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REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY CONCORDIA COLLEGE __ NOVEMBER 13, 1959

COMPETITION IN THE ERA OF PEACE

Today the United States of America is facing the severest test it has ever confronted. We are challenged at every turn by a relentless, determined, united foe. We are challenged on every level by a system of power and purpose dedicated to our undoing. We are challenged by a dynamic political-religion which seeks to bring the whole world under its sway.

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Whether we like it or not we are in a massive and protracted struggle with the Communist world. The leader of that world is a man with courage, imagination and optimism. He is confident that Communist culture will "bury" Western values and institutions because he believes that the balance of world forces has shifted in his favor. There is no greater threat to our security, our very survival, than a powerful, optimistic and messianic leader dedicated to the destruction of the values we hold dear.

Mr. Khrushchev is a more formidable adversary than Stalin ever was.

It now appears that the horrible consequences of nuclear war have seeped through to the Kremlin. Mr. Khrushchev realizes that he cannot win that kind of war and has turned to a massive peace-time offensive. We must clearly understand that this peace is more than the absence of war. We must make it determinedly active. There cannot be a passive peace. We too must wage a peace offensive. And this will demand an energetic, constructive, determined effort.

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We have entered a new dimension of competition between free nations and the Communist world. This new dimension will be an era of mobility and movement. It will require a revamping of our thinking, our planning, our strategy.

Troblem of Fragmentation Treasury Buy State JCA Aque & milk more ... need of 1) Permanent Research & Policy analyzing (1) Permanent Research & Policy analyzing Agency - think about comprehensive strategy = Military-Econ - Scalfa Peletical Psychologica (P.4) (2) Sount tommetter on Notle Strategy. 11ned - Stath - U.M. A) effad Sec Couver (2) Permanent U.N. observors (3) flumonent U.M. monitors 14) Paum - U. M. Peleo torce FOOD - Health - Educ - Plople, Progress, Peace

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Can the free world stand up under this challenge? Can the mighty United States prevail in this protracted conflict which may last a generation or even a century?

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Some thoughtful men believe that we are living in the last days of our greatness -- that we lack the courage and guts to make the sacrifices needed for a sustained period of competitive coexistence. Some men believe that the American government is ill-suited to match our national resources with those of a united, determined and powerful foe. They claim that a government characterized by a separation of powers and checks and balances is inherently incapable of meeting the fast-moving demands of a technological age or of competing successfully with the dynamic, planned offensives of an expansionist totalitarian system. They maintain that democratic institutions lack the unity and force required to prevail in a protracted struggle.

There is some truth to these charges. And we would be foolish if we did not acknowledge it. We do face a grave crisis in which the very survival of democratic institutions is at stake.

But I have not lost faith either in democracy or in the American system of government. We have faced grave crises in the past and we have prevailed. When the threat is dramatic we do have the courage and the will to face the challenge unafraid. But when the threat is not so dramatic, it is sometimes difficult for us to prepare for the battle. It is

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easier for us to understand the meaning of a Pearl Harbor than a sputnik.

001999

America's strength may not be a tidy governmental structure. But we have a secret weapon -- the morale of a free and dedicated people. The not-so-secret key to this secret weapon is leadership -- leadership which understands the challenges we face and has the imagination to enlist the moral and material resources of the American people.

Leadership is the key. But I sometimes think we have lost or mislaid the key, perhaps on the third green of some golf course in Georgia.

There is no substitute for wise and courageous political leadership. In our form of government only the President can govern. If there is a failure at the top it is not possible, as some people have suggested, for Congress to take over. Parliamentary bodies cannot govern. And they should not try.

During the last session of Congress some of us proposed programs and policies designed to fill the vacuum of leadership in the White House. But we all know what happened. We had government by Presidential veto. If you can call that government.

The Problem of Fragmentation

Our government of checks and balances always has a certain amount of built-in fragmentation. But today the problem

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of dozens of duplicating agencies and authorities within the Executive Branch has become a scandal. No less than half a dozen agencies are involved in the distribution of surplus food and fiber abroad. No less than half a dozen agencies are involved in our foreign aid program. And so it goes. With no firm hand at the helm, we are drifting. We know it and our allies know it.

Consistency in policy and long range planning are the first casualties of fragmentation. The widespread let-Georgedo-it mood of the Administration demoralizes the government and confuses the American people.

The fundamental answer to this problem is leadership -and leadership we shall get in 1960 when the Democrats again capture the White House.

But short of a new and dynamic President there <u>are</u> things that can be done. I believe the time has come to consider seriously the creation within the Executive Branch of a permanent research and policy-analyzing agency charged with the responsibility of thinking about comprehensive national strategy. By comprehensive strategy I mean all essential elements in domestic and foreign policy -- economic, military, scientific, political, and psychological.

Such a comprehensive agency would relate the total capacities of the American people to the total needs of the

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challenge we face. In Mr. Khrushchev's centrally-administered world, economics is an instrument of foreign policy. Science and technology are the handmaidens of national purpose. And the arts of persuasion are dedicated to the goal of world conquest. There is one overriding purpose. There are many instruments employed in reaching it.

002001

This new executive agency I am proposing is not a substitute for politics or political leadership. It is an instrument designed to help translate the will of the American people into national policies appropriate to our deepest aspirations.

This new agency would not be an ivory tower inhabited by egg heads thinking about American strategy in the splendid isolation of a country manor house. It would be made up of men who are in intimate contact with the fateful problems facing our government, but who would not have the responsibility for day-by-day policy decisions.

Such a research and policy-analyzing agency would not solve the problem of fragmentation, but it could help to give perspective and a sense of purpose to the many agencies, programs and policies which now often operate at cross-purposes.

Joint Committee on National Strategy

Fragmentation is a problem not only in the Executive Branch, but in the Legislative Branch as well. Congressional

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committees often seem to operate at cross-purposes. Under the present administration the Budget Bureau tends to be the integrating agency to whose omnipotent will the other agencies must ultimately bow. We have a similar, though not identical, situation in the Congress where the appropriations committees sometimes usurp the functions of the policy committees. The policy committees are the ones charged with the responsibility of passing on the merits of competing proposals.

002002

In the area of foreign policy the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, for example, are the major instruments for studying proposals and recommending policies for the international policy of the United States. But in these days when the traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy no longer hold, many other committees deal with matters bearing on our external relations. At present there is no one committee charged with the comprehensive view of national strategy. We have joint committees of the House and Senate in the areas of Atomic Energy, Defense Production and Economics, but there is no joint committee in over-all national strategy.

I propose, therefore, that the Congress consider the establishment of a Joint Committee on National Strategy. I propose that this blue-ribbon committee include the chairmen and ranking minority members of the major committees of the House and Senate. The purpose of this new committee would be

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to consider our total national strategy in this hour of peril. It would attempt to see the interrelations of diplomatic, military, and economic policies as they contribute to our national purpose.

002003

This Joint Committee on National Strategy would be a counterpart in the Congress of what I have proposed for the Executive Branch. It would not usurp the legitimate functions of any of the present committees. It would supplement them by endowing their work with a larger frame of reference. I am convinced that chairmen and ranking minority members of the existing committees would come away from meetings of the new Joint Committee with new wisdom and insight. They would have a greater appreciation, for example, of the relationship between fiscal policy and national productivity and how both factors relate to our defense posture and our negotiating position in Berlin.

Responsible statesmanship is precisely the capacity to see complex interrelationships in a perspective as broad and as deep as the national purpose itself.

No amount of structural manipulation can make up for a lack of leadership in the White House. But I believe that if the essential idea underlying these twin proposals were adopted, it would make a modest contribution toward a more integrated national strategy. And in the face of a united and relentless adversary, even a modest contribution toward better strategic planning should not be brushed aside.

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Concordia College Speeck Maarhead Mr. Nov. 13, 1959

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