

THE FOURTH ANNUAL
ADLAI E. STEVENSON LECTURE
ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Hubert H. Humphrey

April 23, 1969

Dr. Braden and President Eckley, Dr. Brookens, my friend, Paul Simon, and ladies and gentlemen of this great academic community, Illinois Wesleyan and Illinois State University. This is a memorial lecture, and I am going to try to speak in that spirit. Before I do that, may I say that I deeply regret, and I want to say this particularly to the students, that I haven't had the privilege of visiting some of your more illustrious cultural centers like the "Dugout" or the "Cage" and a few other places of interest.

While I was visiting with a prospective student at the University of Minnesota this last week where I am privileged now to be a professor, the student contemplating entering either that University or the college where I teach (McAllister), and I said by the way, what do you plan on taking? He said, "I haven't decided whether it will be the Administration Building or the Library." You know, it just seems as if my timing has been off most of my life. When I was teaching some twenty-five years ago, it was peaceful and quiet on the college campuses--the salaries were so terribly low and it was hardly worth the effort. Now I have returned to the college campus where I was led to believe that it would be a sea of tranquility in the middle of meditation, but needless to say, I think that I know why.

For those of you who think that I do not enjoy my work, I want to put it on the line; I think Dr. Brookens heard me say this tonight. When I see young people today on our college campuses, I am thrilled, I truly am. They are remarkable, they are attractive, they are alert, they are provocative, sometimes they are down-

right argumentative, but they are good. A few may not be all that you want, but that is true in every area of life. There has never been a finer generation, and I am practically in love with them--I only hope they feel a little affection towards me.

Well, I said this was a memorial lecture, and it is because we want a living memorial to a great living spirit. I am singly honored to be invited to deliver this lecture because as the son of this fine and good friend of mine has said, "I was Adlai and am his friend." I was inspired by his light and service, I was thrilled by his great intellect, and I was aroused to laughter by his wit and humor. I felt that I was constantly in the presence of a great man whenever I was privileged to be with him. So I speak tonight seriously and soberly about a great man and his great mission. His life was raw and the specter of his interest was wide and far-reaching. It would be impossible in any one presentation to even attempt to encompass the great tradition or the wide interest this man had in his life. But I shall try at least to think about a parliament for our thoughtful consideration, and we need today to do a little of our own thinking. This is not to be a headline speech--I hope this is a speech that will somehow or another go to your thinking processes and maybe to your heartline.

We honor a man tonight who, in my mind, did more than anyone else of his generation to make our nation and our people aware of the challenge and the complexities of the outside world. He knew that it was a dangerous world, but he also knew that it was a world of opportunity. Adlai E. Stevenson earned the respect of the entire world as a statesman, and he spared no personal effort in the search for man's most precious prize--peace, even if it involved considerable political risk and sacrifice, which it always does.

The search for peace is a lonely journey. Adlai was a builder, not a

destroyer. He was patient and he was persevering; and above all, he was inspiring. These are essentials for a great teacher and a great man. And he added something that is so vitally and so tremendously needed today—he added a full nature of honor and integrity and decency to the political process and to the political pattern. Yes, I guess it is fair to say according to statistical evidence he was the Teton for the Presidency. I believe that history will record that he had as much influence on this nation and this world in defeat as any man has had even in campaigning for the Presidency of the United States. Because peace was his world, his voice rang out with the billowiest sound of peace, not just the peace that was to be absence of conflict, but the peace that was building and constructing a patient and hard-enduring world. Is it any wonder that the scripture saying "blessed are the peacemakers;" it is so easy to talk of it and so difficult to make it.

Well now in Europe, and I concentrate my attention upon Europe and our relationship with it because it is a fundamental part of the strength of the free world. Adlai Stevenson is remembered as an American who fought more valiantly than any other against the excesses of the Cold War. He constantly appealed to our sense of reason rather than our passion. He was a man who never gave in to those who substituted fear for reason and hostility and anger for the patient work of diplomacy. He knew Europe, and Europe knew Adlai Stevenson; he knew its people well. And he spoke for them as he spoke for us on the subject of peace and development.

But the Europe that Adlai Stevenson knew is rapidly changing, and he would be the first if he were here today to tell us that not only has our America changed at an incredibly fast rate, but the Europe that is our partner is likewise changing and has changed. He was concerned with ending the Cold War, preventing crises,

and resolving conflicts that could lead to war. Today, we are concerned increasingly with the problems that are no longer limited exclusively to the Western half of the Continent, and that focus upon cooperation and change, as well as confrontation with hostile forces.

You see, the old hostilities that so many of us have been brought up on, are waning. Fear is no longer the cornerstone of the Western Alliance, although the recent Soviet attack on Czechoslovakia again threatens to turn back the clock to an old and dying era of military subjugation and repression. But time is not on the side of repression, ladies and gentlemen. If there is any one word that characterizes the post war period since the great war of World War II, it is the word "emancipation." Everywhere, here in America, the problems that evolve seem to be emancipated with their poverty, their fear, their confusion, their powerlessness, and throughout the whole world every continent, regardless of the political system, people strike out at the shackles that bind them and hold them to seek a greater freedom--the emancipation. This is the fact of the last third and the last half of the 20th Century.

Now we know there is unprecedented economic strength in Western Europe and prospects for economic growth in Eastern Europe. In recent years, there have been exchanges of ideas and technologies between West and East that were almost unknown a few years ago. Oh, how we used to be able to arouse the audience about speeches, about Communism, a danger of the East to the West, and quietly and almost without observation things have been changing.

Europeans, whatever their nationalities, are expressing hopes of a new and undivided continent--a commonwealth embracing all of Europe. This is what the young men and women at these great colleges and universities are going to be dealing

with and thinking within the next twenty-five or thirty years. Not the Europe that we knew before World War II or immediately thereafter upon many of our present policies are based and therefore are, too, with the times, but a new Europe and indeed very much a new world. This is why true statesmanship today calls for a complete reassessment for all our national interests. What should be our foreign policy? What composes or of what does our national security consist? This is why there are questions being asked in and out of Congress and across the face of this land. Despite the continued Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, the new growth in Europe is towards cooperation and reconciliation and there is a search for the ways to express the common desires of peoples who share the same aspirations. This is the wave of the future--whether or not the Soviets are willing to accept the inevitability of these movements.

Now as Americans, our interest in Europe is as strong as ever. Our President, President Nixon, recently reaffirmed that interest by making a timely visit to the European continent. Our chance to benefit from a new European commonwealth is rivalled only by the benefits to be derived by the European nations themselves. And as before, our interest begins with Western Europe--with our common interests in security, in economic growth, and in the resolution of East-West conflict.

We just recently celebrated the twentieth anniversary of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. During the last two decades, this treaty has preserved the peace in Europe. Today NATO remains the bedrock of our common security--it is in fact the only sure basis for efforts to change the pattern of confrontation on the Continent to want a peaceful engagement. And any initiatives we and our Allies may take in the direction of change will be secured by our mutual determination that

the defense of the Western Alliance is paramount and indivisible.

Now this does not mean that we resist changes, it doesn't mean that we resist the necessary developments in NATO that will either increase its effectiveness or bring our European Allies more fully into making decisions that affect the security of us all. You see, all over the world, my fellow Americans, people want to have something to say about their lives and the decisions that affect their lives, whether it is a nation in alliance with the United States or whether it is the poorest person in your neighborhood or your city or your country. For years, immediately after the war, America's power and America's economic power, its wealth, its money were the accepted plaques of the temporary seed. And all too often we were required to use power and money, the world that was devoid both in capitol and power in order to fulfill the mission of leadership. Times have changed. No longer can America lead alone, dictate, or even tell people what to do any more than any of us can any longer tell other people what to do. What is necessary now is an open society at home and abroad in which even the least of these shall have something to say about the decisions affecting one's life. So you see that foreign policy is directly related to domestic policy even to an individual policy. Now I said there have been many reforms, fortunately those reforms have improved the structure of our lives. New institutions, such as the Nuclear Planning Group, have strengthened the mutual relations among the NATO Allies. There has been a European caucus within NATO just like we have caucuses within a college or university. And there has been a desire on our European partners to procure their weapons from European sources. Don't you see how this is related even to some of the desires expressed here on the American scene. The domestic groups want their own identity; their senses are all autonomy, sometimes their own costs--

sometimes their own programs. I think we can look forward to the day in the not-too-distant future when instead of an American general being in charge of NATO as being the Commander, a European will be the Supreme Allied Commander. Just as surely as we can look forward someday at this land of ours, the leaders, the men and women becoming leaders of the highest offices of this land regardless of race, color, or creed, things are changing, and fortunately, I think, for the better.

Now millions and billions of dollars are still be devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe. And I think we should recognize that we cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better to replace it. There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat--by ourselves or our allies--from our responsibility to our own safety. This is neither a contribution to peace nor to our own welfare. This is especially true in light of the recent events in Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, the diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place. New demands by people all over the world will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful re-examination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies--regardless of the intransigence which some countries may exhibit today.

We would be literally blind to reality if we did not recognize that people everywhere, and I repeat, everywhere, are insisting on a greater allocation of their respective national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies. Military spending is a matter of international concern, and voices are being raised in country after country saying that it is time to put the breaks on--to halt the ever-rising spiro of defense expenditures in a world that is hungry and a world that is sick and has all too much suffering. So the task of statesmanship

in 1970, as I see it, the foremost task, is to de-escalate the arms race. That means to move in common agreement towards a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our respective vast military complexes. But this must be done in concert with Allies--and in negotiation with adversaires. This is the difficult process and it must be done by fellow Americans with American initiative because we are a political leader of the West; we are the world's foremost democracy. The time has arrived when the power that we have exemplified in terms of military power and economic power is not enough. It is once again absolutely essential that we assert a moral power which this nation has and we have been called upon it to do what it is possible for that power to do.

Now this last point is especially important, and it requires me to discuss a matter of pressing urgency here in America--the debate, and it will be a serious and thoughtful debate, over the so-called Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile System. I am acquainted with this system, as a former member of the National Security Council. I believe I have some acquaintance with the subject of our missile program, as the former Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Committee for the better of ten years. I have tried to put at least a part of my lifetime into this tedious and sometimes often misunderstood difficult task of trying to generate a political environment with which we could talk sensibly about the mutual deduction of both offensive and defensive weapons.

Adlai Stevenson devoted himself to bring an end to the nuclear arms race. I remember in 1956 when his was the only voice of the American scene who called for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He fought courageously against the testing of those nuclear weapons in the air. He did so even during his campaign for the Presidency when he knew it was unpopular, when he knew he had little or no support; he suffered

not only opposition, but ridicule. Ladies and gentlemen, he was proved right--and indeed seven years later the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed and his courage then inspires us today. Don't tell me that there isn't such a thing as immortality. The spirit of good men survives long after they have departed, and many of us were inspired because of his valiant, lonely life to take up the cause. My message to the young people tonight is this: there is little anything that is instant. I know that most of us when we are young are very impatient, and rightfully so. There should always be a struggle between the present and the past, but it is the patient, persevering, hard-working, everlasting using of the time that is available to you and ultimately true produces the results. The only thing I know that is instant is instant coffee, instant tea, or instant disaster. Great works require great energy and great sacrifice.

So now we are facing a great moment of decision in the search for a way out of the insanity, and I repeat insanity of the nuclear arms race. We must decide whether our first priority will be to pursue talks with the Soviet Union on checking the arms race, or to concentrate once again on the piling up of armaments that will not increase our security but may very well jeopardize that very delicate political climate that is required for these talks to succeed. There is a time in the affairs of men and that time must be seized--the right time. For the first time in the post war, my friends and fellow Americans, I really believe that there is enough mutual competence between the great super powers for the Soviet Union that permits us to at least engage in rational discussion. I want to be sure that we are the leaders in trying this. We have taken many risks in this country--risks of war, risks of alliances, risks of hating, and risks of military assistance. I believe it is time we took a risk, if you want to call it that, on a search for peace. That is

what we are talking about when we say to halt the arms race.

I have spelled out in many places my reasons for opposition for the Safeguard ABM System. Ladies and gentlemen, just because it has a new title, that doesn't change it. It used to be called sentinel, thank goodness they didn't change the first initial. Now it is called Safeguard. The advertising labels do not always change the product. An anti-ballistic missile is an anti-ballistic missile, a missile is a missile, and a nuclear warhead is just exactly that. I have spelled out my reasons for opposition: It would provide no real increase in our military security. You merely raise the level of weaponry which the other side immediately equates. You raise your defense, he raises his offense. You raise your offense, he raises his defense. You raise the method of danger. Our present policy of deterrence is based on the balance of terror, the possibility of mutual annihilation. Do you want to play with it? You see I have predicted what risk confusing our strategic and political relations with the Soviet Union, and it would command vast resources, huge expenditures, that we can ill afford to spare from our crying domestic needs--need I cite them? Hunger in the land of wealth, poverty in the land of wealth, hopelessness in the land of hope, despair in the land that is suppose to be filled with confidence.

So I raise this crucial issue now, and I shall continue to do so, because I think this is a chance of a lifetime for us to turn back the arms race and maybe prepare the way for broader discussions that would lead to a much more peaceful and secure world. But I also raise the issue in talking about the future of Europe because what we decide to do about this so-called Safeguard ABM System can have the most profound consequences for our relations with our NATO Allies. Did we consult them? Yes, afterwards. Is that the way you have a partnership?

To begin with, the success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Western Europe, the treaty to prohibit the expansion of nuclear technology and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations, will depend in part on what we do to control the proliferation of nuclear arms within our countries. How can you ask others who forego nuclear weaponry? Because you say it is dangerous, but you continue to pile up new and more sophisticated weaponry yourself. How can we ask others to sign away their nuclear weapons and remain indifferent to the dangers posed by our own arms race?

But more importantly, there is the whole nature of our strategic relations with Western Europe. For twenty years, our Allies have trusted our guarantee to defend them as we would defend ourselves, including the use of nuclear weapons if necessary.

But this confidence will be sorely tested if we seem to be drawing a shroud of security directly just around ourselves, leaving our Allies outside, doing so, by the way, without even the courtesy of a frank discussion with them. Indeed, as I see it, our deployment of an ABM System could undo the good work of the Nuclear Planning Group which has helped to create a feeling in Western Europe of common involvement in the problems of nuclear policy. Because nuclear policy is like a death policy, we take it so for granted. Let me assure this audience that there is no shortage of nuclear power, the possibilities of nuclear destruction are beyond your comprehension. Overkill is the only word that can describe it, both on our part and the Soviets.

Our NATO Allies remember all too well the years following the First World War, when we retreated from the Continent and attempted to build a Fortress America. I submit that we must give them no reason to believe that we will repeat that mis-

take once again.

We must not permit these fears to continue. We must reassure our Allies of our concern--our vital concern--for their security. NATO represents only one aspect of our involvement with our Western European Allies. Let me move that from the field of weaponry to the other things that may be just a little less emotional but every bit as fundamental, there is a growing importance of our economic relations with the Continent. I think we have to accept that changes have taken place there. Many Europeans today are disturbed by the growth of American economic power on the Continent, and it has been referred to as the "American Challenge."

Now this concern is real, but I think it is unnecessary. It is largely a legacy of a time when the United States did indeed stand as the great and wonderfully great power, impose particular views on Western Europe concerning the proper approach to European unity and even the development of economic institutions like the Common Market. We were so willing to tell them how to do it, but my friends, those days are over. Institutions will be created by themselves.

The economic strength of Europe and the ability of those nations to plot their own course to the future are undisputed. Yet there remains the task of allaying fears in Europe of our economic involvement, of our economic domination, and to assure our Allies that we are there economically as partners, not as exploiters. We are there for the common purpose, and a common goal.

This common purpose is the development of a European commonwealth in which individual nations will be able to deal with us in many ways and in ways that are as much of their own making and direction as our own. I happen to believe that we in the United States have only to be clear, both to them and to ourselves,

that our sole aim is cooperation--not domination or control. Indeed, American economic domination of Europe, or any part of it, would not be in their interest or ours.

But at the same time we should not forego pursuit of real areas of common concern. There are so many things we can do together: we can explore space together, we can enjoy technological programs together, we can help develop new markets together, we can see the development of communication grids and communication satellites together, and computer facilities. We can join together in efforts to meet our common and difficult problems of urban decay, of air and water pollution, and the depletion of resources. My fellow Americans, the Europeans have something to teach us when it comes to conservation, when it comes to urban lighting.

There are other areas in which we share with Western Europe responsibility for meeting difficult problems. There is the steadily worsening crisis which all too often goes unnoticed by the general public but which would be resulted in catastrophe--it is known as the international monetary crisis.

Yet we must be clear on our intent: that the United States, with our Western European Allies and other nations such as Sweden and Japan, has a fundamental responsibility for the health of the entire international monetary system. Now I know these are facts which are definitely resided in graduate courses and economics. Ladies and gentlemen, domestic inflation is one serious problem, and international monetary crisis has the same dimension of capacity on the economic scene as a nuclear war. We must not permit it to happen. It simply is not acceptable to rock along from crisis to crisis, hoping that the worst can be avoided, and this brings me to the greatest of all tasks which, I think, faces the

Atlantic Partnership, not of Europe standing alone, not of America standing alone, not a European commonwealth on its own and an American fortress on its own, but an Atlantic partnership and our responsibilities in the family of man. If you love it, hope for it.

Pope John the 23rd said it well in his encyclical *MATER ET MAGISTRA*, and here's the way he put it:

" . . . given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

He said it another way when he said, "where there is constant war, there is no peace." The greatest threat to world peace then today is the growing inequities. The glaring economic and social inequality at home and abroad--this is the center of unrest here. The great wealth that so many of us have, the prosperity that so many of us enjoy, and the abject poverty that is the lot of at least one-sixth or one-seventh of our population. It's the glaring differences that sharpen the picture--the same is true on the world-wide scene.

And so I say we above all, nations that are rich, fortunate, just like people who are rich and fortunate, bear a special obligation to those who live in glaring economic and social inequality. Our peace is threatened, and theirs is lost.

Our obligation to help the so-called "third world," or here at home our obligation to help that other American, that poor American, often times that Black American, is, of course, in our self-interest for all of us. It is not soft-headed, or just soft-hearted, but it is an investment in the stability of peace of vast areas. More importantly, if it isn't old-fashioned to say it, it is a moral obligation--the very obligation that Pope John spoke of.

We have that moral obligation both as a nation and as a people--because of who we are and where we came from, of the teachings of our entire civilization--to help all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and dignity which is our own objective.

So these are the objectives and the areas of cooperation and mutual concern that we share here at home and that we can share with our Allies, but we must never forget that the Continent of Europe continues to be unnaturally divided--just as when a nation is divided, it is still with unrest and danger. So when a Continent is divided, it is still with danger and unrest. Now that concept of a unified Europe is far older than the artificial barriers that were built between East and West following the Second World War. Europe is a family longing deep in its heart the coming together. As we face the problems of providing security for Western Europe, and as we encourage the economic growth of these nations, we must never lose sight of our principal goal: to see the barriers removed and development begun of a commonwealth embracing all European nations. You see, my friends, I even believe that all Americans really want to come together. There is a family, but of what race? The human race. While there are voices crying out here and abroad for separatism, voices of a demigod and voices of extremists at home and abroad, individually and as nations--really, the heart of it all is that they greatly want to come together. That is why we are trying to build here at home, painful and difficult as it is, and as your children put it so beautifully, "one nation, indivisible under God, with liberty and justice for all." This same yearning of oneness, this same yearning is to be found not only here but it is found elsewhere. I want to see the policies of this country directed at home and abroad trying to remove the barriers, those artificial barriers that keep people apart. Now there are specific

steps that we can now take to help make that European commonwealth closer and a reality.

First, we must recognize and help assure the legitimate security needs of all the nations in Europe. All of them, because without this, there can be no progress away from sterile and dangerous confrontation towards new engagements across old frontiers. But providing for mutual security is not enough. There must also be mutual will to see the fruits of economic and technological progress shared by all, and mutual tolerance of free exchange of ideas by all. There is the problem at home and abroad.

The Soviet actions again in Czechoslovakia have demonstrated that Moscow is not yet ready to permit the rapid development of the economic relations across the East-West frontier; nor is Moscow ready to tolerate the flow of ideas and reform of governments that will lead to improved political relations among all the nations of Europe. My dear friends we have people right here at home that are not willing to tolerate the flow of new ideas, to challenge old institutions, to accept change, and to try to mold change into a constructive pattern. But it is these improved relations among individual governments and peoples that offer the best hope here and the best hope for the eventual reunification of the Continent.

We cannot tell how long this process will take, I can only say that it will take some time. Nor can we tell all the short-run steps that will be involved, but we must try. Try. Try. Try. When there are inequities, try to remove them. When there are injustices, try to overcome them. When there is denial, try to overcome it. The current reports from Czechoslovakia are not encouraging, but the end result, I predict, will be some form of reconstituted Europe that will have the substance if not the form of a unified Continent. Of this, I have no doubt at all.

But we must not be too hasty, nor should we believe that the United States can play God, Master Supreme, play the central role in eroding these divisions between East and West. With our Allies, we must continue to exercise patience, giving the Soviets no cause to fear for their own or their Allies' security. Nor should we encourage the Soviets to believe that they can enjoy the benefits of an exclusive friendly relationship with us and an exclusive detente while they deny even the rudimentary economic, political, and cultural contacts between their European Allies and our own. You see, a partnership is just that. It can have no separate side affects and benefits.

In time, I continue to believe the Soviets will see that it is in their interest to eliminate these tensions and begin the process towards reunification. Within this context, I think that we can then move towards the day when we can solve problems posed by the continued division of Germany, a dangerous division. We can increase step by step the economic relations among all European nations. And we can begin negotiating the mutual reduction of armed forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact--when we can start once again to live in an atmosphere of some security and that is not imposed by group power.

Now this last step of the reduction of forces will be the end result of a general process that will be conducted largely by European nations, but in consultation with the United States. We can help--we can do so by indispensable guarantees of Western European security. Ultimately, the initiative must come from Europe itself.

I believe, therefore, it is time for the United States to begin talks with the Soviets on arms control; the Soviets can do so with the recognition that it will be difficult, tedious, demanding, and even dangerous. This is a matter of supreme im-

portance. But the reconciliation of the political differences in Europe cannot proceed under a Soviet threat of more invasions or of insensitive efforts to suppress militarily those changes in Eastern Europe that will be of benefit to everyone.

When these signs appear, I foresee a number of further steps that we can take to supplement the efforts which can only be made by European nations themselves. The United States can join in encouraging the wider participation of Eastern European nations in those institutions of commerce and economic development that have proved so successful in the West when the standard of living rises and the hopes for peace are decreased.

This principle could also be applied to the field of security and defense. I envision in the lifetime of most of this audience, the creation of a European Security Commission, to include members now in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the European neutrals. This Commission, which would be a security counterpart of the revitalized Economic Commission for Europe, would provide a forum for the continuing discussion of security problems as they related to strategic stability and the reduction of tensions throughout the Continent.

And these are steps we can take on our own. We should begin revising our out-dated economic and trade policies towards the Eastern European states, as and when the reduction of political tensions warrants it. Within Eastern Europe, we should encourage trade with the United States because it is through commerce which you can build a solid relationship. We should apply the Most-Favored Nation principle of all nations, we should normalize credit facilities, and renovate the existing system of export restrictions.

These are things we can do now. These are but a few of the efforts that we can undertake as our contribution to a long process of removing tensions,

reuniting, and reunifying Europe.

But we must not delude ourselves: these steps must be answered by the countries of Eastern Europe and by the Soviet Union if the Continent is one day to be restored to its rightful place. So I say we should be prepared to try and to encourage the Soviet Union to show an equal desire that the unnatural restrictions should no longer retard the development of the European commonwealth.

I see this as the future of Europe and of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union--a Europe that is at peace. This was Adlai Stevenson's dream. A Europe no longer divided--this was his hope. A Europe no longer the focus of Soviet-American rivalry--this was his dream.

It can be a continent of nations taking an active part in the world; this can be the European Commonwealth. What greater tribute can there be than the statesmanship of America and to the leader that we honor tonight. This can be the realization of Adlai Stevenson's vision of a Europe that is reconciled--at peace with itself and the wider world--a Europe which can offer us fresh hope and that man does indeed possess the wisdom and courage to survive in these perilous times. My fellow Americans, the danger that we face is the danger that comes, the passion and emotion of a world that is still among uncertainty and challenge. If ever there was a need for both a calm and steady hand and yet a creative and innovative spirit, it is now.

Leadership for America, the America of our youth, will come when we are more enlightened, when it is intellectual power that replaces sheer money power; but it is moral power that replaces military power. It does not mean the abandonment of capitol or military strength, but it means that they shall be placed in proper priority and in proper perspective.

The fact is that war is too dangerous for the temporary man. The fact is we have no alternative except to seek peace. To seek it in Southeast Asia, to seek it in the Middle East, to seek and build the cathedral of peace in every continent, to seek and strengthen the great institutions such as the United Nations, but above all to build peace in our hearts, to build peace in our homes, and to build it in our own country. The nations' foreign policy is dictated by its form of domestic policy. We are no better abroad than we are here. We would be no more a peacemaker there than we are able to maintain peace here. If we cannot reconcile the differences amongst our own people, Black and White, rich and poor, how do you think we can be of any help to reconcile differences of people in far and distant lands, peoples of whom we know all too little. So I think the appeal for a departed soldier of peace, let us learn to live together in respect if not in love, in brotherhood. Let us remember that if the American nation wills to do something, we are determined to put ourselves to the task—we are a mighty force for all that is good. Our danger in the days ahead is that we may be indifferent to the troubles of others only to find that we have inherited their misfortune. This is but one little world, and if Apollo 8 taught us nothing else on that Christmas season, 1968, I think it put this world in proper perspective with the great universe that is God's creation. Here we reopen this little spinning door, beautiful as it was in the picture of the astronaut. Here we are together on that little globe with no escape. The only thing that we can do then is to decide will we live together or die together? If you don't mind my taking a position, I would like to come out and swear for the opportunity to live and to live a good life. Believe me it can be done if we have the means and the will and the inspiration which we have. Thank you very much.

REMARKS

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This evening we honor a man who did more than
 anyone else of his generation to make our nation and our
 people aware of the challenge and complexities of the outside
 world. ✓ Adlai E. Stevenson earned the respect of the entire
 world as a statesman. ~~He~~ ^{He} spared no personal effort in the
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Adlai was a builder - Patent
Preserving, and inspiring -
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Peace was his work 000496

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↳ In Europe, particularly, Adlai Stevenson is remembered as an American who fought more valiantly than any other against the excesses of the Cold War -- a man who never gave in to those who substituted fear for reason and hostility for the patient work of diplomacy. ↳ He knew Europe and its people well. ↳ And he spoke for them on the subject of peace as he spoke for us in America.

↳ But the Europe that Adlai Stevenson knew is rapidly changing. ↳ He was concerned with ending the Cold War, preventing crises, and resolving conflicts that could lead to war. ↳ Today, we are concerned increasingly with problems that are no longer limited exclusively to the Western half of the Continent, and that focus upon cooperation and change, as well as upon confrontation.

Nelson Tamm

- 3 -

The old hostilities are waning, and fear is no longer the cornerstone of the Western Alliance, although the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia again threatens to turn back the clock to an old and dying era of military subjugation and repression.

↳ There is an unprecedented economic strength in western Europe, and prospects for economic growth in the East. ↳ In recent years, there have been exchanges of ideas and technologies between West and East that were almost unknown a few years ago.

↳ And Europeans, whatever their nationalities, are expressing hopes of a new and undivided Continent -- a commonwealth of interests embracing all of Europe.

- 4 -

Despite the continued Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, the new growth in Europe is towards cooperation and reconciliation and the search for ways to express the common desires of peoples who share the same heritage and aspirations.

↳ This is the wave of the future -- whether or not the Soviets are willing to accept the inevitability of these movements.

↳ As Americans, our interest in Europe is as strong as ever, ~~and our~~ chance to benefit from a new European commonwealth is rivalled only by the benefits to be derived by the European nations themselves. ~~(But if we are to see these new and hopeful developments, and perhaps take part in them we must meet the new problems of Europe, just as twenty years ago we met the old.~~

* * * *

- 5 -

As before, our interest begins with Western Europe -- with our common interests in security, in economic growth, and in the resolution of East-West conflict.

↳ We have recently celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. During the last two decades, this treaty has preserved the peace in Europe.

↳ Today NATO remains the bedrock of our common security, ~~and~~ ^{it is} the only sure basis for efforts to change the pattern of confrontation on the Continent. (Any initiatives we and our Allies may take in the direction of change will be secured by our mutual determination that the defense of the Western Alliance is paramount and indivisible.)

- 6 -

↳ This does not mean we should resist changes in NATO that will either increase its effectiveness or bring our European Allies more fully into the making of decisions that affect the security of us all. ↳ In recent years, there have been reforms in the structure of NATO that have given the European Allies a greater share in Alliance planning.

↳ New institutions, such as the Nuclear Planning Group, have strengthened the mutual relations among the NATO Allies, and helped our European partners to achieve a new sense of identity and purpose within the Alliance. These are all necessary and constructive steps.

↳ The development of similar methods and institutions should continue, and our Allies should be encouraged to play an even greater role in Alliance planning -- not in order to divide them from us, but to forge a new unity for our common defense.

- 7 -

~~To this end, I have long supported~~ the creation of
a European caucus within NATO for joint consultations among
the European members of the Alliance ~~and proposals~~
for the common procurement of weapons by the European Allies,
~~all are for a better alliance~~
And I look forward to the day, when it will be possible to have
a European as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. ~~all are for a better alliance~~
L Millions of men and billions of dollars are still being
devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe.
L But we cannot abandon a security system which has
worked without having something better replace it.
L There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat --
by ourselves or our Allies -- from our responsibility to our
own safety. ~~oh~~ This is especially true in light of the recent
events in Czechoslovakia.

- 8 -

Nonetheless, the diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place. New demands by people all over the world will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful reexamination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies -- regardless of the intransigence which some countries may exhibit today.

We would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that people everywhere are insisting on a greater allocation of their ~~relative~~ national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies.

The task of statesmanship in 1970 is to deescalate the arms race -- and to move in common agreement toward a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military complexes.

But, This must be done in concert with Allies -- and in
negotiation with adversaries. and ~~But~~ it must be done with
American initiative -- as the political leader of the West.

↳ This last point is especially important, and requires
me to discuss a matter of pressing urgency here in America --
the debate over the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

* * * *

↳ Adlai Stevenson devoted himself to bringing an end to
the nuclear arms race. He fought courageously against
the testing of nuclear weapons in the air, and he did so
even during his campaign for President, when he faced the
most concerted opposition and ridicule. But he was proved
right -- and his courage then inspires us today.

- 10 -

Now we are facing a great moment of decision in the search for a way out of the insanity of the nuclear arms race.

We must decide whether our first priority will be to pursue talks with the Soviet Union on checking the arms race, or to concentrate once again on the piling up of armaments that will not increase our security and ~~will only~~ ^{may} jeopardize the political climate ~~there must be~~ ^{required} for these talks to succeed.

I have spelled out my reasons for opposing the Safeguard ABM system: ~~that~~ it would provide no real increase in our military security; ~~that~~ it would risk confusing our strategic and political relations with the Soviet Union; and ~~that~~ it would command vast resources we can ill afford to spare from our domestic needs.

~~Military spending has gotten out of hand. It~~

But I raise this crucial issue now, in talking about the future of Europe, because what we decide to do about the Safeguard ABM system can have the most profound consequences for our relations with our NATO Allies.

↳ To begin with, the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Western Europe, where success is most important, will depend in part on what we and the Soviets do to control the proliferation of nuclear arms within our two countries. ↳ Over the long run, we cannot ask others to sign away their nuclear option and remain indifferent to the dangers posed by our own arms race.

- 12 -

↳ But more importantly, there is the whole nature of our strategic relations with Western Europe. ↳ For twenty years, our Allies have trusted our guarantee to defend them as we would defend ourselves, including the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. ↳ And for more than a decade, we have all known that for us to implement that guarantee could bring a Soviet nuclear attack directly against the United States.

↳ Yet almost without exception our Allies have trusted us ~~communist~~ despite efforts to discourage them. ↳ Along with us, they believe today that the defense of the Western Alliance remains indivisible.

↳ But this confidence will be sorely tested if we seem to be drawing a shroud of security directly around ourselves, leaving our Allies outside.

- 13 -

There is little merit in the argument that an American ABM system will actually increase our willingness to defend Western Europe. Rather, this system would only seem in Europe to emphasize that we in the United States believe ourselves to be self-sufficient in providing for our continental defense and the deterrence of attack, and that the Europeans are merely dependent upon our good will.

Indeed, our deployment of an ABM system could undo the good work of the Nuclear Planning Group which has helped to create a feeling in Western Europe of common involvement in problems of nuclear policy.

Our NATO Allies remember all too well the years following the First World War, when we retreated from the Continent and attempted to build a Fortress America. We must give them no reason to believe that we will repeat that mistake.

- 14 -

⌞ We must not permit these fears to continue. We must
reassure our Allies of our concern -- our vital concern --
for their security. ⌞ But we cannot do this with words, which
in the past have only seemed to confirm their anxieties. We
must do it with deeds. And the first deed must be to abandon
an ABM system that will only raise doubts in Western Europe
about our determination to consider the defense of the whole
NATO Alliance as one and indivisible.

* * *

⌞ NATO represents only one aspect of our involvement
with our Western European Allies. ⌞ There is also the growing
importance of our economic relations with the Continent.

Rad ⌞ But we must accept that the nature of these relations has
changed radically in recent years.

- 15 -

~~It is a truism that Europe is no longer ^{economically} dependent on us.~~
~~But that fact is often not comprehended in our day-to-day~~
~~commercial activities in Western Europe.~~ Many Europeans
are disturbed by the growth of American economic power on
the Continent -- what is sometimes referred to as the
"American challenge".

~~I believe that~~ this concern is real, but unnecessary. It
is largely a legacy of a time when the United States did indeed
try to impose particular views on Western Europe concerning
the proper approach to European unity and the development of
institutions like the Common Market. But those days are over.

The economic strength of Europe, and the ability of these
nations to plot their own course to the future, ~~is~~ undisputed.

Yet there remains the task of allaying fears in Europe of our
economic involvement and to reassure our Allies that we are
there economically as part of a common purpose *and Enterprise.*

- 16 -

↳ This common purpose is the development of a European
commonwealth in which individual nations will be able to deal
with us in ways that are as much of their own making and
direction as our own.

~~and I doubt that~~
~~I do not believe that the United States has anything to~~
~~fear, economically or politically, from such a European~~
~~commonwealth composed of nations that are economically~~
~~independent.~~ ↳ Our mutual cooperation is assured by the nature
and vast extent of our commercial and economic relationship.

↳ We in the United States have only to be clear, both to
them and to ourselves, that our sole aim is cooperation --
not domination or control. ↳ Indeed, American economic domination
of Europe, or any part of it, would be in no one's interest,
including our own.

But at the same time we should not forego pursuit of real areas of common concern, where cooperation will be to our mutual advantage. ~~In particular,~~ there is great scope for joint scientific and technological programs, sometimes involving American cooperation with individual European countries, and as sometimes cooperation with efforts mounted by groups of these countries, such as the Common Market.

These programs can include the exploration of space -- the development of communication grids and computer facilities -- and efforts to meet our common and difficult problems of urban decay, pollution, and depletion of resources.

- 18 -

Each of us has much to contribute to the others, and we must not lose the opportunity to do so. But in the process, we Americans must be prepared to work with European countries, or groups of them, that organize themselves according to their own lights and that no longer need nor often welcome attempts by outsiders to guide them.

There must be real equality in our relations with Western Europe. And we welcome it.

* * * *

There are at least two other areas in which we share with Western Europe responsibility for meeting difficult problems.

In the first place, there is the steadily worsening crisis in the international monetary system. There are inadequate supplies of international liquidity; and several countries share our concern with a chronically unfavorable balance of payments.

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✓ ~~I support~~ joint efforts ^{have} ^{to} already begun both the increase the supply of liquidity and to cushion the effects of difficulties in the balance of payments of various nations, But it is clear that these are only first steps toward more fundamental reform.

✓ ~~I do not want to prejudice a common solution to these problems by endorsing one or more of the proposals that have been made by economists in many different countries.~~

✓ Yet we must be clear on our intent: That the United States, with our Western European Allies and other nations such as Sweden and Japan, has a fundamental responsibility for the health of the entire international monetary system. ~~It is a responsibility that must be exercised now as never before.~~

✓ It simply is not acceptable to rock along from crisis to crisis, hoping somehow that the worst will be avoided.

- 20 -

And this brings me to the ^{greatest}~~largest~~ of all tasks which faces not only the Atlantic Partnership, but all who profess to membership in the family of man.

Pope John 23rd said it well in his encyclical MATER ET
MAGISTRA:

"...given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

↳ We, above all, who share the European heritage -- with all that it infers -- whose nations are today rich and fortunate, bear special obligation to those who live in glaring economic and social inequality.

- 21 -

Our obligation to help the so-called "third world" is, of course, in our self-interest. It is not soft-headed, or even just soft-hearted, but an investment in the stability and peace of vast areas.

↳ But it is, more importantly, a moral obligation -- the very obligation Pope John spoke of.

↳ We have a moral obligation -- because of who we are... of where we came from... of the teachings our entire civilization represents -- to help all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and dignity which is our own objective. •

* * * *

↳ These are areas of cooperation and mutual concern we share with our Allies in Western Europe.

- 22 -

↳ But we must not forget that the Continent continues to be unnaturally divided -- that the concept of a unified Europe is far older than the artificial barriers that were built between East and West following the Second World War. ↳ As we face the problems of providing security for Western Europe, and as we encourage the economic growth of these nations, we must never lose sight of our principal goal: To see the barriers removed and development begun of a commonwealth embracing all European nations.

↳ There are specific steps we can now take to help bring this vision of a European commonwealth closer to reality.

- 23 -

First, we must recognize and help assure the legitimate security needs of all nations in Europe. Without this, there can be no progress away from sterile confrontation towards new engagement across old frontiers. But providing for mutual security is not enough. There must also be mutual will to see the fruits of economic and technological progress shared by all; and mutual tolerance of the free exchange of ideas.

The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia have demonstrated that Moscow is not yet ready to permit the rapid development of economic relations across the East-West frontier; nor is Moscow ready to tolerate the flow of ideas and reform of governments that will lead to improved political relations among all the nations of Europe. But it is just these improved relations among individual governments and peoples that offer the best hope for the eventual reunification of the Continent.

- 24 -

We cannot tell how long this process will take, nor all the short-run steps that will be involved. Current reports from Czechoslovakia are not encouraging. But the end result will be some form of reconstituted Europe that will have the substance if not the form of a unified Continent. Of this I have no doubt at all.

But we must not be too hasty, or believe that we in the United States can play the central role in eroding these divisions between East and West. With our Allies, we must continue to exercise patience, giving the Soviets no cause to fear for their own or their Allies' security. Nor should we encourage the Soviets to believe that they can enjoy the benefits of an exclusive detente with us while they deny even rudimentary economic, political, and cultural contacts between their European Allies and our own.

- 25 -

∟ In time, I continue to believe the Soviets will see that it is in their interest ~~as well~~ to eliminate tensions on the Continent and begin the process towards reunification. ∟ Within that context, we can then move towards solving problems posed by the continued division of Germany. ∟ We can increase, step by step, the economic relations among all European nations. ∟ And we can begin negotiating the mutual reduction of armed forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

∟ This last step will be the end result of a general process that will be conducted largely by European nations, but in consultation with the United States. ∟ The United States can help, by continuing to preserve the indispensable guarantees of Western European security, and by conducting the closest possible consultations with our Allies during our own direct dealings with the Soviet Union.

I believe it is time for the United States to begin talks with the Soviets on arms control. This is a matter of supreme importance. But reconciliation of political differences cannot proceed under a Soviet threat of more invasions or of insensitive efforts to suppress militarily those changes in Eastern Europe that will be of benefit to everyone.

When these signs appear, I foresee a number of further steps that we can take to supplement the efforts which can only be made by European nations, themselves. The United States can join in encouraging the wider participation of Eastern European nations in those institutions of commerce and economic development that have proved so successful in the West.

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This principle could also be applied to the field of security and defense. I envision the creation of a European Security Commission, to include member nations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the European neutrals. This Commission, which would be the security counterpart of the revitalized Economic Commission for Europe, would provide a forum for the continuing discussion of security problems as they related to strategic stability and the reduction of tensions throughout the Continent.

In addition, there are steps we can take on our own. We should begin revising our outdated economic and trade policies towards the Eastern European states, as and when the reduction of political tensions warrants it. Within Eastern Europe we should encourage trade with the United States -- apply the Most-Favored Nation principle of GATT more widely -- normalize credit facilities -- and renovate the existing system of export restrictions.

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These are but a few of the efforts that the United States can undertake as our contribution to a long process of reunifying Europe -- a process that will be in the common interest of all nations, including the Soviet Union.

↳ But we must not delude ourselves: these steps must be answered by the countries of Eastern Europe and by the Soviet Union if the Continent is one day to be restored to its rightful place in the world. (I say we should be prepared to try, and to encourage the Soviet Union to show an equal desire that unnatural restrictions should no longer retard the development of the European commonwealth. •

↳ I see this to be the future of Europe and of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union -- a Europe that is at peace -- no longer divided -- no longer the focus of Soviet-American rivalry.

- 29 -

It can be a continent of nations taking an active part in the world, and the source of growing international cooperation.

↳ This can be the European Commonwealth.

This can also be the realization of Adlai Stevenson's vision of a reconciled Europe -- at peace with itself and the wider world -- a Europe which can offer us fresh hope that man does, indeed, possess the wisdom and courage to survive in these perilous times.

#

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 9

TO: Susan Davis

FROM: Ted Van Dyk



Per HHH request, I edited this. He does not need to see it further. He wants to be sure it gets back immediately for publication to whomever is waiting for it. I assured him you would indeed do it.

REMARKS
THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

THE ADLAI E. STEVENSON MEMORIAL LECTURE *SERIES*

Wesleyan
Illinois ~~State~~ University
Bloomington ~~Normal~~, Illinois
April 23, 1969

THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH

This evening we honor a man who did more than anyone else of his generation to make our nation and our people aware of the challenge and complexities of the outside world. Adlai E. Stevenson earned the respect of the entire world as a statesman who spared no personal effort in the search for peace, even if that involved considerable political risk and sacrifice.

In Europe, particularly, Adlai Stevenson is remembered as an American who fought more valiantly than any other against the excesses of the Cold War -- a man who never gave in to those who substituted fear for reason and hostility for the patient work of diplomacy. He knew Europe and its peoples well. And he spoke for them on the subject of peace as he spoke for us in America.

But the Europe that Adlai Stevenson knew is rapidly changing. He was concerned with ending the Cold War, preventing crises, and resolving conflicts that could lead to war. Today, we are concerned increasingly with problems that are no longer limited exclusively to the Western half of the Continent, and that focus upon cooperation and change, as well as upon confrontation.

The old hostilities are waning, and fear is no longer the cornerstone of the Western Alliance, although the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia again threatens to turn back the clock to an old and dying era of military subjugation and repression.

There is unprecedented economic strength in western Europe, and prospects for economic growth in the East. In recent years, there have been exchanges of ideas and of technologies between West and East that were almost unknown a few years ago.

And Europeans, whatever their nationalities, are expressing hopes of a new and undivided Continent -- a commonwealth of interests

embracing all of Europe.

Despite the continued Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, the new growth in Europe is towards cooperation and reconciliation and the search for ways to express the common desires of peoples who share the same heritage and aspirations. This is the wave of the future -- whether or not the Soviets are willing to accept the inevitability of these movements.

As Americans, our interest in Europe is as strong as ever, and our chance to benefit from a new European commonwealth is rivalled only by the benefits to be derived by the European nations themselves. But if we are to see these new and hopeful developments and perhaps take part in them, we must meet the new problems of Europe, just as twenty years ago we met the old.

* * * *

As before, our interest begins with Western Europe -- with our common interests in security, in economic growth, and in the resolution of East-West conflict.

We have recently celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. During the last two decades, this treaty has preserved the peace in Europe.

Today NATO remains the bedrock of our common security, and the only sure basis for efforts to change the pattern of confrontation on the Continent. Any initiatives we and our Allies may take in the direction of change will be secured by our mutual determination that the defense of the Western Alliance is paramount and indivisible.

This does not mean we should resist changes in NATO that will either increase its effectiveness or bring our European Allies more fully into the making of decisions that affect the security of us all. In recent years, there have been reforms in the structure of NATO that have given the European Allies a greater share in Alliance planning.

New institutions, such as the Nuclear Planning Group, have strengthened the mutual relations among the NATO Allies, and helped our European partners to achieve a new sense of identity and purpose within the Alliance. These are all necessary and constructive steps.

The development of similar methods and institutions should continue, and our Allies should be encouraged to play an even greater role in Alliance planning -- not in order to divide them from us, but to forge a new unity for our common defense.

To this end, I have long supported the creation of a European caucus within NATO for joint consultations among the European members of the Alliance. I endorse proposals for the common procurement of weapons by the European Allies. And I look forward to the day when it will be possible to have a European as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Millions of men and billions of dollars are still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe.

But we cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better replace it.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat -- by ourselves or our allies -- from our responsibility to our own safety. This is especially true in light of the recent events in Czechoslovakia.

Nonetheless, the diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place. New demands by people all over the world will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful re-examination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies -- regardless of the intransigence which some countries may exhibit today.

We would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that people everywhere are insisting on a greater allocation of their respective national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies.

The task of statesmanship in 1970 is to de-escalate the arms race -- and to move in common agreement toward a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military complexes.

This must be done in concert with Allies -- and in negotiation with adversaries. But it must be done with American initiative -- as the political leader of the West.

This last point is especially important, and requires me to discuss a matter of pressing urgency here in America -- the debate over the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

* * * *

Adlai Stevenson devoted himself to bringing an end to the nuclear arms race. He fought courageously against the testing of nuclear weapons in the air, and he did so even during his campaign for President, when he faced the most concerted opposition and ridicule. But he was proved right -- and his courage then inspires us today.

Now we are facing a great moment of decision in the search for a way out of the insanity of the nuclear arms race. We must decide whether our first priority will be to pursue talks with the Soviet Union on checking the arms race, or to concentrate once again on the piling up of armaments that will not increase our security and will only jeopardize the political climate there must be for these talks to succeed.

I have spelled out my reasons for opposing the Safeguard ABM system: that it would provide no real increase in our military security; that it would risk confusing our strategic and political relations with the Soviet Union; and that it would command vast resources we can ill afford to spare from our domestic needs.

But I raise this crucial issue now, in talking about the future of Europe, because what we decide to do about the Safeguard ABM system can have the most profound consequences for our relations with our NATO Allies.

To begin with, the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Western Europe, where success is most important, will depend in part on what we and the Soviets do to control the proliferation of nuclear arms within our two countries. Over the long run, we cannot ask others to sign away their nuclear option and remain indifferent to the dangers posed by our own arms race.

But more importantly, there is the whole nature of our strategic relations with Western Europe. For twenty years, our Allies have trusted our guarantee to defend them as we would defend ourselves, including the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. And for more than a decade, we have all known that for us to implement that guarantee could bring a Soviet nuclear attack directly against the United States.

Yet almost without exception our Allies have trusted us despite efforts to discourage them. Along with us, they believe today that the defense of the Western Alliance remains indivisible.

But this confidence will be sorely tested if we seem to be drawing a shroud of security directly around ourselves, leaving our Allies outside.

There is little merit in the argument that an American ABM system will actually increase our willingness to defend Western Europe. Rather, this system would only seem in Europe to emphasize that we in the United States believe ourselves to be self-sufficient in providing for our continental defense and the deterrence of attack, and that the Europeans are merely dependent upon our good will.

Indeed, our deployment of an ABM system could undo the good work of the Nuclear Planning Group which has helped to create a feeling in Western Europe of common involvement in problems of nuclear policy.

Our NATO Allies remember all too well the years following the First World War, when we retreated from the Continent and attempted to build a Fortress America. We must give them no reason to believe that we will repeat that mistake.

We must not permit these fears to continue. We must reassure our Allies of our concern -- our vital concern -- for their security. But we cannot do this with words, which in the past have only seemed to confirm their anxieties. We must do it with deeds. And the first deed must be to abandon an ABM system that will only raise doubts in Western Europe about our determination to consider the defense of the whole NATO Alliance as one and indivisible.

* * * *

NATO represents only one aspect of our involvement with our Western European Allies. There is also the growing importance of our economic relations with the Continent. But we must accept that the nature of these relations has changed radically in recent years.

It is a truism that Europe is no longer dependent on us. But that fact is often not comprehended in our day-to-day commercial activities in Western Europe. Many Europeans are disturbed by the growth of American economic power on the Continent -- what is sometimes referred to as the "American challenge."

I believe that this concern is real, but unnecessary. It is largely a legacy of a time when the United States did indeed try to impose particular views on Western Europe concerning the proper approach to European unity and the development of institutions like the Common Market. But those days are over.

The economic strength of Europe and the ability of these nations to plot their own course to the future are undisputed. Yet there remains the task of allaying fears in Europe of our economic involvement and to reassure our Allies that we are there economically as part of a common purpose.

This common purpose is the development of a European commonwealth in which individual nations will be able to deal with us in ways that are as much of their own making and direction as our own.

I do not believe that the United States has anything to fear, economically or politically, from such a European commonwealth composed of nations that are economically independent. Our mutual cooperation is assured by the nature and vast extent of our commercial and economic relationship.

We in the United States have only to be clear, both to them and to ourselves, that our sole aim is cooperation -- not domination or control. Indeed, American economic domination of Europe, or any part of it, would be in no one's interest, including our own.

But at the same time we should not forego pursuit of real areas of common concern, where cooperation will be to our mutual advantage. In particular, there is great scope for joint scientific and technological programs, sometimes involving American cooperation with individual European countries, and as sometimes cooperation with efforts mounted by groups of these countries, such as the Common Market.

These programs can include the exploration of space -- the development of communication grids and computer facilities -- and efforts to meet our common and difficult problems of urban decay, pollution, and depletion of resources.

Each of us has much to contribute to the others, and we must not lose the opportunity to do so. But in the process, we Americans must be prepared to work with European countries, or groups of them, that organize themselves according to their own lights and that no longer need nor often welcome attempts by outsiders to guide them.

There must be real equality in our relations with Western Europe. And we will welcome it.

* * * *

There are at least two other areas in which we share with Western Europe responsibility for meeting difficult problems. In the first place, there is the steadily worsening crisis in the international monetary system. There are inadequate supplies of international liquidity; and several countries share our concern with a chronically unfavorable balance of payments.

I support joint efforts already begun both to increase the supply of liquidity and to cushion the effects of difficulties in the balance of payments of various nations. But it is clear that these are only first steps toward more fundamental reform.

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It simply is not acceptable to rock along from crisis to crisis, hoping somehow that the worst will be avoided.

And this brings me to the largest of all tasks which faces not only the Atlantic Partnership, but all who profess to membership in the family of man.

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" . . . given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

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But we must not forget that the Continent continues to be unnaturally divided -- that the concept of a unified Europe is far older than the artificial barriers that were built between East and West following the Second World War. As we face the problems of providing security for Western Europe, and as we encourage the economic growth of these nations, we must never lose sight of our principal goal: To see the barriers removed and development begun of a commonwealth embracing all European nations.

There are specific steps we can now take to help bring this vision of a European commonwealth closer to reality.

First, we must recognize and help assure the legitimate security needs of all nations in Europe. Without this, there can be no progress away from sterile confrontation towards new engagement across old frontiers. But providing for mutual security is not enough. There must also be mutual will to see the fruits of economic and technological progress shared by all; and mutual tolerance of the free exchange of ideas.

The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia have demonstrated that Moscow is not yet ready to permit the rapid development of economic relations across the East-West frontier; nor is Moscow ready to tolerate the flow of ideas and reform of governments that will lead to improved political relations among all the nations of Europe. But it is just these improved relations among individual governments and peoples that offer the best hope for the eventual reunification of the Continent.

We cannot tell how long this process will take, nor all the short-run steps that will be involved. Current reports from Czechoslovakia

are not encouraging. But the end result will be some form of reconstituted Europe that will have the substance if not the form of a unified Continent. Of this I have no doubt at all.

But we must not be too hasty, or believe that we in the United States can play the central role in eroding these divisions between East and West. With our Allies, we must continue to exercise patience, giving the Soviets no cause to fear for their own or their Allies' security. Nor should we encourage the Soviets to believe that they can enjoy the benefits of an exclusive détente with us while they deny even rudimentary economic, political, and cultural contacts between their European Allies and our own.

(more)

In time, I continue to believe the Soviets will see that it is in their interest as well to eliminate tensions on the Continent and begin the process towards reunification. Within that context, we can then move towards solving problems posed by the continued division of Germany. We can increase step by step the economic relations among all European nations. And we can begin negotiating the mutual reduction of armed forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

This last step will be the end result of a general process that will be conducted largely by European nations, but in consultation with the United States. The United States can help, by continuing to preserve the indispensable guarantees of Western European security, and by conducting the closest possible consultations with our Allies during our own direct dealings with the Soviet Union.

I believe it is time for the United States to begin talks with the Soviets on arms control. This is a matter of supreme importance. But reconciliation of political differences cannot proceed under a Soviet threat of more invasions or of insensitive efforts to suppress militarily those changes in Eastern Europe that will be of benefit to everyone.

When these signs appear, I foresee a number of further steps that we can take to supplement the efforts which can only be made by European nations, themselves. The United States can join in encouraging the wider participation of Eastern European nations in those institutions of commerce and economic development that have proved so successful in the West.

This principle could also be applied to the field of security and defense. I envision the creation of an European Security Commission, to include member nations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the European neutrals. This Commission, which would be the security counterpart of the revitalized Economic Commission for Europe, would provide a forum for the continuing discussion of security problems as they related to strategic stability and the reduction of

tensions throughout the Continent.

In addition, there are steps we can take on our own. We should begin revising our outdated economic and trade policies towards the Eastern European states, as and when the reduction of political tensions warrants it. Within Eastern Europe we should encourage trade with the United States -- apply the Most-Favored Nation principle of GATT more widely -- normalize credit facilities -- and renovate the existing system of export restrictions.

These are but a few of the efforts that the United States can undertake as our contribution to a long process of reunifying Europe -- a process that will be in the common interest of all nations, including the Soviet Union.

But we must not delude ourselves: these steps must be answered by the countries of Eastern Europe and by the Soviet Union if the Continent is one day to be restored to its rightful place in the world. I say we should be prepared to try, and to encourage the Soviet Union to show an equal desire that unnatural restrictions should no longer retard the development of the European commonwealth.

I see this to be the future of Europe and of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union -- a Europe that is at peace -- no longer divided -- no longer the focus of Soviet-American rivalry.

It can be a continent of nations taking an active part in the world, and the source of growing international cooperation.

This can be the European Commonwealth.

This can also be the realization of Adlai Stevenson's vision of a reconciled Europe -- at peace with itself and the wider world -- a Europe which can offer us fresh hope that man does, indeed, possess the wisdom and courage to survive in these perilous times.

Draft: Adlai Stevenson Memorial Lecture
RE Hunter
2 April 1969

Here in Libertyville, in the heart of the American continent, we honor a man who did more than any ~~other~~ ^{one else member} of his generation to make our nation and our people aware of the outside world. Adlai Stevenson earned the respect of the entire world as a statesman who always sought peace and who spared no effort in that search.

In Europe, particularly, he is remembered as an American who fought more valiantly than any other against the excesses of the Cold War, and who never gave in to those who substituted fear for reason and hostility for the patient work of diplomacy. He knew Europe and its peoples well; and he spoke for them on the subject of peace as he spoke for us in America.

But the Europe that Adlai Stevenson knew is rapidly changing. He was concerned with problems of ending the Cold War, preventing crises, and resolving conflicts that could lead to war. Today, we are concerned with problems that are no longer limited exclusively to the Western half of the Continent, and that focus upon cooperation and change rather than upon confrontation.

The old hostilities are rapidly dying, and fear is no longer the cornerstone of the Western Alliance. There is unprecedented economic strength in western Europe, and ^{prospects for} ~~new~~ economic growth in the East. In recent years, there have been exchanges of ideas and of technologies between West and East that were almost unknown a few years ago. And Europeans, whatever their nationalities, are ~~expressing hopes~~ ^{expressing hopes} working ~~patiently towards the creation of a new and undivided Continent~~ ^{of interests embracing all of Europe.} --a ~~European~~ commonwealth; Only the forms of the old confrontation retain their strength; the new growth in Europe is towards cooperation and reconciliation and the search for ways to express the common desires of peoples who share the same heritage and aspirations.

As Americans, our interest in Europe is as strong as ever, and our chance to benefit from a new European commonwealth is rivalled only by the benefits to be derived by ~~all~~ ^{the} European nations ^{themselves.} But if we are to see these new and hopeful developments and perhaps take part in them, we must meet the new problems of Europe just as twenty

years ago we met the old. Then there was a problem of economic recovery, and we produced the Marshall Plan. ~~Then~~ there was a problem of security, and we helped form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was led by another great statesman of both Europe and America, Dwight D. Eisenhower. We made ^{common} trust with Western Europe; and for twenty years we have kept that trust. Now we must ^{build on} ~~see~~ that trust, ^{working towards a} ~~through to a~~ Europe that is no longer divided and no longer denied its natural development as a center of economic power and cultural worth.

As before, our interest begins with Western Europe -- with our common interests in security, in economic growth, and in the resolution of East-West conflict.

We have recently celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. During the last two decades, this treaty and the organization we built with our Allies have preserved the peace in Europe and brought us from the tensions of the Cold War to a hopeful era of détente.

I do not believe that NATO has outlived its usefulness, or that ^{Americans} ~~we~~ can yet reduce our commitment to it in terms of men and matériel. NATO remains the bedrock of our common security, and the only sure basis for efforts to change the pattern of confrontation on the Continent. NATO, indeed, provides us with confidence that any steps we and our Allies take in the direction of change will be secured by our common determination that the defense of the Western Alliance is paramount and indivisible.

~~But to say~~ This does not mean that we should resist changes in NATO that will either increase its effectiveness or bring our European Allies more fully into the making of decisions that affect the security of us all. In recent years, there have been reforms in the structure of NATO that have given the European Allies a greater share in Alliance planning. New institutions, such as the Nuclear Planning Group, have strengthened the mutual relations among the NATO Allies, and helped our European partners to achieve a new sense of identity and purpose within the Alliance.

I believe that the development of similar methods and institutions should continue, and that our ~~A~~llies should be encouraged to play an

even greater role in Alliance planning, not in order to divide them from us, but to forge a new unity for our common defense.

To this end, I have long supported the creation of a European caucus within NATO for joint consultations among the European members of the Alliance; I endorse proposals for the common procurement of weapons by the European Allies; and I look forward to the day when it will be possible to have a European as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

~~But this is not enough.~~ I also believe that NATO can serve as a focus for the development of East-West relations -- a focus that will include arrangements, mutually agreed and secured, for the eventual reduction of forces in both East and West. NATO must not be used to stifle other efforts to reduce tensions and promote reconciliation in Europe. But it must not be lost as a valuable forum for consultation and negotiation on vital security questions affecting the entire Continent.

At the present time, old questions concerning the proper means for defending Western Europe no longer have the relevance that they had during the darkest days of the Cold War. We are now searching for ways to end confrontation, not to secure it. But in the process we must still be mindful of the need for each Ally to be confident of the commitment of the rest to our common defense. Without a clear path towards changing East-West confrontation, there can be no question of unilateral troop withdrawals by any of the Western Allies; ~~nor and~~ *The United States must do nothing* ~~can we tolerate any step~~ that will decrease the confidence of our Allies in ^{our} the nuclear guarantee ~~by the United States~~ to their security. This last point is especially important, and requires me to discuss a matter of pressing urgency here in America -- the debate over the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

Adlai Stevenson devoted himself to bringing an end to the nuclear arms race. He fought courageously against the testing of nuclear weapons in the air, and did so even during his campaign for President, ^{when he faced} ~~against~~ the most concerted opposition. But he was proved right; and ^{he} has become an inspiration for us all.

Today, we are facing another great moment of decision in the search for a way out of the insanity of the nuclear age. We must decide whether our first priority will be to pursue talks with the Soviet Union on checking the arms race, or to concentrate once again on the piling up of armaments that will only decrease our security and jeopardize the political climate there must be for these talks to succeed.

The supporters of the Safeguard ABM system have presented us with a black picture of Soviet intentions towards us -- a picture that is simply unreal when held up against the long record of mutual caution and confidence that we have compiled over the past few years. We have ^{partial} a nuclear test-ban treaty; a hot-line connecting Washington and Moscow; and a treaty to end the spread of nuclear weapons. In all of these the Soviets have shown that they understand both the folly of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and the paramount need we both have to preserve mutual confidence in our security. ^{It} The arms lobby is attempting to sell the American people an anti-ballistic missile system that has rightly been characterized as a "weapons system that is looking for a purpose."

✓ This lobby has reverted to the scare tactics of an earlier time -- ~~scare~~ tactics that Adlai Stevenson faced in his effort to end the testing of nuclear weapons. ^{After long effort,} ~~It~~ prevailed then; and we shall prevail now.

^{On several occasions}
I have spelled out my reasons for opposing the Safeguard ABM system: that it would actually decrease our security; that it would risk confusing our strategic and political relations with the Soviet Union; and that it would command vast resources we can ill afford to spare from our domestic needs.

But I raise this crucial issue now, in talking about the future of Europe, because what we decide to do about the Safeguard ABM system can have the most profound consequences for our relations with our NATO Allies.

To begin with, the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Western Europe, where success is most important, will depend in part on what we and the Soviets do to control the proliferation of

nuclear arms within our two countries. We cannot ask others to sign away their nuclear option and remain indifferent to the dangers posed by our own arms race.

But more importantly, there is the whole nature of our strategic relations with Western Europe. For twenty years, our Allies have trusted our guarantee to defend them as we would defend ourselves, including the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. And for more than a decade, we have all known that for us to implement that guarantee could bring a Soviet nuclear attack directly against the United States. almost without exception
Yet/our Allies have trusted us despite efforts to discourage them; along with us, they believe today that the defense of the Western Alliance remains indivisible.

But this confidence will be sorely tested if we seem to be drawing the shroud of security directly around ourselves, leaving our Allies outside. There is little merit in the argument that an American ABM system will actually increase our willingness to defend Western Europe. Rather, this system would seem ^{in Europe to} only emphasize that we in the United States are self-sufficient in providing for our continental defense and deterrence of attack, and that the Europeans are merely dependent upon our good will. Indeed, our building an ABM system would tend to undo the good work of the Nuclear Planning Group which has helped to create a feeling in Western Europe of common involvement in problems of nuclear policy.

Our NATO Allies remember all too well the years following the First World War, when we retreated from the Continent and attempted to build a Fortress America. We must give them no reason to believe that we will repeat that mistake.

These are the political facts with which we must deal. Our European Allies have heard us debate the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from the Continent. They have witnessed our anxiety to conclude a Non-Proliferation Treaty, ^{and the troubling questions the Vietnam War has raised about our foreign} ~~And now they are watching~~ ^{commitment} decisions on an ABM system that is based upon new fears of Soviet intentions. Whether we like it or not, for the West Europeans these developments raise the awful prospect of a new period of American ^{Soviet-American antagonism and - at the same time -} isolationism.

We must not permit these fears to continue. We must reassure our Allies of our concern -- our vital concern -- for their security. But we cannot do this with words, which in the past have only seemed to confirm their anxieties. We must do it with deeds. And the first deed must be to abandon an ABM system that will only raise doubts in Western Europe about our determination to consider the defense of the whole NATO Alliance as one and indivisible.

NATO represents only one aspect of our interest in ^{being} ~~an~~ involved ~~with~~ with our West European Allies. There is also the growing importance of our economic relations with the Continent. But we must accept that the nature of these relations has changed radically in recent years. It is a truism that Europe is no longer dependent on us. But that fact is often not comprehended in our day-to-day commercial activities in Western Europe. Many Europeans are disturbed by the growth of American economic power on the Continent -- what is sometimes referred to as the "American challenge."

I believe that this concern is real, but unnecessary. It is largely a legacy of a time when the United States did indeed try to impose particular views on Western Europe concerning the proper approach to European unity and the development of institutions like the Common Market. But those days are over. The economic strength of Europe and the ability of these nations to plot their own course to the future are undisputed. Yet there remains the task of allaying fears in Europe of our economic involvement ~~and~~ to reassure our Allies that we are there economically as part of a common purpose. This common purpose is the development of a European commonwealth in which individual nations will ~~be~~ be able to deal with us in ways that are as much of their ~~own~~ making and direction as our own.

I do not believe that the United States has anything to fear, economically or politically, from such a European commonwealth ^{composed} of nations that are economically independent. Our ~~mutual~~ cooperation is assured by the nature and vast extent of our commercial and economic relationship. We in the United States have only to be clear, both to them and to ourselves, that our sole aim is this ~~coope~~ration, and that American economic domination of Europe or any part of it would be in no one's interest,

including our own.

But at the same time we should not forego pursuit of real areas of common concern, where cooperation will be to our mutual advantage. In particular, there is great scope for joint scientific and technological programs, sometimes involving American cooperation with individual European countries, ^{and} ~~as~~ sometimes cooperation with efforts mounted by groups of these countries, such as the Common Market. These programs can include the exploration of space; the development of communication grids and computer facilities; and efforts to meet our common and difficult problems of urban decay, pollution, and depletion of resources. Each of us has much to contribute to the others, and we must not lose the opportunity to do so. But in the process, we Americans must be prepared to work with European countries, or groups of them, that organize themselves according to their own lights and that no longer need nor often welcome attempts by outsiders to guide them. There is and must be real equality in our relations with Western Europe. And we welcome it.

There are at least two other areas in which we share with Western Europe responsibility for meeting difficult problems. In the first place, there is the steadily worsening crisis in the international monetary system. There ~~is the problem of~~ ^{are} inadequate supplies of international liquidity; and several countries share concern with a chronically unfavorable balance of payments.

I support joint efforts already begun both to increase the supply of liquidity and to cushion the effects of difficulties in ~~various~~ the balance of payments of various nations. But it is clear that we must do much more. I do not want to prejudice a common solution to these problems by endorsing one or more of the excellent proposals that have been made by economists in many different countries. Yet we must be clear on our intent: that the United States, with ~~four~~ Western European Allies and other nations such as Sweden and Japan, has a fundamental responsibility for the health of the entire international monetary system. It is a responsibility that must be exercised now as never before. We have succeeded in cooperating to solve other problems of vital importance; we must ~~and~~ succeed in

solving these vital problems, as well.

Finally, the United States shares with its Western European Allies a major responsibility for the economic development of countries less advanced than we are. Providing economic aid and technical assistance is one of the best efforts we can undertake, both to recognize our moral obligations in the world and to decrease the likelihood of conflict born of poverty and neglect.

I regret to say that in recent years our country's commitment of resources to this important purpose has been declining, both in absolute terms and in proportion to our gross national product. We are failing woefully to meet the ^{modest} standard for economic aid set by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development -- a mere 1% of GNP. Yet several Western European countries outstrip us in committing a proportion of their wealth to developing countries.

I believe that this is an important area in which we need to match the effort being made by these nations of Western Europe, who have followed our example of earlier years and are now setting the pace. We also have an excellent opportunity to cooperate with them by providing aid to the developing world on a multilateral basis. This can be the great Crusade of the 1970s.

I believe the United States should begin immediately to reverse the downward drift of our appropriations for foreign economic aid. We can do no less if we wish to be true to our goal of uniting the world instead of seeing it further divided.
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

These are areas of cooperation and mutual concern we share with our Allies ^{in Western Europe.} ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ But we must not forget that the Continent continues to be unnaturally divided; that the concept of a unified Europe is far older than the artificial barriers that were built between East and West following the Second World War. As we have dealt with the problems of providing security for Western Europe, and ^{as we} have encouraged the economic growth of these nations, we have never lost sight of our principal goal: to see the barriers removed and development begun of a commonwealth embracing all European nations.

I believe that we should now take new steps towards achieving that goal of a European commonwealth, ever mindful of the difficulties, but

never failing to take whatever opportunities are presented to us.

First, we must meet together the legitimate security needs of all nations in Europe. Without this, there can be no progress away from sterile confrontation towards new engagement across old frontiers. But providing for mutual security is not enough. There must also be mutual will to see the fruits of economic and technological progress shared by all; and mutual tolerance of the free exchange of ideas.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last August has demonstrated that Moscow is not yet ready to permit the rapid development of economic relations across the East-West frontier; nor is Moscow yet ready to tolerate the flow of ideas and reform of governments that will lead to improved political relations among all the nations of Europe. And it is these improved relations among individual governments and peoples that offer the best hope for the eventual reunification of the Continent.

Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there had begun a long and slow process of eroding the hostile barriers separating East from West. I believe this process will continue regardless of efforts to stop it. Improvements in communications; the demands of technological progress and sophistication; and increasing opposition throughout the world to outdated methods of suppression and control -- all these developments mean that Europe is moving inexorably away from its division into isolated compartments.

We cannot tell how long this process will take, nor all the short-run steps that will be involved. But we do know that the end result will be some form of reconstituted Europe that will have the substance if not the form of a unified Continent.

But we must not be too hasty, or believe that we in the United States can play the central role in eroding these divisions between East and West. With our Allies, we must continue to exercise patience, giving the Soviets no cause to fear for their own or their Allies' security. But at the same time, we must not encourage the Soviets to believe that they can enjoy the benefits of an exclusive détente with us while ^{they} attempting to deny even rudimentary economic, political, and cultural contacts between their European Allies and our own.

In time, I believe the Soviets will see that it is in their interest

as well to eliminate tensions on the Continent and begin the process towards reunification. Within that context, we can then move towards solving problems posed by the continued division of Germany; we can increase step by step the economic relations among all European nations; and we can begin negotiating the mutual reduction of armed forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

This last step will be the end result of a general process that will be conducted largely by European nations, pursuing their own visions of the future. But the United States can help, by continuing to preserve the indispensable guarantees of Western European security, and by conducting the closest possible consultations with our Allies during our own direct dealings with the Soviet Union.

By travelling to Western Europe, President Nixon has shown that he understands the need to consult closely with our Allies on matters of vital interest and concern to them. But this must be only the beginning. His visit must be backed by continuing contacts at all levels of government -- contacts that deal with ~~real~~ ^{real} matters of substance affecting both the long-standing problems of the Western Alliance and possible approaches to the Soviet Union. This will not be easy. But it is indispensable if we are to bring an end to the nuclear arms race and start the process of political change throughout Europe.

I believe it is time for the United States to begin talks with the Soviets on arms control. This is a matter of ~~vital~~ ^{supreme} importance to us all, as our Allies agree. But before we and our Allies proceed to other matters of interest to the Soviet Union, ^{in Europe} we must wait for signs that the Soviets are prepared to show a new tolerance towards changes within Eastern Europe -- changes that pose no threat to their security or to their relations with those nations. We must expect the Soviets to modify the unreasonable rigidity of the approach they have adopted toward their Eastern European allies since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Détente cannot proceed under the threat of more invasions or of insensitive efforts to suppress those changes that will be to the benefit of everyone.

When these signs appear, I foresee a number of specific steps that we can take to supplement the efforts which can only be made by European nations, themselves. The United States can ^{join} _L in encouraging the wider part-

icipation of Eastern European nations in those institutions of commerce and economic development that have proved so successful in the West. They already belong to the United Nations and the Economic Commission for Europe. With a broadened mandate, this Commission could play a revitalized role in

facilitating trade and economic relations across the old Continental divisions.

Aside from those institutions already spanning East and West, there are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and even the Organization for European Cooperation and Development. All these institutions could some day be broadened to provide a useful and ready framework to link more closely the economies of all European nations and to begin exploring the common economic interests of the Soviet Union and ~~the United States~~ ^{the United States -} ~~ourselves~~.

This principle could also be applied to the field of security and defense. I envision the creation of a European Security Commission, to include member nations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the European neutrals. This Commission, which would be the security counterpart of the ^{revitalized} Economic Commission for Europe, would provide a forum for the continuing discussion of security problems as they related to strategic stability and the reduction of tensions throughout the Continent. This could be a first step towards the eventual reduction of forces by both military alliances and, with the ~~ECE, Economic Commission for Europe~~ ^{would be} tangible evidence of the process of political and economic change in Europe.

In addition, there are steps that we can take on our own. I believe that we should begin revising our outdated economic and trade policies towards the Eastern European states, as and when the reduction of political tensions warrants it. Within Eastern Europe we should encourage trade with the United States; apply the Most-Favored Nation principle of GATT more widely; normalize credit facilities; and renovate the existing system of export restrictions.

These are but a few of the efforts that the United States can undertake as our contribution to a long process of reunifying Europe -- a process that will be in the common interest of all nations, including the Soviet Union. But we must not delude ourselves: these steps must be answered by the countries of Eastern Europe and by the Soviet Union if the Continent is one day to be restored to its rightful ~~xxx~~ place in the ^{world.} ~~world~~. I say we should be prepared to try, and to encourage the Soviet Union to show an equal desire that

unnatural restrictions should no longer retard the development of the European commonwealth.

I see this to be the future of Europe and of its relations with the United States ~~and the Soviet Union~~ and the Soviet Union.-- a Europe that is at peace; no longer divided; no longer the focus of Soviet-American rivalry. It can be a Continent of nations taking an active part in the world, and the source of growing international cooperation. This can be the European commonwealth.

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