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AN ABOUT FACE FROM WAR TO PEACE

At a time when strength and unity of purpose is urgently needed, America's leadership in our critically troubled world is fumbling and faltering.

In recent weeks the objective of our international relations has been lost in the twisting and turning of Presidential, State Department, and Senatorial pronouncements and actions.

Let's look at the record:

Our ally on Formosa, Chiang Kai Shek, insists we are committed to the defense of the off-shore islands. The Secretary of State, carrying out the policy of the President, says maybe we are and maybe we are not; possibly we will and possibly we will not. All add to the general confusion in a time of crisis.

The President and the Secretary of State informed us a week ago that we may very well use precision atomic weapons if the Chinese Communists attack the off-shore islands. But on Wednesday, March 23rd, the President in his press conference states categorically that atomic weapons will be used only in case of a major war and not in police actions.

The chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, Senator Bridges, persists, however, in stating that our national policy is to defend the offshore islands by dropping atom bombs on the mainland.

American policy runs hot and cold, uncertain and confused. Surely if these policies are indefinite and uncertain to the American people, they must be even more so to our allies and enemies.

On Monday, March 14th, the official custodian of the Yalta papers in the State Department said their publication would adversely affect the nation's security and our relations with our allies. On Wednesday, the Secretary of State, after conferring with Senate Republican leaders, expressed his astonishment at the revelation that the Yalta documents were in the hands of one of America's leading newspapers. On Wednesday night the documents were ordered released to the nation's press. The White House expressed no knowledge of the release of the papers, and in fact the Presidential press secretary stated the President was not aware of their release.

This series of events reveals an unbelievable lack of coordination between the President and the State Department, and a degree of irresponsibility that exposes our nation before the eyes of the world as erratic, unpredictable and politically immature. Regretfully, this same degree of uncertainty and confusion prevailed concerning the proposal of Senator George, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in suggesting a meeting of the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France.

For at least two days the State Department clearly stated that Senator George's proposal was in line with the foreign policy of this nation. The President, at least through Monday and Tuesday of the last week, felt such a conference was premature. On Wednesday, March 23, the White House and the Department of State double checked their signals, and came to the conclusion that in due time such a conference would be desirable. Since then, at a recent press conference, the President seemed to qualify his earlier approval.

These policy gyrations and conflicting statements can only add to the feeling of uncertainty and indecision as to American policy.

Perhaps we need a thoughtful reappraisal of what we are now doing -- and what we SHOULD be doing.

Instead of alienating our friends through diplomatic blunders geared to domestic political expediency, now more than ever we should be seeking to strengthen our ties of unity and solidarity with our allies, to maintain a common front for preservation of the free world.

Instead of Presidential appointees deliberately stirring up the fires of domestic political controversy, now more than ever they should be devoting their attention to achieving some semblance of unity within their own party and within the nation on vital foreign policy issues that affect the destiny of our nation.

Instead of playing right into the hands of Red China's propaganda and helping turn Asians against us by our publicly brandishing a big club in threats to use atomic warfare, now more than ever we should be bending every effort to convince Asia our purpose is peace, not war -- development, not exploitation.

Instead of letting the Communists choose their own grounds for a new international "showdown" where we may be forced to stand alone, now more than ever we should be taking the initiative in diversionary moves of our own to put the Kremlin on the defensive and upset its carefully calculated timetable of Pacific strategy.

The Yalta papers, internationally:

What kind of reckless diplomacy is it to needlessly insult your friends, when you have nothing to gain and everything to lose? What possible constructive purpose could release of these documents against the wishes of England have in the present tense state of international affairs? As a result of this colossal diplomatic blunder, the free world's efforts for peace have been given a distinct setback rather than been advanced. Hereafter, frankness and candor will be ruled out of international negotiations. Diplomats of friendly countries will be as cautious as diplomats from unfriendly countries in dealing with the United States-- and the cause of peace will suffer.

The Yalta papers, domestically:

Appeasement has never gained us any ground internationally, and it will not gain President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles any ground trying to appease opposition forces within their own party. Trying to turn the clock back ten years might divert America's needed attention from problems and failures of today, but it cannot divert the consequences of these problems and failures. High sounding comments of the President against political exploitation of these documents cannot erase the responsibility of his own cabinet appointee for releasing them for no purpose other than political exploitation. The President and his Secretary of State must accept responsibility for an apparent willingness to toss bipartisan foreign policy out the window, and risk playing deliberate politics with our country's future security.

About A Bomb Threats:

Threats of A-bomb attacks might create caution in a country responsive to the fears and the will of its people, but have just the opposite effect on a country or a government holding human life cheap, unresponsive to any fears of its own people, and deliberately conniving to tag the label war-monger on the United States.

Nothing could serve the Kremlin better than to jockey the United State into a position of first using A-weapons against Asians, so that it can beat the drums of world opinion against us.

One American atomic weapon used on Red China would do more to turn Asia solidly against us, than all the propaganda the Communists have been able to contrive, and to them be well worth the price in human life it might entail.

Quemoy and Matsu:

The responsible leaders of our nation are today in the process of making what may well be the most crucial and important decision of foreign policy since the beginning of World War II.

The issue is what should be American policy concerning the off-shore islands from the Chinese mainland, namely and most important, the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. What do we do in light of our commitments to the defense of Formosa if the Chinese Communists attack these islands?

Yes, we are in a period of self-examination, of self-questioning, and this is as it should be. There is stilltime for thoughtful consideration and for careful planning. The time is short; the urgency of the situation can not be over-estimated, and the necessity for clear thought and definite policy is evident to everyone.

This decision rests with the President of the United States who is, under the Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief and the chief spokesman of our nation in foreign affairs.

Prior to the passage of the so-called Formosa Resolution, the President stated to the Congress that he alone would make the decision as to American policy with respect to the so-called related positions and off-shore islands. Our President, during the past weeks and today, has been and is seeking guidance and sound advice. This is no time for partisan prejudices or political expediency. The issue of peace and war is in the balance. The relationships between ourselves and our allies is involved in our decision over the off-shore islands. Our whole position in the Far East has been brought into sharp focus. Our strategy in meeting the challenge of Communist aggression is subject to intensive evaluation. We can not afford to make a mistake.

Powerful weapons of mass destruction are in the hands of both ourselves and the Soviet Union. Huge armies have been trained to combat effectiveness. The whole world awaits the decision. It is not right nor true to say that what may happen in the Far East is in the hands of the Communists. We have a part in this decision - we and our allies. And we must always remember that if we take upon ourselves the sole responsibility for making a crucial decision, we are not only involving our own nation but, due to the dynamics of modern warfare and the terrible tensions that exist in the world, we are involving all people everywhere.

The outbreak of hostilities today in any part of the world could be the spark that ignites a world-wide conflagration. We can not safely assume that hostilities involving the off-shore islands will be limited to that area. We can not safely assume that the Soviet Union will not honor her treaty of mutual assistance with Communist China. Nor can we assume that because of our great assistance to the other nations and our alliances in Europe and the Far East that our allies will stand with us on this issue.

It is true that the President yesterday expressed his belief that the Russians would not enter should war break out in the Formosa Straits. But look at the position we would be in should such a war occur. We would be thoroughly and endlessly engaged with our forces in Asia, while the real center of world Communism -- the Soviet Union -- would be unleashed to grab the prize, Europe -- the core of world strength.

Therefore, with prayerful thought and the highest degree of statesmanship that we as a nation and our leaders can bring to bear, we must patiently, carefully and objectively arrive at a decision, and do it within a matter of days.

These things we know: The Communist Chinese have declared to the world that they will take the off-shore islands. These off-shore islands have historically been under the dominion and jurisdiction of the government of the mainland. Presently, these islands are under the control of the Republic of China and heavily garrisoned. There has been sporadic fighting in and around these islands for the past six months. These are acknowledged facts.

There are those who feel that if the islands are to be lost to Red China this would be a stunning blow to the morale of the free Chinese forces on Formosa. Commanders are split as to how much American support it would take to hold these islands against Communist attack -- or if it is possible to hold them. The Navy and the Air Force have stated openly that these islands can be held with just naval and air support, plus the Chinese Nationalist troops. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army has testified before committees of the Congress that to hold these islands would require American ground forces. No member of the Chiefs of Staff has testified that the islands are essential to the defense of Formosa. They are essential only if there is to be an invasion of the mainland of China.

But, I, for one, have been lead to believe by our President and the Secretary of State that our government will not engage in any military action designed for the retaking of the mainland.

The question may very well be asked then - why is it that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is so much more important than the defense of the islands to the North of Formosa, which were evacuated, particularly if there is to be no invasion of the mainland. It has been stated by our military commanders that these islands are not essential to the defense of Formosa - and it is to the defense of Formosa that we have pledged American strength and resources.

Our declaration of defense for Formosa has not disrupted our relationships with our allies. The British agree with us on this, and there has been no protest from other friendly powers. The legal and historical position of Formosa as to a government on the Chinese mainland is entirely different from that relation to the off-shore islands. The final disposition of Formosa has never been arrived at. It is one of the by-products of World War II yet unsettled. The off-shore islands, on the other hand, represent a land area involved in the Chinese civil war. There can be no doubt about that.

From the point of view of international law, Formosa occupies a different position. Therefore, our declaration of defense of Formosa against Chinese Communist aggression is in the interests of international law and order; is in the interests of the United Nations; and is a proper and honorable policy. Quemoy and Matsu are not in the same legal or moral position.

I respectfully suggest that with respect to the off-shore islands, before any decision is made we carefully and frankly discuss this matter with our friends and allies. For example, what does the Japanese government think about American participation in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu? What about our main ally, the British? The Canadian government has made its position clear and has frankly stated we will have to go it alone. This should cause us to pause and think. Canada is like a brother to the United States. A more firm and noble ally we have never had. And yet, the responsible leadership of Canada has notified our government, and notified its own people, that Canada will stand aside and not be a partner with us in any military operations concerning the off-shore islands.

Have we consulted with the South Asian powers? What about President Magsaysay of the Philippines -- a leader that represents the spirit of the new Asia, a staunch friend of the United States -- what does he have to say?

The Secretary of State and the President owe it to the American people and to themselves to know exactly where these nations stand, and to seek their advice and counsel, before rushing headlong into conflict.

Our decision pertaining to the off-shore islands likewise must take into consideration our future relationships with such countries as Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand, and the other south and southeast Asian countries. It is fair to say that our relationship with many of these nations already is strained. The Prime Minister of India has spoken out forcefully against our policies relating to the off-shore islands, and even to Formosa. We must keep in mind constantly that what we do now may very well determine what we ever will be able to do in Asia. I am sure that the men of the Kremlin and their partners in Communist China sense that in this crucial decision concerning the off-shore islands they may well have discovered the Achilles heel in American Far East policy. It would be nothing short of tragic if a decision to defend the off-shore islands should lead to a complete break between ourselves and the free Asian nations. It is ridiculous to assume that the defense of these islands is more important than a cooperative and effective relationship between the hundreds of millions of people of the free nations of South and Southeast Asia.

These are some of the questions that appear on the international political scene. The answer is not easy, nor can anyone ever be sure that whatever decision we may arrive at will be the right one. Nor can we predict the future. All we can do, or should seek to do, is that which is right, which is legal, and which is honorable. Above all, whatever decision we make must be in concert with others. We must not stand alone in this area, nor can we condone statements by responsible political leaders to the effect that no white troops will be used if we should defend the off-shore islands. Statements such as these do us irreparable damage in the Far East.

Big Power Conference:

We are giving consideration to the desirability of a Big Power Conference in an attempt to ease the world's tensions. If we are to participate in such a conference, it is absolutely essential that we go there in full agreement with our allies, with no major questions unsettled, in our friendly family of free nations. We must remember at all times that the Soviet will use any international conference to drive a wedge between us and our European and Asian friends. We must be absolutely certain, before going to the conference table with the Soviet, that the United States, Great Britain and France have come to a meeting of the minds, not only on the unsolved questions in Europe, but equally so on the problems and questions in Asia.

The decision about American policy concerning the off-shore islands is the single more dramatic problem that faces us today. Unless we can reconcile

our point of view on this limited but crucial matter, a Big Power Conference would only lead to further differences and confusion among the allied powers. The leaders in the Kremlin know that so long as the free world remains united, so long as we are able to reconcile our differences, so long as we are able to agree on fundamental and basic policies, the Communist conspiracy cannot succeed. The immediate and long range objective of Soviet strategy and diplomacy is to divide us, to split us apart, and above all to isolate the United States from our major allies in Europe and the Far East. This we must not permit to happen.

In the months ahead our nation will be faced with many more critical **decisions** and difficult challenges. If we are to have a Big Power Conference, then every conceivable effort must be made to go there from a position of strength -- I mean strength based on cooperation and understanding between ourselves and our allies. I mean strength derived from a positive and constructive policy for the Far East as well as for Europe. I mean strength that is based on scrupulous adherence to the principles of international law. Yes, strength that comes from doing what is right, not doing what may be politically expedient.

And, also the issue has an effect on our talk of disarmament. Our President has appointed a special adviser in the field of disarmament. We are now participating in the United Nations disarmament conference. What could be more tragic in view of all of these future challenges and present problems, than for the United States of America to become involved in hostilities, standing alone without friends or allies. All we hope for could go down the drain. A war with Red China over the off-shore islands would not be conducive to a Big Power meeting. A war with Red China over the off-shore islands surely does not lead to disarmament. Such a war would not serve the purpose of integrating West Germany into the great NATO organization. It is abundantly clear to me that the diabolical plan of the Soviet Union is to force our hand in the Far East, if we permit it to be forced, over an area that is questionable as to its importance and that involves us with grave differences of policy with our allies. If the Soviet is successful in this tactic and strategy, we may well have forfeited our leadership, both in Europe and the Far East. It is not improbable to assume that in case of hostilities over the off-shore islands, that the Soviet may well threaten every ally we have if they should accede to American pressure to intervene and join with us, the war may be extended and enlarged. I do not say this will happen -- but I do say we must take these eventualities into account.

Such is the world we live in today. On that scene, other nations are troubled and looking for solutions.

Bandung Conference:

We are nearing the date of one of the most significant conferences in the world's history -- the African-Asian Conference ~~next~~ month from which white people are excluded. Have we no better bid for support of this vital block of the world's people than the threat of atomic warfare? Where is any positive, constructive policy to be offered these people as evidences of our goodwill and peaceful intent, evidence of our understanding of their own aspirations and our willingness to cooperate in their own progress and development?

A positive program for peace:

Let me advance a suggestion.

Let us get away from the negative, and move to the positive. Let's show the Asian peoples we recognize their importance under the sun, by taking the lead in proposing India for a seat on the permanent security council of the United Nations.

Instead of just saying 'No' alone to Red China on admission to the United Nations -- and it is a 'No' I have always supported -- let us counter with a suggestion of our own that would give recognition to Asia without letting Communist power blackmail its way into the family of nations.

It is a reflection of a very rapidly disappearing past for the United Nations to continue to seat China as a permanent member of the Security Council. China at the end of World War II was a powerful ally. The Communist China of today is an enemy. The nationalist China of today on Formosa is weak and not representative of the new Asia. Neither of these Chinas deserves a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Our nation should instead call for a revision of the United Nations' charter so as to give India the seat now held by China. Such a dramatic move would attract the attention and support of our friends all over the world. If the Soviet Union opposes this suggestion, our position in Asia would be strengthened. If our suggestion is accepted, we would have a strong, democratic Asian

nation sitting in its rightful place of leadership in the councils of the world. Let us not forget that India was our ally during World War II. That India was one of the few nations making a contribution to the Korean conflict by providing ambulances and medical assistance. That India is a democratically-elected nation committed to the principle of freedom. That the only major defeat inflicted on the Communists in Asia in the last year was inflicted by Nehru against the Communists in India.

Such a bid to India -- even evidences of our interest in creating such a bid -- could have a powerful impact in our behalf at the African-Asian Conference.

Then let us strengthen our friends in that Conference with our assurances of a positive, constructive development program for underprivileged nations -- assurances of economic aid, technical assistance, an expanded exchange program to better understand each others cultures.

On the economic front we have wasted valuable time in meeting the challenge of Communist infiltration due to economic distress, particularly in Asia. It is in this area where our participation through the United Nations, in technical assistance, in health and education programs can check and push back the inroads of Communist political and economic aggression. Then too, we must more boldly and meaningfully outline to the Asians the extent and degree of our own economic assistance to them, with particular emphasis upon long-term loans at low rates of interest for capital improvement projects. The development of new instrumentalities of international financing is a challenge to our political and economic statesmanship.

And let us strengthen them in that conference with assurances to the now-neutral peoples of the world that this democracy will never START an atomic war-- but will stand firm on our resolve to swiftly retaliate in force against a nation that does risk starting one.

About choosing the grounds for a "showdown":

The time is long past when we can afford to back away from threats of Red aggression. But the time and place of any showdown need not be at Red choosing. It should be obvious that Soviet strategy now calls for forcing our hand at Matsu and Quemoy, in the hope of making us attack the Chinese mainland -- a move which they could interpret as intervening in a China Civil War, and a move which they know we might be compelled to make without the support of our allies.

What is to prevent us from taking the initiative ourselves by shifting the scene of decision to Korea, where international law is solidly on our side in view of Red China's violation of cease fire agreements? What is to prevent us from calling the Kremlin's hand on such violations by calling on our Korean allies, through the United Nations, to enforce the Korean truce? Is it not reasonable to assume that a sudden buildup of our forces in Korea would do more to upset Red China's calculations about Formosa than anything we do about Matsu or Quemoy? Moving of our bomber squadrons into Korea, where they would be in ready striking distance of both Red China and Moscow itself, would give the Kremlin more cause for concern than any threat to use A-weapons on the Chinese people.

At the same time, our nation should assume the initiative in an attempt to resolve the issue of Quemoy and Matsu peacefully, we should propose the neutralization and demilitarization of those islands. We can propose that the Formosa troops be withdrawn from Quemoy and Matsu if Communist China agrees not to occupy those islands can then be placed under the supervision of neutral Asian countries or the United Nations itself. Such a suggestion places us in a peace-seeking, rather than warlike, posture and would give our allies in Asia an opportunity to seek a constructive solution which will secure our national security in Asia.

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