall Plan and

CASE: That conviction has not always been in the White House because two years ago, when we pulled out of Korea, the representatives of the Army and the representatives of the Navy and the representatives of the Air Force testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in the House of Representatives that we were pulling out of South Korea, and we took our troops out of South Korea. That conviction has always been there. Why did we move out?

HUMPHREY: Well, Senator, may I say it has always been the objective of the American people and their Government not to occupy or not to militarize any other person's land or any other people's land. We did exactly what was in the tradition of our country, - not to have military occupation over an extended

period of time, but I go back to the fundamental issue that the war that we're engaged in is a major war and a major conflict. It is not the conflict in Korea. It's not even the conflict in Malaya or in Indo-China. It is a total conflict all over the surface of this world and that total conflict has as its guide post and as its major power terminal the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has its tentacles sticking out into all sections of the world and I submit it would be wrong to have a military or a political policy to try to make a major war out of what the Soviet considers to be a small war when the major enemy is the Soviet Union itself.

CASE: I could not agree with you more that it is a mistake to make a major commitment in Korea and I cannot state too strongly that I think that we have been the victim of letting the Soviet Union and Russian Communism dictate where we meet them and when we meet them. I have repeatedly said that the fallacy ... the policy of containment was that it left ... it gave the choice of time and place to the enemy and as long as that continues we will be run ragged all around the world.

HUMPHREY: Well, I would want to say in reference to your last comment that any peace-loving people, any peace establishment always finds the burglars, the arsonists and the murderers on the offensive. That's true in a municipality with its police department. It's true in a country as it deals with its gangsters, and what you're dealing with here is international gangsterism, but what has been our policy? The containment policy was an effort to restore a balance of power, to stop the

CASE: I'm glad you're agreeing with what I said earlier!

HUMPHREY: to stop the flood of Communism and the tide of Communism and to build up our Allies. Now we have done that and we're continuing to do it so that our Allies today are not ... are not leaches upon us, but are becoming strong, friendly, participating partners and we have extended our military strength to a point today where we are the major military power on the face of the globe and I think the fact that the Soviet Union's delegate at the United

Nations suggested a cease-fire truce in Korea indicates that this was another one of their little plans that back-fired just exactly as the Berlin airlift. Now, if we keep on the pressure, if we keep ourselves strong, if we do not let this delude ~~us~~ ^{us} into believing that we've won war, because this kind of war we're engaged in may last for a generation, if we keep in mind that this is but one of the many sectors that will require our strength and our steadfastness of purpose, I think we will win the total conflict with the Communist aggressor.

NOVINS: Gentlemen, I think you'll probably agree that it's very important that we make and maintain and perpetuate the friendship that we have, or did have, with the peoples of Asia because that's a very strategic part of the world

CASE: Indeed!

NOVINS: and now I would like to ask what has our experience in Korea done to our relationship with the rest of Asia? Have we made friends there by walking into Korea? Was the United Nations

~~HUMPHREY~~ CASE: It's terrible what it has done, Mr. Novins. I heard Harold Stassen say that today a picture of the battlefield suggests to the average man in Asia a white man fighting a man of color. I was in China in 1945 and never did I realize the truth of what Wendell Willkie later said, that we had a reservoir of goodwill there. When we passed the Chinese coolies working along, building airports and so forth, they would hold up their hands, turn up their thumb, and say "nung ho!" which was a greeting of good wishes and good luck, and that isn't the feeling that was there in Kaesong this morning when the Chinese guards came there armed, suspicious. Unfortunately, we've destroyed that reservoir of goodwill and we've got a job to get it back.

NOVINS: How can we do it, Senator?

~~HUMPHREY~~ CASE: Well, I think that I would launch a program of goodwill. One of the things I had in mind to suggest as a constructive thing was that we try to get behind the Iron Curtain the true story of what free enterprise and individual liberty and religious freedom means.

NOVINS:

Well, Senator, if I may interrupt for a moment. What can we do in those areas like Malaya and so forth, which are not behind the Iron Curtain but which might well be in the future? How can we prevent that from happening now?

~~HUMPHREY:~~ CASE:

I would try there to help them build themselves up economically and I'd put more ins ... emphasis upon them doing it themselves, and behind the Iron Curtain I'd experiment with this idea and ... that Drew Pearson has been talking about, - floating leaflets into the Iron Curtain countries with tiny balloons. I'd use picture that they could understand as there can never be peace if the people of Asia and the Communist countries regard us as bloodthirsty imperialists who have built up a great world power bent upon destroying the people of the world.

NOVINS:

Senator Humphrey, do you agree that we have lost friends in Asia by our action in Korea?

HUMPHREY:

No, I do not agree that we have lost friends in Asia and (inter.) and I'd like to give you a case example. A year ago the country of Burma, the Republic of Burma, was within an inch of falling into the Communist hands. This is a matter of record. Today, Burma is firmly on the democratic side and she is on the democratic side because she saw over a year ago that the tide of Communism was sweeping down in Asia and she just literally knew that she could not resist it, but when we put up our firm resistance in Korea we demonstrated to the peoples of Indo-China, for example, of Thailand, of Korea, of Pakistan, of Ceylon, of Malaya, of Indonesia, each and every one of these countries, that the United States of America, working through and with the United Nations is willing to stand and to help resist the tide of military aggression. Now, to conclude on the more positive program, because war does not settle these questions, - what is it that they need in south and southeast Asia more than anything else? They need the chance to live, the chance to make their new governments work, the chance for their people to lift their standards of living, the chance of better health and better education, the chance of jobs, the oppor-

tunity that is there, and I submit that our program must be a bold and a imaginative and a creative one of economic and technological, and scientific and educational assistance, not this twenty-five-million or thirty-five-million-dollar project that we have of Point Four that ... but a program that goes up in the hundreds of millions of dollars to aid these people, to educate their young people, to bring them to America, to give them opportunities of education, to send our young people to their countries, to contribute to their build-up. This is the kind of demonstration that will build goodwill. Now, I'm for leaflets, I'm for radio broadcasts, but you can't eat them, and these people are dying of mass starvation, - no jobs. Our job is to build up their resistance from within, namely, their economic status, their political security, to give them the sense of participation as free and equals in this world.

NOVINS: Well, Senator, you had little more than a minute to summarize and let's do the same thing for Senator Case.

CASE: Well, Senator Humphrey, with your objectives I'd agree, but the time has got to come in America when we find a solution for our problems without drawing a check book on a treasury that calls for increased taxes all along the line. I think we've ~~xx~~ got to maintain our strength. I'd reinforce the policy of Theodore Roosevelt - to speak softly and carry a big stick, and I would supplement that with a constructive program, ~~xx~~ but it would place emphasis upon the people of these other countries doing something for themselves.

NOVINS: Well, gentlemen, it's been enlightening and most interesting to hear your views on the hearings and on our future policies in the Far East. I think you'll agree that the American public, given all the facts, is going to be better able to make up its collective mind and I think you both have helped in that process today.

Thank you so much!

ANNOUNCER: And that brings to a close this session of "People's Platform" with Stuart Novins. Today we considered the question: "After the Mac-

Arthur Hearings - What?" Participating in the discussion were Senator Francis Case, Republican, from South Dakota, and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat, from Minnesota.

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