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202/395-6930

R E M A R K S

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

WILLIAM C. FOSTER DINNER

WASHINGTON, D. C.

APRIL 3, 1969

It is a great privilege, and indeed a great personal pleasure, to participate in this dinner honoring William C. Foster, our first full-time disarmament diplomat -- our first director of the first Federal agency concerned solely with arms control and disarmament.

Having had more than a passing interest in the legislation which made these "firsts" possible -- the creation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- I have thought many times of our good fortune in President Kennedy's selection of Bill Foster as the Agency's first director.

Our late President selected a man who understood the complexities and frustrations of attempting to control the accumulation by many nations of ever-more destructive weapons.

But this was understanding born of an inner toughness, a quiet courage, which characterized Bill Foster's conduct at Geneva and in the high councils of this government.

Make no mistake: it helps little to approach the issues of arms control with a bleeding heart. Neither anger nor anguish provide answers. The subject is too important for sentimentality -- too difficult for sloppy thinking.

Clear vision is essential -- but so is a hard head.

This issue of armaments -- and how to control and curtail them -- goes to the foundation of international behavior;

-- of how the leaders of nations look at the world,

-- of how men seek to defend themselves and their vital interests in an international environment which has never been secure.

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The problem of controlling armaments is nothing less than the problem of achieving world order -- and all that obstructs the establishment of a universal system for the peaceful settlement of conflict.

We know there are many kinds and levels of arms control problems. We know there is more than one arms race going on in this world.

But we know, too, that there is one arms race which overhangs and overshadows all the others: the strategic nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

We are, and we have been since the Soviet Union's initial rejection of the Baruch Plan, reluctant participants in this arms race.

But we have done what we had to do: we have stayed ahead in the race we tried very hard to avoid. We have stayed ahead not only for our own security and defense, but also because of our responsibilities and obligations to other free peoples.

But "staying ahead" in the nuclear race is a highly relative concept in the late sixties. The fundamental political fact is that both sides now possess the means to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the others.

We have kept our nuclear deterrent highly credible.

But we have kept it under lock and key -- unusable except by decision of the President of the United States.

We have surrounded it with elaborate devices to guard against accident or misunderstanding: the hot line between the White House and the Kremlin, for example, is always open.

And despite the dangers and the terrors of this arrangement -- or perhaps because of them -- the policy of deterrence has worked. It is a stark fact that there has been no nuclear war. No man, woman or child has been a victim of nuclear arms since 1945.

But in our search for a more stable international environment, the United States has done more than maintain a credible deterrent force of strategic weapons.

We have negotiated patiently and seriously -- in Geneva and New York, in Moscow and Washington -- for ways to curtail production of nuclear weapons materials, to limit the means of delivery of nuclear bombs, to end nuclear testing, to prevent another upward spiral in the accumulation of nuclear weapons.

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We have insisted only that the world be able to verify somehow that agreements made will be agreements kept.

In all of this there have been many false starts, much disappointment, and nerve-wracking frustration. And who knows this better than Bill Foster?

It stands to the great credit of the American government -- and to the skill of our tireless negotiators -- that patience with perseverance has prevailed. We have kept at the job of trying to limit and reduce arms whenever we had someone else to talk to -- a rather basic prerequisite for productive negotiations.

But patience and hard work have reaped their rewards. We have not been standing still. In fact, it is only the immensity of the problem as a whole -- and the awesome nature of strategic nuclear weaponry -- that obscures a series of dramatic achievements.

In the past eight years:

- Total disarmament has been achieved in Antarctica;
- Testing of nuclear weapons has been banned in three environments;
- The rise of atmospheric contamination has been halted;
- Outer space has been ruled out for nuclear weapons;
- Latin America has been quarantined against atomic arms;
- A curb has been placed on the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology through the non-proliferation treaty;
- Work has started on securing a second environment -- the seabed -- from encroachment by weapons of mass destruction; and
- We have offered to move toward regional arms control in Europe;
- We are seeking to negotiate a program of Regional Arms Control in the Middle East;
- In order to insure and verify the integrity of Arms Control Agreements, we have developed an elaborate and effective system of detection, inspection and surveillance;

So if an enormous job remains to be done, we are not starting from scratch. Due in large measure to the man we honor this evening, impressive strides have been made.

* * *

- 4 -

We now stand at a critical moment -- a rare opportunity to break the upward spiral of strategic weaponry which has dominated U.S. - Soviet relations since the dawn of the atomic age.

We have had reason to believe for many months that the Soviet leaders are willing to begin bilateral negotiations over the control of offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Only the tragic Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia kept these talks from beginning last fall.

I have no illusions about the difficult nature of these negotiations. When responsible leaders of great nations approach their vital security interests, they do so with great caution. I know our leaders will not agree to anything that endangers our national security. And I make the same assumption about the Soviet leaders.

But I also assume that the Soviet leaders would not lightly enter into these talks with us. If that assumption is wrong, of course, all bets are off.

But we must believe, until their actions demonstrate otherwise, that the Soviets understand the compelling reasons for ending the nuclear arms spiral -- a process which is not only expensive and dangerous, but one which has become meaningless in terms of securing for either side a decisive military advantage.

We must pray that the Soviet leaders see the futility and folly of pursuing further a course which cannot possibly add either to their security or to ours, but which will instead lead all mankind closer to the brink of nuclear disaster.

It is, therefore, vitally important that we understand the urgency of beginning these bilateral talks as rapidly as possible.

I do not agree that these negotiations should await progress in settling more general political problems. The imperative of our present circumstances -- that of preventing the next round in the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched -- cannot await the solution of political disputes many years in the making, and that will be many years, if not generations, in solving.

It is especially important that prior to the negotiations we exercise great restraint in word and action on matters relating to strategic weapons.

It is primarily for this reason that I have opposed the decision to proceed with a modified deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system. I remain unconvinced that the security of our second-strike forces required such action at this time.

- 5 -

More than this, however, there remain severe questions about the efficacy of the Safeguard system in comparison to other steps which might be taken to protect our ICBMs or to strengthen our Polaris fleet -- steps which would avoid moving to the next level of nuclear weapons technology.

My concern for restraint in word and action prior to U.S. - Soviet negotiations also causes me to regret very much those statements imputing to the Soviets a commitment to achieve a first-strike capability in strategic nuclear weapons.

In a world where our Polaris fleet is constantly on station, in a world where we have proceeded very far in the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, I do not believe the Soviets could seriously delude themselves into thinking a first-strike capability was possible.

These statements, moreover, necessarily arise from a series of assumptions of long-term Soviet behavior, assumptions which by their nature can be neither proven nor disproven at this time and which remain, to say the least, a matter of considerable debate among our intelligence community.

Secretary Clark Clifford, for example, reached quite different conclusions as to the Soviet strategic posture less than three months ago. And Secretary of State Rogers clearly raised doubts about the reliability of these forecasts of a Soviet first-strike capability when he stressed the negotiability of the Safeguard system in any future arms control talks.

These forecasts of Soviet strategic intent -- statements which depart markedly from earlier U.S. pronouncements -- can only raise doubts in the Soviet mind about our strategic objectives. And we know from the past that doubt or uncertainty on either side about the strategic goals of the other has been a principal stimulus to the nuclear arms spiral.

A far more prudent course, in my opinion, would be one which avoided raising spectres of massive Soviet strategic commitments until we have determined through direct talks their actual willingness or unwillingness to decelerate the arms race. Then we will not have to speculate on such critical matters. We will know.

I trust we are wise enough to understand that within the Soviet government, as within our own, are found widely varying opinions and beliefs on the issue of strategic weapons. We must, it seems to me, be exceedingly careful not to erode through ill-considered statements or decisions the influence of those Soviet leaders who may be advocating a more rational policy of controlling the strategic arms race -- those men who now seem to favor bilateral talks with the United States. For we can never doubt the Soviet Union's capacity to propel the arms race to new and more dangerous heights if saner and more rational heads do not prevail -- just as the Soviets cannot doubt our ability to do likewise.

- 6 -

That is why our efforts must be directed toward beginning the negotiations as promptly as possible and in an atmosphere as conducive as possible to meaningful progress.

Let me also observe at this juncture: I would hope that our government would enter into these bilateral talks with a truly comprehensive proposal, one that raised all major issues for negotiation and which did not unilaterally restrict the flexibility and freedom of our negotiators.

Some people cannot conceive of the possibility that the two nuclear giants could ever reach an enforceable agreement to halt the arms race. These people may be right.

But even great powers with different values and different political and social systems share at least some areas of common interest. Manifestly the first area is a shared interest in survival.

Perhaps this does not respond to the highest ambitions of our hearts and minds. Perhaps it is no great compliment to the human race that it took nuclear weapons to teach us that lesson. But survival is an excellent place to start. It establishes the fact that the great powers today stand, in the most fundamental sense, on common ground. And from this, much that is sane and good can flow.

No doubt bilateral arms control talks with the Soviet Union will be difficult. No doubt they will take some time. More likely than not, they will have their ups and downs. But given the terrible risks to which the U.S., the Soviet Union and much of the world's populations will be exposed if the arms race proceeds unimpeded, we have the obligation -- in the most profound sense of the word -- to try.

Whatever we do has an element of risk -- Isn't it time to take some risk for peace?

* * *

In all of this there is expectation -- possibly premature but pregnant with hope for a world where the cold war is but a memory -- where arms races are behind us -- where peaceful engagement and reconciliation are the order of the day, East and West.

I think I know as well as any man just how hard it will be to get from here to there.

I know how many powerful traditions must be confined to history's junkyard -- and how much new history must be made.

- 7 -

I know, too, that with all the will and all the energy we can summon, with the clearest vision and the most creative imagination, we cannot reform relations which others do not want to reform, or which they fear to reform.

But let history record that America was not the country which denied the people of this planet a chance for survival.

Let this nation boldly take the lead in working for arms control and disarmament -- nuclear and conventional, global and regional -- for peaceful settlement of those disputes which do arise among nations - for an atmosphere in which governments can at last devote maximum energies and resources to the needs and aspirations of their own peoples.

Let future generations read and know, that in a period of danger, uncertainty and peril -- we had that extra measure of courage and character which challenged us to try.

This is the opportunity which now awaits us. I pray that we do not let it slip away. I pray that we are willing to take the risks for peace which can gradually transform the fragile balance of terror into a covenant of trust among nations.

For only as we succeed in replacing terror with trust, fear with faith, and suspicion with confidence can we expect to fashion the foundations of world order that are necessary for survival in the nuclear age.

Paul's Story on Paul Tranter

Socrates was a Greek

Socrates gave answers to the people
the people answered Socrates

000336

^{Anna} Paul's of Anna

Bill & Beulah (man electrified)

Set Rush

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Ant Gerard Smith

WILLIAM C. FOSTER DINNER

John McCloy

WASHINGTON, D.C.

APRIL 3, 1969

"Blessed on the Passover"
Passover - Shalom!

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Sumner
Phl

Be Brit!
Alan Rusk
about this
someone
entirely
of me!

Title McClay

Mr Vice President & Professor?
Both imposed Humility!
Both Hazardous! Both unapproachable

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But this was understanding born of an inner toughness, a quiet courage, which ^{has} characterized Bill Foster's conduct at Geneva and in the high councils of this government.

Make no mistake, it ^{very} helps little to approach the issues of arms control with a bleeding heart. Neither anger nor anguish provide answers. The subject is too important for sentimentality -- too difficult for sloppy thinking.

Clear vision is essential -- but so is a hard head.

strong mind +
hard head.

└ This issue of armaments -- and how to control and curtail them -- goes to the foundation of international behavior;
-- of how the leaders of nations look at the world;
-- of how men seek to defend themselves and their vital interests in an international environment which has never been secure.

└ The problem of controlling armaments is nothing less than the problem of achieving world order, and all that obstructs the establishment of a universal system for the peaceful settlement of conflict.

└ We know there are many kinds and levels of arms control problems.
└ We know there is more than one arms race going on in this world.

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↳ But we know, too, that there is one arms race which overhangs and overshadows all the others: the strategic nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

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↳ But we have done what we had to do; we have stayed ahead in the race we tried very hard to avoid. ↳ We have stayed ahead not only for our own security and defense, but also because of our responsibilities and obligations to other free peoples.

↳ But "staying ahead" in the nuclear race is a highly relative concept in the late sixties. ↳ The fundamental political fact is that both sides now possess the means to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the others.

↳ We have kept our nuclear deterrent highly credible.

But we have kept it under lock and key - unusable except by decision of the President of the United States. .

We have surrounded it with elaborate devices to guard against accident or misunderstanding: the hot line between the White House and the Kremlin, for example, is always open.

And despite the dangers and the terrors of this arrangement -- or perhaps because of them -- the policy of deterrence has worked.!

↳ It is a stark fact that there has been no nuclear war. ↳ No man, woman or child has been a victim of nuclear arms since 1945.

↳ But in our search for a more stable international environment, the United States has done more than maintain a credible deterrent force of strategic weapons.

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∠ We have insisted only that the world be able to verify somehow that agreements made will be agreements kept. !

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It stands to the great credit of the American government -- and to the skill of our tireless negotiators -- that patience with perseverance has prevailed. ∠ We have kept at the job of trying to limit and reduce arms whenever we had someone else to talk to -- a rather basic prerequisite for productive negotiations.

∠ But patience and hard work have reaped their rewards. ! (X)

∠ We have not been standing still. ∠ In fact, it is only the immensity of the problem as a whole -- and the awesome nature of strategic nuclear weaponry -- that obscures a series of dramatic achievements.

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~~and~~

- 8 -

∠ -- We have offered to move toward regional arms control in Europe.

-- We are seeking to negotiate a program of Regional Arms Control in the Middle East.

and -- In order to insure and verify the integrity of Arms Control Agreements, we have developed an elaborate and effective system of detection, inspection and surveillance.

∠ So if an enormous job remains to be done, we are not starting from scratch. ∠ Due in large measure to the man we honor this evening, impressive strides have been made.

*Churchill
Story*

* ~~the~~ *

∠ We now stand at a critical moment -- a rare opportunity to break the upward spiral of strategic weaponry which has dominated U.S. - Soviet relations since the dawn of the atomic age.

- 9 -

↳ We have had reason to believe for many months that the Soviet leaders are willing to begin bilateral negotiations over the control of ^{both} offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Only the tragic Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia kept these talks from beginning last fall.

↳ I have no illusions about the difficult nature of these negotiations. ↳ When responsible leaders of great nations approach their vital security interests, they do so with great caution. ↳ know our leaders will not agree to anything that endangers our national security. ↳ And, I make the same assumption about the Soviet leaders.

↳ But I also assume that the Soviet leaders would not lightly enter into these talks with us. If that assumption is wrong, then of course, all bets are off. 6

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But we must believe, until their actions demonstrate otherwise, that the Soviets understand the compelling reasons for ^{*slowing down*} ending the nuclear arms ^{*spiral*} ~~process~~ which is not only expensive and dangerous, but one which has become meaningless in terms of securing for either side a decisive military advantage. ○

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It is especially important that prior to the negotiations we exercise great restraint in word and action on matters relating to strategic weapons.

It is primarily for this reason that I have opposed the decision to proceed with a modified deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system. I remain unconvinced that the security of our second-strike forces required such action at this time.

- 12 -

More than this, however, there remain ^{serious} ~~severe~~ questions about the efficacy of the Safeguard system in comparison to other steps which might be taken to protect our ICBMs or to strengthen our Polaris fleet -- steps which would avoid moving to the next level of nuclear weapons technology.

My concern for restraint in word and action prior to U.S. - Soviet negotiations also causes me to regret very much those statements imputing to the Soviets a commitment to achieve a first-strike capability in strategic nuclear weapons.

In a world where our Polaris fleet is constantly on station, in a world where we have proceeded very far in the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, I do not believe the Soviets could seriously delude themselves into thinking a first-strike capability was possible.

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These statements, moreover, necessarily arise from a series of assumptions of long-term Soviet behavior, assumptions which by their nature can be neither proven nor disproven at this time and which remain, to say the least, a matter of considerable debate among our intelligence community.

Secretary Clark Clifford, for example, reached quite different conclusions as to the Soviet strategic posture less than three months ago. And Secretary of State Rogers clearly raised doubts about the reliability of these forecasts of a Soviet first-strike capability when he stressed the negotiability of the ^{ABM} Safeguard system in any future arms control talks.

These forecasts of Soviet strategic intent -- statements which depart markedly from earlier U.S. pronouncements -- can only raise doubts in the Soviet mind about our strategic objectives. And we know from the past, that doubt or uncertainty on either side about the strategic goals of the other has been a principal stimulus to the nuclear arms spiral.

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A far more prudent course, in my opinion, would be one which avoided raising spectres of massive Soviet strategic commitments until we have determined through direct talks their actual willingness or unwillingness to decelerate the arms race. Then we will not have to speculate on such critical matters. We will know.

And I trust we are wise enough to understand that within the Soviet government, as within our own, are found widely varying opinions and beliefs on the issue of strategic weapons.

We must, it seems to me, be exceedingly careful not to erode through ill-considered statements or decisions the influence of those Soviet leaders who may be advocating a more rational policy of controlling the strategic arms race -- those men who now seem to favor bilateral talks with the United States. For we ~~can~~ ^{should} never doubt the Soviet Union's capacity to propel the arms race to new and more dangerous heights, if saner and more rational heads do not prevail -- just as the Soviets cannot doubt our ability to do likewise.

-15-

That is why our efforts must be directed toward beginning
the negotiations as promptly as possible and in an atmosphere
as conducive as possible to meaningful progress.

Let me also observe at this juncture: I would hope that
our Government would enter into these bilateral talks with a
truly comprehensive proposal, one that raised all major issues
for negotiation and which did not unilaterally restrict the
flexibility and freedom of our negotiators.

Some people cannot conceive of the possibility that the two
nuclear giants could ever reach an enforceable agreement to
halt the arms race. These people may be right. *I think not.*

But even great powers with different values and different
political and social systems share at least some areas of common
interest. Manifestly the first area is a shared interest in survival.

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Perhaps this does not respond to the highest ambitions of our hearts and minds. Perhaps it is no great compliment to the human race that it took nuclear weapons to teach us that lesson. But survival is an excellent place to start. It establishes the fact that the great powers today stand, in the most fundamental sense, on common ground. And from this, much that is sane and good can flow.

No doubt bilateral arms control talks with the Soviet Union will be difficult. No doubt they will take some time. More likely than not, they will have their ups and downs. But given the terrible risks to which the U.S., the Soviet Union and much of the world's populations will be exposed if the arms race proceeds unimpeded, we have the obligation -- in the most profound sense of the word -- to try.

Whatever we do has an element of risk -- Isn't it time to take some risks for peace?

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↳ In all of this there is expectation -- possibly premature but pregnant with hope for a world where the cold war is but a memory -- where arms races are behind us -- where peaceful engagement and reconciliation are the order of the day, East and West.

↳ I think I know as well as any man just how hard it will be to get from here to there.

↳ I know how many powerful traditions must be confined to history's junkyard -- and how much new history must be made.

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↳ But let history record that America was not the country which denied the people of this planet a chance for survival. !!

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Let this nation boldly take the lead in working for arms control and disarmament -- nuclear and conventional, global and regional -- for peaceful settlement of those disputes which do arise among nations -- for an atmosphere in which governments can at last devote maximum energies and resources to the needs and aspirations of their own peoples.

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For only as we succeed in replacing terror with trust, fear with faith, and suspicion with confidence, can we expect to fashion the foundations of world order that are necessary for survival in the nuclear age.

OK

REMARKS

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

WILLIAM C. FOSTER DINNER

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Having had more than a passing interest in the legislation which made these "firsts" possible--the creation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--~~in recent~~ I ~~always~~ have thought many times of our good fortune in President Kennedy's selection of Bill Foster as the Agency's first director.

~~The business of arms control is neither dramatic~~

Our late President selected a man who understood the complexities and frustrations of attempting to control the accumulation by many nations of ever-more destructive weapons.

~~And although he understood~~ But this was understanding born characterized ~~not~~ of an inner toughness, a quiet courage, which/Bill Foster's conduct at Geneva and in the high councils of this government.

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4

~~This distinguished assemblage knows better than I the complexities and frustrations of attempting to gain control over the accumulation by many nations of ever-more destructive weapons.~~

→ The issue of armaments -- and how to control and curtail them -- goes to the foundation of international behavior;
-- of how the leaders of nations look at the world;
-- of how men seek to defend themselves and their vital interests in an international environment which has never been secure.

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Make no mistake: it helps little to approach ~~the~~ subject with a bleeding heart. Neither anger nor anguish provide answers. The subject is too important for sentimentality -- too difficult for sloppy thinking.

Clear vision is essential -- but so is a hard head. ~~And~~
~~Bill Foster surely brought both these capacities to the directorship of ACDA.~~

The problem of controlling armaments is nothing less than the problem of ^{achieving} world order -- and all that obstructs the establishment of a universal system ^{for the} peaceful settlement of conflict.

We know there are many kinds and levels of arms control problems. We know there is more than one arms race going on in this world.

But we know, too, that there is one arms race which overhangs and overshadows all the others: the strategic nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

We are, and we have been since the Soviet Union's initial rejection of the Baruch Plan, reluctant participants in this arms race.

But we have done what we had to do: we have stayed ahead in the race we tried very hard to avoid. *We have stayed ahead not only for our own security and defense, but also because of our responsibilities and obligations to other free peoples.*

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production of nuclear weapons materials, to limit the means of delivery of nuclear bombs, to end nuclear testing, to prevent another upward spiral in the accumulation of nuclear weapons.

We have insisted only that the world be able to verify somehow that agreements made will be agreements kept.

In all of this there have been many false starts, much disappointment, and nerve-wracking frustration. And who ^{knows} ~~has~~ ^{has better} survived more of this than Bill Foster?

It stands to the great credit of the American government -- and to the skill of our tireless negotiators -- that patience ^{with perseverance} ~~has~~ prevailed. We have kept at the job of trying to limit and reduce ^{whenever} ~~as often as~~ we had someone else to talk to -- a rather basic prerequisite for productive negotiations.

But patience and hard work have reaped their rewards.

We have not been standing still. In fact, it is only the immensity

of the problem as a whole -- and the awesome nature of strategic nuclear weaponry -- that obscures a series of dramatic achievements.

(Chuck)

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-- ~~The continent of South America~~ *-- Latin America* has been quarantined

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-- A curb has been placed on the spread of nuclear weapons *and* through the non-proliferation treaty;

-- Work has started on securing a second environment --

Nuclear weapons technology

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We now stand at a critical point in this process -- a rare opportunity moment when we have the chance to break the upward spiral of strategic weaponry which has dominated U.S. - Soviet relations since the dawn of the atomic age.

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intervention in Czechoslovakia kept these talks from beginning last fall.

I have no illusions about the difficult nature of these negotiations. When ^{responsible} ~~sober~~ leaders of great nations approach their vital security interests, they do so with great caution. I know our ~~own~~ leaders will not agree to anything that ^{endangers} ~~is to the disadvantage~~ of our national security. And I make the same assumption about the Soviet leaders.

But I also assume that the Soviet leaders ^{would not lightly} ~~have not agreed~~ ~~lightly~~ to enter into these talks with us. If that assumption is wrong, of course, all bets are off.

^{But} We must believe, until their actions demonstrate otherwise, that the Soviets understand the compelling reasons for ending the nuclear arms spiral -- a process which is not only expensive and dangerous, but one which has become meaningless in terms

of securing for either side a decisive military advantage.

(We must pray that the Soviet leaders ~~now~~ see the futility and folly of pursuing further a course which cannot possibly *lead all mankind closer to the brink of nuclear disaster.* add either to their security or to ours, *but which will instead*)

It is, therefore, vitally important that we understand the urgency of beginning these bilateral talks as rapidly as possible.

✓ I do not agree that these negotiations should await progress in settling more general political problems. The imperative of our present circumstances -- that of preventing the next round in the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched -- cannot await the solution of political disputes many years in the making, and that will be many years, if not generations, in solving.

It is especially important that prior to the negotiations we exercise great restraint in word and action on matters relating to

strategic weapons.

It is primarily for this reason that I have opposed the decision to proceed with a modified deployment of the ~~mini~~ anti-ballistic missile system. I remain unconvinced that the security of our second-strike forces required ~~this~~ ^{such} action at this time. { More than this, however, there remain severe questions about the efficacy of the Safeguard system in comparison ~~with~~ to other steps which might be taken to protect our ICBMs or to ~~strengthen~~ strengthen our Polaris fleet,--steps which would ~~not involve moving~~ avoid moving to the next level of nuclear weapons technology.

My concern for restraint in word and action prior to U.S.-Soviet ~~arms control~~ negotiations also causes me to regret very much ~~those~~ ^{these} recent Department of Defense statements imputing to the Soviets ~~remain~~ a ~~commitment~~ commitment to achieve a first-strike capability in strategic ~~nuclear~~ nuclear weapons.

→ These statements ^{moreover,} necessarily arise from a series of assumptions of long-term Soviet behavior, assumptions which ~~are unproven~~ ^{nature} by their ~~nature~~ can be neither ^{proven} ~~proven~~ nor disproven ^{at this time} and ~~assumptions~~ which remain, to say the least, a matter of considerable debate among our intelligence community.

Secretary Clark Clifford, for example, reached quite different conclusions as to the Soviet ~~strategic~~ strategic posture less than three months ago. And Secretary of State Rogers clearly ^{raised doubts} ~~questioned~~ ^{about the reliability} the ~~markedly~~ ^{of a Soviet first-strike capability} certainty of the Department of Defense forecasts

when he stressed the negotiability of the Safeguard system ^{in any future} ~~once~~ arms control ^{talks.} ~~negotiations were under way.~~

These forecasts *Strategic*
~~Public~~ *of Soviet intent - -*
~~Such public statements by high-ranking officials of~~

~~the Administration~~--statements which depart markedly from earlier U.S. pronouncements--can only raise doubts in the Soviet mind about our strategic objectives. And we know from the past that doubt or uncertainty on either side about the strategic goals of the other has been a principal stimulus to the nuclear arms spiral.

A far more prudent course, in my opinion, would be one which avoided raising ~~such~~ spectres of massive Soviet strategic commitments until we have determined through direct talks their actual willingness or unwillingness to decelerate the arms race. Then we will not have to speculate ^{on such critical matters} ~~We~~ will know.

I trust we are wise enough to understand that within the Soviet government, as within our own, are found widely varying opinions and beliefs on the ^{issue} ~~question~~ of strategic ^{weapons} ~~posture~~. We must, it seems to me, be exceedingly careful not to erode through ill-considered statements or decisions the influence of those Soviet leaders who ^{may be} ~~are~~ advocating a more rational policy of controlling the strategic arms race, ^{seem to} those men who now favor bilateral talks the United States. For we can never doubt the Soviet Union's capacity to propel the arms race to new and more dangerous heights if saner and more rational heads do not prevail -- just as the

Soviets cannot doubt our ability to do likewise.

That is why our ~~policies~~^{efforts} must be directed toward beginning

the negotiations as promptly as possible and in an atmosphere as conducive as possible to meaningful progress.

Some people cannot conceive of the possibility that the two nuclear giants could ever reach an enforceable agreement to halt the arms race. These people may be right.

But even great powers with different values and different political and social systems share at least some areas of common interest. Manifestly the first ^{area} is a shared interest in survival.

Perhaps this does not respond to the highest ambitions of our hearts and minds. Perhaps it is no great compliment to the human race that it took nuclear weapons to teach us that lesson.

But survival is an excellent place to start. It establishes the fact that the great powers today stand, in the most fundamental

Let me also observe at this juncture: I would hope that our government would enter into these bilateral talks with a truly comprehensive proposal, one that raises all major issues for negotiation and which did not unilaterally restrict the flexibility and freedom of our negotiators.

sense, on common ground. And from this, *much that is done and good* a lot can flow.

No doubt bilateral arms control talks with the Soviet Union will be difficult. No doubt they will take some time. More likely than not, they will have their ups and downs. But given the terrible risks to which the U. S., the Soviet Union and much of the world's population will be exposed if the arms race proceeds unimpeded, we have the obligation -- in the most profound sense

of the word -- to try.

Whatever we do has an element of Risk - isn't it time to take some Risk for peace?
* * *

[In all of this there is expectation -- possibly premature

but pregnant with hope for a world where the cold war is but a

memory -- where arms races are *behind us* ~~bygone happenings~~ -- where

engagement and reconciliation *all* is the order of the day, East and West.

I think I know as well as any man just how hard it will be to get from here to there.

I know how many powerful traditions must be confined to history's junkyard -- and how much new history must be made.

I know, too, that with all the will and all the energy we can summon, with the clearest vision and the most creative imagination, we cannot reform relations which others do not want to reform, or which they fear to reform.

But let history record that ^{Cleveland} ~~this nation~~ ^{Columbus} was not the one which denied the people of this planet a chance for survival.

Let this nation boldly take the lead in working for arms control and disarmament -- nuclear and conventional, global and regional -- for peaceful settlement of those disputes which do arise among nations -- for an atmosphere in which governments can at last devote maximum energies and resources to the needs and aspirations of their own peoples.

Let future generations read and know, that in a period of danger, uncertainty and peril - we had that extra measure of courage and character which challenged us to try.

This is the opportunity which now awaits us. I pray that we do not let it slip away. I pray that we are willing to take the risks for peace which can gradually transform the fragile balance of terror into a covenant of trust among nations.

For only as we succeed in replacing terror with trust, *faith with*
faith, and suspicion with confidence
can we expect to fashion the foundations of world order that are necessary for survival in the nuclear age.

#

21

This distinguished assemblage knows better than I the complexities of and frustrations in attempting to gain control over the accumulation by many nations of ~~the~~ ever-more destructive weapons ^{of war.} ~~of destruction.~~

The issue of armaments--and how to control and curtail them-- goes to the foundation of international behavior--of how the leaders of nations look at the world--of how men seek to defend themselves and their vital ~~interest~~ interests in an international environment which has never been secure, ~~since nations began.~~

Make no mistake: it ^{helps little} ~~does not help~~ to approach the subject with a bleeding heart. Neither anger nor anguish provide answers. The subject is ~~too~~ too important for sentimentality--too difficult for sloppy thinking.

~~If we are going to think straight about this very tough problem,~~
~~we have to start at the right place and~~

3/

[Clear vision is essential--but so is a hard head. And Bill
surely these
Foster/brought both/capacities ~~to the directorship~~ to the directorship
of ACDA.

[*Controlling*
The problem of armaments is nothing less than the problem of
world order--and all that obstructs the establishment of a universal
system of peaceful settlement of conflict.

[We know there are many kinds and levels of arms control ~~and~~
~~of armament~~ problems. We know there is more than one arms race
going on in this world.

~~Next~~ [But we know, too, that there is one arms race which overhangs
and overshadows all the others: the *Strategic* nuclear arms race between the
Soviet Union and the United States. [^{we} We are, and/have been ~~from~~ since
Soviet Union's initial rejection of the Baruch Plan,
the ~~beginning~~ reluctant participants in this arms race.

[But ~~we~~ have done what we had to do: we have stayed ahead in
the race we tried very hard to avoid.

[We have kept our nuclear deterrent highly credible.

[We have kept it under ~~lock and key~~ lock and key--~~it~~ unusable except
by decision of the President of the United States.

4/

We have surrounded it with elaborate devices to guard against accident or misunderstanding: the hot line between the White House and the Kremlin, for example, is ~~still~~ always open.

And despite the dangers ~~of~~ and the terrors of this arrangement-- or perhaps because of them--the policy of deterrence has worked. It is a stark ~~and brilliant~~ fact that there has been no nuclear war. No man, woman or child has been a victim of ~~any~~ nuclear arms since 1945.

But ~~we have done more than maintain a credible deterrent~~ in our search for a more stable international environment, *The United States has* ~~we have~~ done more than maintain a credible deterrent force of strategic weapons.

We have negotiated patiently and seriously--in Geneva and New York, in Moscow and Washington--for ~~agreed~~ ways to curtail production of nuclear weapons materials, to limit the means of delivery of nuclear bombs, to end nuclear testing, to prevent another upward spiral in the accumulation of nuclear weapons.

We have insisted only that the world be able to verify somehow that agreements ~~made~~ ^{made} will be agreements kept.

In all of this there have been many false starts, much disappointment,

5/

has survived more of this
and nerve-wracking frustration. And who knows this ~~fact~~ *fact* better
than Bill Foster?

to the skill of
~~But~~ It stands to the great credit of the American Government--
and our tireless negotiators--that patience has prevailed. We have

kept at the job of trying to limit and reduce arms as often, and for as

we had someone else to talk to -- a rather
~~long~~ as there was somebody else to talk to, with whom we might do
basic prerequisite for productive negotiations.
~~business.~~

But
Patience and hard work have reaped their rewards. We have
not been standing still. If fact, it is only the immensity
of the problem as a whole--and the awesome *nature* ~~character~~ of ~~many~~
strategic nuclear weaponry--that obscures a series of dramatic
achievements,

U.S.
the
In/seven short years since the creation of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency: ~~many~~

--Total disarmament has been achieved in Antarctica;

--Testing of nuclear weapons has been banned in three environments;

--The rise of atmospheric contamination has been halted;

--Outer space has been ruled out for nuclear weapons;

the *of South America*
--A continent has been quarantined against atomic arms;

--A curb has been placed on the ~~the~~ spread of nuclear weapons, *through the non-proliferation treaty.* *-- the secret --*

--Work has started on securing a second environment from encroachment by ~~weapons~~ weapons of mass destruction; and

--We have offered to move toward regional arms control in Europe.

So if an enormous job remains to be done, we are not starting from scratch. Due in large measure to the ~~patience and skill of~~

the man we honor this evening, impressive strides have been achieved.

note stars *stand at * * * this process -- a rare*
~~Indeed, we have now come to a critical point in history -- a~~
~~moment which offers the rare opportunity to escape from~~ *moment when we have the chance to*

~~the~~ break the upward spiral of strategic ~~weapons~~ weaponry which dominated ^{U.S.-Soviet} relations has ~~characterized our relations with the Soviet Union~~ since the dawn of the atomic age.

We have known for many months that the Soviet leaders were willing to begin bilateral negotiations over the control of offensive and defensive strategic weapons; only the tragic Soviet ^{intervention} ~~intervention~~ in Czechoslovakia kept these talks from beginning last fall.

I have no illusions about the difficult of these negotiations.

When sober leaders of great nations approach their ~~vital~~ vital security

7/

interests, they do so with great caution. I know our own leaders ^{will} ~~are~~ not

~~going to~~ agree to anything that is to the disadvantage of our national

security. And I make the same assumption about the Soviet leaders.

But I also assume that the Soviet ~~the~~ leaders have not agreed lightly to enter into these talks with us. If that ^{assumption} is wrong, of course, all bets are off.

We must believe, until ^{their} ~~by the Soviets~~ ~~their~~ actions/demonstrate ~~to the contrary~~ otherwise, that the Soviets understand the compelling reasons for

ending the nuclear arms spiral which is not only expensive and dangerous, ^{-- a process} but which ^{one has} ~~become~~ meaningless and therefore devoid of any rational ^{in terms of security for either} ~~basis from the national security of either side.~~ ^{side a decisive military advantage.}

We must pray that the Soviet leaders ^{now} ~~have come~~ to see the futility and folly of pursuing further a course which cannot ~~possibly~~ ^{either} possibly add to their security or to ours.

It is, therefore, vitally important that we understand the urgency of beginning these bilateral talks as rapidly as possible. It is especially

^{Insert A.} ^{prior to the negotiations} ~~equally~~ important that we exercise ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ ~~great~~ restraint ⁱⁿ word

It is primarily for this reason that I have opposed the decision and action on matters relating to strategic weapons. ^{In this regard,}

to proceed with a modified deployment of the

Insert A

I ~~express~~ do not agree that these ~~bilateral talks~~ negotiations should await progress in settling more general political problems. The imperative of our present circumstances--that of preventing the next round in the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched--cannot await the solution of political disputes many years in the making, and that will be many years, if not generations, in solving.

[This is also why ^{that}

8/

I regret ~~exceedingly~~ the recent statements imputing to the Soviets

statements

-- the creation of a first-strike capability -- (which rely heavily on long-range speculation and which, to say the least, SS-9 ICBM that are, to say the least, far from a certainty and

are ~~not~~ *Considerable doubt*
remain a matter of considerable disagreement among our intelligence

~~experts, spokesmen, or~~ community. Secretary Clifford, for example, reached

as to the ~~Soviet's~~ Soviet's strategic posture
considerably different conclusions ~~are reached~~ ~~are reached~~ less ~~that~~

than three months ago.

This public ~~These~~ kind of statement which departs so markedly from earlier

U.S. pronouncements can only ~~raise~~ raise doubts in the Soviet mind

about our strategic objectives. And we know from the past that

doubt ~~and~~ uncertainty on either side ~~about the~~ about the strategic

goals of the other ^{has} ~~been~~ been a principal stimulus to the arms spiral.

~~It is not~~ A far more prudent course, in my opinion, would
raising such spectres
avoided ~~such~~ of massive Soviet strategic ~~commitment~~
be one which ~~held these judgments in~~ pending the outcome
until we have determined ~~the~~ through direct talks their actual willingness
~~to the~~ ~~the bilateral talks which hopefully will begin soon.~~

to decelerate the arms race. Then we will not have to ~~speculate~~ *speculate*;

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ we will know.

~~xxx~~ I trust we are wise enough to understand that within the

Soviet government, as within our own, are found widely varying opinions

and beliefs on the ^{question} ~~issue~~ of strategic ^{posture} ~~weapons~~. We must, it seems to me, ^{through all-considered statements or decisions} be exceedingly careful not to ~~xxx~~ ^{erode} weaken the influence of those

Soviet leaders who ~~xxx~~ are advocating a more rational policy of

controlling the strategic arms race, those who ^{men} ~~support the xxxxxxxx~~ ^{beginning now}

favor talks with the United States. ~~Now is surely the time~~ ^{for} ~~for~~ bilateral negotiations ~~xxxxxx~~ the ~~offensive and defensive~~

~~for restraint, in~~ For we can never doubt ~~the~~ ^{either country's} ~~Soviet Union's~~ capacity

and more dangerous to propell the arms race to new heights if saner and more rational

heads do not prevail. ^{-- just as the Soviets cannot ~~xxx~~ doubt our}

^{ability to do likewise.}

That is why our policies must be directed toward beginning

the negotiations as promptly as possible and in ~~xxx~~ ^{atmosphere} an ~~environment~~ as ^{as possible} possible conducive/to meaningful progress.

^{But even} ~~even~~ great powers with different values and different political

and social systems share at least some areas of common interest.

Manifestly the first is a shared interest in survival.

Perhaps this does not respond to the highest ambitions of our hearts and minds. Perhaps it is no great compliment to the human race

that it took nuclear weapons to teach us that lesson. But survival

Some people cannot ~~xxx~~ ^{conceive of} the possibility that ~~the~~ ^{two} nuclear giants could reach an enforceable agreement to halt the arms race. These people may be right.

10/

is an excellent place to start. It establishes the fact that the great powers today stand, in the most fundamental sense, on common ground. And from this a lot can flow.

[No doubt bilateral arms control talks with the Soviet Union will be difficult. No doubt they will take some time. More likely not, than ~~may~~ they will have their ups and downs. But given the terrible risks to which the U.S., the Soviet Union and much of world's population will be exposed if the arms race proceeds unimpeded, we have the obligation--in the most profound sense of the word--to try.

* * * *

[In all of this there is expectation--possibly premature but pregnant with hope for a world ^{where} ~~in which~~ the cold war is but a memory--^{where} ~~in which~~ arms races are bygone things--^{where} ~~in which~~ reconciliation is the order of the day, East and West.

~~I~~ I think I know as well as any man just how hard it ~~is~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~to~~ ~~get~~ ~~from~~ ~~here~~ ~~to~~ ~~there~~. ~~xxxxx~~ will be to get from here to there.

[I know how many powerful traditions must be confined to history's junkyard--and how much new history must be made.

[I know, too, that ^{with} ~~will~~ all the will and all the energy we can

11/

summon, with the clearest vision and the most creative imagination,
which
we cannot reform relations ~~with~~/others do not want to reform, or which
they fear to reform.

But let history record that this nation ~~was not the one which~~
~~denied~~ the people of this planet ^a ~~this~~/chance for survival.

~~Let this nation~~ ^{boldly take the lead in working} ~~work everlastingly~~ for arms control and
disarmament--nuclear and conventional, global and regional--for
peaceful settlement of those disputes which do arise among the
nations--for an atmosphere in which government^s can at last ~~spare~~
devote maximum energies and resources to the needs and aspirations
of their own peoples.

This
~~that~~ is the ~~chance which~~ opportunity which now awaits us.

I pray that we do not let it slip away. I pray that we are

~~willing to take the risks for peace which our present circumstances~~
~~balance of terror into a covenant of trust among~~
~~so clearly require.~~
nations. For only as we succeed in replacing
terror with trust ~~##~~ can we expect to fashion
~~the~~ the foundations of world order that are
necessary for survival in the nuclear age.



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