

PEOPLE, PEACE AND PROGRESS

Remarks by  
Senator Hubert Humphrey  
at  
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of  
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It is good to be with you here as you gather in Washington to study some of the problems confronting you as citizens and our country generally, both at home and abroad. While I know that domestic problems of our economy are perhaps foremost in your immediate concern, you have also always taken the broad view of looking at the entire world scene and our role in it. That is why today I want to talk to you about people, peace, and progress.

Perhaps I can relate my theme to your own organization.

You have a big, powerful union -- yet its real strength can only be measured in its concern about the individual people who make up your membership, and the confidence of those people that you as an organized group are keenly interested in their well being.

It is not much different with governments. We are a big and powerful nation, but our real strength rests in how well we stay aware of the needs, desires, and aspirations of people -- and design our official policies accordingly.

"Bigness" has become almost a universal trait of our society. Business is big, agriculture is big, labor unions are big, and government is big. The phrase we Americans often use -- "bigger and better" undoubtedly represents some instinctive urge of our people to do things on a broader and grander scale than anybody else, and there has been much good in this. America has in part been made great by this compulsion to surpass the other fellow -- to build the tallest skyscraper, to construct the largest dam, to turn out the longest cars from our assembly lines.

PEOPLE

But in our passion for "bigness", I wonder if we have not lost something. The bigger we get, the farther we remove ourselves from those personal contacts that are the most fertile seeds of human understanding and progress. We begin to get trapped by the complexities of our problems, and lose sight of the human beings and the human values involved in these problems.

With the expansion and growing complexity of our government has come a depersonalization that often can have deplorable results. All too frequently the government, and I include Congress as well as the Executive in that term, has a tendency to deal with "problems" rather than with people.

A case of unemployment in Detroit, for instance, with all the heartbreak and the personal tragedy that is involved, manifests itself in Washington, not in all its

human aspects, but as a statistic -- a figure that makes the bar on the graph grow a little taller or a little shorter as the case may be. Unfortunately one of the basic deficiencies of the present Administration is its habit, born perhaps of long business experience of most of its members, of preoccupying itself with "problems" to the neglect of people -- and the hopes, aspirations, and needs of people.

Harsh and unsympathetic as this mistaken behavior can be and is on the domestic scene, it is positively calamitous when it infects our foreign policy.

To concentrate on the technicalities and abstractions of "problems" can become disastrous. Our message must be one of concern for and interest in people.

Ironically enough the Soviet Union, where the basic political philosophy of the Communist rulers is glorification of the state and the suppression of individuality and personal rights, has grasped the fact more than we that foreign policy affects and influences people. The barrage of letters and statements fired by Khrushchev into the world press and over the world air-waves shows that he understands all too well that there are people in the world and that their opinions are the key to the future course of affairs on our planet.

Unfortunately, in Washington, the capital of "government of the people, by the people and for the people", many in the Administration seem to be only dimly aware that we must live and work with live human beings, with impressionable minds and emotions, inhabiting the great wide world beyond our national borders.

At home and abroad there is a crying demand for peace. People are sick and tired of war and conflict, whether "dirty" or "clean", "hot" or "cold" or lukewarm. They want an end to struggles for power, for influence and advantage, among a few big nations.

In many parts of the world where poverty, illness, and misery have been the lot of the common people for countless centuries, people are astir with longing for some of the comforts and better things of life. Probably the most remarkable phenomenon of our age is the vast disparity between levels of technological progress in various countries -- some parts of the world rushing headlong into the atomic and space age, while others are still eking out a meager living with stick hoes and traveling in buffalo carts. This is a maladjustment that could be explosive if not corrected. Progress everywhere must be brought into closer harmony.

Peace and progress -- the achievement of one and the stimulation of the other -- are two of the prime obligations that we must meet if we are to be true to ourselves and just to all men. They are obligations of people to people, and they must be comprehended as such, or we can badly miss our mark. To treat these aims of our policy as governmental problems, rather than as relationships of the most personal sort, is to invite continued failure and perhaps catastrophe. Yet sadly enough, there

are few signs that our present errors are soon to be corrected.

Let us first look at the question of PEACE -- more specifically, of disarmament. For the State Department; the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, this is a "problem". These agencies know that people around the globe are terribly interested in disarmament, but how to cope with this fact is, to them, only another phase of the "problem".

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department do really fine jobs much of the time, in carrying out their technical responsibilities.

The AEC for instance, has done a competent job in the scientific and technological development of atomic energy and nuclear weapons, but it does not see these weapons clearly in their essentially human context. The AEC spokesmen want to develop so-called "clean" nuclear weapons in the interests of humanity. The AEC does not seem to realize that the felt needs of the people here and now, do not fall into the "clean weapons" category. It does not realize that, in the interests of people rather than of some remote, abstract humanity, it would be far better to formulate methods of controlling and inspecting atomic armaments now than it would be to clean them up, which in essence means only to focus their destructiveness and make them, as Secretary Dulles puts it, more "useful" militarily.

The Defense Department, too, is affected by the same limited perspective. It views modern weapons as problems in military science and strategy, neglecting their impact on the delicate framework of human relationships. To be sure, the Pentagon's task is military defense. It wants to expand and improve armaments, not throw them into the scrap heap.

Even in the State Department where one would expect a more profound appreciation of the political implications and desirability of formulating an effective disarmament policy, there has been a rigidity and a blindness that have throttled the initiative and vision required for a solution of the mounting arms crisis.

The paralysis of our disarmament policy is due in part to that bigness and complexity to which I referred earlier. Major disarmament policy decisions are made in the National Security Council, in which many agencies like State, Defense, and the AEC bring to a central point their often divergent and conflicting views. Disarmament policy, in other words, is the end product of a tortuous process that starts at numerous individual desks and winds its way painfully through a maze of bureaus, agencies, committees and departments until it emerges as a meaningless and inadequate compromise. It is subject to all the deadening apparatus that complicated government can bring to bear upon it.

Frankly, the only way to slash through this confusing machinery is by the exercise of inspired leadership at the top where the ultimate responsibility resides.

But this kind of leadership has been woefully lacking. In its place have been complacency and inertia, with the result that disarmament has remained simply a technical or a legal problem, divorced from the human considerations which the situation demands.

As evolved by the tortuous apparatus of policymaking, our disarmament proposals have been masterpieces of complexity, obscurity, and rigidity. At London last year the United States proposed a complicated, interlocking disarmament package. All this was done on the pretext of safeguarding national security. The theory ran something like this.

If we gave up nuclear tests, then to be secure there had to be a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. But if we did these things, then to add to our security, we had to have a reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons in which the Soviet Union had superiority. Then just to be doubly secure we had to have inspection on the ground and in the air specifically designed to warn of surprise attack. A couple of other proposals were thrown into the package just to round it out. All this was supposed to constitute a "first step" agreement which could lead the way to further disarmament steps later on. Obviously if we had ever gotten agreement to such a first step, we would not have had to worry much about a second or third step, for the millenium of peace would have been near.

The futility of trying to negotiate such a complex package in the name of security is so obvious that I hesitate to draw it to your attention. By proposing such a package we were not advancing security, we were jeopardizing it. When nuclear bombs and missiles are dangling menacingly over our heads, the first step toward security has to be immediate and practical. The package was entirely too complicated

Now the United States disarmament package was also intended to impress the world with the sincerity of our hopes for disarmament. But the gaps and obscurities in it were so prominent, that it had the opposite effect. For years the United States had hammered away at the theme that disarmament must be backed up by effective inspection, because of the risk that the Soviet Union would try to cheat. In view of the character of Communist ideology and the long record of broken pledges by the Kremlin, this was sound policy.

However, incredible as it might seem, the United States never evolved a practical plan of inspection for any of its London disarmament proposals, except possibly for its "open skies plan" of aerial inspection against surprise attack. We gave the impression that one of the main sticking points between us and the Russians was that we favored and demanded effective inspection whereas they really did not. Yet we never put on the table a specific plan of inspection or even a



study proving that inspection was feasible. This was the obscurity, the dark area in our proposals that cast a questioning shadow across our intentions and made us look unconvincing in the eyes of a hopeful world. It was another instance in which we had failed to understand that our policy must be directed at serving the needs of people, rather than at drafting theoretical blueprints in a political vacuum.

All around the globe, people want atomic tests to end. They want to put a stop to radioactive fallout which many believe can shorten their lives or deform their children. Above all they want to make some start toward eliminating nuclear arms from the arsenals of potential belligerents. They do not understand why we persist in refusing to break up our cumbersome disarmament package and commit ourselves to a simple proposal for suspending atomic tests.

The reasons we have given to justify our basic inflexibility have, paradoxically, been unusually flexible.

At one time we said it was because we could not act without the concurrence of our allies. Furthermore, it seems hard to imagine how, if the United States and the Soviet Union ever came to a genuine agreement on an inspected test suspension, Britain, France, and other countries could long withhold their support and cooperation.

It was an open secret that a hot controversy was raging in the ranks of the Administration over whether inspection for a suspension of nuclear tests could be made really effective. To settle this quarrel the President called on Dr. James Killian and his assistants to study the technicalities and let him have a decision. Recently, Dr. Killian reported that an inspection system of reasonable reliability was technically feasible.

At this point the arguments against suspending tests went through another switch, this time heavily stressing the point that we had to develop small "clean" weapons, a process that would take several years at least.

The United States position has been made all the more embarrassing by the Soviet announcement a few weeks ago that it had unilaterally suspended atomic tests. I agree with the President and the Secretary of State that this Soviet maneuver was a fraud and a gimmick. On the very day of the Soviet announcement I denounced it on the floor of the Senate as meaningless except for propaganda purposes.

It made no provision for inspection to verify that it was actually going to be carried out, and, coming as it did after the most intensive series of experimental explosions in Soviet history, it was transparently timed to coincide with a natural break in Soviet testing. When Soviet scientists are ready again, we can be sure that tests will be resumed.

But mere denunciation of Soviet propaganda maneuvers is not enough. Here again the United States has treated the disarmament question as though it were a theoretical

problem, and not a live question affecting thinking and breathing people. Having issued statements rebutting the Soviet announcement, the State Department then rested on its laurels. But we cannot make progress in this role of a perpetual rebutter. This negative attitude can get us nowhere. We must offer positive policies and put positive momentum into our endeavors for peace.

I propose that the United States move off dead center and inject fresh vigor into its disarmament policy by adoption of the following proposals:

1. We should immediately slash through all the red tape bogging down the present United States disarmament package and announce our willingness to enter into an agreement, verified by effective inspection, to suspend nuclear weapons tests for a temporary period of two or three years. This simple proposal will be a cogent demonstration of our desire and willingness to act on behalf of peace.

2. The United States should immediately make known the kind of inspection system it believes is necessary to backstop an international ban on atomic tests. There is no practical reason why this cannot now be done. Dr. Killian's report on an inspection system is now complete. Let's spread it out publicly in front of the Soviet Union and say, "This is where we stand. What about you?" This will call the Kremlin's bluff and the world will watch and judge what Khrushchev then does.

3. The proper locale for formal presentation of our proposal is the United Nations. According to the resolutions of the General Assembly at its last session, we and the other principal negotiating nations on disarmament have a responsibility to carry on arms limitation talks within the UN Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union has expressed its intention of boycotting the Commission. There is no valid reason why this should give us pause. Regardless of what Moscow does, we are still subject to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the collective voice of the nations of the world. The U.N. Disarmament Commission should meet and note the absence of the Soviets, etc. If the Disarmament Commission cannot carry on its

work profitably because of the non-cooperation of the Soviet Union, then we should take the arms limitation question to the U.N. Security Council. The Soviet Union cannot afford to cold-shoulder the Security Council. It tried that once before -- at the time of the Korean aggression -- and got badly jolted when the Council acted very effectively in its absence. In the Security Council the Soviet negotiators can be brought before the bar of world opinion. There they can be compelled to take a stand on our proposals, to vote either "Da" or "Nyet" to practical measures for peace. The world can then plainly see who is encouraging or blocking progress of the world toward more tranquil relations.

4. In the United Nations we should be flexibly ready to adapt our proposals to any reasonable conditions proposed by other countries. This is particularly true in regard to inspection. An international inspection system must be effective, but it does not necessarily have to follow every detail that we suggest. Among the first items of business, we should initiate a proposal for a United Nations commission on inspection to study our plan, the Soviet plan, if it is presented, and any other plans brought forward by attendant nations.

This impartial study commission could then develop, through independent procedures, an inspection network adequate for assuring success of a test suspension.

5. Finally, we should take into account the fact that not all nuclear explosions are conducted for the purpose of perfecting weapons. This powerful blasting force has considerable potential for peaceful engineering operations, such as boring mines, digging channels and leveling mountains. The Soviet Union has recently announced its intent to conduct engineering operations with nuclear charges and our own Atomic Energy Commission has made public various kinds of projects in which nuclear blasting could be profitably carried on. Provisions for peaceful applications of nuclear explosions under appropriate international surveillance and inspection should be included in an international agreement terminating weapons tests.

The adoption of a dynamic and positive policy of disarmament is only part of the job of bringing lasting peace to the world. The proposals I have outlined will not provide a final and conclusive resolution of the conflict and tensions in the world. They constitute only a first step, but which, if adopted, could have immense political implications. They would be a major break through the hard crust which the Soviet Union has constructed around itself to shut out the flow of thought and communication from the free world. If we penetrate the Iron Curtain with an inspection system for an effective ban on nuclear weapons tests, then the door would be thrown open for further measures to advance the cause of peace.

#### PROGRESS

But peace alone, essential though it is, is not our only goal. We must also think of progress. Maintaining peace should not mean maintaining the status quo. Attempts to keep the peace can be construed as such, if we do not have anything else to offer.

If we are to reach through to people effectively, we cannot afford to be cast in the role of supporting the status quo in the world. It just happens that hundreds of millions of people are not satisfied with things as they are. They have caught glimpses of a better life, and are determined to get it for their children. People in the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world have embraced and embarked upon a revolution -- what Toynbee calls a "revolution of rising expectations". For our part, we must not block these aspirations. If we do, we will earn and deserve the enmity that "have nots" feel toward the uncaring "well-to-do".



Americans, one would think, should be sympathetic toward this new resolution. Our own country was founded that way. For generations the American Revolution was held up as an example to all peoples dissatisfied with their status. For years, we encouraged and supported the aspirations of any people for national self-determination and economic independence. We justified our own revolution on the principle of the worth of the individual man. Our declared purposes were to insure his personal liberty and give him the opportunity to advance his welfare. Now when these same legitimate aims are sought in Asia and Africa some of our leaders appear irritated and annoyed. American policy retreats to the line of easiest resistance, and ironically we become the spokesmen for the status quo.

Instead, of course, we should join with the spirit of independent nationalism that grips the underdeveloped and underprivileged countries, reminding these people that we, too, are the children of self-determination, of revolution, and of a will to freedom and independence. These people will be a powerful force in decades to come, and we must help them prepare to use their strength in behalf of freedom.

We can aid them, if we will, to progress toward their two-fold revolutionary goal of economic development and advancement of human dignity goals upon which our own good life is based.

Now, such progress is not automatic. Liberty and democracy are not the inevitable results of full stomachs, as we sometimes have let ourselves believe. In the desperate drive to overcome centuries of colonialism and deprivation, newly independent peoples may rush into communism, or fall victim to the new economic imperialism of the Kremlin. The Soviet Union exerts a powerful gravitational pull over people who as yet are uncommitted to a modern way of life.

Moreover, Soviet policy is flexible. The Kremlin can throw a huge sum suddenly into Egypt or Indonesia, while we must await the slow procedures of the democratic process to institute new programs abroad.

The Soviets can concentrate their resources to buy or sell products in order to achieve political advantage abroad, while our own trade is subject to fluctuations of an uneven economy and a wavering international trade policy.

The Soviet Union can promise long-term loans at minimal interest and delayed repayment; our banking philosophy has usually insisted on higher interest and "normal" repayment. The Soviet Union through education and marshaling of all its resources has achieved a tremendous rate of growth in scientific and economic prowess; we have allowed a wastage of intellectual talent and a falling off of our rate of economic growth -- needlessly!

The Soviets now appear to have broken through in technology to a point where Khrushchev can proclaim -- as he did again after returning from Hungary -- "A war of consumer goods" with the United States.

The result of all this is that we have lost much of our leadership in the nearly world-wide revolt against slavery to nature and to human exploitation. We are allowing the Soviets to seize this leadership. In doing so, we risk the loss of the uncommitted nations to the cause of freedom in our time. If we lose them, there will pass into Soviet hands a preponderance of power that will eventually annihilate the peace we are trying so hard to preserve.

The only way out of this morass is for America to reassert its own leadership of the great forces of revolution toward the better life now stirring half the world. We must show these people how to achieve progress toward human betterment, and how to accomplish it without the violence of arms and without insidious capture by totalitarianism along the way.

Such progress can be had through intelligent action on the part of the United States. It will require a vigorous and imaginative foreign policy consisting of more than military pacts encircling the Soviet Union. Our policy must be based upon ideas of economic and political assistance to encircle ourselves with viable, prosperous, actively free peoples.

To embark upon a program of world progress that has some chance of success, we need a thorough going reorientation of our foreign aid program. It needs to be new, and it needs to look like a new program.

If is fair to say, I believe, that we have never really had a definite policy for speeding up the economic growth and development of friendly non-Communist countries. Whatever we have done along this line was basically only incidental to our military containment policy. Hence, the appropriateness of the term "defense support" for much of our development aid.

I believe the time has come to weave an over-all pattern for overseas aid -- "a grand design" bold enough to capture the imagination of the American people -- and of the world -- and clear enough to commend itself to men of good will everywhere as the sure way forward to economic progress plus -- rather than minus -- freedom. I should like to suggest several principles to guide our policy.

1. We should separate the economic assistance program of foreign aid from the military program. Once again this year, I am attempting within the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, to achieve this separation. Last year the President recommended a separation, which was accepted by the Senate, but turned down by the House of Representatives. For some reason this year the President has not seen fit to repeat this suggestion.

In continuing to associate these two very difference types of support -- military aid and economic aid -- we have generated a confusion that is harmful both abroad and here at home. Overseas we have been tagged as warmongers -- of wishing only to buy minions to stand guard for us and of forcing a distortion in the economies of backward countries that cannot support heavy military budgets. Here at home the combination of military and economic aid has magnified out of all proportion, in the public mind, the percentage of money being spent abroad on non-military projects. And unfortunate results of certain programs undertaken for military expediency have cast discredit on all sound foreign economic endeavors. Hence separating these programs makes sense to me.

2. We should put our foreign aid on a long-term basis. We have been so afraid of scandal and so committed to an international-banker psychology that we have insisted on annual appropriations and scathing reviews. This has led to restrictive, short-sighted arrangements that have benefited us neither economically nor from a propaganda standpoint. Our foreign aid officials need to be able to sit down with officials of other countries and make a realistic study of their needs and capacities over a period of years to plan out a program of sound growth. They need to be able to make long-term commitments and be able to revise programs as experience dictates. This way the programs with the greatest merit could be devised and followed through. This way, the full impact of our aid could be made apparent to the people concerned.

On our present year-to-year basis, an appropriation of \$40 million a year looks paltry compared to a Soviet announcement of an advance of credit of \$164 million. We need to be realistic about loan rates and repayment schedules in order to make our offers usable and competitive.

3. We should greatly enlarge the scope of our program. Something on the order of \$3 billion a year would not be out of line. Last year the Committee for Economic Development suggested from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion in new capital each year, over and above the present flow. The most detailed estimate I have seen was that advanced by the MIT study project, which came up with a total cost of \$2.5 billion a year, of which some part would be borne by other industrialized countries, part could be financed with American farm surpluses, and the balance of about \$1.5 billion a year would be provided by American public funds. This represents a little less than we are now spending on so-called "economic aid", though of course under the MIT proposal this amount would go entirely for economic development, rather than military support.

We can easily afford this expense. Look at it this way. In the present recession we are allowing extensive resources to lie idle. In 1958 we have a surplus capacity of some 13%. For every million unemployed over the two million mark, the country is losing some \$600 million a month in national output. At the present level of unemployment, equivalent to some 6,500,000, we are losing -- irretrievably -- over \$2½ billion a month, or more than \$30 billion dollars a year, in goods and services. It is not even a "giveaway" since nobody is receiving it and nobody is benefiting from it. Our present rate of waste in terms of idle men and unused resources is far, far more than the rate of aid the people of the underdeveloped countries could possibly use in helping them achieve improved living standards.

Anyway, the question has never been whether we can afford it, but whether our national interest will assign a sufficiently high priority to this foreign policy leadership to justify the use of our resources.

4. We need to increase the consumption level of the underdeveloped countries. We should not expect their peoples to wait for decades or even generations to reap some of the benefits of an industrializing society. England collected the capital for its industrial revolution at the cost of great misery on the part of its



voteless proletariat. In the Soviet Union and in China, totalitarian government can sweat the needed capital out of the skins of the peasants. Only in resource-rich United States could economic growth take place under more desirable conditions -- and we were substantially aided by huge foreign investments and large numbers of mature, trained immigrants. The people of the new countries who have achieved political liberation should not be expected to await the economic millennium in an unforeseeable future.

One immediate program to raise their consumer standards is through the use of our surplus resources of food and fiber. Besides raising living standards, increased supplies of vital commodities would enable these countries to start needed public works programs without the inflation of food costs such additional requirements would generate. From a domestic standpoint, nothing could be more sound than to restore economic stability and prosperity for some of our own farmers while dedicating our greatest unused productive capacity to advancement of our world policy aims. We have taken a step toward utilization of farm products in foreign programs through Public Law 480, which I have been proud to sponsor and to support. This program allows the sale abroad for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural products. While the Senate has approved an increase for this program for next year, we have not yet fully exploited the possibilities of this measure.

Permanent programs of raising consumption levels abroad depend upon large-scale investment in consumer-goods industries by foreign capital. Our private corporations are willing to explore for oil and minerals and develop them abroad, but they have not been ready to produce clothing, shoes, and simple conveniences there. I believe the government could well guarantee a rate of return equal to the cost of the capital if American manufacturers would be willing to share their managerial skills and investment funds.

In addition, a way should be found to establish consumer credit in these countries so that the workers can partake in the fruits of their labors at once.

5. We need to have a sensible foreign trade policy in order that other countries in the world may prosper.

Obviously, the closer our economic relations with our allies the more stable our political and military ties will be; contrariwise, the weaker our economic relations, the less effective our political and military unity against Soviet imperialism.

The trade policy of the United States is clearly in serious trouble in the Congress. But in my opinion it is absolutely essential that the Reciprocal Trade extension be passed without crippling amendments. If we present to the world a mutilated trade program we will have taken a step to discourage free world unity at the very time when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a trade offensive.

6. We must see that our foreign aid program interlocks with other free world efforts. It can be designed to supplement the activities of United Nations groups such as FAO and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). We need to encourage regional development authorities, in the Middle East, for example. We can enlist the aid of our highly developed NATO friends in supplying technicians for the rest of the world.

7. All of these programs I have suggested so far have been programs aimed at economic development. We must not neglect the other facet of the world revolution -- the urge to achieve human dignity.

Overall we seem unaware that the problem we face is greater than a military one or an economic one or a technological one. It is also a matter of the spirit, of our interest, either strong or weak, in freedom and justice in a climate of progress. I think that our foreign aid should be concentrated in those countries who are making a real effort toward the development of individual liberty. There has been no such necessary relationship hitherto.

I am a champion of economic assistance for underdeveloped nations when there is a realistic probability that this assistance will be used for economically and socially progressive results. In places like India, Burma, Pakistan, and Turkey -- nations where hopeful, democratically-oriented, welfare-conscious governments are in power -- the case for economic assistance is a strong and persuasive one. Yet since 1945 our total per capita economic assistance to each of the 392,000,000 natives of India has been about 90¢, while our total per capita economic assistance to each of the 10,000,000 residents of the strategically important island of Formosa has been over \$60 since 1950 alone, a period five years shorter.

Unfortunately it also appears that the nations of the Middle East most likely to receive new financial benefits from the United States are those nations ruled by the most feudal and reactionary regimes.

8. To achieve the results we have every right to expect from our programs of foreign development, we should put in charge men who realize that our job abroad is to help direct a social revolution toward democratic goals instead of authoritarian goals, and who knows what reform is and how to get it. For this task we should enlist the leaders of our democratic groups. It is not a job alone for bankers or businessmen and it is not at all a job for people who are lukewarm about democracy.

9. Finally we must set a good standard at home --revise our immigration laws, set new standards of morality in government, business and labor. We must implement our new program of civil rights. A catastrophe like Little Rock can undermine our whole national image abroad.

At home, too, we must keep our economy fully employed and fully productive to support a rising standard of living as well as adequate programs of defense and foreign policy. We cannot advertise our economic system by displaying unwillingness to make it serve our needs

This is no time for us to falter in our own efforts. With unwavering zeal, the Communists have preached their gospel and built their power until they are within sight of their goal of making the coming century the century of Communism.

Yet we still have the overwhelming predominance in industrial and economic power. If we use our power with anything like equal dedication and purpose, we can make this coming century -- first for the people of the underdeveloped areas of the world, ultimately even for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain -- the century of political - as well as economic - democracy.

In so doing, we would be fulfilling the highest destiny of our country, as Thomas Jefferson saw it 132 years ago, in the closing months of his life. He wrote:

"All eyes are opened, or are opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them..."

This is the vision we must cherish, and realize through bold and generous action, if we are to make the "revolution of rising expectations" through which the majority of mankind is passing our revolution, not the Kremlin's.

1776 came almost a century and a half before the October revolution of 1917. That is very long head start -- and history will not readily absolve us if we fritter it away through apathy and fatigue. Let us, instead, move forward with full confidence and vigor into the great adventure of this century -- the banishment of poverty and inequality from the face of the earth and from all the languages of man.





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