

President Spaulding
SOME GUIDEPOSTS TO DISARMAMENT

Speech by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey to the

Wingspread Symposium on Arms Control, Racine, Wisconsin

June 7, 1963

Also Margarine
~~I am indeed privileged to be speaking to you in this forum~~

~~today.~~ The trustees of the Johnson Foundation and the

University of Wisconsin have shown characteristic vision in

holding the Wingspread Symposium on Arms Control in such a

beautiful setting. Wingspread is a monument to the late master

architect, Frank Lloyd Wright. This great nonconformist in the

arts devoted his genius to the liberation of his craft. In the

same way I hope that we, under this roof, can add a brick or

two to the structure of a world peace. This is why I

especially want to thank Dr. Leslie Paffrath, President of the

Johnson Foundation, for inviting me to ~~participate in the~~ *participate in the* symposium

~~today.~~ I am honored to be present.

The letter of invitation sent to all participants states

correctly that many citizens are reluctant to engage in group

discussion on arms control "despite awareness that a
solution of the nuclear arms contest is the primary issue
affecting security and peace of mind for every citizen, now
and in the future." This is true not only of the citizenry
at large, but also of the United States Congress. In both
the Senate and the House there are several thoughtful
dare to
individuals who voice provocative opinions on questions of
disarmament and arms control. In my experience, however,
they usually voice them to an empty or near-empty chamber.
Controversies about the test ban and related matters flare up
and subside, but we have yet to hold the comprehensive debate
which is vital to the formulation of government policy. For
this reason I particularly welcome your "challenging attitude
toward present policy" and your call to "point out new paths
which the government may explore."

The various departments of our government are probably

well aware of ^{many} ~~most of the~~ "new paths" which could be explored

in the domain of arms control and disarmament. The difficulty

is to find men who have the courage to enter them. ^{Civil Servants} ~~Bureaucrats~~

and legislators sometimes share the same hesitancy to strike

out on bold new ventures when past efforts have yielded no

results. Throughout our government there is little conscious-

ness of the old sportsmen's maxim: "Never change a winning

game; always change a losing game." When a sailboat has run

out of wind on a lee shore, the skipper doesn't get very far by

repeating the tired old slogans of more hopeful days. He will

simply drift with the tide unless he has an alternative -- a

contingency plan.

Before outlining some of the alternatives which are fore-

most in my thinking, let me add one disclaimer. I do not

subscribe to the view that ^{on the previous} the administration is ~~entirely~~ to

blame for the failure to reach agreements with the Russians on

Disentary
~~Deputy~~
+
Timidity

a test ban or a disarmament treaty. The last two adminis-
trations have taken unprecedented initiatives toward a
nuclear test ban, toward agreement on world disarmament,
and toward encouragement of the peacekeeping functions of
the United Nations. They have done so in spite of the often
erratic, irresponsible, and deceitful behavior of the Soviet
Union.

I am personally convinced that the Soviet Union is
primarily to blame for the barrenness of the test ban
negotiations to date. There is no need to chronicle the
stalling tactics of the Russians or their unwillingness to
take serious steps toward ending the arms race. ^{But,} We, too,
have neglected some splendid opportunities. ~~We, too, have~~
~~acted the unbecoming part of an unwilling bridegroom.~~ But
for the most part, we can thank the Soviet Union and its
allies for the present impasse.

ACDA - Its importance
Research - Public
spin

Despite this, we cannot afford to lose faith in the eventual triumph of man's instinct for self-preservation.

As President Kennedy has indicated, the "genie" -- the genie of radioactive contamination and proliferation of nuclear weapons' capabilities -- is neither in nor out of the bottle.

In his news conference of May 22, President Kennedy promised that the United States would push for a test ban in May,

June, and July "in every forum." The administration is clearly intensifying its efforts to reach ~~some~~^{some} understanding with the Russians before late summer and early fall --

the most propitious time for nuclear testing on Soviet

territory. Regardless of the chances, the diplomatic

effort must be made. Whatever the attitude of the Soviet

leadership at any given moment, we cannot be sure when or

why they will shift it. This is particularly true of the

Russians, as is widely speculated, have hardened their position

~~on the test bed as a consequence either of strains within the Bloc or of a ~~serious~~ challenge^s to the leadership of Chairman Khrushchev. I will not speculate as to their motives. I can only suggest that when we find ourselves at a dead end on one or another proposal, we should be prepared to strike out cross-country.~~

Our disarmament policy should be guided by at least three principles: firmness ~~stubbornness~~ on matters that are both right and essential; flexibility where judicious "give" might be in the national interest; and a readiness to change course when the main avenues of approach ^{run} ~~are~~ dry. It is increasingly urgent, in my opinion, to register at least some tangible progress. The world has gone too many years with nothing but empty communiques or the verbal fencing of international conferences.

I was extremely gratified to read in the NEW YORK TIMES

of June 6 that agreement on a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow may be imminent. A system of rapid communication between heads of states, or between command headquarters in both capitals, is essential in this age of split-second ~~crises~~. The "hot line" is no *absolute* guarantee against war by miscalculation or accident, but it could be one means of preventing such a war. It certainly would avoid the dangerous confusion that was apparent to both sides during the Cuban crisis of last October. Without counting chickens before they hatch--for I am well aware of the difference between a treaty that is "imminent" and one that is signed -- the officials negotiating on this subject at Geneva are to be warmly congratulated. Their efforts could be a significant step toward world security. The "hot line" agreement could point to even more significant progress in the future.

The urgency of progress is beginning to be appreciated, I feel, in many quarters. President Kennedy feels the need as strongly as anyone. Just examine his news conference^s of March 22, May 8, and May 22 for evidence of his great concern and even foreboding for the future. He is rightfully obsessed with the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He foresees a "barely manageable situation slipping out of control." He is frustrated and disappointed, although not yet hopeless, after the let-down of the test ban negotiations of January, February, and March.

✓ The Soviet ^{proposal} ~~conception~~ of two to three on-site inspections has not advanced, as some hoped it would, the cause of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Since the Russians have not budged from this figure, and since it is manifestly unacceptable to the United States, the President had every reason to warn of the genie being let out of the bottle. I expressed similar

thoughts after my own experience with Soviet intransi-

gence at Geneva last February. I said, in effect, that ~~we~~ unless

significant progress towards a test ban could be achieved by April
or May, there might be none at all.

~~had to have a test ban now or never.~~ There were suggestions

at that time that I was being too ~~optimistic~~ *pessimistic*.

gravity of the

other suggestions that I was overstating the situation. Now

the President of the United States himself has spoken pessi-

mistically of the prospects for a test ban -- and with good reason.

Even the closed society of Soviet Russia is unable to

suppress the ^{consciences} ~~concern~~ of its most respected individuals.

Many of you may recall the CBS REPORT of May 22, in which the

distinguished Soviet physicist Igor Tamm made an outspoken plea

for mutual understanding among nations. In an uncensored inter-

view with correspondent Marvin Kalb, Dr. Tamm said he was

deeply worried by the need to prevent "a suicidal atomic

war." "The question of disarmament," said Dr. Tamm,

speaking in English, "is a very urgent one. What I'm most

afraid of is not an intentional war for either side, but an accidental war, and that is the thing which I'm most afraid of."

~~How long~~ ^{along time for such} We have waited ~~to hear these~~ sensible words from someone with a claim to speak for the more enlightened strata of Soviet public opinion!

Igor Tamm, the Nobel prizewinner, said that "some major step" toward a test ban agreement was vital. When asked to define the roadblocks to disarmament, the Soviet physicist replied:

I think that the base of it is the widespread feeling of mutual distrust and suspicion, which are almost the same, identical, on both sides . . . Just as we do experiments in physics, I do suppose we have to make experiments in politics. I'm quite confident that the most important thing, now, would be to reach agreement, to sign an agreement between both sides on any important question. Up to now, we have had no signed agreements between our countries as far as I

know, with the exception of the neutrality of Austria and Antarctica. Nobody has broken these agreements. I'm quite confident that neither side will somehow break that agreement . . .

If a leading Soviet scientist can speak such words, then

we know that the gulf separating our politicians and diplomats can be bridged. It may not be bridged. There is nothing in human history to guarantee that man will not

blow himself skyhigh. But if sophisticated humanists like Dr. Tamm can ever get through to the fanatics, there is at least some hope of bringing a runaway situation under control.

I am ^{pleased} ~~glad~~, therefore, that the administration has not given up on disarmament just because the road is strewn with the wreckage of futile negotiations. By the same token, the

United States Congress has not dropped the subject, although the Members appear ^{sharply} ~~divided~~ on important questions of policy.

I can assure you that the Senate, which has the responsibility of ratifying any treaty in the area of arms control, will

*Pope John's
concern
over war*

*Pope
John's
concern
over
war*

strive to keep itself informed. It will neither ~~nip~~

agreements in the bud nor will it accept untenable

risks to U. S. security. What the Senate needs is

~~absolute~~ confidence that the administration's proposals
are scientifically sound and that the degree of risk in
any proposed agreement is minimal in comparison with its
advantages.

Rucks

Many people, including some of my own colleagues,

have called the Senate "the certain graveyard of any

test-ban agreement." Others have ascribed purely

political motives to S. Res. 148, ^{the} ~~Senator Dodd's~~ resolution *of Sen*

Dodd myself calling for a ban on tests that contaminate the atmosphere

or the oceans. This resolution, which I co-sponsored and

^{to} helped [^] draft, has been called an indirect effort to kill a

comprehensive test ban in all environments. It supposedly

sets

~~shows~~ the limits of the kind of treaty which the Senate

will accept.

This is not true!

The "graveyard" theory is decidedly premature.

If the wrong kind of test ban treaty ever came to the

Senate for ratification, I would be the first ^{OF} ~~the~~ *one that threatened our security -*

gravediggers. ~~And I would be there for the funeral, too.~~

But the fact is that the Senate is not the predictable,

incorrigible conservative body which it is widely pictured.

How many people could have foreseen that Senators Dodd and

Humphrey, joined by 32 of their colleagues, could ever have

co-sponsored a proposal that the United States, and I quote:

"Should again offer the Soviet Union an
immediate agreement banning all tests that
contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans, bearing
in mind that such tests can already be monitored
by the United States without on-site inspections on
Soviet territory."

And further:

"That if the Soviet Union refuses to accede
to such a first-step agreement, we commit ourselves
before the world to conduct no nuclear tests in the

atmosphere or under water so long as the Soviet Union abstains from them."

Ladies and gentlemen, in calling for a voluntary moratorium on atmospheric and underwater tests, one third of the Senate has gone on record for a step which is more "radical" than the administration itself has been prepared to accept. The resolution shows a liberality which is contrary to the stereotyped view of the Senate. It shows a desire to help the President, a desire to achieve results either by international agreement or unilateral action. It shows an ability to distinguish between the real and the imagined requirements of national security. And yet some commentators persist in regarding the Senate ^{of 1963} ~~today~~ as the Senate of the Versailles treaty. ^{days}

In my remarks endorsing the so-called Dodd-Humphrey resolution, I tried to make it perfectly clear that a ^{ban on} tests in all environments was still the chief goal of the United

States and Great Britain. Senator Dodd agreed with this thought, despite his well-known disagreements with the current on-site inspection proposals of the United States.

Nevertheless, 34 Senators perceived that a partial test ban would end the contamination of living organisms by radioactive fallout. They feel this goal should be pursued both for its own sake and also as a forerunner of a comprehensive test ban. I regard this proposal as one of the most promising "new paths" which our government should explore.

A partial test ban has already been offered the Soviet Union, which has rejected it out of hand. Nevertheless, the offer is still on record and it should be vigorously pushed. If our efforts continue to be stymied, we should tell the world that we will conduct no more atmospheric or underwater nuclear tests as long as the Russians refrain from such testing themselves. As President Kennedy has pointed out, another

round of atmospheric testing by the nuclear powers would be an unmitigated disaster.

Regional

The list of new paths has not been exhausted in my talk thus far. I want to mention some of the approaches which deserve further study and action. First of all, additional efforts should be made to reduce the risks of war by accident or miscalculation. Second, we should strive to set up nuclear-free and missile-free zones in the many areas of the world which have no business being engaged in the arms race. I have on several occasions proposed denuclearization of Latin America, and I am gratified that *Some of* the Latin American countries are themselves taking steps in this direction. What is needed is explicit endorsement of this proposal by the United States Government.

2 In addition, my S. Res. 135 of May 8 called for a prohibition on the production or the introduction of nuclear weapons and long-range offensive missiles into the

Middle East. This, too, should be actively supported by the United States as perhaps the ~~only~~ best chance of avoiding a catastrophic escalation of the arms race in the Middle East. Every effort should be made to obtain the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, which has irresponsibly fed the arms race in the Middle East.

These are some of the horizons which lie before us.

~~In closing,~~ Let me reemphasize the need for the proper mixture of ~~stubbornness~~ ^{firmness}, flexibility, and ~~inventiveness~~ ^{resourcefulness} in our disarmament policy. On our attitude could depend the fate of our children and that of generations to come.

U. N. Peace Keeping



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