## OPENING REMARKS VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY DEPARTMENT OF STATE NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE FOR EDITORS AND BROADCASTERS APRIL 28, 1966

I am delighted to have the opportunity of spending some time today with so many of the people who do so much to make the American people the best informed public in the world.

The fact that several hundred of you, from all parts of the country, have gone to the trouble and expense to be here today testifies to the seriousness with which you view your responsibilities.

It indicates the attention which all Americans today are giving to the world around them.

I agree with President Eisenhower that "what we call foreign affairs is no longer foreign affairs; it's a local affair. Whatever happens in Indonesia is important to Indiana .... We cannot escape each other."

For two decades the power and purpose of the United States have helped contain totalitarian expansion around the world.

But this has not been our only aim.

We have, in President Kennedy's phrase, sought "to make the world safe for diversity"... to make sure that no one nation or group of nations ever gains the right to define world order, let alone to manage it.

But diversity must, in this nuclear age, be accompanied by safety.

The threat to both diversity and safety in post-war Europe was clear and visible. Today -- in large part because of the success of our post-war policies -- the threat to Europe has receded.

There are still threats to diversity and safety in the world, but they are not so simple and direct as was the post-war challenge in Europe.

I remember predictions that any break-up of the bipolar world -- in which basic decisions of war and peace were largely made by the Soviet Union and the United States -- would lead to a reduction of our involvement in world affairs.

We now know that the rise of independent centers of power and decision has changed our involvement, but has not diminished it.

Since the Cuban confrontation of 1962 and the

Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the emergence of a nuclear

stalemate has weakened the inhibiting fear that local

wars would lead to nuclear wars. The result has been

an increase in the number of local conflicts -- each one

of which carries with it the seeds of larger, more

dangerous trouble.

Today we are challenged, in Vietnam, by just such a conflict.

Three American Presidents have considered it in our interest to prevent the Communists from imposing their power on the people of South Vietnam.

They have involved American power to help assur e
the South Vietnamese people the right to decide their own
futures, freely and without intimidation.

It is not necessary to trace the history of our involvement in Vietnam or to detail our present strategy there. This has been done many times. And you will undoubtedly spend a good deal of time on these subjects at this conference.

Over the past few weeks I have discussed Asia and Vietnam on numerous occasions.

One of the things I have said concerns you, and it is this: I believe the press is, to a large degree, missing an important part of the story.

The old city hall tradition calls for the reporting of violence.

In Asia and Vietnam there is plenty of violence to find -- and it should be fully reported.

There is a military struggle. It is being reported in some depth.

But there is also a non-military struggle. And I submit that it is being reported in almost no depth.

Today I wish to focus on that second struggle.

Most of Asia achieved its independence in the first decade following World War II.

Enough time has elapsed so that the first heady intoxication of independence has passed, and the people of Asia are thinking less of the mere fact of independence and more of the use they can make of it.

They today look to their governments not merely to raise the national flag, or even wave it, but to buckle down to raising standards of living. They look not merely for freedom from alien rule, but greater freedom of choice in their own lives and in their own countries.

Empty slogans do not fill empty stomachs. Time is running out for new rulers who have nothing but the old rhetoric to offer.

This is the root cause of a great deal of what we have seen in Asia in recent months.

Another development that has come to Asia is a lively and vigorous interest in regional cooperation.

During the colonial period, Asian peoples were oriented toward their respective European masters rather than their next-dooor neighbors.

In the first years after independence, many of them were too fully absorbed in savoring their newfound freedom to be interested in cooperation with their Asian neighbors.

Today this is changing.

On my own recent missions to Asia, I found its peoples well aware that they cannot solve their problems alone.

As anyone else, they resent outside domination. They want to preserve their national identities.

But they know increasing regional and international cooperation will be necessary if they wish to lift themselves fully into the 20th century.

There is the beginning of a new understanding between Korea and Japan, and the promise of normalized relations between the Philippines and Malaysia.

Consideration is being given to the possibility of closer relations among the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.

The Japanese have recently held a conference on economic cooperation, attended by nearly all her neighbors in free Asia. Japan is keenly interested in strengthening her economic ties with Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

Pakistan and India both seem determined that their resources shall not again be squandered in conflict.

Meanwhile, both Australia and New Zealand are moving toward increased recognition of their responsibilities as Asian and Pacific -- as well as Commonwealth -- powers.

I found enthusiastic support for the Asian

Development Bank. It is looked upon by Asian leaders

as Asian in both inception and location, and as a significant instrument for social and economic progress.

Finally, many nations are working together on programs of enormous potential to harness the Mekong River. The proposals in President Johnson's historic Johns Hopkins University address last year -- and the offer by the United States of a billion dollars to assist in Mekong Valley development -- have served to stimulate and give renewed incentive to detailed and far-reaching plans for the entire Mekong system.

This common effort, and others of concern to Asia, are being coordinated by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), with headquarters in Bangkok.

During their early years of nationhood, most of the new Asian countries have been subjected to Communist attacks from within or without.

In their first years of independence, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma suffered from Communist insurrections.

The Communist insurrection in Malaya took a number of years to overcome. And it took many thousands of British and Gurkha troops.

South Korea in 1950 and  $I_n$ dia in 1963 were the victims of direct Communist military aggression.

In Indonesia, a Communist-backed coup d'etat almost succeeded earlier this year.

In all these places -- as well as Vietnam -- military security was and is called for.

But, in the long run, the even more important security will be security from hunger, disease and ignorance.

Today, in Vietnam, we are striving to help establish military security.

But also we are -- in a struggle that, frankly, has been too greatly overlooked -- striving to achieve that second and even more critical security.

This is a war that is being waged without guns. It is being waged by our soldiers and marines engaged in civic action -- and by civilians of equal valor and dedication. It is being waged by doctors, nurses, teachers, farm and labor

specialists, sanitarians, municipal experts, electric power and cooperative advisers.

Not the least of these are Americans who, under the title of "provincial representatives," work right with the people, doing everything from delivering babies to driving bulldozers.

With every school that goes up -- and 13,000 classrooms have been constructed; with every textbook that is distributed -- and seven million have been printed and placed in the hands of elementary school-children alone; with every hamlet health center established -- and 12,500 have been set up with American aid -- the stake of the people in their society, and their interest in defending it, increases.

South Vietnam is an agricultural country, and the backbone of its economy are its peasants. They do not resist new techniques and crops -- they welcome them and eagerly

apply them. Farmers using modern equipment and improved varieties of plants, insecticides, and fertilizers have increased their crop yields by 20 to 50 percent. The major crop -- rice -- has risen I2 percent in the last three years, despite the intensification of the war. The production of corn has quadrupled since 1962.

There has been a radical improvement in the past decade in pig production. The number of animals has doubled and is now approaching four million. At the same time, the breed has been improved through the introduction of better stock and better techniques. Pork production may be prosaic, but it means a great deal to the peasants - whose daily lives depend on it.

Within six years, South Vietnam's fishermen have more than doubled their catch. Fish, in the form of a widely-us ed fish sauce which remains usable even in the hot and humid climate, is a major source of protein. The most important single cause of the added output is the motorization of fishing boats, enabling them to range more widely and return to port more promptly. Out of approximately 44,000 fishing boats in South Vietnam, about 10,000 have been fitted with engines, and the number grows each year.

Beginning practically from scratch, industrial output has gone up from a few thousand dollars five years ago to several million now. During these same periods, more than 700 manufacturing plants have been started or expanded.

Vietnamese workers are quick to master mechanical skills --

as shown by the record of Air Vietnam which does all its own maintenance and has never had an accident due to mechanical failure.

A new development, which should be of special interest to this gathering, is the introduction of television in South Vietnam, with the first telecast on February 7.

Over 500 sets have already been distributed for community viewing in market places, public buildings, and bus terminals. They have drawn crowds of hundreds and even thousands.

Television can unite the people of South Vietnam as iron rails united our own nation 100 years ago.

Does all this -- this "other war," as I have called it -- have a bearing on the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam?

The Communists certainly seem to think it does.

They have given particular attention to dynamiting schools -in one province alone, they blasted 56 classrooms in a year,
against the 70 we were able to help the Vietnamese build.

Last month they recognized the coming of television by blowing up a television receiver, in the process wrecking the two-story municipal building in which it was housed and killing or wounding several spectators.

Another kind of evidence comes from defectors from the Viet Cong. One of them commented, for example, that he ceased to believe Communist propaganda about the misery of the South Vietnamese people when he saw so many boats powered with outboard motors chugging along the waterways!

Primarily, however, we are waging the "other war" not against the Viet Cong but for the overwhelming majority -- the non-Communist majority -- of the people of Vietnam. And the eagerness and effectiveness with which they have responded is a measure of their vitality and of their justified confidence in the future of their country.

That vitality has also been demonstrated in recent weeks on the political front. The people have expressed themselves vigorously -- and even with impatience and urgency -- about their futures. As a result, the national elections initially projected for next year have been moved up to this summer.

We welcome and we support this opportunity for the people of South Vietnam to decide their own futures, and we shall cooperate willingly and gladly with whatever government emerges from this process.

We seek no domination, no dominion. We seek no military bases on the mainland of Asia. We do not dream of dictating the destinies of its peoples. We wish only to help assure them the opportunity for self-determination.

This, I think, is the <u>big</u> story in Vietnam, as it is in Asia: the story of the struggle of a good share of the world's peoples to live in peace and security, and with the right to choose their own place in the world. This is the story I commend to you for coverage.

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## REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters

West Auditorium
U.S. Department of State
April 28, 1966

## ON BACKGROUND

MR. BALL: Ladies and Gentlemen, the Vice President of the United States.

[Applause.]

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Thank you very much.
[Standing ovation.]

Thank you, Secretary Ball.

One of the disadvantages of coming to the State

Department is you can get these protocol introductions.

[Laughter.]

When I am out on the hustings or speaking at one of these fine gatherings at one of Washington's large hotels, I generally have introducers that indulge in fiction and mythology and give me a good send-off.

But I am very pleased and honored to be here with Secretary Ball and with members of the State Department staff, our

Defense Department, and indeed with you.

Many parts of a Vice President's life become rather uncertain and at times unscheduled, and today that is what happened to me. I had planned on being with you at 2:00 o'clock to open this National Foreign Policy Conference, but at 2:00 o'clock the President of the United States had a meeting of all the top leadership in the field of civil rights to go over our new message that was presented this afternoon and legislation to be introduced in the Congress, and we had a full discussion of all the details of this legislation. It lasted just two hours and, therefore, the best laid plans of the Vice President's Office had to be set aside.

I know that you have had a rewarding experience already with those who have addressed you. I understand that Mr. Bundy has been demonstrating his qualifications as a Senator by holding forth here for some time.

[Laughter.]

George Ball said that he had been filibustering for me. Now, I don't believe that is the case, but I do know that he has filled in beautifully and has been most helpful in a question and answer period.

I want to visit with you a little while and on my own terms, and then to open up this matter again for questions. It seems to me that this is the best way to explore the many areas of American foreign policy.

Some time ago, President Eisenhower said, "What we call foreign affairs is no longer foreign affairs. It is a local affair." And whatever happens in Indonesia is important to Indiana. We cannot escape each other.

I always knew that I had a bipartisan spirit, but I didn't know it was quite so directly related to what President Eisenhower said. Because many times I have said, and indeed feel, that what happens in the Middle East may be of more importance to the Middle West of America than anything that develops in the Middle West. And indeed what happens in Southeast Asia, which you have discussed at some length I am sure this afternoon, may very well affect Southeast America and all of America more than anything that will develop in the southeastern states of this land.

Now, this is just another way of telling all of us what we know. This is a different world. It is a world that has been bound together by those of you in this room -- communication. The media has made this a world

of people, not just a world of nations and continents but people. And it is a smaller world every day.

Earlier this day, I was visiting with some of our student leaders and I had in my office, and have in my office, a model of the supersonic transport -- or should I say that I have two models, because we as yet have not decided which model it will be --

[Laughter.]

-- but being Chairman of the Space Council, I have a little something to at least contribute to this decision. And I pointed to this series of models -- one from Lockheed and one from Boeing; one with the fixed wing, Delta wing, and the other with the kind of TFX, the wing that folds in and out -- and I said, "This particular instrument is going to change the world in which you live, because this particular instrument, this particular machine, brings Australia within seven hours of Los Angeles."

And it makes the Far East, what we call "a far away place," the nextdoor neighbor. It reduces the time between Chicago and Tokyo by a factor of four. In other words, it will travel twenty-two hundred miles an hour, and it is going to work and it is going to carry two to

three hundred people. That is in its beginning. And it will get bigger and it will get faster and it will get more sophisticated, and this is just the beginning of supersonic transport.

So you are going to have to learn a great deal more about the other parts of the world if for no other reason than that you're most likely to go there and you really ought not to go as a stranger.

Practically everything that we have learned in our time has been the result of a shock or of some tragedy or of some tremendous event. We learned about collective security and the need for it as a result of Hitler's expansionism and militarism, and Japanese militarism.

We learned that you could not stand alone and we learned that from watching other nations being selected for the so-called "kill" one at a time.

We ought to have learned it a long time before, because Benjamin Franklin once said, "We either hang together or we hang separately." He was the first advocate of collective security in the American scene. But as much as weworshiped at the shrine of Benjamin Franklin, we didn't always believe what he said.

And after the experiences of World War II, we became staunch advocates of what we should have been staunch advocates of after World War I, namely, international organization for peace or international organization for creating the conditions that are conducive to peace. It is my view that that is a much more relevent and a much more precise phraseology of what the United Nations has as its purpose. It seeks to produce conditions that are conducive to peace.

learned in the postwar period that Communist power was an expansionist philosophy. And without any regard to theories that are developed for purposes of headlines or purposes of catch-phraseology or a catch-phrase, we learned that if a Communist regime is successful in its new forms of aggression — and there are new forms of aggression — that one success tends to encourage another attempt for another success. In other words, to seek and seize power in whatever means or manner you can and wherever you can. Therefore, we had to develop systems of alliances and collective security and we had to sometimes do it bilaterally or unilaterally to prevent the success of Communist

aggression. And that lesson I think ought to be clearly in our minds, because that lesson is yet to be practiced in other areas of the world.

Then we learned from Sputnik something about the world in which we live. We found out we had to take a great, a brand-new look at American education, particularly American science and technology, the relationship of the Government in the fields of science and technology to the private sector, the partnership relationships that were required if this nation was going to be at least a participant in the exploration of outer space — and hopefully the leading nation in the exploration of outer space.

But it took the shame of Sputnik to awaken this country. There was no space program until Sputnik. We didn't get a space program because you thought it up. We didn't get a space program because some intelligent people sat down and said, "Now, we really ought to do this." We got it because we were afraid that if we didn't get it, that it would be another Communist triumph. Sometimes I wonder what we would do without the Communists.

[Laughter.]

We have got to be careful, George, you don't

get rid of all of them.
[Laughter.]

I read an article one time, I recall, in the <a href="Chicago Sun Times">Chicago Sun Times</a> that said, "What would we do without the Red devil?" and they listed all the benefits that this writer -- that was his phraseology -- all the benefits that had accrued to us simply because we were threatened here and threatened there and we became feareful and then we moved into action.

I happen to be one of those that believes that there are a number of things that we ought to be doing if there had never been a Communist or if Karl Marx had never lived or if no one had even thought of him. And I believe that that motivation was a much more positive motivation, a much more constructive one, than just working on the basis of fear.

But we do not seek a world in which all is alike. We have never been a people that lived by dogma and doctrine; nor have we ever wanted to see in our own country, much less in the world, a monolithic unity.

President Kennedy, I believe, put it about as succinctly and as pointedly or poignantly as anyone could

when he said that we seek to make the world safe for diversity; in other words, to make sure that no one nation or groups of nations ever gains the right the define world order, let alone manage it. But it's my view that diversity must, in this age, nuclear age or space age or this age of modern science and technology, be accompanied by safety. It isn't good enough just to have self-determination, if it includes with it extermination; therefore, diversity with security.

Now, the threat to both diversity and safety in postwar Europe has been clear and visible and we are very much aware of it and we have, for all practical purposes, done something about it. But there are still threats to diversity and safety in the world, and they are not so simple and direct as was the postwar challenge in Europe.

Now, I keep saying this about Europe, because everybody else says it. And the main reason I believe that things seem a little bit more simple about Europe is because we are all European oriented. And whenever you are oriented toward any particular set of problems or area, it seems much more simple.

I have never been able to understand this new mathematics. The main reason is that no one ever was mean enough to enforce me to do anything about it. But I have a young son that does something about it -- not very well, but he does something about it; not well enough to please his mother, but he knows something about it. But to me, it is a new language. I am not oriented toward it. But I am fairly good about solid geometry and trigonometry and plain geometry and algebra. And I was a chemist of a sort and it didn't bother me particularly. When I see a chemical formula, I understand that. I studied in pharmacy. But I really can't understand that these nuclear physicists are talking about. I meet them on the airplane and they are all young and they are active and they've got books this thick [indicating], and they are all reading things that no one ever read before, and they have charts that no one ever saw before, and to me it's a very complicated world. And it doesn't seem to be complicated to them, primarily because they are accustomed to it.

And I believe that while we go around and say that the problems of postwar Europe were much more manageable

it is simply because they were more manageable because we were more identified with the people there. And now having said that, that doesn't help you at all, because it is imperative that we become knowledgeable about the rest of the world.

Cliches seldom are worthy of one's attention, but in this day of public relations, I guess you have to have a few of them. And I have one that I have used from time to time which says that if you are going to be a world power you have to have more than a half-world knowledge.

And we really only know about half of the world. That gives you the benefit of the doubt, and it is giving me a great benefit of the doubt. Quite frankly, we speak about whole sections of the world as if it were a county - Westchester or someplace -- you know.

We speak about Asia. We have only learned how to say Asian. We used to say Asiatic before. This is just the most recent accomplishment among the sophisticated erudites to get them to say Asian. That started when I got in Congress about 1950. We were becoming -- up until then we hadn't progressed that far. And I venture

to say if you go through the universities of the United States that you will find very little emphasis upon Asian studies. Oh, once in a while you will. We were shaken into some realization because of World War II, but that subsided quickly.

And I am somewhat interested in university life.

And I hear a great deal about intellectuals, and I want
them to tell me how many Asian studies they have and how
many people they have involved in them. They are very
limited.

It is only recently that we have become deeply concerned about Latin America. And then we say Latin America as if that was all in the same area too. And that is just about as different. There is as much difference in what we call Latin America as there is between Maine and Mexico -- great differences. We need to understand these areas of the world.

As the late President Kennedy said, "If we are going to have a world safe for diversity, we need to understand that there are diverse countries." There are even different states. And I will give you a shocking statement -- believe it or not, the newspapers in the

Midwest are not like they are on the Atlantic Seaboard -- [Laughter.]

-- they don't even talk about the same things.
[Laughter.]

you have an entirely different picture, for example, about the price of pork as a consumer than as a producer. And our people are producers primarily, you see, where I come from. There is diversity, great diversity, and, in order to understand anything about the world in which we live, we have to understand what the word "diversity" means.

I had an experience today that to me was one of the most revealing that I have had since I have been in ?
Washington. Mr. Mehta, the Chief of Planning, economic planning, in India, came in to see me. Now, I have tried to fool myself into believing for almost twenty years that I was somewhat of a student of India. The reason I did that is because I didn't know very much, but I knew more than some other people did. Everything is relative. I took an interest in the Congress on India.

And I want to say that if you really want to be an expert in the Congress on something, the main thing is to find a

topic about which no one else has any interest or knowledge and then proceed to do something about it.

[Laughter.]

Well, I looked around the world and I picked myself a country. And, as Paul Douglass used to say to me,
as Senator Douglass, he would call me the Senator from
India.

[Laughter.]

Well, I have been interested in India, because I sincerely believe that the experiment that they are going through in their Indian democracy, their type of democracy, is one of the most unique in the world and its success has a true bearing upon the possibilities and the hopes of peace in Asia and throughout the world.

And I was even more pragmatic. I felt that if
you were going to have continuing trouble with Communist
China as a Communist, socialist, Marxist state, then it
might be well to try to have some understanding and knowledge
of and interest in a society that has preserved democratic
institutions, that tried to have a mixed economy of a sort
Well, not one like ours, but at least one in which there
was a blend between both public and private activity.

So I took a great interest in India. I thought it was pragmatic. I never believe, for example, that you could offset the votes of New York with Rhode Island, as a politician. I like both, don't misunderstand me. Or to put it in my own state, Holdingford County being the largest country, I felt that if you were going to be a practical political man in my state you ought not to offset Holdingford County with Cottonwood, because it only had 14,000 people and the other one had almost a million.

And sometimes I was worried that American foreign policy, when it was considering the power factors in world politics and the balance of power or at least the structural relationships of power, was placing a great deal of emphasis upon a small area, tremendous emphasis, with a small population and not enough emphasis upon a larger area with great population, particularly when it appeared that the menace to all that we stood for came from another large area with large population.

So I really became an expert on India -- sort of an instant expert. Today I found out that I didn't know anything about it that was really very important, anything that you couldn't get out of a world almanac or a few good

books on India.

I talked to a man today that told me more about what is going on in that great part of the world where one-seventh of the population of the world lives, than I ever dreamed was possible for one man to learn in such a short period of time.

And I asked him to come back and talk to me because I, for the first time, perceived what they are trying to do, how they are trying to do it, the complexities of their problems. Oh, I know they are poor and I know they have hunger and famine. That is not new. That is as old as the Scriptures. But what is the nature of their problems and how are they trying to put this great heterogeneous population together into a nation and yet preserve diversity, which is a fundamental part of democratic structure, to preserve individual identity, group identity, without having it split apart as a wheel that is out of control. That is what I mean by more knowledge.

And I happen to be one that believes that out of the pain and the suffering of Viet-Nam, whatever may be your point of view as to what our policy ought to be, that we are being compelled to learn about Asia and about all

parts of Asia.

To learn, for example, that there are regions that may be economically viable, that there are possibilities for regional development. We are being compelled to learn about the cultures, the religions, the languages, the territory, the geography. We are even compelled to learn about the resources.

Asia haven't the slightest idea what a geological survey would reveal. I would be interested in all the folks that have points of view today about what we ought to do in Asia, about what they know about their natural resources; what do they know about the traditions of their people? What about their old enemies and new friends? What do they know about their currency? What do they know about the development of their economy? What do they know about whether or not the economy is developing in balance, or whether it's out of balance? This really tells you what is going to happen.

Sometimes, when you and I hear somebody discuss

America, we say, "How can they be so ignorant?" We hear

people from other parts of the world talk about our country

and it sounds as if they had just gotten ahold of tencent pamphlet, one of those Public Affairs pamphlets, and just decided to read it right quick.

[Laughter.]

Don't misunderstand me. It's a good pamphlet.
[Laughter.]

I'm not coming out against much of anything today.
[Laughter and applause.]

Having both just had them and read them -[Laughter.]

--I sometimes get the feeling that some of our critics in other parts of the world, when they are attempting to dissect America and to take a good look at it, have that quickie, instant knowledge about America, and they come out with the most unbelievable conclusions and observations about a very complex society.

For example, what kind of an economy do we have?

That is a good question to spend the next week on. It

isn't all capitalistic. And it surely isn't all social
istic -- one of the advantages of the middle of the road,

you know -- and it surely isn't all corporate. And it

isn't all cooperative. It isn't all individual ownership.

And it surely isn't all just huge business. It's a very mixed economy.

How do you explain the economy of the Tennessee Valley? How do you explain the economy of my state, where you have the United States Steel Corporation and General Mills, or you have the International Business Machines and Univac and Cargill and Washburn-Crosby? And at the same time you have more cooperatives than in any other state in the United States and any other country -- farm cooperatives. And you have public ownership even of heating establishments and electric utilities.

How do you explain Nebraska -- [Laughter.]

-- where you have staunch advocates of free enterprise and every utility is publicly owned? You see, it does confound you a little bit, even those of us who are somewhat acquainted with it.

Therefore, all I am saying is that if we are going to have a policy towards a country or make observations, we need to be better students.

Well, I think I have made my point. I don't say what you are supposed to learn, but I do think we

need to open the book. And we will have to do this much sooner than we thought.

One other development I believe that is worthy of our consideration for a moment -- this isn't a bipolar world. This isn't a world today in which one power center is the United States and the other center is the Soviet Union and the satellites or the Soviet Bloc. That is in the history books.

I suppose it's fair to say that it is almost a multipolarized world. We have a great deal of power, we and our allies and friends. And even those shift a little bit from time to time, so keep a good computer around.

The Soviet Union has a great deal of power, a good deal of power. We hope and think and believe that we have more, but the Soviet Union is experiencing some of the same problems of affluence that we are. Her allies or satellites are becoming restive and independent. I suppose that must give them a certain degree of encouragement as to the success of some of their policies. We always say that.

[Laughter.]

Then there are new power centers growing --

the Communist Bloc and the Communist center of China. There are other possibilities. The Common Market with its economic power, which doesn't always act the same politically as it does economically, if you need to be reminded.

So this isn't an easy simple world in which you can compartmentalize everything. And I think it is only another way of telling us the difficulty of designing international policy and foreign policy.

I saw a headline the other day on one of the great publications, "Why American Foreign Policy Is a Failure." I like to read about what a failure we are. Boy, we need more failures -- that is all I can say. I read about the failures of our country. Well, I think we have made mistakes. I think we need to change and I think we need to make some adjustments; and we will discuss those, and that is what you are here for.

But what is this all about -- failure? I hear many people talk about the weaknesses and limitations of our economy, and we have them. But on balance, I think I would just as soon take this one as any that is going, and it has done fairly well. There hasn't been any failure

of foreign policy. There may very well be certain policies that need to be adjusted to new sets of circumstances, new power relationships, but a foreign policy, like life itself, is in constant change, just as our military national security policy is in constant fluctuation and changes.

This is why we develop new weapons systems.

This is why we have new systems of training. This is why we have military assistance programs. This is why we work with certain allies more than with others and have a dependency upon certain power centers more than others -- because there are changes.

Now, let me just conclude this part of my remarks by giving you just a few of my own observations on the role of Congress in foreign policy. I think I can maybe do this out of some experience. And I am not at all sure whether this will be pleasing to anybody.

Congress does have a role in foreign policy.

And it should have. It represents the elected representatives of the American people. Foreign policy is not the private preserve of the Department of State. You didn't have to cough on that one, George.

[Laughter.]

But, by the same token, while foreign policy is not the private preserve or the private possession of the Department of State, it is equally true that the Congress of the United States, even if it should, is not properly equipped to manage foreign policy.

Our foreign policy today is influenced a great deal by public opinion. And you help influence it. I wonder if this audience has given any attention to the impact of television upon foreign policy -- the balance that is required in television to give a true, balanced presentation of what we are talking about when we discuss foreign policy. Let me tell you what I am getting at.

I look at the newspaper clips occasionally on the war in Viet-Nam. Now, remember, these are the clips that are taken by a photographer out on the battlefield. And you are sitting home in your comfortable living room or bedroom or kitchen or wherever you have the television. Or you may be in the local tavern and you have become a lot smarter after the first two drinks, -[Laughter.]

-- and a little more belligerent, too. That happens. And you are looking at a screen and all at once there it is --

killing, bombardment, horror scenes, because all war is horrible. And it is as foreign to what you are and where you are as if you had a picture of a scene on the moon; much moreso, as a matter of fact, because we have had some pictures of the moon in a rather peaceful condition.

What does this do to the thinking of the American people? Because the thinking of the American people and the attitudes of the American people are reflected in Congress -- and they should be. What does it do ultimately in the pressures upon the structure or the mechanism of foreign policy making and upon those who administer it? I don't know. I am just asking you to think about it. I know this is entirely different.

reel once a week -- such as I experienced as a young fellow at the local theater -- blended in with a lot of other things about something that was going on in Ethiopia or someplace -- than it is to see night after night, day after day, morning after morning, week after week, month after month, scenes of battle. And, with all deference, that which makes news is just about the most gruesome thing that you can find.

I checked my television out home when I was in my home state the other day, and there were thirteen minutes and thirty seconds of news and nine minutes and ten seconds was on auto accidents, fires. Now, I knew there was something else going on in the state besides that, but it doesn't make as good a scene as if you can get right out there with this mobile unit and get that crashed car and people stretched out on the ground and the fire and the firemen fighting the fire and something like that.

Now, I know that isn't all of the news of the world and I am sure that what is going on in this struggle is not merely the war. In fact, if I had gotten here at 2:00 o'clock, I was going to tell you a little bit about the other war. I'd like to see some good newsreel morning after morning, night after night, day after day, week after week, on how they build schools in Viet-Nam. I am not interested in coffins. They bother me. They make me sad. I think here because we have a war you have to have the balance.

I'd like to know what they are doing out in the rural areas. There are some provinces that are pacified.

What is going on there? Now, I know what's been done. I don't want to act as if some of this hasn't been done. But I have learned a long time ago that education is repetition and if it isn't repetition it is osmosis.

Most of us are slow learners and we have to be steeped in it. You just simply have to know that. And that's why every day there is a battle scene to remind you what's going on.

And the only way that you can put it in proper balance, if there is any balance on the other side, is what's going on in the hospitals. Who else is in that struggle?

I asked one of my staff men this morning, the man that comes to me from the Central Intelligence Agency, I said to him, "Why don't we hear something about the Koreans? I know they are fighting over there. What has happened to them?" Well, that just doesn't make news over here. There isn't a big Korean reading public.

[Laughter.]

Now, I know there are Koreans fighting there and they are valiant soldiers. What about those Australians?

They only make it once in a while. What about those

Australians? They only make it once in a while when the Australian Minister of External Affairs is paying us a visit. What happened to them? They are there. I know they are in this struggle. And what happened about the doctors from Iran, the teams that are in there? What happened to all these people? What happened about the five medical teams from New Zealand that have been set up? How come they don't get in the act?

I say that this is important to have a balance of what we are talking about, because we have said publicly that this struggle is not a military struggle alone. We have said it is primarily a political struggle, and if it is a political struggle and a social struggle, then we ought to have something more than just the view of the Buddhist demonstrations and the military.

I will be more candid with you. I guess this is the time to be candid. You are going to be candid with me. How come that the demonstrators are worthy of so much copy? I will give you an experience. I was out in a big city here recently talking to eight thousand school board members. They also had the Commissioner of Education. Let's presume that the Vice President was not

worthy of any of that particular copy, and I think that could have been the case in that instance, but the Commissioner of Education was very good, and he had a message And really this was not a meeting on how you organize demonstrations. It was a meeting on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act -- eight thousand school board members. And I venture to say that most of the copy -radio, TV, and news -- was on the twenty demonstrators, the same twenty. They had demonstrated on everything for a long time. They just were demonstrating -- and don't misunderstand me, I think they have a right to demonstrate but I don't think they are entitled to the first page every day. Not on your life.

[Applause.]

Now, I know that makes me appear as if I am against dissent. I am not against dissent at all. I have been a dissenter on many, many things, but I think there is such a thing as balance. And when we are trying to educate a public in a free society -- a free society presumes that you have judgment and that things will be presented in balance. And I don't believe that a meeting that happens to have twenty protesters -- whatever meeting it might be +- t doesn't need to be on this one, it can be on anything.

I saw it at a meeting in Pueblo, Colorado, where there are about, I think, eight of ten protesters out in front, they were protesting a Congressman, a wonderful Congressman, too. And he is entitled to have some protests.

[Laughter.]

But that was the main news item. Not particularly in that paper, but I mean naturally the people in Pueblo knew better. Naturally.

I recall going to Australia. I have to tell you about this one. This late in the afternoon, you might just as well enjoy the rest of the day here.

[Laughter.]

We went to Australia on this Far Eastern tour, and I had a wonderful experience there with the fine people of that great country and with the members of their Parliament and their Government. And on the evening that we came in, it was a wonderfully beautiful evening and the next morning, when I awakened, it was a cool, crisp morning. And I was at a luncheon. We had meetings all morning with the Cabinet and the Ministers and members of the Parliament.

When we went into the Government buildings, I noticed there were about twenty-five or thirty, maybe thirty-five pickets. Well, that made me feel good. You know, I had been away from home a long time, -[Laughter.]

-- and a fellow gets a little lonesome at the end of a trip.

And I just simply couldn't help but comment on this at noontime.

and I said to the Prime Minister, Mr. Holt, I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I have often heard of the hospitality and the generosity and kindness of the people of Australia, but you have gone overboard." I said, "I came in last evening in our big jet, and I was greeted by a Texas sunset, just the kindest thing that you could do out of respect for our President."

[Laughter.]

"This morning when I awakened and opened up the window to take a good breath of fresh air, in came a cool Minnesota breeze." And I said, "I just felt just grand and I thought, 'well, that is just about enough, you know, and I come to your Parliament and there you have the pickets." And I said, "I understand that there was a

whole week's preparation that went into that, according to what I have read."

[Laughter.]

And I said, "But to top it all off --" just to show you what the Prime Minister will do, I found out a little later that not only did he have the pickets and the Texas sunset and the Minnesota morning, but at the head of the pickets was a young lady from Brooklyn, a graduate of the University of California in Australia on a Fulbright Fellowship.

[Laughter and applause.]

I said now -- it's so humorous, but it was true.

[Laughter.]

It was no longer a Fellowship, but it was. [Laughter.]

Well, that emphasizes my point, I think, about balance of the news.

The role of Congress -- I think the role of Congress is well fundamental when it does in fact much of what it's presently doing. I happen to believe, as a former member of the Foreign Relations Committee, that it

is fulfilling a very important function when it opens up topics that ought to be discussed and aired and vented.

I believe that it is not only the right, but the duty and indeed the privilege and opportunity of Congress, and its committee system to integrate, to investigate, to inquire, to explore, to study.

And these hearings, for example, that have been held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator Fulbright on the China policy, I think they are much needed. It isn't whether or not you agree with what all the witnesses say or whether you agree in what the Chairman may say.

What is important is that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is an important Committee of the Congress of the United States, well staffed with members of the Committee that are deeply involved in matters of international relations, and they ought to be looking at the policies of this Government.

This is not just the prerogative of the Executive Branch. They ought to be looking at it and they can do it without upsetting normal relationships. The Secretary of State and his associates have to deal with the

most difficult and sensitive problems every day as a Government.

Now, I know that many other countries don't understand this. They don't understand our Parliamentary or our Congressional system. They will have to learn, because we are not going to change that system. And I don't think you can go around and tell members of Congress that just because somebody else doesn't understand us, that they ought to be quiet.

I am against quieting the Congress. I think the Congress of the United States has a responsibility in its own right. Now, it ought to act responsibly. So should we all, but I guess those who live in glass houses, at least for a long period of time, ought not to start throwing stones.

We have all made an intemperate remark on occasion, and some of us in public life have maybe made too many. But the Congress of the United States represents the people. It has all kinds of people in it, and they represent all kinds of people. And many people in this country are concerned about a lot of things we do and don't do, and they ought to be heard! They have a right to be heard.

Now, this doesn't mean that your Government accepts each -- that is, the Executive Branch of your Government, charged with the administration of foreign policy, charged with the basic formulation of foreign policy, charged with the responsibility of national security -- it doesn't mean that the Executive Branch has to accept every criticism, adjust every policy because of the criticism, but it means at least that there ought to be the dialogue and the interchange between the two branches out of which some refinement comes.

Now, this is what I consider to be important dissent; more importantly, important dialogue, discussion, dissent and decision. The Congress of the United States can have discussion. It is a forum for dissent. On some instances, it must make decisions, but for the Executive Branch, it is no different. Within the Executive Branch, itself, there is discussion. There is often times dissent but after the discussion and the dissent, within the Council of the Executive Branch there must be decision.

Both branches of Government have their role to play, so that when I read, for example, sharp criticism of the role of Congress, remember, Congress must appropriate the money and Congress can tell you how it ought to be spent.

I spent sixteen years in Congress and I happen to think that
the elected representatives of this country that are
charged with making the laws of this nation are entitled
to tell the Executive Branch how to spend the money.

Now, that doesn't mean they are necessarily going to make the wise decision, but they have a right to make the decision. The duty of the Executive Branch is to attempt to convince and persuade that the right decision be made, and generally speaking, that is an effective procedure.

There is, of course, a great strain and stress on occasion, and many of our top officials in this Government spend many, many hours before the Committees of Congress. I can think of no better place, even though it is a tiresome and at times a wearying task. But the Congress of the United States does reflect in the main over the long period of time the attitudes and the opinions of the people of the United States. And if you think that some of the Congressmen are making foolish statements, you ought to hear what is said from where they come.

[Laughter.]

And if you think that some of the positions that they seem to represent seem untenable, just take a look at some of your own editorials, --

## [Laughter.]

-- or take a look at some of your own commentaries. And it doesn't necessarily mean you are wrong. I used to think that most everybody else was wrong but me, but I have long outgrown that. As a matter of fact, there have been many changes, many, many changes that we have made, many changes in attitude on domestic policy and many changes in attitude on foreign policy where you can't say that you were consistent, Consistency. Consistency? Consistency about what? Consistency is valid if all of the other factors are the same upon which you base your decision. But, if the factors change and the facts change, to be consistent with the previous decision only proves that you were stupid. It doesn't prove that you were enlightened. It doesn't prove you are a statesman. It proves you are stubborn. Therefore, consistency does not necessarily mean that we have a good policy.

Now, these are random remarks. Oh, I have some priceless words in this booklet. It's just a pity that you

didn't get them all.

[Laughter.]

Maybe sometime I will come back here and tell you about them, but if you ask the right questions, maybe we can get into it anyhow. So I now place myself open for your questions.

[Continued on page B-1]

VRVoce Vice-Pres. 4-28-66

MR. JOHN WHITE [WTRP in LaGrange]: Mr. Vice

President, are we taking too much of a position of reaction

rather than progress in our foreign policy today?

A Well, my view is no. I think that one of our difficulties is maybe again in communication. This Government is pledged, for example, to economic and social development all over the world. Some people think we are engaged in it too deeply, that the real legitimate argument in this country is how much can we do; how much of the burden must we share alone; how much can this economy take; how much do you think we ought to do.

But I gather that the question would indicate that we seem to be supporting old regimes or that we are engaged primarily in military activities, rather than in joining with what seems to be the future, the new spirit of the new times, and working in the economic, political and social areas.

The fact of the matter is that a government such as ours has to work with what is. But this does not mean that we are oblivious to what is coming. But you couldn't very well have this Government on the one hand working with a particular government in a country and then conspiring

underneath to overthrow it without getting caught and without having plenty of trouble for yourself.

So what we seek to do in our Embassies is to work with, and through our governmental institutions, to work with the governments to which we are accredited, and at the same time to keep in good lively contact with all other elements in the country. This is why we have in our Embassies political officers, labor attaches, agricultural specialists, a science adviser, a commercial attache.

These people are working with other segments of the economy, other than the established government.

And I can say that I know of no country that has done more to encourage what I would call economic and social progress. Our critics, international critics, frequently say to us that we ought to do more. And I say, "Come join. Come join."

I spoke to the Associated Press here in New York the other day and had a little something to say about leadership. Leadership doesn't mean doing it alone. Leadership doesn't mean that this world is our oyster, so to speak, and that we will do with it as we wish. Leadership means that we will try to inspire, encourage others to join on common objectives in common projects, working with people

who want to help themselves. And, frankly, it's my view that we are a whole lot better to work within their plans than always come to them with a plan made in America, designed in America, and say, "Now, paste that over your country and we will work on it."

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Vice President, on your comments in the press of late, stories have come out especially in Viet-Nam, that some people say have hurt diplomatically, do you think that this is true, and if so what should be done about it?

A Well, we have to make a hard choice in this country, but I think it's one that we will make and ought to make. If you want a free press, you have to rely a great deal upon the factor of what we call self-discipline rather than official censorship, or you can't have a free press.

Now, there are varied stories coming out of VietNam and every other part of the world. If you and I go
out on a trip to Viet-Nam and you make your observations
and I make mine--the same country, same day, and maybe
meet the same people--we may see things a little differently.
And this is one of the reasons that we have many reporters

and many news outlets. We don't want an official government line. On occasion I think it would be--I'd like one for myself.

[Laughter]

But I can't get one-- even in the higher circles, may I say.

[Laughter]

No, I do think that it's fair to say that there have been times where a story has temporarily caused some difficulty or embarrassment, but this is one of the prices that we pay for what we call our freedom. And I think you have to pay it.

Now, don't misunderstand me. It's like any other thing. I don't exactly always like it. I don't want to act, you know, like it's just jolly. I had two office members give me a memorandum two days ago about me that I didn't like at all. One of them is sitting in this audience. I felt like I ought to fire him, but he was right. And I put at the bottom--I didn't talk to him, I just said, "You're right. I shall try to improve." I haven't, but I'm trying, you see.

[Laughter]

But I wanted him to know I didn't like it.
[Laughter]

But he was right. And don't you ask who he is.
Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Vice President, to what extent has the present political unrest affected the mission for which you went to Southeast Asia--to bring the Great Society to the people of South Viet-Nam?

A Well, let me just say a word about the Great Society for a minute here. You know, there are two kinds of politics—the politics of hope or the politics of despair. Now, most everybody knows that you don't accomplish your objectives, even in the best of organized societies, in a hurry. But I want to say to all of you that are in the media business, you all, most of you, carry some advertising and all these products are not always quite as good as you say they are, and they don't always whiten your teeth as fast as you say.

I have met some ladies that have been using this soap and their hands are not as pretty as you say they are supposed to be. But I am not against you saying that this particular kind of soap does something for your hands, or if you take these vitamins that your eyes will sparkle and

your hair will be bright and your complexion will be nice, because I do think that all of these things sort of help.

We talked about in Viet-Nam, as we put it, "the other war". We said there was a social revolution under way. Now, that came as almost like a shock. Well, that was just about as much news as saying that the sun rises in the east. Of course there is a social revolution under way in South Viet-Nam. What the outcome of that revolution will be is the question.

And we said we would like to see that part of the world—and I have said it in particular, because this is maybe my kind of thinking and my kind of faith—we said that we would like to see for these people the chance for their children and their families for an education, for health, and for homes, for jobs. We would. That's the only way there is going to be any peace in the world. And we need also to let them know that we believe in social justice, not just in jobs, that our objectives are for them what they are for ourselves.

So there maybe is the picture of a better world, and there is also the picture of heaven and there is the picture of the Great Society or the New Frontier or whatever you wish to call it. These are the calls to the

emotions and to the idealism of people.

I want to say that I want my country, my America, to be identified in this world--not with having the biggest bomb, not with having the biggest military machine, not with having the biggest bank or being the richest country--but I want us to be identified for what we are. This country, as has been stated--I have a favorite little clipping that, I hope I got it with me. Yes, I have. And now I have two members of the staff walk out.

## [Laughter]

A Thomas Walsh quote. This is what I want

America to be known for, in Viet-Nam, in India, in Europe,
in Latin America, in the Arctic Circle with the penquins
if need be. I want it to be known for this, "To every
man, regardless of his birth, his shining golden opportunity, to every man the right to live, to work, to be
himself and to become whatever thing his manhood and his
vision can combine to make him." That is the promise of
America.

I want people to know that that is what we are for. The poor people don't always fall in love with rich people. It's difficult to be the rich man on the hill when

you are the poor man in the swamp. And most people in this world are very poor. And I suggest we find ways of identifying ourselves with the poor. And you don't always identify yourself with the poor by being the man that makes all the loans and wants to collect all the bills. You don't always identify yourself with this great mass of humanity that is aspiring for a better life, and they want it and they are going to get it one way or another or destroy yours. That is a fact. You don't identify yourself by ignoring their aspirations.

So I think it's good for us to let the peoples of South Viet-Nam know that we are not interested in just sending our B-52's over to blast them to bits, hopefully finding the enemy, and that we are not just there with the finest military establishment that the world has ever known, but we are also there with doctors and teachers and farm specialists and health officers, and social workers and, if you please, with philosophers and students to help them build a whole new society.

And I got excited about this chance of helping to build a nation. I am not much of a destroyer. I just get a little worried about destroying all of this in so many areas of the world. I know that you have security. I

believe in it, and that is why I defend our policy—and not only defend it, I advocate it. But our policy is not merely preventing the success of aggression. Our policy is also to defeat social misery. And it's not just to defeat social misery, it's to help build democratic institutions and, above all, it is to secure a peace.

Now, I know that my friend, Homer Biggert, of the New York Times said that when I said "secure peace", that I didn't mention "negotiation". Well, now, let me spell it out. I will spell it in capital letters. Of course that is the way you get peace. We have limited objectives in a sense. We have the application of limited power. This country is exercising great self-discipline—a nation with unlimited power, limiting its use; a nation that could have the unbelievably large objectives that limits its objectives. And we haven't had, as an objective, conquest. And I think we ought to start telling the people again. Now, we have told each other how wrong we are in a lot of things, and a lot of people are beginning to believe that.

I suggest we take just one day a week to tell just about what we are trying to do, sort of give a little balance in it. We are not trying to blast away a country.

We are not trying to build a country. We are not trying to take lives. We are trying to save lives. We are not trying to destroy a society. We are trying to bring a better society to help, to help them. It's their country. It's their war. It's their people. It's their resources. It's their children. And we are there to only help them.

Now, that's what I believe, as Vice President of the United States, is our objective. And I am all for just making it crystal clear that we are people that believe in life. We are people that believe in hope. We are people that believe in a future. We are not just a group of warriors. I do now want the United States of America to be known only for the arrows in the claw of the eagle. I want the United States to be known for the olive branch as well, and not only the olive branch but the great constructive good that can come out of it.

All right. Well, I aroused a few questions here, I see. Go right ahead.

I'll quit any time you want me to.

Q Mr. Vice President, you stated an opinion that I interpreted to be that the voice of responsible dissent should be heard.

A Yes, sir.

Q May I ask, sir, for your opinion and comment on the demonstrators who burned draft cards, carry North Viet-Nam flags, violate State Department rules for illegal trips into North Viet-Nam, persons who under an official declaration of war might be charged with sedition or treason?

A Well, I think they make a serious mistake.

I think they demonstrate irresponsibility. I think they
do not do justice to themselves or their country. But I
guess if people want to be foolish, they have the right to
be foolish. I don't want to condone it. I surely don't
want to put a blessing upon it. I think it's most regrettable, most unfortunate, but I want to say to those who do
it, I don't think they help their cause. Quite frankly, it
really helps the other side.

I think maybe--I wasn't going to tell them that, because that sort of makes them change their tactics. But the American people are a patriotic people. And don't you kid yourself! The American people are essentially a people of great restraint and respect, and they are also a people that have their deep and abiding love for what they believe

is their country. And when somebody comes along and violates every tradition and every norm of conduct that is considered to be good conduct and flies in the face of what is known to be respect for law and order, and to be respect even for the nation and the symbol of the nation, the flag and the country itself, it doesn't help the cause of the person that's doing that. He is the enemy to his own cause. He irritates us. He angers me.

But the question is, should you take forceable action against him? And until a national emergency has been declared or until there is a set of conditions that tells you that this is a war in formal declaration, I think from the legal point of view we just have to put up with that.

Q Discussing the policy of the United States towards Rhodesia, if in, say, six months or a year from now it was seen that Rhodesia was advancing, would the United States ever consider recognizing the regime there? And also, in the near future, is there any consideration of working along with Britain to try and come about a peaceable settlement there?

A Well, very frankly, I am not capable of

answering your question. And I don't think that I would help very much with a rather ill-informed or uninformed reply. I can only say this, that we will work with our British friends because we think that the British have common sense, judgment and respect for the rights of people and nations.

But for the Vice President to add any further confusion to this situation, I don't think would be helpful. The policy which we presently pursue is one that we believe is in the best interests of our nation, of our commitments to the United Nation's Charter and to our relationships with the other nations of the world. Whether that policy will be changed, you better see Secretary Ball and Secretary Rusk. I'm just not equipped to give you a better answer.

- Q Thank you.
- A Yes, sir?

MR. BRUCE MORTON [York, Pennsylvania Gazette and Daily]: I share your feeling that I would like to have another identity for my country. However, I seem to be at a loss as to how to prove that this exists, especially in Viet-Nam. Perhaps you can do it with some concrete figures

as to what we are spending on social progress as opposed to the military effort.

that a military effort is the most expensive of all matters of course. The cost of military equipment, of munitions, is fantastic, and it has been for a long time and will continue to be. Our budget, our present budget has a heavy requirement upon it for our defense. Even though the present budget is only 7.8 percent, I believe, of our gross national product—it's actually less—we spend less today in the defense budget, including the Vietnamese struggle, than we did in the period of the Korean War, and we spend no more today in terms of our gross national product, which is our base of resources, than we did last year or the year before.

So when I hear that the Vietnamese War is a tremendous strain on the economy—while I know this economy has tendency to heat up because it's at high pitch, rather full production and productive capacities being used in many areas to its maximum—the truth of the matter is that the amount of money that is going into defense for all of our purposes, including the Vietnamese struggle, percentagewise,

and that is the true figure, is no more this year than it was last year, and I think about one tenth of one percent more than it was two or three years ago. We are, however, pouring in hundreds of millions of dollars. I think the figure—let me see, is it around three, what is it, around five hundred? I would think close to for this year in the AID program, if you put in Public Law 480—that is our excess and surplus foods, which are not in such surplus any more—we would be well close to it, well, maybe better than the half billion dollar mark. This is just the United States.

There are many other countries that ame putting in substantial sums of both money—substantial sums of money and numbers of personnel. And I believe it's fair to say that you can point to your country as having made a very substantial contribution over the years. My gracious!

Since 1954 we have poured hundreds of millions, I think approximately two billion—is that about the figure?——two billions of dollars into Viet—Nam in mostly nonmilitary.

So that we have made this impact and this effort.

But I would like to add this, that we can do a better job if we can get Hanoi to come to the peace table.

This gets me to this point. I do feel that it is only fair and right that we identify why there are no negotiations for peace. Every day I get somebody coming to me and telling me, "Now, I have a plan for peace." And most of them are pretty good. Some of them go further than our Government says it's willing to go now. But let's say that no matter what plan you bring in, you can't get peace unless you can get the other fellow to sit down.

Walter Reuther was in to see me not long ago, and he told me of an experience he had in Denmark with some students at the University of Copenhagen, and they were very critical of American policy in Viet-Nam and they wanted to know why we didn't get peace. He said, "Now, look, I represent one of the great unions of the world and I have a disagreement now with the General Motors." He gives this analogy, this picture. "And General Motors and the UAW can't seem to get at the conference table. And the UAW says if you will agree to this, this, this and this, we will sit down. And everything that UAW asks General Motors to agree to is what they hope to get in the wildest demands of their union."

He said to this student group, he said, "Now, I head that union." I am just giving you an analogy here. It

has no relevance to any particular situation. "I head this union and if the management of General Motors sat down under those restrictions and terms, why all they have done is completely capsized. They have forfeited their rights of management. There isn't any collective bargaining. They have already agreed to the wildest and the most extreme demands that we can make."

Or you can put it around the other way, where the management says, "We will sit down with you if you agree to this, this, this and this." Now, that isn't the way to get negotiations. And that is why the President of the United States has said that we will enter into negotiations with no preconditions—un, what was the word, unconditional—unconditional negotiations. We are asking for one opportunity, my fellow Americans. To anyone that is a critic, would you help us get somebody to come to the room? Just somebody to look at? Somebody to say they were interested in talking?

My dear friend, Senator Mansfield, made a splendid proposal here not long ago. It went further than many people thought it ought to go, but our Government, the State Department, said it had genuine merit, that they looked upon it with favor. What was that proposal? What it was

maybe we could get Japan and possibly Burma to get interested and help us with these negotiations. Maybe the site for the negotiations or the scene or the site could be Tokyo or Rangoon. And also that we ought to bring Communist China in.

Now, what happened to that? That was a considerable change in some people's view. It wasn't really a great change, I can tell you. Because Rangoon had been considered many times, and so had Tokyo, and we have always said that we would be glad to have the Geneva cochairmenand those two chairmen are Russia and Great Britain—to call a conference of the Geneva Conference members and one of them was Communist China.

So it really didn't have very much in terms of what was basically new in terms of membership, but it was a new initiative from the Majority Leader of the Senate, and it went further than we have gone before. What did they say? Hoax. Fraud. Beware, said Peiping. And Hanoi said, "We are. And it's a fraud. It's a hoax. We will have nothing to do with it."

Now, the problem about peace is in order to get peace you got to get somebody that really wants to talk

peace. And your Government has said that we will meet anywhere with anybody under any auspices to discuss ways and
means of bringing this struggle to a peaceful conclusion.

Now, how much further can you go? And yet day after day
I hear people say, "We need to find a way to peace."

Well, I can tell you the way to peace. Get one of the contestants to sit in and they can bring in all their relatives, all their friends. They can bring in anybody they want to. All I hear is, "You won't meet with the Viet Cong." Who said so? The President of the United States has said that that presented no insurmountable obstacle. Now, do you want me to turn around and say that that means what it says? Don't you think diplomats know that? Diplomats seldom ever tell you directly, you know, what they are thinking.

[Laughter]

It's no problem about having representation of the Viet Cong. But we are not going to have the Viet Cong be the sole representation of South Viet-Nam!

So that all these suggestions that come have one missing ingredient. And I venture to say that I could get Dean Rusk out of his sick bed today if you could give me one flickering hope that somebody from Hanoi would bring

their cousin along from the Viet Cong and was willing to meet, we don't care where, we'll go where they want to go.

And we'll go. We'll meet. And if you can convince the Soviet Union to join with the British Government to call the Geneva Conference back into session, we'll be there.

And we are not going to say that this is ruled out or that's ruled out.

When we say "unconditional negotiations", when we say that we are prepared to come there and negotiate all things—and I have heard our President say, and the Secretary of State, everything is on the table—their four points, our 14 points, the five points of South Viet—Nam, and if you have some points you want to bring in we will include them too.

But yet time after time I hear people say, "Well, now, we just got to stop this war and negotiate." I say in all reverence that you can find a way to do this with-out just selling out South Viet-Nam. You can always, of course, get a kind of peace if you're willing to play dead, and if you're willing to walk away. But we didn't enter that fray in South Viet-Nam to betray people, and we didn't enter it at such sacrifice to leave under dishonorable

conditions. And may I say quite candidly, we don't have to. We don't intend to!

All right, the lady?

MISS FLORENCE KING [The World Affairs Council, Radio Committee of Philadelphia]: Mr. Vice President, instead of this group building up the idea that we couldn't possibly change our policy in Viet-Nam, that it would be letting our friends down, that we couldn't doit with honor, and so forth--which is going to bring about that very situation--would you like to see this group exert its influence, in case we feel that we cannot win in Viet-Nam, to try to make it a little easier by giving the idea to people that we might decide that we could fight for our cause better somewhere else in some other conditions and that we could leave with honor?

A I would say that the worst thing that could happen to Asia, to Europe, to the United States, to the Free World, is to have a responsible group of Americans that represent the voice of America—in a very real sense—say that we couldn't win. I think that would be a major, major blow. I think that would be.

[Applause]

Now, let's see what we are trying to win. Our

goals are not very large compared to what some people think they ought to be. If there is any criticism to be leveled against the policy of this Government on Viet-Nam, it possibly could come from those that say, "Well, you don't have a big enough goal." What is our goal? What does this "win" word mean? What are we trying to win? We are not asking for all-out victory, unconditional surrender, all that World War II talk. We are simply saying that we want North Viet-Nam to stop its aggression.

Now, aggression is a fact, and we don't need to argue about that. It is a fact that every knowledgeable-well, every literate person with any degree of objectivity recognizes and accepts. There isn't any doubt about that.

What is our other objective? First, to prevent the success of aggression, hoping that Hanoi, North Viet-Nam, will stop its aggression; secondly, to offer what assistance we can to the peoples of South Viet-Nam, if they want it, to assist them in rebuilding their country.

We do not seek to have a base in Viet-Nam. I think we could give you a written assurance that we have no desire for any bases. We have been closing up bases until this Vietnamese thing got started. We have been cutting down on our bases. We have no desire to occupy North

Viet-Nam. We don't want an inch of their territory. We are not waging a war against Communist China. We seek no confrontation with them. We seek no sphere of influence. We are not asking for any special trade relationships. And I doubt that we will even be trying to collect any bills from anybody.

So what are our objectives? Our objective is please permit the people of South Viet-Nam to work out their own destiny. Now, that destiny may not come out the way I want it. I want to be quite candid with you. When you run the risk of saying people ought to have self-determination, and I'm for it, and you believe in free elections, and I'm for them, and you believe that they ought to write a constitution, and I'm for that, and so is our Government -- when I say I am, our Government is for that -- you run many risks. They may elect a government that says, "We want to join with the North." That is a risk you run. You may elect a government that has members of that government that you don't like. There may be Viet Cong members. Now, if there are Viet Cong members, I think they ought to get elected.

Now, I don't think we ought to foist them on them. I want to be very clear about that! This business

of going around and designing a kind of interim government and foisting a certain group on them that has already tried to destroy them, I'm opposed to that. But if the people of South Viet-Nam will elect a member of the National Liberation Front to their assemblies, we will have to live with that. That is the price that you pay when you ask for free elections.

So we are taking--what we are really saying is,

"You chart your course." But we are also saying to North

Viet-Nam, "Let them chart their course." And we are saying basically to the world that in a world of the nuclear
age, that aggression is too dangerous to be tolerated, that
the pattern of aggression is contagious, that aggression
unleashed or unchecked is unleashed, that aggression that
goes unpunished feeds on itself. And we don't think that
a nation such as ours, and other nations in the world that
want peace, can long tolerate those circumstances.

And if there is any similarity between this experience in Asia and Europe, I think it's in that. We went through that and if we didn't learn about aggression in the days prior to World War II and in World War II, then we have learned nothing and deserve less.

Yes? I think we have got General Johnson out here, haven't we? I will take a couple more questions here. I think we have another participant here, and you have a reception too, haven't you? You don't want to miss that.

Yes, sir?

MR. GLENN WILSON [Parkersburg, West Virginia]:
Mr. Vice President, I wonder if you would mind commenting
on your recent trip to South Viet-Nam in regards to the
feelings of the average South Vietnamese citizen as to our
being on their soil?

A Well, I don't think that I could give you an objective statement on that. My trip was brief. And one thing that I have learned in my public life is that you really don't become a national expert on the country in a four or five day visit, particularly when it's such a complex situation as appears to be the case in Viet-Nam.

I know that we have seen "Yankee go home" banners
But I saw those in Austria. I have seen those in Paris.

I have seen them in London. And if you're going to--I'm

in public life, you know, and if I quit every time somebody
told me to I would never have got started.

[Laughter]

And these "Yankee, go home" signs, they are readily available. They pass them out, people that work on that all the time. I have passed out a few signs myself in my day on certain projects and people. And all of this spontaneous outburst of public opinion is well-organized in the back room, most of it. I have been in political conventions where there was sudden spontaneity out of months of preparation.

[Laughter]

Now, I think it's important to note this—and this I think answers your question—that with all of the unrest, and there is unrest, and with all of the many groups in Viet—Nam, and there are many, that there are two things upon which the Vietnamese seem to agree. And this is true of the students, of labor, of the many types of Buddhists, of the Catholics, of the government people, of the military. There are two things upon which they agree: they do not want Communists to take over their country. That is number one. Tri Quang, this famous Buddhist monk, he has made it quite clear he doesn't want the Communists there, and he said a few unkind things about us. But the second thing that they agree upon is that they do not want us to abandon them.

So I think I have answered your question. That is, the articlate leaders—and, ladies and gentlemen, now isn't it interesting too that not a single leader of any of the groups that I have mentioned, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, the many sects, military, students, not one has defected to the North! They haven't joined up with the Communists. Now, this is quite amazing.

And, isn't it also interesting that when the refugees have to make a choice where they are going to go when they leave the battle areas—and here is the Viet Cong that is supposed, according to some of our people, to be the sole representative of the masses—here are the masses, 800 and some thousand of them in the last year, did they go North? Did they go with the Viet Cong? Did they go to Hanoi? I'll say they didn't! They came into the government controlled areas of South Viet—Nam, and that government is having to wrestle with that problem. Now, I think they are like Berliners in a way. They are kind of voting with their feet.

So I keep hearing that, "Oh, if you have an election the Communists will win." Well, I want to say if they do, it will be the first national election any Communist ever won anywhere. That will be quite an experience. We

are willing to take that chance. We have many people here who say, "Ho Chi Minh is popular." Well, let him test that. If he is so popular, why doesn't he have an election or two up North? I always like elections I think I'm going to win. I just think the facts are he is not that sure of it. And we are prepared to take that risk.

All right?

George, what are the ground rules here?
[Laughter]

All right. You know I love this. I mean it's great for me, but I think we have others who ought to participate.

Yes, sir. Excuse me. I'll have to get to you next.

MR. DONALD BARNHOUSE [WCAU Television, Philadelphia]: Mr. Vice President, you have spoken of the faith of the American people and of the needs of these other areas of the world, and the statistics that I can find indicate that other nations of the world—France, Britain and Japan—are doing more in the way of percentage of their gross national product in foreign economic aid than we are. For a nation that can afford electric can openers, why can't we afford better than four tenths of one percent of economic aid?

A That is what I said when I spoke to the AP. [Laughter]

And didn't get a word, not a line. That is exactly what I said, and I agree with you.

[Applause]

No, I thank you for what you said, because I think that you have stated something here that the American people clearly ought to understand. Now, I must say for our French friends and others, they do kind of direct some of that aid a little bit, so it kind of finds its way back. But so do we. Eighty, was it? What is it?

MR. BALL: Eighty-five percent.

A Well, 85 percent of our aid, about between 80 and 85 percent of our aid is expended—that is, what we call foreign aid—is expended for goods and services here in the United States. This is to help us on our balance—of—payments problem. This doesn't mean that it doesn't help the people that receive it. But we designed the legis—lation so that it does come back.

But I would call to the attention of this fine audience the great Encyclical of Pope John the XXIII, "mater et magistra", on the relationship of the poor and the

rich nations of the world, and what's involved in this.

It just happens to be my view—and maybe this makes me a softy—but it happens to be my view that the greatest threat to peace in the world is this broadening gap with all of the frustrations and all of the tensions and all of the bitterness that's involved in it. And, unless we can find ways and means—not we in America alone but I mean now of the more privileged, of the industrialized, of the better financed, of the more modern nations—to start to narrow that gap, we are just living on borrowed time.

And I think this is what we really ought to be talking about.

One of the things that has bothered me so terribly about the Vietnamese struggle is we are just becoming just sort of mesmerized by it. It doesn't mean the government as such is, but the public attention. I know this is natural, but we do have other areas in the world in which we have a keen interest.

I was meeting this morning with the Ambassador from Brazil. It's terribly important what happened in Brazil. The Alliance for Progress--very important to our future and their future. The whole problem of NATO and what its relationship will be, which I'm sure you have

discussed, and how it's going to be redesigned and restructured—very, very important. Nuclear proliferation—if you really want to wake up in the middle of the night with a cold sweat, what about this nuclear proliferation? And it will come just as surely as we are gathered in this room unless we can put a checkmate on it. And that is going to take a good deal of, a good deal of work, and it's going to take some diplomacy. It's going to require some kind of understanding with the Soviet Union.

I'm not even sure that even that will do the trick, because we have France and we have China and we have Britain—I think Britain will be very cooperative—and, hopefully, France. Well, what about China? There are many other problems and we ought not to lose ourselves and lose our sense of direction simply because we find ourselves involved here. We were involved in Korea, and yet we conducted a major foreign policy throughout the world. We were involved in Greece, and I might say that had we not have been involved in those areas of the world, there wouldn't be any Greece today that we can call a free Greece. And it is free and independent, free enough even to occasionally cause us a little concern. And therewouldn't be any South Korea.

And what I must ask myself time after time is,

Why did we get so--why is there so much dissent about

Viet-Nam and there didn't seem to be quite that much about

Korea until later on?

I had somebody that came to me the other day and told me he spoke for the conscience of America. I thought that was very interesting. I said, "I make a contribution to my church on that proposition. I have got a man up there that is working on that for me all the time. I didn't really need your advice and counsel on that subject."

[Laughter]

But he was entitled to speak for it if he wanted to, I guess. I just can't quite see how some people can feel that it's all right to have a war over here (indicating) but don't have one over here (indicating)—that is when you get down to morality, because if killing is bad here and bombing is bad on these people, then it's bad on these too.

Now, a good, a religious pacifist, that's a position that is hard to maintain. I'm incapable of doing it.

But there are honest religious pacifists, and I respect them and if they want to come up and get a hold of the Vice

President and say, "Look, I think you're a bad man and you ought not to be lending your voice to this kind of a policy", I can look at them and say, "Well, I must disagree with you, but I respect you."

But when I get somebody who comes in and says to me, "Well, I think it was all right to really let them have it over there in Europe, but I don't see how you can kill anybody over there in Viet-Nam", well, now, when they get into this business of who is to be killed, I get lost. I think it's something different than that. I don't like killing at all. I think it's tragic. I think it's--I think that the whole of our life, of our nation ought to be dedicated to ways to find out how to stop it. That is what a civilized man is for.

All right, this gentleman [indicating].

MR. HERNDON J. EVANS [The Lexington Herald]:

I just wanted to comment that I think the Vice President has been very generous in his comments and has been a fine influence on this meeting. And, coming from Lexington, Kentucky, I have only one question to ask right now on this winning and losing. Do you think Abe's Hope and Cowell King can take Graustark on the 7th of May at Churchill Downs?

[Laughter]

A Well, I have a friend down there that invited me to come down, as a matter of fact. And I'd like to see you after the meeting. Any man that knows these horses that well is the man I need to talk to before I place those bets.

[Laughter]

I think I had better quit. Thank you very much. [Standing ovation]

B Section, VRVoce

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