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My dear Senator Humphrey:

Reference is made to your lecture, "The United States and International Communism Today: A Balance Sheet of the World Power Struggle," given at The National War College on 21 March 1962.

Enclosed is an edited retyped copy of this lecture for your retention.

May I again express our appreciation for this splendid presentation.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,



MILTON C. TAYLOR
Colonel, Infantry
Executive Officer

Encl - 1
as

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.
United States Senate

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"Edited by Author"

THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM TODAY:

A BALANCE SHEET OF THE WORLD POWER STRUGGLE

By

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.

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**Presented at
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THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM TODAY: A BALANCE SHEET OF THE WORLD POWER STRUGGLE

By

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.
(21 March 1962)

GENERAL GRISWOLD: (Introduced the speaker).

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you very much, General.

Gentlemen, this is one of several appearances that it has been my privilege to have at the College. As I said to the General and the staff when I came in this morning, I am an expert on no particular subject except just opinions. I have an expertise knowledge of personal views and opinions, and it is in that particular area of expertise that I shall confine my remarks.

I also made another confession and I might as well get it out to you because it will relieve any emotional tension that I might have at the moment, that in the preparation of my remarks I had failed to scan through all the correspondence as carefully as I should have and, therefore, I shall not confine my remarks entirely to the African and Asian areas of the world, even though that in itself would be a great challenge. But I shall move into the broader areas, everything, even including some of outer space, so you can expect an orbital flight this morning in some kind of political ecstasy which I hope will be of some interest to you.

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Now let's just talk together for a while in rather informal and general terms about the world situation as some of us may see it.

Mr. Rostow, who is one of the President's main advisors today in the field of foreign policy and national security, in an address at Purdue University I think succinctly summarized or stated some of the basic forces that are confronting us today in the world and affecting our policy decisions.

Just what are those forces?

Let me paraphrase what this distinguished professor and political analyst had to say. I think we will recognize the credibility of all these statements.

First, there is the revolution in military technology yielding an uncontrolled competitive arms race, at least at the present, and imbalance of the offensive over the defensive in the field of nuclear weapons. You who are experts in military science or tactics I believe would agree at least at this particular moment that this is a fair statement of the military position or of the military potentialities of modern weapons.

The second force confronting us is the revolution of modernization or, to put it another way, the revolution of expectation in Latin America. We have witnessed some of this in the past few days in Africa, in Asia, in the Middle East, including the modernization going forward in the underdeveloped

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areas under Communist control. In other words, people are tired of backwardness; they are fed up with their poverty, with their sickness, with their illiteracy. These are prevalent, powerful, continuing forces affecting political decisions and political leaders throughout the world, and anyone that doesn't take these forces into full consideration in the formulation of policy is just missing the boat completely insofar as effective policy is concerned.

I think we in this country must clearly understand that the world is in a hurry and that people are not going to wait, even if in their emotion and irrationality they destroy the very world in which they find such hopelessness and frustration.

There is another force that is very evident today; and that is the economic revival of Western Europe and the economic revival of Japan and the economic growth of the North American Continent and other scattered areas of freedom.

There is a tremendous economic force at work in this world. And let me say that that economic force is more powerful in the so-called West than it is in the East. This is not to underestimate the achievements in the Eastern world, but I would like to leave at least this one thought with you -- Don't undersell yourself. You cannot possibly formulate policy by a miscalculation of your own strength -- surely it is just as

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serious and maybe more so to underestimate your strength as to overestimate it.

Then there is another force at work -- the political revolution marked simultaneously by proliferation of ardent new nations and an intensified interdependence which requires the individual nation-state to cooperate increasingly with others in order to provide for its security and its economic welfare. This is another way of saying that blocs are inevitable, that they are in the design of things today. It is another way of saying the new nations need the United Nations. It is another way of saying that the new nations in a sense need a center of power around which they can group and with whom they can work, even though that center of power may not be aligned with either the East or the West -- that is, the Sino-Soviet bloc or the United States and its allies.

Then I think that if we will just face up to the fact that there is an air of expectancy in the world today, an uneasiness, there is a feeling that a breakthrough on the international scene is long overdue. All over the world people are impatient; they are impatient with the traditional beliefs in an older way of life; they are impatient with their leaders; they are impatient with their governments; they are impatient with the threat of nuclear extinction.

Some of this impatience is manifest in the United States and in different degrees. There are the extremists who say that we ought to get

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this thing over with now, have to have a policy that says you are going to win tomorrow morning, next week, set a date, get a calendar out, put a pin in it and say that that date will mark the end of Communism, the end of our problems. There are others who say, well, we ought to do it in two years or five years.

There is a restiveness, and I think this is indicated in every home, in every business, in every campus, and in every area of our life. The real question is whether or not those who are too restless, too impatient, will gain the ascendancy -- in other words, gain power -- and by that impatience and that emotionalism, based upon both fear and anxiety, will make decisions and implement those decisions that can lead us to disaster.

I am an optimist. I come here this morning filled with optimism based upon fact and not illusion. I do not think that the power struggle in the world today is favoring the Communist bloc. I think the power struggle is definitely, if we but maintain the policies that we are presently pursuing and strengthen and broaden those policies, favoring the West; it is favoring what we call the areas of freedom.

Now, naturally, with all this impatience and anxiety, we have to be on guard. We cannot let ourselves be drawn into hasty concessions or needless concessions or dangerous concessions to the Soviet Union just

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because people are tired of the cold war. Who isn't tired? I am tired this morning because I didn't get enough sleep. I had a bad day yesterday, and I am going to have a worse one today. Most people are tired. What I keep saying is if you get too tired, move over and let some of us who are not that tired get up front.

Now there is a widespread disgust at this cold war, and there is a growing realization on both sides that both a cold or hot war may well involve intolerable waste of effort and resources. Contrary to the opinions of what some people term the radical right, we do aim at victory. In this cold war, in this, if you wish to call it power struggle, we have been aiming at victory for years. We have been in this cold war now for seventeen years. I think we are going to be into it for another twenty or twenty-five, maybe fifty. Who knows? We have had Thirty-Year Wars, Hundred-Year Wars, and the social and political forces today are more dynamic than they were three centuries ago. But the victory that we seek is not just the physical victory of dominance over a geographical area. Surely it is not that. We don't seek any imperial or any imperialistic aims. The victory that we seek is to fulfill the longing of mankind for a chance to work, to develop, to learn, to prosper in freedom, or at least to live in a social and political environment in which individual capacity can be unleashed and in which there can be some intellectual and spiritual enlightenment.

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We remember how difficult it was to fight to victory in the last war. We were in a war against Japan and Nazi Germany to the end -- "unconditional surrender". No one expected, or at least very few did, that it would be over one day after Pearl Harbor, or one week or one month, or even one year. Instead, we buckled down for a long struggle. We were almost surprised that the military struggle ended as soon as it did -- to be continued in new dimensions.

We have suffered some losses too, very grievous ones. We have made some great mistakes, as modern unravelling of historical facts come to our attention, grievous political mistakes, and military mistakes. But we came back to win on the military battlefield, and we came out the strongest nation in the world.

Now, just because some of our "do-it-ourselves", or "do-it-yourself" political colonels say win, that doesn't mean we have to throw all the hard-fought gains that we have been able to garner these last twenty or twenty-five years over the brink. I think most people that are sensible today realize that a bomb on Moscow will mean a bomb on Chicago, and one on Leningrad will mean one on Washington or New York. It is because of this realization that the facts of power or the terrible destructive capacity of the modern weapons that statesmanship, political statesmanship, political sensitivity, political calculation and analysis today is a priceless

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qualification for survival and freedom -- not just survival but survival for freedom and independence.

Since both sides realize and each side knows that the other knows that there will be no real victory in the next war, we have to consider the prospect of peaceful coexistence with our rivals. I am going to come back to this phrase "peaceful coexistence", but I used it now because in this kind of situation we are either going to have an all-out war, the outcome of which surely would leave some doubt as to the kind of society that would survive. I think we could militarily win that war. You know more about that than I do. I have been told if a war broke out today maybe we would win the war, but whether ever again there would be representative government in this country, whether ever again there would be freedom of choice, whether ever again there would be the kind of freedoms we have been conditioned to all throughout our lives, I have serious doubts.

I gather the purposes of winning a war is not merely to preserve the flesh, but more importantly, to preserve and protect the spirit, the soul. I never did feel that the purpose of military conflicts was just geography, nor did I feel it was just economics. I thought that it had something to do with the preservation of a way of life, and I think that honest men could have an honest disagreement as to whether or not a first-class knock-down, all-out nuclear war would leave much of a way

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of life. I have no desire to be one of those who survives and crawls out from under a rock. Better to be dead than that. I am interested in living as a human being with all that God Almighty endowed us with, the spirit, the mind, the body, and I think that by using that we can have a better way of life. I consider that the policy of victory.

The policy of defeat is to fight this struggle on the terms of the enemy, to fight it with their weapons under their standards, to aid them in the struggle only to end up losing more than they do. That is not Humphrey's way. I only speak for myself. We had better face up to the fact, and it is quite a fact. It is quite evident this morning that we would not only have to suffer the devil, but we will have to sit at the table and talk with him, if you like, bargain with him. That is what we have been doing. It is what we have been doing at the United Nations.

By the way, since I have said I would be quite informal, I don't know why we don't face up to it. Summit politics, summitry, is a way of life. Why do we have to be drawn through a knothole, bedraggled, acting as if we never wanted to do it, getting ourselves into a mental attitude, acting as if we don't want to do it. Why don't we sometime drag Khrushchev through one of those knotholes? Why don't we say to Khrushchev, "We are going to meet in Washington, or Paris, or some place else. Here is the agenda. Get on your bicycle and come on over." No, he makes the

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offensive and we are going to meet with him just as surely as we are sitting in this room. We will go before the world because he dragged us to the conference table, the President of the United States. Why do we do it?

What we need to have is constant preparation for the meeting of the heads of state. This is a world in which, believe me, power is concentrated in individuals. I don't care for this particular kind of world, but I haven't been able to get out of it right now. And those who have want to get back in a hurry. We spend a lot of money on re-entry.

This world today is a world in which power is concentrated in the heads of state. And when it isn't, it is a world that is fractured, and at times disordered. We have one of the few working representative governments in the world. Everybody in Congress knows today that more and more power is concentrated in the Executive, and we rationalize this by saying at least the President is elected. I want to say it is very difficult to defeat an incumbent President. Maybe the wisest decision this country made was the two-term amendment. I think it may stand us very well in the days ahead, even though I must say I wasn't for it when it was passed. I frankly admit my error, as I see it now.

If this is a world in which the power forces come to a point in what we call the heads of state, then the heads of state have to be equipped for

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what they call summitry, because that is what it is. You take along a Secretary of State because you need an associate. You take along staff people because you need experts. Let's quit kidding ourselves. We are going to have summitry, and I suggest if we are going to have it, we ought to outline it.

I am a politician, gentlemen. I do not get appointed; I run for office and have to get elected. Every time I have ever fought a political campaign under the battleground and under the terms and initiative of my opponent, I have been defeated. I have suffered that too. I don't like it. I like to win. I don't go for these moral victories. I like the other type. I also know that when I start laying out the agenda, when I pick the times and places for debate, when I outline what will be the course of this campaign, I win. At least I get a fifty-fifty chance. The way you do that is to pre-empt the field. You repeat it and repeat it until when somebody wants to do something else it looks like he is a foreign agent. Why is it that most people when they are in a high position wish to have a meeting in their own office when they face a difficult situation. You are more comfortable. You are more at home. The Yankees win more games at Yankee Stadium than they do on the road. There is something about the environment that gives you a greater sense of confidence. Then, I pray, why is it we keep pretending this is an age of Machiavelli, or that this is

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an age of Talleyrand, or that this is the 19th century, or even the early 20th century.

Summitry started with Woodrow Wilson. Good or bad that is where it started, and it has been there ever since, because Woodrow Wilson was the first American who understood the nature of the modern world. He was truly a 20th century individual.

This particular devil I say we are sitting down with, Mr. Khrushchev, hasn't come up with anything we are willing to sign. He talks disarmament, but he arms for war. And he refuses to talk about international inspection and control even as he talks disarmament, and international inspection and control are the only conditions in the field of disarmament we could conceivably accept — the only conditions the Senate of the United States will ratify. We have something to say about treaties, and there will be no treaty go through the United States Senate in the field of disarmament that does not provide an alternative to trust. We do not trust these days. We have to build, as Admiral Radford once said, an alternative to trust, and that is a mechanical political system, and the mechanics of inspection and control. The intensity of degree of that is debatable, but the principle is not. I keep repeating this lest anybody who talks or negotiates for us gets some idea we have forgotten this. We don't have much authority left in the Congress of the United States, but advice and consent we do have, and

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we are going to sustain it.

Khrushchev talks about settling the Berlin problem, which gives a throbbing pain in the neck to both the United States and the Soviet Union. When you sit down and talk with him, what does he do but scatter chaff in the air corridors and order his pilots to play chicken, or Russian roulette with ours. I want to say I think our performance in this crisis has been admirable. We have a policy, and we adhered to it. We have been firm without being belligerent; we have been firm without being arrogant. Our pilots, our soldiers and our officers have been careful, prudent, courteous, and on the alert, and it is just exactly this kind of a demeanor and poise that I think stands well in this cold war battle, not this fantasy of fever that runs from hot to cold; one day you are wondering if you ought to do this and the next day that, but rather a position and policy that is adhered to at least until such time as it is demonstrated unworkable or ineffective.

I really believe that we have demonstrated again in the Berlin crisis both a firmness of character and position that we ought to have as well as that flexibility which is required at the negotiating table to probe, to seek answers without the sacrifice of principle or without making concessions that would adversely affect either our security or that of our Allies.

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Through all of this that I have spoken, all of this frustration, all of this anxiety, you just can't slam your cards on the table and say I won't play. That is what some people have done. Illogical though it may seem, Mr. Khrushchev really does want to talk disarmament. He too is probing. In June of 1960 at Geneva he did not want to talk disarmament. He had other matters in mind, so the Soviet delegation walked out just as the United States was coming up with an effective disarmament proposal which really showed some promise. Since that time nothing substantive has been agreed upon. There has been no basic change in our disarmament policy. Yet at the United Nations last fall the Russians did agree with us on the broad principles of disarmament. Now the Geneva Disarmament Conference is deadlocked, but in the most friendly manner you can ever imagine. In fact, since this conference began, our negotiators have been surprised at what Flora Lewis of the Washington Post calls the "meticulous mildness" of the Communists. There has been little or no invective, no tiresome propaganda. There has been no slamming of the shoe on the table, but there have been no concessions either. There is a sort of a neither backward or forward movement, but a sort of side-walk, just sliding back and forth more or less on the same line.

What is behind this strange juxtaposition of belligerence in Berlin and calculated moderation in Geneva, because that is exactly what you have within a distance of 1250 miles. You have got two diametrically

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opposed actions. I have never believed in the theory that the Communists always act according to plan. I don't think these Communists are supermen. I don't think they can possibly be supermen without having Wheaties, and they don't have Wheaties. I don't think they are intellectual giants. I don't think they have a crystal ball. I don't think they are eight foot high. Neither are we. Some day we are going to have to talk with these people in terms of reality rather than looking upon them as depraved peasants, illiterate, unknowing, or as some kind of supercolossal genius in science and technology, with some kind of advanced degree in Machiavellian diplomacy. They don't have all of that. I don't think they even have our destruction fully plotted down to the last detail in some secret command post in the Kremlin.

On the contrary, most of the time the Russians are just as confused as we are. Lots of time they are even more confused. We saw that in Hungary. We have seen it in Germany. We have seen it again and again. Ambivalence and uncertainty in Soviet policy is nothing new, and it is not always carried out according to plan. In fact, I am one who believes Khrushchev has simply not made up his mind how to balance off the dangers of cold war with the unrelenting and conflicting pressures on him at home and abroad. I think this is what we are going through now. This is why you have belligerence in Berlin and calculated moderation and mildness in Geneva. This is a period of transition. It is a study period. It is a regrouping period. It is a period of crisis in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and it is

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one of the most dangerous periods of all times, because the leader in the Soviet Union is hard-pressed at home and abroad, sensitive, angry, confused, and we have all kinds of detailed intelligence information that reveals that this is a fact.

My friends of the CIA are here. You know better than I do. All sorts of information as to the outbursts of anger, emotionalism on the part of Mr. Khrushchev, which shows terrific strain. We know that he has had to make public confessions of failure in the fields of industry and agriculture. He is in a sense searching for a policy. And this is the moment when the danger of war is the greatest, because basically the Russians are a cautious people. And remember the Communists are also Russians in Russia. They are a combination of Peter the Great and Lenin, of the peasant and the dogma, and the doctrine of Communism. They are people too, with all kinds of human appetites.

It is at this particular period that sensitive diplomacy and statesmanship is required more even than military preparation. It is now that there could be miscalculation, now that there could be accidental war, and therefore I think that President Kennedy was astute and wise in sending Dean Rusk and some of our top diplomats to Geneva to keep the talkathon underway, to keep talking, to keep negotiating, not even negotiating, just to keep eating, to keep having parties, because this is a period of uncertainty on the part of the Soviet leaders. Khrushchev's problems are terrible. They are

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fierce. We think we have got trouble. My dear friends, we are on a weekend holiday compared with this man. I would not want to trade problems any moment of the day, any day of the year. Let me list them to you as I see them.

First, he has to maintain his country on a war footing while seeming to satisfy the genuine longing of his people for peace and security. For the first time, my fellow Americans, we have a defense policy in this country that is sufficiently strong and demanding so that in order for the Soviet Union to meet it, stay on even with it, the pressures and taxes on the Soviet Union are very heavy. I felt that this country for several years pursued a policy which everybody at home could afford, which did not require any sacrifice on our part except for the few who went into the Armed Forces, which actually lent itself to a kind of false prosperity. The Soviet Union also had a defense policy which it could afford to pay for, even though it required some sacrifice, yet at the same time it enabled Khrushchev to make all kinds of additional promises, and occasionally deliver some of them. We were buying defense cheap. It made everybody from Wall Street to Timbuktu happy. It sort of told you you didn't need many men, nobody would die, all you would have to rely on was fantastic weapons which you hoped you would never use, and didn't cost too much.

Now, my friends, we know it is going to take more men, we know it

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is going to take more of our natural resources, we know it is going to be risky, and we are compelling the Soviet Union today to spend and spend and spend, and this forces a policy decision on their part as to whether they really want a first-class arms race. If you are going to have one, don't mess around with it. If you want to have an arms race, have one that you win. We can buy more arms, my fellow Americans. I am Chairman of the Subcommittee on disarmament. Let me tell you if you are going to have an arms race, have one. If you are going to have a night out, if you are going to catch heck when you get home, have one. Don't go around the block looking at street lights. If you are going to have an arms race, have one that is calculated on the basis of not only what we can afford, but what we are willing to sacrifice to pay for, compelling a policy decision, risky to be sure, but maybe a decision to fight. This is for the experts. These are calculated, political, technical decisions that have to be made, but it is no decision to have a defense policy that most anybody can afford. That doesn't get you any place except to satisfy the few people who like to talk patriotism, but don't want to pay for it. We have a bucketful of some of those. I want to get that off my chest too.

Mr. Khrushchev's military officers react rather coldly to suggestions that they settle down to "socialist construction" in Siberia. That is what he wants to do for the expansion of the Soviet Union. Siberia is just about as interesting to them as the Arctic Circle is to some of you unless you happen

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to be one of the scientists in exploration. They like Moscow. When Khrushchev tried to decentralize industry, lay off a few officers, and get them out of Moscow, they resisted. They like the fleshpots, they like Lenin Hill, they like the fringe benefits of the big city. They are not really covered wagon boys. They don't want to do any of this pioneering. They don't want any new frontier. They want to stay right close to where there is steam heat.

Khrushchev has domestic enemies, and domestic enemies undoubtedly whisper Khrushchev is about ready to sell Mother Russia out, right down the drain to the capitalists. He makes some remarks that are rather unbelievable utterances. The Chinese constantly accuse him of being a deviationist. He is, and he knows it. He is trying to rationalize his position. Now listen to this. Khrushchev has to make good on some point of his rash promise to raise total real income per capita by two and a half times in twenty years. He didn't just make that promise to the Russians; he made it to the world. It was a number-one Soviet propaganda effort, worldwide. The whole world is watching. He protested too much. He has said what he was going to do. He said, "Watch us. Watch me." And people are watching and they are not happy about what they are seeing. In the process he says he is going to catch up with and surpass the United States. I wish our industrialists in this country, our labor leaders, our finance leaders would understand that challenge.

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We have got people here who say we need new weapons, we must have a better Army or Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, better science. They think that is the way we are going to win this struggle. That is only the finer cutting edge of the broader blade of the national economy. That edge can lose its sharpness quickly. Khrushchev said he is going to pass us economically, and the whole world of Africa and Asia is watching that because they are primarily concerned with economics. They are concerned with another loaf of bread, some shelter, and some education. And the one weak area of the American economy is not its science, it is not its military; its weakness is finance and industry. As long as you can make a big profit of 70 percent of production, why hurry? What this economy needs is a sense of competition, a sense of urgency on the world scene. There ought to be a penalty in this country for those who permit unemployment.

I don't know how we are going to do it. We have a penalty for people who go AWOL, don't we? We have a penalty for the military that doesn't take care of its installations. If you, as a commanding officer, are charged with an installation and told you are to use it to maximum capacity, and one of your superiors comes by and finds you are only using 70 percent, they start taking off those ribbons and those stars and a few other things. Soon you are not a general any more. What is wrong with this economy of ours? Why do we satisfy ourselves with 18 percent of unused capacity this morning?

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Why do we satisfy ourselves that way when the rest of the industrialized world is overemployed, overtaxed with industrial capacity, used industrial capacity?

I think there needs to be some soul searching in this economy of ours. Other countries have free economies too. The Germans have a free economy. The Italians have a relatively free one. The French. Even with the problems of France they have got a nine percent growth of economic product, and they have been averaging seven percent for ten years. Old, tired France. Overemployment in Belgium, overemployment in Holland, overemployment in Denmark, overemployment in Switzerland, importation of workers everywhere they can find them. Every modern industrialized nation on the face of the earth is overemployed and its capacity overused except this one. I think I know why. Built-in protection for unearned profit. I think profit ought to come in excellence. It ought to come from quality and quantity, not from protection for industry or labor.

When we learn that, we are going to start to win this cold war, and we are going to be able to pay these bills without deficit financing, and we are going to be able to think as we ought to think, that Mr. Khrushchev is not fighting us militarily so much as he is ideologically, through propaganda, politics, penetration, economic penetration. Just because his economy is not working too well is no excuse that we should permit ours to work only a

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little better. Mr. Khrushchev has made remarkable industrial progress. That is Russia. He has done so in the past fifteen years. I repeat it is no more remarkable than our own growth, the capital stage of our industrial development, and it has many built-in problems of bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption that our intelligence services ought to reveal to the entire world, and our propaganda agencies ought to make the best of.

Everybody in this audience knows there are more pay-offs per square mile in the Soviet Union than there was in Capone's Chicago. This is a fact. I don't know why we have to go around defending our capitalism as if it were a major evil, which it is not. Our system of economy has built-in blessings, humanitarianism. It has a degree of efficiency if we will apply more competitive practice to it. In the Soviet bureaucracy, economic, and political bureaucracy, there is wholesale corruption and mismanagement. Every sensible objective student of Soviet economics and politics knows it, and we never get around to writing except occasionally. We don't tell the American people about it. They don't like the Communists anyway. We are really sold on the idea of anti-Communism. We can hardly get a good audience on the subject any more.

The question is how does the rest of the world feel about it? It seems to me we also ought to recognize that Mr. Khrushchev's problems are even deeper than what I have mentioned. I wanted to say something about his

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agricultural problems. I was in Europe this last July, and I came home after being over in Eastern Europe and Central Europe and said I didn't think Mr. Khrushchev was going to fight over Berlin. I didn't think there was going to be any war over Berlin unless it is accidental, which could happen. I felt we ought to be strong. I thought we ought to strengthen our defenses. I voted for it, not only talked, but voted for it. I worked with our President for it.

I think Napoleon had an awful lot of sense when he said an army travels on its stomach. The entire Sino-Soviet bloc represents a colossal failure in production of food and fiber. You cannot have a first-class military or economic power when your agricultural basis is ineffective, obsolete, and unproductive. One of the facts you know is that last year the per capita production of Soviet farmers was lower than 1913, according to their own figures. Forty percent of the total population of the Soviet Union is rural. Eight percent of your country and my country is rural. One American farmer feeds thirty-five fellow Americans. This is the most fantastic agricultural production system that the world has ever known. Your system and mine, the one that we kick around and laugh about and abuse, the one we call subsidized, and what have you. If there is only one thing this country needs, it needs to ask for forgiveness of its condemnation of its own agriculture. If American industry would do as well in producing an American agriculture, we w

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would be so far out in front we could laugh at the rest of the world.

American agriculture doesn't produce at 60 percent of capacity, it produces at 150 percent of capacity. Steel produces at 70 percent of capacity and causes a little problem of unemployment, lack of revenues, lack of jobs, and there is just as big a shortage of steel in the world as there is agriculture. We have learned how to use our food. One of the most powerful weapons and a tool of American diplomacy is food. You give me some control over the food supply of other countries and you will not have to worry about how far they are going to deviate from our policy. People have to eat, even before they make policy decisions.

American food and fiber production is one of the great assets of this power struggle. No other nation in the world even comes close to it, and I think this needs to be driven into the minds of every statesman, every diplomat, every civil servant agent in this country. Not even the military understands completely even though they come closer, because they understand if you are a sailor at sea for some time you need something to eat.

I will never forget my visit with the late Admiral Briscoe in Naples some years ago at the southern command of NATO. I asked the distinguished admiral, "How much food do you have available here for your troops?" "Less than one week." We had it all stored up in warehouses over here. "How many submarines does the Soviet Union have?" He told me. "Do you think we could deliver food to these troops?" "No." "What are we going to do?" He said,

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"Senator, I have been making recommendations on this for a long time. Nothing has been done about it." I came back and made some recommendations of my own, and I had as good luck as Admiral Briscoe.

I want to say I think if you had to stockpile atomic weapons overseas, you ought to stockpile food overseas. You can trust your European Allies that they are not going to raid your atomic stockpiles in the Western Alliance; I don't think they are going to raid food supplies. Why do you have to have it all stored over here? We still haven't made up our mind in case of war somebody will have to eat, or have we made up our mind they will all be dead? I hope not. The strategy we are pursuing in food and fiber is a military strategy that seems a little ridiculous to me. I think I know something about this. I claim some expertise knowledge.

Half of the Soviet market food production last year came from private plots tilled by collective farm workers in their spare time. From five percent of the total tillable soil that was under the plow in the Soviet Union, 50 percent of the food came. This is why Mr. Khrushchev talked about incentives. One thing about Khrushchev, he may be mean, he may be dangerous, he may be subtle, but he is not stupid. I found that out when I talked with him. This is a sharp fellow, and he understands the principle of incentives. I will never forget when he told me about the Chinese communes. He said, "They won't work. We tried them. They are reactionary, and they are not progressive. You know the

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principle of communes: From each according to his ability; to each according to his need." This is the Golden Rule of Communism. He looked right at me, paused with the drama of a Barrymore, and said, "Senator, you know that won't work. It takes incentive to get production." This is the number one Communist telling you, my capitalistic friends, it takes incentive to get production. He knows more about capitalism than some of our capitalists. That is what he tells the farmers of Russia today, that you are going to have to have incentives. He is trying to reorganize their entire industrial and agricultural system.

Now, there is a third development that I think is worthy of our attention. There is not yet well defined urge in the Soviet Union for more freedom, elementary personal freedom, right of voice in their own affairs. We assume this is the monolithic bloc. It is not a monolithic bloc. These are building blocks held together by a rather inadequate cement. This nationalism expresses itself, this desire for more economy and freedom, in various ways, in literary criticism. Yesterday the Poles announced the abolition of compulsory courses in Marxist economics. In Poland! This desire for a greater degree of freedom and mobility is exemplified in the continued religious worship of peoples who have been oppressed because of their religion, and it is exemplified by growing dissent, criticism of the Party within the Party, criticism of

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industries within the industry. And there is a universal desire to travel, to have contact with the West, and a revival of demands for democratic procedures within the centralized Communist Party itself.

Khrushchev has again rashly promised more interparty democracy, even before the millennium of the withering away of the state and the Communist Utopia. He looks the other way at Western nations, at Western fashions and music, and contact with foreigners. We Americans have the feeling if he doesn't contact us he is not seeing anything. We really get kind of egocentric. I want to say a Russian that visits Copenhagen will see as much democracy as he will see in America, and he will see as good materials and as fine automobiles, and finer consumer goods, and a more beautiful city than in most places in America. One that visits any of the Western cities will come in contact with a mature flowering democracy. They don't all have to come here. Cultural relations with the United States are important, but let's not think this is one central part of the universe. This is just a part of it.

What Khrushchev did was to open up a Pandora's box of trouble. In order for Khrushchev to come into power, in order for Khrushchev to stay in power, he has to cater to the liberalizing forces in the Soviet

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Union. The more he caters to them, the more he finds it is difficult to hold the Soviet Union under complete dictatorial command, and the more he opens up the possibility of dissent and autonomy and liberalization and a degree of freedom in the so-called captive nations area, he is caught in his own dilemma. Maybe Mao is right about Khrushchev. Khrushchev, they say, is not a true believer. He deviates. He occasionally zigs and zags, and zigs when some people think he ought to zag. The reason he has done it is because he is pragmatic. He is a Communist who wants to stay in power. He likes it. He likes it very well, all the comforts, all the notoriety. He knows, and shows every sign of knowing that the most dangerous moment for the regime comes when it relaxes its hold on the people, and when it tries to improve itself, and yet he is faced with that demand.

This brings me to the last, and perhaps most severe of Khrushchev's problems, how to achieve Russia's stupendous economic and political goals which require a firm hand and control over the Russian people without losing Soviet control over the Communist movement. Already the militant Chinese Communists have taken him to task for his liberal approach. Let me just give you some examples of what I am talking about. This is no longer just newspaper talk. Our intelligence services, our State Department, British, French, Italians and others now feel that the conflict between Communist leadership of China and that of the USSR has reached

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the serious stage. Differences are not merely ideological, but encompass the entire state-to-state relations, economic relations, personality clashes, competition for world leadership of the world Communist movement, and policy differences of major proportion.

There is no longer a monolithic unity in the Communist camp. There is still restraint in public utterances, but a bitter struggle with no holds barred is underway behind the scenes. Peking does not recognize Soviet authority. It refuses to abide by Soviet decisions, particularly decisions it doesn't like. It opposes de-Stalinization. It picks up every little satellite Khrushchev sloughs off. Albania, example number one. Khrushchev literally sneers privately and publicly at the Chinese "great leap forward".

As far as economic relations are concerned, Moscow has stopped all economic assistance to the Chinese. Since the latter part of 1960 there has been no Soviet experts in Communist China. There is a credit squeeze. There is a cancellation of imports, and what is more, Khrushchev and Mao don't like each other. Khrushchev doesn't like a lot of people. I remember sitting around one day when he was telling me about all the people he didn't like. He told you about it publicly in the 22nd Congress. I think I told some of you about it after my visit to the Soviet Union. He told me about these fellows, Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Molotov and all

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the others, called them fools, reactionaries, tyrants, and worse than that, denounced them for two hours and said, "I have told you about my fools, now you tell me about yours." I reminded him we didn't have any, to which he gave a polite laugh, just as you do.

Mr. Khrushchev has had something to say recently about Mr. Castro, Mr. Sukarno, Mr. Nasser, and lots of men, nasty things to say about all of them. He has got a whole list of them. Mr. Khrushchev doesn't consider himself equal in this great equalitarian movement known as Communism, L'etat, c'est moi. This is Louis XIV, from the peasantry, and he conducts himself that way.

Now, as I said, the militant Chinese are taking Mr. Khrushchev to task. He faces a kind of underground OAS secret force, diehard Stalinists, who insist the late dictator's methods are the only ones that will work. Khrushchev knows they won't work. He keeps feeding the people crumbs or relaxation, and relaxation at home is followed by loosening of centralized control over other areas of the Soviet empire and the Communist movement. Under Stalin world Communism was split two ways, in the powerful Sino-Soviet Eastern European bloc on the one hand, and feeble Yugoslavia on the other, and that is all. Today it is split three ways, China and the Soviet Union, that hardly talk the same language, and there are separatist nationalist forces hard at work

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in the satellites and in Western Communist parties, symbolized by Yugoslavia primarily, somewhat by Poland, and separatist movements in a half dozen countries controlled by Communism.

Now, is it any wonder that Khrushchev on the one hand sets off bombs, threatens the neutrals, harasses the airlift in Berlin, while on the other hand he backtracks on Berlin deadlines, he congratulates Colonel Glenn, he shows an interest in disarmament, he talks about cooperation in outer space. Khrushchev has to satisfy influential circles at home while guaranteeing the security of his country. We have shown him without our making an all-out defense effort we can plug up every area of military vulnerability. Aggressive war, therefore, will not pay off for him.

I think this makes it quite clear that we need to examine what is his present policy. I think that present policy is one of probing, not of confrontation. Whenever Khrushchev is openly confronted with American power he backs off, as they did in Berlin, as they will do elsewhere. They probe on the periphery of the free world, of the neutral, nonaligned areas, and then, therefore, what must be our policy in Asia? In Africa? Our policy must be, number one, to have a defensive strength which is characterized by mobility and availability of force, adequate force that is needed for any particular contingency on

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the part of ourselves and our Allies so as to firm up the soft spots of military vulnerability such as we are attempting now to do in Vietnam, such as we have done in Berlin, such as we may have to do in place after place. And then, secondly, to engage in a competitive type of economic assistance of political and social collaboration with friends and with neutrals and nonaligned to a point where they get a viable economy.

Let me just put more simply. In other words, I have got to be able to meet their threat of mobilizing militarily, with the kind of flexibility, mobility, and strength that is required for the situation, and on the other hand of an equally effective, well organized, on-the-spot, timely economic and foreign assistance program to build viable economics, and if you can't afford it, you are out of the ball game.

Mr. Khrushchev is going to probe and push. He is like the uninvited guest at a banquet. If there is an empty chair, he will take it. I don't think he intends to blow the world to pieces. I think he intends to pick it up piece by piece if he can - operation nibble - a little here, a little there, never open confrontation with the United States, and if it is, it is for only a limited period of time because he respects the massive military power of this country. In other words, we must be

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able to cope with many pronged attacks, but we must include our Allies in this counterattack. I think we have seen and we must use other instruments, by the way, such as the United Nations. I think we have seen what we can do by a flexibility of policy and a diversity of instruments with the United Nations.

There is trouble in the Middle East this morning, and anybody that ever had any doubts about the United Nations ought to ask themselves this morning, Do you want to send a couple hundred thousand, or fifty thousand American troops between the Israeli and the Syrian border, or do you want the United Nations to do it? Somebody is going to have to place a police force in these areas of trouble. There are three possibilities, gentlemen, and only three: The Soviet Union, the United States, or the United Nations. And as long as the United States of America has been able to command a leading and controlling majority in the United Nations, what are we complaining about, to put it bluntly? That is strong language, and I get sick and tired of hearing people condemn the United Nations when really the person who ought to be condemned is the Soviet Union. The Soviet is condemning the United Nations. They know what they are doing. The United Nations is not doing its job. Their job is to promote disorder; our job to promote order, tranquility, peace, freedom of expression, and the United Nations is attempting to help us in that job, and we have people in this country

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who are so blind because they can't have their way in every detail that they want to scrap or weaken or paralyze one of the best instrumentalities that we have today in our conflict with international Communism. I must say that it is exasperating to me. If I show irritation and disgust in my voice, I mean every word.

So we can argue over in Congress about whether we ought to buy \$100 million worth of bonds. That sum wouldn't buy a good afternoon's exercise in any afternoon military operation. It is the best bargain this country ever had. If you think you can settle the problems of the Congo, try it. We will be fighting the problems of the Congo twenty-five years. Those people are not prepared for self-government, but they have got it. You are either going to have the United Nations over there helping them get some degree of order, or you are going to have the Soviet Union or the United States. If you want to put your sons over there to run that country for a generation, you go ahead, but not with my vote. I have got one, if you haven't, in the Senate. I am perfectly willing, and I will advance, and I will support the proposition that this is an international responsibility, that this is one of the peace-keeping responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, and whatever the cost may be in terms of treasury or supply or logistics, as an American, as a United States Senator, I am for it. I have got darned little time for these Monday morning

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quarterbacks who think they know how to do it better.

I would like to ask any of our military officers how they would like that little nest of trouble on their lap. They were even more than the Irish could handle for a while. Between the combination of the Irish and Swedes and the Indians, the United Nations has done quite well. I hear my colleagues in Congress and others talk about how much we have paid. Do you know how much the Irish lost, how many lost their lives? How many Swedes have lost their lives? I would like to take a vote of my constituents. I can't find a mother or father who would take a million dollars for their boy. There have been far more than a hundred Irish and Swedes who have lost their lives. Yet we are sitting up here batting our gums about who ought to pay this bill. I think it is cheap. It is a bargain-counter deal. It is better than these sales they have on Washington's birthday. We ought to grab on before somebody takes it away.

Khrushchev in effect has added a new phrase to the Soviet vocabulary. That phrase is "peaceful coexistence". He throws the phrase around a good deal. According to Khrushchev we are supposed to make our peace with him under those terms, because he wants to bury us peacefully. He wants to bury us peacefully, and the Chinese want to bury us violently. It is all the same tool. It may well be that we are a little better off with Khrushchev's type of burial than with Molotov's. On

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the other hand I would be the last to advise any attempt on our part to influence the internal Soviet power struggle. We are going to have to be very careful about that. All we can do is to be ready for the moment Khrushchev is forced by internal or external necessity to offer real bargaining terms to the West. I think he will be compelled to do it, if we have the patience and perseverance and determination to last it out. Such an offer might come sooner from Mr. Khrushchev than from any other Russian. That is my view.

I want to repeat again. Khrushchev is dangerous. He is a Communist. He is the sinful one. As they used to say, he has paid a dollar for a bottle of beer and put a quarter on the piano. He has been a sinful Communist. He has deviated. He has done all these things that ought not be done, but he is dangerous because he is a Communist. He is smart. He is not a monolithic man. He has many facets to his character, and with all of that, knowing how dangerous he is, what a subtle character he is, I think he may be from our point of view the most, or let's say the best of the worst. He may be the easier one with which to work. This doesn't mean that it is very easy. Peaceful coexistence is not an attractive prospect, as Khrushchev uses it. It is merely another way of translating the unrelenting Marxist class struggle into the lexicon of international relations. It concedes that the days of inevitability of war are gone.

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It recognizes that capitalist encirclement is a myth. At the bottom of those changes, Khrushchev is confident that the socialist camp is now stronger, or will be stronger than the capitalist camp, and by this reasoning, according to Khrushchev, the evil capitalists no longer dare to wage war against the Soviet Union. Not daring to wage war, they must engage in peaceful competition with the Soviet Union and its allies, and, having done so, says Mr. Khrushchev, the West will inevitably decline. Communist production will rise geometrically while the West is sealed off, swallowed up, or allowed to wither on the vine.

This is his explanation. This is the way Khrushchev explains the view of orthodox Leninism. This is interesting. This is the point he made at the 22nd Party Conference. Western scholars have ransacked the writings of Lenin to find a single mention of the term "peaceful coexistence", and they can't find it, all of which indicates that Nikita Khrushchev's doctrine is a desperate attempt on his part to square the traditional aggressive aims of Communism with the power realities of the present day. This is a pragmatist. He isn't about to abandon the aims of Communism, but to adapt to what happens. He gets up today and says, "In the doctrines of Lenin", like a number of people who get up and say "According to Lincoln", "According to Jefferson", "According to Washington". You ought to be careful, because what he is really saying is "according to me", and he is trying to get some

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allies.

Soviet Russia is a relatively affluent state, and it has a lot to lose in a nuclear war, and Khrushchev knows it. What is more, Khrushchev has a close relationship with his scientists, his militarists, and they know what modern war means. Khrushchev has a vested interest in the status quo. Khrushchev's radical right wing, his John Birches, and his fellow travellers, and his Chinese critics are willing to pay a much higher price than is Khrushchev. They are impatient too. They want to get it over with. They say fight them, destroy them. We have a group in America who says get the United States out of the United Nations and the United Nations out of the United States.

They have got the same thing over in Russia. They have got some over in Russia that say get the Russians out of the United Nations and get the Russians out of New York, their own Russian people. They have a group over there who are tired, who are anxious, who are emotional. They say break it off; let them have it; we have got the rockets; we have got the bombs, and we can afford to lose 350 million. There will still be 350 million left. They take the world view. And what is more, the Chinese feel maybe the war will be between the United States and Russia, and the worst effects they will have will be fallout. They have

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a vast area to escape some of that. They don't mind promoting the struggle.

Mr. Khrushchev says it may cost 350 million dead, but there are only 250/^{million}Russians. That means all of us and maybe 150 million Americans, and the world for the Chinese.

The chief point that I would like to make is that this radical group within the Soviet, like in our own country, their actions, their first thought, is forward momentum of aggressive world Communism. Khrushchev sees the Communist advance levelling off and even receding, but he does not have the fanatical drive to commit suicide for the sake of world domination. The chief point, therefore, that I leave with you is that Khrushchev may very well need a standoff with the West, a breathing period. I think that is what he is getting at Geneva. I think that is what it is about. I think he has got to come home with the biscuits, even if they are like popovers, with nothing inside. But I think he has got to be able to convince the people in his country and the Soviet bloc that he is in charge. I don't think there will be any agreements. I don't think we ought to expect any agreement. I think even to force agreements at this time might be dangerous business.

First of all, I don't think you are going to get them.

Secondly, I think they would be violated.

We are going through what many analysts have said is a crisis in the Sino-Soviet bloc. We have had some crises in our Western bloc.

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We have overcome most. NATO is stronger today than it has been for years. We have a new crisis with Latin America in terms of our own relations, but compared to the crises in the Sino Soviet bloc, this is minor. It seems, therefore, without a timely diversion of investments for military into peaceful production in the Soviet Union, consumer demand will continue to outpace supply. Agriculture and basic transport will remain the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy, and the Soviet for the unpredictable future will be wavering in between its bellicose attitude on the one hand and its constant pressure within its economy for some peaceful adjustments on the other hand.

It is going to require more than military tactics and military science, my friends, to be able to cope with this particular situation. I think what is required is what we are now doing, studying carefully the techniques of disarmament, talking, probing, and analyzing, laying on the table for the world to see constructive proposals. I think we can afford to be more reasonable, more calculatingly reasonable today than any time in our national history. I think that we can afford to take some risks in the terms of diplomacy today, risks in the terms of being more considerate at the same time that we preserve the hard shell of our defense.

What Senator Humphrey is saying, let us get a policy that has two

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sides to it, or two faces. On the one hand a firmness of position and objective that we pursue, backing it up with the necessary strength, military, economic, political, to pursue that objective, and on the other hand have another army of diplomats, technicians, tacticians, and analysts, statesmen probing the empire of the Soviet Union and the personalities for any possible understanding that could be reached with any degree of enforceability and reliability.

These are not contradictory at all. They are complementary. Disarmament is the opposite side of the coin of armament. Churchill was right -- we arm to parley. Kennedy is right, President Kennedy, when he said we should never negotiate, we should never be afraid to negotiate, but we will not negotiate from fear. We have had people in America who have been afraid to negotiate sincerely, and we have some, I believe, who actually negotiated from fear. We need to correct both of those psychological situations, and I think we are doing it. One of the ways we are doing it is to build these areas in the underdeveloped world, build what I call centers of strength, centers of reliability, and I am sure that in your course of study you found those to be here.

There is a better situation in Asia today, despite Vietnam, despite Southeast Asia; Malaya is strong. There is an improvement in Burma. There is an improvement in Pakistani relations in India, des-

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pite the fact Krishna Menon was elected, and I don't like him and you don't like him, but that reveals a strong democratic base. India is nationalistic. India will protect its frontiers. There is a better relationship today between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a greater stability in the Middle East, imperceptible as it may seem.

The Communists have not taken over Africa. The so-called Communist regime in Guinea has kicked out the Soviet Ambassador. The Russians have not taken over in Latin America, and they are not going to take over in Latin America if we get on the stick. We need less studies and more action. That place has been studied to death. Latin America has become what I would call a continental seminar. We know what to do and so do they.

I am an optimist. I think we have put together the greatest combination of military, economic, and political power the world has ever known, and we are beginning to understand how to use it temperately, conservatively, prudently, and yet firmly. It is with these points that I have come to harass you this morning. I have taken a lot of your time, but you have soft seats down there, so I thought I would explode and let you know what I have been thinking. I gather we will come back and have some questions and it is your turn to work me over.

Thank you.



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