


Pacific Partnership



Hubert H. Humphrey



Hubert H. Humphrey, former Vice President of the U.S., arrived in Tokyo on October 19th in the course of a twelve-day visit to Japan and Korea. Accompanied by Mrs. Humphrey, he conferred with a great many people in official life, as well as the business communities of both countries. Although the primary purpose of Mr. Humphrey's visit was to inspect Encyclopaedia Britannica's operations in both countries in his capacity as a director of EB, it was inevitable that he be repeatedly interviewed and questioned on political subjects—in particular, the matter of relations between both Japan and Korea and the U.S. For many years, date from his long service on the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Mr. Humphrey has had a strong interest in the East Asian countries. As Vice President, he performed official missions in this direction.

During this trip, the former Vice President made two major speeches in Tokyo and Seoul. In them he developed his idea of a Pacific partnership, to express the new relationship between the United States and the leading Asian nations. The speeches were given under the auspices, respectively, of the Asian Research Council in Tokyo on October 20 and the Dong-A Ilbo newspapers in Seoul on October 30, 1969. The text of both these speeches follows:

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

**A speech delivered by the Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey
at the Asian Affairs Research Council
in Tokyo on October 20, 1969**

It is a particular honor that you have asked me to speak to you on this day, when we are commemorating the second anniversary of the death of Shigeru Yoshida, the Council's distinguished first and founding President. My subject is the Japanese-American Relationship. I believe that this was a favorite theme of Mr. Yoshida's. It was one to which he devoted many many years of time and energy—as Premier during the American occupation of Japan, and later, as the co-architect of Japan's treaty and, finally, when he set the course for Japan's present prosperity during his later administration.

We knew Mr. Yoshida as an able statesman and a skilled negotiator. We Americans would be the first to admit that, at times, we must have taxed his capacity for patience and encouraged his constant aptitude for frank and sharp criticism. But we remember him best as a good friend and a firm friend. The quality that we admired most in him was his ability to take the long view of things, to see past the daily twists and turnings of single events and look steadily towards the final goals, the long-range objectives on which the peace and prosperity of nations are truly based. That ability was never needed more than it is today.

Shortly before his death, Mr. Yoshida wrote a memorable article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica on Japan's Decisive Century, the hundred years of struggle and progress that began with the Meiji Era. In his comments on Japan's role in the modern world, he continually stressed that "the basic principle of Japanese policy" was and must continue to be "the maintenance of close and cordial political and economic ties alike with Great Britain and the United States." In particular, he emphasized the cooperative relationship that exists between Japan and the United States. In Premier Yoshida's view, this relationship was "natural and entirely consistent with the mutual and abiding interests of both countries."

I would like to address myself today, then, to that key word 'abiding' in Mr. Yoshida's statement about the relations between our two countries. Too many people, on both sides of the Pacific, are taking the short view of the Japanese-American relationship. Too many people are thinking of tomorrow's abiding policy only in the narrow and often deceptive terms of today's newspaper headlines. Too many people, in both our countries, are thinking of themselves as beneficiaries or even spectators of this relationship, instead of being vital participants in this relationship.

On the Japanese side, if you will permit me an observation, I find that the normal give-and-take of business competition is often seen as a one-sided American assault on Japan's 'sacred' economic soil.

And in the political area, some Japanese critics have chosen to view a broad-based American guarantee of military protection as a device of



Former U.S. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey conferred with Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato at the latter's official residence in Tokyo on the 21 st of October.

so-called "imperialism."

Now, on the American side I find not so much what you could call hostility, as a disturbing myopia. In other words, as a people, we Americans do not see too well across the Pacific.

The American-Japanese partnership, nevertheless, has been one of the most successful and meaningful political relationships in recent history. Because it is based on mutual interest, as Premier Yoshida put it, it is worth any number of hastily drawn mutual aid pacts or area alliances or formal paper agreements. It holds within it the potential for fostering and assuring the peaceful development of the whole East Asia region. If Japan were never to contribute a single soldier to implement the present security pact, or what may follow it, the Japanese would nonetheless constitute the strongest friend the United States could have in this part of the world. This is true not merely because of your economic power and achievement, but more importantly, because of the striking abilities and energies of the Japanese people. It is true also, I think, because history has given Japan a unique ability to exert moral and political influence world-wide, if you want it, in the years ahead.

Yet despite what I have just said many Americans continue to see Japan as it was during the Occupation days. Although our newspapers

and our magazines write long stories about Japan's economic progress, most Americans, I regret to say, appreciate this only intellectually. Whereas American policy towards the countries of Europe, a culture that we seem to have understood a little better, can be, on occasion, quite intuitive, sensitive and thoughtful, we seem all too often to be dealing with Japan as if you were still the docile and spiritually confused occupied country of 25 years past.

Of course, that view of a great nation cannot help but make things more difficult. We have tended to cling to the letter of our pacts, while all too often neglecting their spirit. Now, I am sure that some of the more than 100 U.S. military installations on Japanese soil are of doubtful value. Only recently did we begin to comprehend the force and concern of Japanese public opinion on an issue like Okinawa. I might add that the United States has too many things to do and has many problems of its own at home. So it is no wonder that it is not always worldly wise on great international issues.

It has been widely written that the coming year, 1970, is a year of crisis in the American-Japanese relationship. This may be so, but if so, I believe that we have a crisis for the wrong reasons. There need be no crisis about the Security Treaty.

Thus far, it has served as a shield under which this great country has been able to build up its extraordinary economic prosperity in peace, and, frankly, able to observe with impunity the continual nuclear testing of its two large Communist neighbors.

Ultimately the Japanese must decide for themselves whether to continue this Treaty, with the relationships it implies, or to rearm themselves, with the expense and controversy this implies; or to choose for an unarmed neutrality, with the risk that this implies.

What I am saying is that the year of the Security Treaty need not in itself be the subject of 'crisis' reporting. It has become so because of other factors which have been made into crises when they deserved less. These other factors are, most obviously, the Okinawa question and the matter of trade liberalization. They really should be considered separately. But each should be considered in its true perspective.

For more than 20 years, the United States built up Okinawa as a military base, but regrettably did far too little about the political development or the ultimate future of Okinawa's million-odd population. Okinawa is a Japanese prefecture. It was inevitable that its inhabitants would insist on some kind of "reversion" to Japan. It was inevitable, too, that feeling would grow in Japan for the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and administration.

The United States military administration of Okinawa failed to

recognize or respond to this feeling. And I regret to say that the government in Washington for far too long a time chose to go along with them.

Okinawa's reversion to Japan was always a legitimate concern to the Japanese people, which no American government can or should afford to ignore. If the United States government had in the past considered Okinawa as a political as well as a military method, the intensity of this issue would not now be so great. Americans must now face the fact that the compromise reversion timetables which might have worked in 1966 or 1967, may well not work today.

We should see to it, therefore, that Okinawa is returned to Japan as soon as possible and that any agreement on security matters be negotiated promptly. This will give the American military ample time to plan the de-emphasis of the present base structure. And it will afford both countries the opportunity to work out joint arrangements for Okinawa's defense.

The economic sector is another area where short-term gains should not be allowed to obscure the vision of mutual long-term trading prosperity. Yet my strong impression is that such a tendency is a danger in Japan.

Lately the world of international trade has witnessed a flurry of communiques and counter-communicues, on the subject of protectionism, between Japan and European countries and, notably, between Japan and the United States. Now, perhaps this was inevitable. But the fact that such intergovernment power plays are out of the conference room and into the newspaper headlines does not augur well for happy mutual trading relations for the immediate future. In other words, calling each other names is no way to promote constructive trade relations.

Japan is justly nervous about the threats of protectionism that it hears from across the Pacific, in my country. But American spokesmen are equally nervous about the fence of government restrictions which sometimes hinders the investment of new foreign capital in Japan or the extension of trade.

George Ball, the former United States Under-Secretary of State, was here in Tokyo the past summer. He spoke to many of you. I think he stated this problem of trade very well. I would like to quote him:

"Today", said Mr. Ball, "the Japanese are only beginning to explore the full implications of increasing economic preeminence. You are entering a period that compels a progressive adaptation of your thinking to the evolving realities of a wholly new age. This is never easy for any great nation . . .

But economic greatness carries responsibilities that transcend the homefront-responsibilities in areas of foreign trade and foreign assistance.

"Japan has a special responsibility in view of her giant strides to a top position among the world's industrial powers. Yet in my view, Japan has not yet adjusted its thinking to the full recognition of its own strength . . . I feel it only honest to say to you that unless Japan moves more rapidly toward trade and investment liberalization it may well find the gates to world markets shutting out its products; more than that it could trigger a chain reaction of protectionism that would be disastrous not only for its own industrial growth but for the whole world economy."

I believe Mr. Ball's warning was a sound one, even though a very stern one. It is my impression, however, that there is now a trend inside the Japanese government and business circles to allow increasingly more real liberalization. I would hope that this trend continues. We are both trading countries. It is necessary for both Japan and the United States because of our great reliance upon foreign trade to insist upon an open world market place.

Here, again, it would be a pity—in fact, it would be a tragedy—if we allowed momentary irritations or restrictions to blind us to our legitimate long-range mutual goals. In other words, what appear to be problems of the moment must not deny us some vision of the better days of the future.

Therefore, it is imperative that both government and business leaders act responsibly, knowing there is the world market of expanding opportunity. There is room for your goods and ours. Our task is to keep that world market open and to do so by setting an example.

There are two other areas which continue to strain the Japanese-American relationship: Viet Nam and China. In both of these areas, the policy of the United States has hardly been free of mistakes. I suppose we grossly underestimated the difficulties of the long-term commitment we were assuming in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam. We undertook that commitment without thoroughly analyzing all its implications or adequately explaining our reasons for undertaking it. I think you should know, however, that we are determined as a government and a country to pursue a course which will end this war as rapidly as possible. And that course is now under way.

Yet our involvement there was in response to a real danger, not a fancied one. And, if one looks at the countries of Southeast Asia today, they are seen to be healthier and more self-reliant than they stood five years ago. Regional cooperation, for the first time, has become a new

and active force. Old disputes between the nations of Southeast Asia that sapped their vitality and aroused their peoples are giving way to negotiation and cooperation.

The so-called 'domino' theory that we have heard so much about may or may not have been correct; we will leave that for historians to decide. But the fact remains that aggressive Communism no longer runs rampant in Asia. It has been contested. The non-communist nations are valiantly resisting both subversion and aggression. And I have reason to believe that they have taken heart from the fact that there was a power that would stand up and resist that aggression.

In China we too long neglected the simple fact that a government controlling a vast population existed, and, because it existed, had to be recognized and negotiated with, as other governments are. There are a great many systems existing in this world which Americans do not like and would not tolerate for ourselves. Yet we must learn to live with them. Our policy towards mainland China is one of patient bridge-building in the cultural, scientific and economic areas, which we hope can lead to peaceful and normal relations with our country and all countries. I happen to believe that a policy of deliberately isolating Communist China is both self defeating and dangerous.

For we must and we should trust that, in time, the example of free institutions and the efficiency of free peoples will exert its influence by example and performance on those who must still live under totalitarian regimes.

I don't believe this a naive or a vain hope. I think we have some evidence that proves the point. For this influence is already working its way in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe that it will exert itself, ultimately, in China. I recognize that this will take time and that, of course, we may be wrong in our judgment. Yet this seems to me the most sensible course to pursue.

With all our defects, United States government policy remains essentially the creature of the democratic will—and never more than today. As the popular mood of Americans shifts and changes, the government of the people's elected representatives shifts with it. And so it should. No man in the White House can ignore the will of people. And in the case of both Viet Nam and our policy towards China, I believe that the world has been made aware of the American people's interests in finding a workable peace in Viet Nam as promptly as humanly possible—and the American people's concern for trying to build a world neighborhood in which nations, regardless of their differences—ideological, cultural or political—can at least live together in respect and self-restraint.

I cannot pretend to be an expert on Asia generally or Japan in particular, but I am quite sensitive to shifting opinions in the U.S. We Americans are now engaged in a period of debate and review about all our commitments and in particular our policy towards Asia. In this debate, the central issue before us is not whether we should turn our backs on Southeast Asia—or on other nations or peoples in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood. It is rather how we can best assess our own national interests and how carefully we can define our own goals and priorities in concert with others. It is not a question of withdrawing from a role in world affairs, but rather what kind of a role should we have.

We know that the United States is a Pacific power. We have interests there. But the United States is not in itself an Asian power. It is obvious that my country and people can reach sound decisions in relation to the nations of Asia only by a very high, intimate and continuing sensitivity to Asian views to the views of the people who live here and must live here. Whatever role we may have in Asia, therefore, must be based on a working partnership with Asian nations which would welcome our participation, and would be willing to join in a common effort, sharing responsibilities to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives—not just American objectives but objectives agreed upon in cooperation and concert with others.

The United States cannot play the role of a global policeman. The American people don't want it and the rest of the world won't accept it both of which are good. But the alternative to American peace keeping cannot be no peace keeping at all. There has to be some kind, and therefore, it must be peace keeping either by the United Nations itself or, even more likely, by regional agencies and instruments committed not merely to the defense of the areas but more positively to the steady development and reconstruction of those areas.

Selective American assistance to Asian countries and others must and will continue. But it is my view that it should continue on a basis of national self-help, or regional self-help. People must want to help themselves. Multi-lateral responsibility is the only way, as I see it, in which small and medium-sized nations can withstand the double pressure of internal subversion or direct or indirect aggression. Therefore, not only should we place high priority upon regional cooperation such as with the Asian Development Bank, for one example, and regional security organizations: but I happen to believe that my country should avoid unilateral involvement, either militarily or economically, wherever of whenever multilateral means are available.

In other words, the American policy for the future is not one of

providing a world umbrella—where everybody's business is our business or our business is everybody's business—but rather a selective interest primarily with those who are willing to protect themselves, work for themselves and engage in regional or multilateral cooperation for the purposes both of the development and security.

A total re-examination, therefore, is under way. It is long overdue and much needed. And this is why in the days ahead the relationship of the United States and Japan is so important. During this period we must learn to reason together, thinking in terms of mutual interest, rather than letting the passion or emotion of the moment—or the loudest noise of the most militant minority—determine the course of action for great peoples and great nations.

At the same time that I advocate a new international posture for the United States in Asia, I have the presumption, as your invited guest, to suggest a few thoughts to my hosts. I hope that, in the spirit of Mr. Yoshida, you will indulge my frankness.

The Japan that moves into the nineteen seventies is, as we know, a totally new kind of world power, a very unique world power—with only modest armed forces, without colonies or hinterlands or even significant raw material wealth. Devoted to free enterprise, you have still managed to retain many virtues of a national family society. You have managed and planned your business enterprises in the disciplined way that other nations have managed and organized their armies and technologies. And you have succeeded in vastly increasing your production, raising your standards of living, without forgetting the human factors on which production must be based. The world stands in admiration of your achievement. I know the American people do.

The American economist Peter Drucker, in his recent book, *The Age of Discontinuity*, noted the watchwords of those two great Japanese business pioneers of the Meiji period, Yataro Iwasaki and Eiichi Shibusawa. "Maximize profits," Mr. Iwasaki said. "Maximize talents," Mr. Shibusawa said. Both of them were right. Both of them, as Drucker said, worked not for a merely rich Japan, but for a strong and achieving Japan and the world of difference.

But Japan, as you know better than I, long ago ceased to be an island, isolated from the main stream of world events. You are a powerful force in a world needing and crying out for help and direction. You have at your doorstep the problem of what to do about the continuing political and economic rehabilitation of Southeast Asia. Quite frankly, it's my view that if there is going to be any hope of real peace or development in Southeast Asia, much of it will have to be realized because of your leadership, your cooperation and your

assistance.

You are facing the monumental task of treating with China and attempting to bring that huge and at times angry nation back into some responsible relationship with the community of nations. This is a very difficult job, and one that I suspect my country is not quite capable of meeting. It is my view that this can be one of your very greatest contributions to world peace.

You have a deep understanding of Chinese history, culture and life. We in our part of the world lack that. (And when one treats with the surface of the problems and fails to understand the whole structure of a society one seldom makes wise decisions.) So we must look to you.

I say this because Japan, not mainland China, is Asia's major power in the best sense of the word—because of your culture, your economy, your education, the strength and vitality of your people, and your government. But yours is a power not for war or aggression. You renounced that. Yours is a power for peace and cooperation. And all of Asia needs your help in the development of its physical and human resources.

Frankly, you have the resources, the talent, the leadership, the knowledge and technology to do more than has been done up to date. I believe that more than ever before in your history the Japanese people are facing outward towards new responsibilities within the international community. And throughout the world community, we must not forget that Japan's very abstention from the possession or use of nuclear weapons gives you a unique moral force. You can be a powerful peace force, and you come with a strong and mighty hand.

All of us in America, therefore, are hoping that the relationship between our two countries will be a help in assuming new responsibilities and in achieving our common goal of a peaceful and stable world order. We have so much at stake in that kind of world order. A peaceful world is our kind of world, our future, therefore, must be one of true partners, equal partners, talking frankly with each other, respecting one another, understanding each other's limitations as well as our abilities; equal partners working together in mutual respect and trust and sharing in the responsibilities of helping the peoples of Asia achieve true peace and progress.

This nation, your nation, has experienced much in these past years.

This is my hope, my dream of a new day for a better world. The 20th Century is running out on us, soon to be ended. I believe this 20th Century which has witnessed too much war, far too much trouble, deserves the best of us. Our two nations have suffered together and now have had a chance to work together. It seems to me that we can set an example that the world desperately needs. Thank you.

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

A speech delivered by
the Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey
at Citizen's Hall
on October 30, 1969
under the co-sponsorship of
Encyclopaedia Britannica (Korea) Inc.
and The Dong-A Ilbo

It is a particular pleasure for me to be here today and speak to a country and a people I admire and hold in deep affection. I came to discuss with you the Pacific Partnership, which I feel more than ever will become an essential of American foreign policy.

It is gratifying to appear under the joint auspices of Encyclopaedia Britannica and of this great newspaper which for 50 years has been a voice for freedom and independence for Korea.

I congratulate you on your coming Anniversary.

Our two nations have had a long history together or, to put it more accurately, we have packed a lot of history into the last 25 years. Our relationship has been extremely close and open. You are frank, outgoing people—and so are we. Our voices may sound different, but we talk the same language. We have both made mistakes in the course of this relationship and exchanged some harsh words, as well as congratulatory ones. This happens among the members of any family. And when an American visits Korea, he finds in many ways the warmth of a family relationship.

I speak to you today as a private citizen but also a concerned American citizen. For as an American, I am not merely a spectator of Korea's progress. I have shared in it.

This is my fourth visit to Korea. Two years ago I visited Korea as Vice President of the United States to attend the second inauguration of President Park. I was encouraged then by the progress you have made. Indeed, I was inspired by it. I helped in the beginnings of your new science and technology institute which was just dedicated this week. I saw the structure of this great city rising to the sky, growing and expanding and I found many friends.

Now, as I revisit Korea after little more than two years, I must confess I am almost astounded by the great strides and progress so evident. The city of Seoul is transformed. Where before I had seen only excavations, I now see finished highrise buildings. I can not recall any city in the world whose citizens have changed its skyline so rapidly. In the future, I think if I were asked to suggest experts for a superspeed construction job in the U.S., I might insist on Korean contractors.

But change and growth bring their own tensions and their own problems especially the staggering growth you have had here. In 1930, I believe, there were only 300,000 people in Seoul. Now there are more than 4,000,000. It is larger than Britannica's home city of Chicago. The number of your college students and universities has increased literally ten-fold since 1945. Your population has learned or relearned new crafts. Millions of your people have moved into the cities.

All this growth has brought its share of confusion and crowding. It has forced people to learn new things and think in new ways. But these are the challenges that a fast changing society faces and I'm proud to see that Korea is meeting them.

Your customs are changing, because they have to change. And it is your

job to see that what is good abides but what is not essential disappears. Korea is unique among world's developing countries in having had an extremely high standard of culture on the other hand, yet having suffered from an efficient but peculiar crippling form of colonialism on the other. That colonialism is long dead. I think you should know that in Japan today I found a tremendous respect for Korea's new achievements and an active interest in them. I hope, I know that the emerging cooperation between Korea and Japan can triumph over past scars and memories of injustices. Of course, I know you will remember in any case, that although Hideyoshi won the first battle Admiral Yi won the last.

Consider two Korean cities within a few miles of each other, Ulsan and Kyongju. They are classic contrasts. In one, you look forward in creating a massive new industry—steel, petro-chemicals and the like. In the other you look back to respect the traditions of many centuries past. Few cities in the world can equal the history which inheres in Kyongju's delicate eighth century temples and great stone monuments.

No country can live without the mixture of new abilities and old traditions which these two cities signify. I am glad that you express them so well here. For the present projects the past, but proceeds from it. And both build the future. For in the near future, your amazing growth will speed its benefits everywhere.

The late President John F. Kennedy liked to use the phrase "a rising tide lifts all the boats." As a maritime country—and incidentally a country with some of the highest tides in the world—you Koreans can appreciate the truth of this comment. The burdens of building any new economy are heavy. The cost in new buildings and new highways may seem excessive, but if we take the long view, we see in history how such benefits are distributed to all the people of a country.

Your tradition of democracy in Korea has roots deep in your history—the democracy of the village, of the soldier, and of a homogeneous people that lives together. It is no easy task to take these roots and make them flower into a new democracy, where guarantees which have been taught in the west for centuries must be learned in new forms and under new pressures. These forms will be in some ways distinctively Korean ones, for while you build the future you must not break faith with your country's distinguished past.

But it is heartening to see that the Korean people do understand democracy. They are insisting on such basic rights as free speech and a free press—and it is heartening to find that there is growing respect for such rights.

It is equally encouraging to see that the determination of the Korean people to secure for themselves the blessings of education. Your investments in all forms of education—from elementary schools to your great universities and institutes of science and technology—will pay rich dividends in a more prosperous, happier, and free Korea. It is education that gives your country

strength and wealth.

In the U.S. we are still going through the fires of change and growth. We have much in common with you. I would like to talk today about our common associations, our common partnership and the American view of an Asian policy, as one American sees it.

The makers of American foreign policy must now think of Asia with a long view. We must see Asia through the eyes of a developer, a planner, above all a partner. And we must look on the countries of East Asia not as self-contained sealed-off compartments, but as parts of a developing unit—a changing, growing region, but a region. From Japan in the north to Indonesia in the south, there is a chain of free countries, whose people are most actively engaged in promoting and achieving growth. The so-called revolution of rising expectations is not some far-off vision. It is here and now—and no one knows this better than the people of Korea.

Now there are two elements of basic importance to the man or the country who plans for the future: development and security. I put development first, because it deserves first priority. The most important weapon any country possesses in its arsenal are the weapons of peace—education, rising technology, new industry—and above all the will to grow and to increase one's own portion of the world's goods—and to share that portion with others. So development comes first. There are some Americans who put security first and then forget about development. That is wrong. The United States is not a world policeman. No American government, no American army alone can make a people secure, unless that people can develop an inner national strength, a strong economy, and a consciousness of who they are and where they want to go. Outside help to be effective must be based on self-help.

American policy for the future should be one of selective help, where help can be used and built upon. It should be on a regional basis. And we should encourage the countries of a region to help each other. What one lacks, the other may have. But the United States, through our technology, through our wealth, our industry, our experience, does have the means to inject into the planning and development of other nations, certain elements of assistance—in money, in technology, in goods, in the help of skilled people. This can often be the difference between a bare margin of existence and a promising future.

America does not have the wealth to scatter indiscriminately its resources. Events of recent years have made that clear to us. We have problems at home. We have our own under-privileged. We have urgent needs to educate our own people to help the revolution of rising expectations within the United States itself. Our own needs will never make us blind to our responsibilities as a world citizen, as a force for world peace. But they will and must make us think of American aid in a selective way—helping those who sacrifice to help themselves.

The American policy of aid and assistance was never thought of as a miracle, some magic ingredient that can supply a will to resist or an urge to strive further or a sense of political and social unity. When these elements are absent from any country, all the aid in the world will not save it.

But in Korea these elements are present. And they are present in an outstanding degree. That is why the partnership between the U.S. and Korea has proved so successful.

So if I were looking around the world for a country which has used American aid wisely and built well on its foundations, I would not have to look far. The record of growth in this country speaks convincingly. You have a record of achievement that speaks well of your efforts.

Imagine a country that exported only 32 million dollars worth of goods in 1960, but will export over 700 million dollars worth this year of 1969. A country whose economic growth rate now averages 13 percent and keeps going up, a country that could increase its industrial production by 321½ percent in one year and that almost quadrupled its industrial production between 1961 and 1968. In merely two years, since I was here last in 1967, you have doubled your power capacity in kilowatt hours.

This is a great record, for any country. It is all the more significant because you have transformed your economy by careful planning. You are putting electric power resources where there was no power before. You are creating new industries. You are sending your products overseas at an amazing rate. Yet at the same time you are bringing your agricultural production up to a point of self-sufficiency. In many ways you are two years ahead of your own second five-year plan. I would like to see that record of yours compared with the real results of the so-called seven-year plan of the brutal communist regime in the north. There would be no comparison at all.

Western Europe had a similar recovery with the Marshall Plan. And you know the remarkable recovery of Japan after World War II. Yet both Japan and the western European countries had existing industries to build on and existing groups of skilled workers to depend on. Here in Korea you had to train the people and build the factories right from the ground up—and at the same time, which makes your achievement all the more remarkable.

For you started here with only one major resource—the determination and will of your people—the leaders they found and the traditions on which you could build.

U.S. economic aid in Korea has been selective and on the whole remarkably effective. We helped prime your industrial pump. Now you Koreans are working the pump yourselves, and what once was necessarily massive aid is being reduced to the level of technical assistance and development loans, more and more.

In turn you in Korea will gradually help others. Korean technicians are already appearing in many countries. This country knows the value of selective aid. And you will be able in the future to show others the way that you have

charted such a magnificent record of development.

But now let us come to the element of security. For although I put development first, I know the importance of security. It is the shield behind which the farmer grows his crops and the merchant sells his wares. And you face a great security problem in the outlaw regime in the north. As an American, I value the security of this country as I would my own. We have stood shoulder to shoulder with you in the past and we will in the future—should any threat come into being. The north is not so strong. It is your strength that makes the communist bosses angry and frustrated. But we are determined to see that they will never repeat their cruel invasion of almost 20 years ago. Never.

Now you know that we in the United States are re-examining our own security goals and our world-wide commitments. This does not mean we are abandoning them—in no sense of the word. When I talk about a systematic withdrawal in Viet Nam, I mean just that, a phased withdrawal, at a time of our own choosing, behind which the South Vietnamese can take up their own defense. We have been there for five years—and I must say that in that fight, we look with pride and a gratitude on the sacrifices of those great three Korean divisions who fought side by side with Americans and South Vietnamese against Communist aggression.

But because we are withdrawing our massive ground presence in Viet Nam, we are not abandoning security in East Asia. We have already checked the spread of Communism—all of us—throughout the past five years. And I can say to you that the free nations of this continent are in far better condition—they are stronger, they are bolder—than they were. They have the confidence of men who have looked the aggressor in the face and stood him off. This is true of Indonesia, of Malaysia, of Thailand. It is true in Laos and Formosa and the Philippines. And it is certainly true of the Republic of Korea. The Communists have not succeeded in their plans of subversion and aggression. It is they who have suffered defeat. It is the free Non-Communist Nations that stand stronger and freer today.

But to assure the security of this region, it must act as a region. You in Korea have understood the precious value of regional development, and regional security. You have been taking the lead in both. The meetings held in Seoul these past years to discuss collective security in the Asian and Pacific regions were historic ones. And they are bearing fruit.

Other people are aware of the Communist danger. The Japanese know about it. And the Japanese are as anxious as anybody else to preserve security in Asia. The mutual security treaty between the U.S. and Japan is not designed alone as a nuclear umbrella for Japan. It is just one in a series of plans to ensure the security of an entire region. It is clear, for example, that the American government will soon return both sovereignty and administration of Okinawa to Japan. We must. But that does not mean that Okinawa will be without defence or that American and joint security plans will be abandoned. It means that security responsibility must be shared.

We are a Pacific power, not an Asian power—I have said that before. But we have friends and partners in Asia and we will not desert those friends. All we ask is that the free countries of Asia do what must be done in the way of getting together and standing together for their own security, as well as development. You may and will meet with different degrees of enthusiasm among the Asian Nations. But you will find that the need for peace is very strong essential common denominator—and peace in Asia requires regional cooperation—regional development—regional security with which we in the U.S. can work.

That is why I have stressed the theme of partnership today. We have a joint venture—Koreans and Americans. Its goal is expanding prosperity and ultimate peace. Its risks are great—and ever present. But its guarantors are the strongest possible—the united wills and hearts of two great peoples.



Visiting former U.S. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey exchanged views with President Park Chung Hee during a visit to the presidential residence in Seoul on the 29th of October.



ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA

Draft: Address to the Asian Affairs Research Council

by the Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey - October 20, 1969

It is a particular honor that you have asked me to speak to you on this day, when we are commemorating the second anniversary of the death of Shigeru Yoshida, this Council's distinguished first and founding President. My subject: the Japanese-American Relationship, was, I believe, a favorite theme of Mr. Yoshida's. It was one to which he devoted years of time and energy -- as Premier during the American occupation of Japan, later, as the co-architect of Japan's treaty and, finally, when he set the course for Japan's present prosperity during his later administration.

We knew Mr. Yoshida as an able statesman and a skilled negotiator. We Americans would be the first to admit that, at times, we must have taxed his capacity for patience and encouraged his constant aptitude for frank and sharp criticism. But we remember him best as a good friend and a firm friend. The quality we admire most in him was his ability to take the long view of things, to see past the daily twists and turnings of single events and look steadily towards the final goals, the long-range objectives on which the peace and prosperity of nations are truly based. That ability was never needed more than it is today.

Shortly before his death, Mr. Yoshida wrote a memorable article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica on Japan's Decisive Century, the hundred years of struggle and progress that began with the Meiji Era. In his comments on Japan's role in the

- 2 -

modern world, he continually stressed that "the basic principle of Japanese policy" was and must continue to be "the maintenance of close and cordial political and economic ties alike with Great Britain and the United States." In particular, he emphasized the cooperative relationship that exists between Japan and the United States. In Premier Yoshida's view, this relationship was "natural and entirely consistent with the mutual and abiding interests of both countries."

I would like to address myself today to that key word 'abiding' in Mr. Yoshida's statement about the relations between our countries. For too many people, on both sides of the Pacific, are taking the short view of the Japanese - American relationship.

Too many people are thinking of tomorrow's abiding policy only in the narrow and often deceptive terms of today's newspaper headlines. Too many people, in both our countries, are thinking of themselves as beneficiaries or even spectators of this relationship, instead of being vital participants in this relationship.

On the Japanese side, I find that the normal give-and-take of business competition is ~~too~~ often seen as ~~merely~~ ^{and} a one-sided American assault on Japan's sacred economic soil. In the political area, ~~all too many~~ ^{some} Japanese critics have chosen to view a broad-based and generous American guarantee of military protection as ~~merely a crass~~ ^a device of so-called "imperialism."

On the American side I find not so much hostility, as a disturbing myopia. As a people we do not see too well across the Pacific.

The American-Japanese partnership has been one of the most successful and meaningful political relationship in recent history. Because it is based on mutual interest, as Premier Yoshida put it, it is worth any number of hastily drawn mutual aid

pacts or area alliances or formal paper agreements. It holds within it the potential for fostering and assuring the peaceful development of the whole East Asia region. If Japan were never to contribute single soldier to implement the present security pact, or what follows it, the Japanese would nonetheless constitute the strongest friend the United States could have in this part of the world. This is true not merely because of your economic power and achievement, but because of the striking abilities and energies of the Japanese people. It is true also, I think, because history has given Japan a unique ability to exert moral and political influence world-wide in the years ahead.

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Yet despite ~~this fact~~ many Americans continue to see Japan as it was during the Occupation days. Although our newspapers and magazines write long stories about Japan's economic progress, most Americans appreciate this only intellectually. Where American policy towards European countries can be, on occasion, quite intuitive, sensitive and thoughtful, we often seem to be dealing with Japan as if you were still the docile, spiritually confused occupied country of 25 years past. *have tended* We ~~seem~~ to cling to the letter of pacts, while neglecting their spirit. *I'm sure that some of the* ~~Many, very many of the more~~

more than 100 U.S. military installations on Japanese soil are of doubtful value; ~~but~~ we ~~have seemed to hang on to them like molasses~~. Only recently did we begin to comprehend the force and concern of Japanese public opinion on an issue like Okinawa.

- 4 -

It has been widely written that the coming year, 1970, is a year of crisis in the American-Japanese relationship. This may be so, but if so, we have a crisis for the wrong reasons. There need be no crisis about the Security Treaty. Thus far, it has served as a shield under which this country has been able to build up its extraordinary economic prosperity in peace, able to ignore with impunity the continual nuclear testing of its two large Communist neighbors.

Ultimately the Japanese must decide for themselves whether to continue this Treaty, with the relationships it implies, or to rearm themselves, with the expense and controversy this implies; or to opt for an unarmed neutrality, with the risk that this implies.

~~No~~, The year of the Security Treaty need not in itself be the subject of 'crisis' reporting. It has become so because of other factors which have been made into crises when they deserved far less. These are; most obviously, the Okinawa question and the

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matter of trade liberalization. They should be considered separately. But each should be considered in its true perspective.

For more than 20 years ~~we must admit~~, the United States built up Okinawa as a military base, but did far to little about the political development or the ultimate future of Okinawa's million-odd population. Okinawa is a Japanese prefecture and it was inevitable that its inhabitants would insist on some kind of "reversion" to Japan. It was inevitable, that feeling would grow in Japan for the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and administration.

The United States military administration of Okinawa failed to recognize or respond to this feeling. And I regret to say that the government in Washington chose to go along with them.

Okinawa's reversion to Japan was always a legitimate concern to the Japanese people, which no American government can afford to ignore. If the United States government had in the past considered Okinawa as a political as well as a military problem, the intensity of this issue would not now be so great. Americans must now face the fact that compromise reversion timetables which would have worked in 1966 or 1967, will not work today.

We should see to it that Okinawa is returned to Japan as soon as possible and that any agreement on security matters be negotiated promptly. This will give the American military ample time to plan the de-emphasis of the present base structure. And it will afford both countries the opportunity to work out joint arrangements for Okinawa's defense.

The economic sector is another area where short-term gains should not be allowed to obscure the vision of long-term trading prosperity. Yet my strong impression is that such a tendency is a danger in Japan.

Lately the world of international trade has witnessed a flurry of communiqués and counter-communicués, on the subject of protectionism, between Japan and European countries and, notably, between Japan and the United States. Perhaps this was inevitable. But the fact that such inter-government power plays are out of the conference room and into the newspaper headlines, ~~particularly in this country~~, does not augur for happy mutual trading relations for the immediate future.

Japan is justly nervous about the threats of protectionism it hears from across the Pacific. American spokesmen are equally nervous about the fence of government restrictions which sometimes hinders the investment of new foreign capital in Japan.

✓ George Ball, the former Under-Secretary of State of the United States, has stated this problem well. And I would like to repeat to you what he said on this score during a visit to Tokyo this past summer:

"Today the Japanese are only beginning to explore the full implications of increasing economic preeminence. You are entering a period that compels a progressive adaptation of your thinking to the evolving realities of a wholly new age. This is never easy for any great nation. . . But economic greatness carries

- 7 -

responsibilities that transcend the homefront-responsibilities in areas of foreign trade and foreign assistance.

"Japan has a special responsibility in view of her giant strides to a top position among the world's industrial powers. Yet in my view, Japan has not yet adjusted its thinking to the full recognition of its own strength I feel it only honest to say to you that unless Japan moves more rapidly toward trade and investment liberalization it may well find the gates to world markets shutting out its products; more than that it could trigger a chain reaction of protectionism that would be disastrous not only for its own industrial growth but for the whole world economy."

Mr. Ball's warning was a sound one. It is my impression, however, that there is now a trend inside Japanese government and business circles to allow increasingly more real liberalization. And I would hope this trend continues. We are both trading countries and it is ^{necessary for} ~~incumbent on~~ both of us to insist on a ^u open world market place. ^u

Here, again, it would be a pity if we allowed irritations or restrictions of the moment, to obscure our long-range mutual goals.

And I would be negligent if I did not take notice of two other problem areas which continue to ^{strain} ~~scar~~ the Japanese-American relationship: Viet Nam and China.

In both of these areas the policy of the United States has hardly been free of mistakes.

We grossly underestimated the difficulties of the long-term commitment we were assuming in Viet Nam. We undertook a commitment without thoroughly analyzing its implications

or adequately explaining our reasons for undertaking it. *We are determined to pursue a course which will end this war as rapidly as possible* ^{- cont. -}

- 8 -

Yet our involvement there was in response to a real danger, not a fancied one. And, if one looks at the countries of Southeast Asia today, they are seen to be far healthier and more self-reliant than they stood five years ago. Regional cooperation has become a new force. Old disputes between the nations of Southeast Asia are giving way to negotiation and cooperation.

The so-called 'domino' theory may or may not have been correct; we will leave that for historians to decide. But the fact remains that aggressive Communism no longer runs rampant in Asia. The non-communist nations are valiantly resisting both subversion and aggression.

In China we ~~too long~~^{have} neglected the simple fact that a government controlling a vast population existed, and because it existed, had to be recognized and negotiated with, as other governments are. There are a great many systems existing in this world which Americans do not like and would not tolerate for ourselves. Yet we must learn to live with them. Our policy towards mainland China is one of patient bridge-building in the cultural, scientific and economic areas, which we hope can lead to peaceful and normal relations between our countries. A policy of deliberately isolating Communist China is both self defeating and dangerous.

For we must and should trust that, in time, the example of free institutions and the efficiency of free people will exert its influence by example and performance on those who must still live under Totalitarian regimes. Nor is this a naive or vain hope. This influence is already working its way in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself. There is reason to believe that it will exert itself, ultimately, in China.

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With all our defects, United States government policy remains essentially the creature of the democratic will - and never more so than today. As the popular mood of Americans shifts and changes, the government of the people's elected representatives shifts with it. No man in the White House can ignore it. And in the case of both Viet Nam and policy towards China, the world has been made aware of the American people's interests and the American people's concern.

I cannot pretend to be an expert on Asia generally or Japan in particular, but I am quite sensitive to shifting opinions in the U. S. We Americans are now engaged in a period of debate and review about our policy towards Asia. In this debate the central issue before us is not whether we should turn our backs on South-east Asia - or on other nations or peoples in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood. It is rather how we can best assess our own national interests and how

carefully we can define our own goals and priorities in ~~consent~~ ^{concert} with others.

The United States as a Pacific power
~~Since~~ ^{Therefore} the United States is not itself an Asian power, it is obvious that my country and people can reach sound decisions in relation to the nations of Asia only with a very high, continuing sensitivity to Asian views. Whatever role we may have in Asia must be based on a working partnership with Asian nations which would welcome our participation and join in common effort to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives.

Americans have been criticized in the past, for a tendency to go around telling this or that Asian nation that it is threatened and must take appropriate steps to meet this danger. I happen to believe that each nation is the best judge of its position and the course it should take. The U. S. must avoid meddling in important internal

decisions of this kind.

The United States cannot play the role of a global policeman. The American people don't want it and the rest of the world won't accept it.

But, the alternative to American peacekeeping cannot be no peacekeeping. It must be peacekeeping either by the United Nations itself or even more lately by regional agencies committed not merely to the defense of their areas, but - more positively, to the steady development and reconstruction of those areas.

Selective American assistance to Asian countries will and must continue. But it must continue on a basis of national self-help and regional self-help. For multilateral responsibility is the only way in which small and medium-sized nations can withstand the double pressure of internal subversion and indirect aggression. Not only should we place high priority upon regional cooperation such as the Asian Development Bank and regional security organizations, but we should avoid unilateral involvement either militarily or economically where multilateral means are available.

At the same time that I advocate a new international posture for the United States in Asia, I have the presumption, as your invited guest, to suggest a few thoughts to my hosts, I hope that, in the spirit of Mr. Yoshida, you will indulge my frankness.

The Japan that moves into the nineteen seventies is a totally new kind of world power -- ^{only defense} without ~~any~~ armed forces to ~~be~~ speak of, without colonies or hinterlands or significant raw material wealth. Devoted to free enterprise, you have still

managed to retain many virtues of a national family society. You have managed and planned your business enterprises the disciplined way that other nations have managed and organized their armies and technologies. And you have succeeded in vastly increasing your production, without forgetting the human factors on which production must be based.

The American economist Peter Drucker, in his recent book, *The Age of Discontinuity*, noted the watchwords of those two great Japanese business pioneers of the Meiji period, *E-wah sã kã A-wah ei-She-bah Sak-wã* Yataro Iwasaki and Eiichi Shibusawa. "Maximize profits," Mr. Iwasaki said, "Maximize talents," Mr. Shibusawa said. Both of them were right. Both of them, as Drucker said, worked not for a rich Japan, but for a strong and achieving Japan.

But Japan, as you know better than I, long ago ceased to be an island, isolated from the main stream of world events. You are a powerful force in a world needing help and direction. You have at your doorstep the problem of what to do about the continuing political and economic rehabilitation of Southeast Asia. You are facing the monumental task of treating with China and attempting to bring that huge nation back into some responsible relationship with the community of nations. This can be your great contribution to world peace.

Japan, not China is Asia's major power. But yours is a power, *not for* ~~not~~ war or aggression, but peace and cooperation. All of Asia needs your help in the development of the physical and human resources of this continent. You have the resources and the technology to do far more than has been done.

I believe that, more than ever before in your history, the Japanese people are facing outward towards new responsibilities within the international community. And throughout the world community, we must not forget that Japan's very abstention

-12-

from the use of nuclear weapons gives your position a unique moral force. All of us in America are hoping that the relationship between our two nations will be a help in assuming these new responsibilities and in achieving our common goal of a peaceful and stable world order. Our future must be one of partners - equal partners - working together in mutual respect and trust and sharing in the responsibilities of helping the peoples of Asia to achieve peace and progress.

Mr Koh
Coe

Mr Kim

President Park

Korea
immunity
Seoul
national
university

It is a particular pleasure for me to be here today and speak to a country and a people I admire and hold in deep affection. I come to discuss with you the Pacific Partnership, which I feel more than ever will become an essential of American foreign policy.

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It is gratifying to appear under the joint auspices of Encyclopaedia Britannica and of this great newspaper, which for 50 years has been a voice for freedom and independence for Korea.

Tonggillo -

Tong-ah-Ilbo

I congratulate you on your coming Anniversary.

Our two nations have had a long history together or, to put it more accurately, we have packed a lot of history into the last 25 years. Our relationship has been extremely close and open. You are a frank, outgoing people - and so are we. Our voices may sound different, but we talk the same language. We have both made mistakes in the course of our relationship and exchanged some harsh words, as well as congratulatory ones. This happens among the members of any family. And when an American visits Korea, he finds in many ways the warmth of a family relationship.

I speak to you today as a private citizen but also a concerned American citizen. For as an American, I am not merely a spectator of Korea's progress. I have shared in it.

This is my fourth visit to Korea. Two years ago I visited Korea as Vice President of the United States to attend the Second inauguration of President Park. I was encouraged then by the progress you have made. Indeed, I was inspired by it. I participated in the beginnings of your new science and technology institute which was just dedicated this week. I saw the structure of this great city rising to the sky, growing and expanding and I found many friends.

Now, as I revisit Korea after little more than two years, I must confess I am almost astounded by the great strides and progress so evident. The city

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of Seoul is transformed. Where before I had seen only excavations, I now see finished highrise buildings. I can not recall any city in the world whose citizens have changed its skyline so rapidly. In the future, I think if I were asked to suggest experts for a superspeed construction job in the U.S. I might insist on Korean contractors *and workers*.

ⓧ But change and growth bring its own tensions and its own problems especially the staggering growth you have had here. In 1930, I believe, there were only 300,000 people in Seoul. Now there are more than 4,000,000. It is larger than Britannica's home city of Chicago. The number of your college students and universities has increased literally ten-fold since 1945. Your population has learned or relearned new crafts. Millions of your people have moved into the cities.

ⓧ All this growth has brought its share of confusion and crowding. It has forced people to learn new things and think in new ways. But these are the challenges that a fast changing society faces and I'm proud to see that Korea is meeting them.

ⓧ Your customs are changing, because they have to change. And it is your job to see that what is good ^{*continues*} abides but what is not essential disappears.

ⓧ Korea is unique among world's developing countries in having had an extremely high standard of culture, ~~on the other hand~~, yet having suffered from an efficient but peculiar crippling form of colonialism, ~~on the other~~. That colonialism is long dead. I think you should know that in Japan today I find a tremendous respect for Korea's new achievements and an active interest in them. I hope, I know that the emerging cooperation between Korea and Japan can triumph over past scars and memories of injustices. Of course, I know you will remember in any case, that although ^{*Hayato*} Hideyoshi won the first battle Admiral ^{*Yee*} Yi won the last.

ⓧ Consider two Korean cities within a few miles of each other, Ulsan and *Olson*

③

Kyongju

Kyongju. They are classic contrasts. In one, you look forward in creating a massive new industry - steel, petro-chemicals and the like. In the other you look back to respect the traditions of many centuries past. Few cities in the world can equal the history which inheres in Kyongju's delicate eighth century temples and great stone monuments.

No country can live without the mixture of new abilities and old traditions which these two cities signify. I am glad that you express them so well here. For the present projects the past, but proceeds from it. And both build the future. For in the near future, your amazing growth will speed its benefits everywhere.

The late President John F. Kennedy liked to use the phrase "a rising tide lifts all the boats." As a maritime country - and incidentally a country with some of the highest tides in the world - you Koreans can appreciate the truth of this comment. The burdens of building any new economy are heavy. The cost in new buildings and new highways may seem excessive, but if we take the long view, we see in history how such benefits are distributed to all the people of a country.

Your tradition of democracy in Korea has roots deep in your history - the democracy of the village, of the soldier, and of a homogeneous people that lives together. It is no easy task to take these roots and make them flower into a new democracy, where guarantees which have been taught in the west for centuries must be learned in new forms and under new pressures.

These forms will be in some ways distinctively Korean ones, for while you build the future you must not break faith with your country's distinguished past.

But it is heartening to see that the Korean people do understand democracy. They are insisting on rights of free speech and free press - and it is heartening to find that their growing respect for such rights.

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It is equally encouraging to see that the determination of the Korean people to secure for themselves the blessings of education. Your investments in all forms of education - from elementary schools to your great universities and institutes of science & technology - will pay rich dividends in a more prosperous, happier, and free Korea. It is education that gives your country strength and wealth.

④ In the U.S. we are still going through the fires of change and growth. We have much in common with you. I would like to talk today about our common associations, our common partnership and the American view of an Asian policy, as one American sees it.

The makers of American foreign policy must now think of Asia with a long view. We must see Asia through the eyes of a developer, a planner, above all a partner. (And we must look on the countries of East Asia not as self-contained sealed-off compartments, but as parts of a developing unit--a changing, growing region, ^{almost} but a region. From Japan in the north to Indonesia in the south, there is a chain of free countries, whose people are most actively engaged in promoting and achieving growth. (The so-called revolution of rising expectations is not some far-off vision. It is here and now - and no one knows this better than the people of Korea.

X Now there are two elements of basic importance to the man who plans for the future: development and security. I put development first, because it deserves first priority. (The most important weapon any country possesses in its arsenal are the weapons of peace--education, rising technology, new industry - and above all the will to grow and to increase one's own portion of the world's goods - and to share that portion with others. So development comes first. There are some Americans who put security first and then forget about development. That is wrong. The United States is not a world policeman. No American government, no American army alone can make a people secure,

unless that people can develop an inner national strength, a strong economy, and a consciousness of who they are and where they want to go. Outside help to be effective must be based on self help.

American policy for the future should be one of selective help, where help can be used and built upon. It should be on a regional basis. And we should encourage the countries of a region to help each other. What one lacks, the other may have. But the United States, through our technology, through our wealth, our industry, our experience, does have the means to inject into the planning and development of other nations, certain elements of assistance--in money, in technology, in goods, in the help of skilled people. This can often be the difference between a bare margin of existence and a promising future.

America does not have the wealth to scatter indiscriminately its resources. Events of recent years have made that clear to us. We have problems at home. We have our own under privilege. We have urgent needs to educate our own people to help the revolution of rising expectations within the United States itself. But our own needs will never make us blind to our responsibilities as a world citizen, as a force for world peace. But they will and must make us think of American aid in a selective way - helping those who sacrifice to help themselves.

The American policy of aid and assistance was never thought of as a miracle, some magic ingredient that can supply a will to resist or an urge to strive further or a sense of political and social unity. When these elements are absent from any country all the aid in the world will not save it.

But in Korea these elements are present. And they are present in an outstanding degree. That is why the partnership between the U.S. and Korea has proved so successful.

So if I were looking around the world for a country which has used American

aid wisely and built well on its foundations, I would not have to look far. The record of growth in this country speaks convincingly. You have a record of achievement that speaks well of your efforts.

Imagine a country that exported only \$32 million dollars in 1960, but will export over \$700 million dollars this year of 1969. A country whose economic growth rate now averages 13 percent and keeps going up, a country that could increase its industrial production by 32½ percent in one year and that almost quadrupled its industrial production between 1961 and 1968. In merely two years, since I was here last in 1967, you have doubled your capacity in kilowatt hours.

This is a great record, for any country. It is all the more significant because you have transformed your economy by careful planning. You are putting electric power resources where there was no power before. You are creating new industries. You are sending your products overseas at an amazing rate. Yet at the same time you are bringing your agricultural production up to a point of self-sufficiency. In many ways you are two years ahead of your own second five year plan. I would like to see that record compared with the real results of the so-called seven year plan of the brutal communist regime in the north. There would be no comparison at all.

Western Europe had a similar recovery with the Marshall Plan. And you know the remarkable recovery of Japan after World War II. Yet both Japan and the Western European countries had existing industries to build on and existing groups of skilled workers to depend on. Here in Korea you had to train the people and build the factories right from the ground up--and at the same time, which makes your achievement all the more remarkable.

For you started here with only one major resource--the determination and will of your people - the leaders they found and the traditions on which you could build.

U.S. economic aid in Korea has been selective and on the whole remarkably effective. We helped prime your economic pump. Now you Koreans are working the pump yourselves, and what once was necessarily massive aid is being reduced to the level of technical assistance and development loans, more and more.

In turn you in Korea will gradually help others. Korean technicians are already appearing in many countries. This country knows the value of selective aid. And you will be able in the future to show others the way that you have charted such a magnificent record of development.

But now let us come to the element of security. For although I put development first, I know the importance of security. It is the shield behind which the farmer grows his crops and the merchant sells his wares. And you face a great security problem in the outlaw regime in the north. As an American, I value the security of this country as I would my own. We have stood shoulder to shoulder with you in the future--should any threat come into being. The north is not so strong. It is your strength that makes the communist bosses angry and frustrated. But we are determined to see that they will never repeat their cruel invasion of almost 20 years ago. Never.

Now you know that we in the United States are re-examining our own security goals and our world-wide commitments. This does not mean we are abandoning them - in no sense of the word. When I talk about a systematic withdrawal in Vietnam, I mean just that, a phased withdrawal, at a time of our own choosing, behind which the South Vietnamese can take up their own defense. We have been there for five years--and I must say that in that fight, we look with pride and a gratitude on the sacrifices of those great ~~three~~ Korean divisions who fought side by side with Americans and South Vietnamese against Communist aggression.

But because we are ^{reducing and} withdrawing our massive ground presence in Vietnam,

we are not abandoning security in East Asia. We have already checked the spread of Communism--all of us--throughout the past five years. And I can say to you that the free nations of this continent are in far better condition, they are stronger--they are bolder, than they were. They have the confidence of men who have looked the aggressor in the face and stood him off. This is true of Indonesia, of Malaysia, of Thailand. It is true in Laos and Formosa and the Philippines. And it is certainly true of the Republic of Korea. The Communists have not succeeded in their plans of subversion and aggression. It is they who have suffered defeat. It is the free Non-Communist Nations that stand stronger and freer today.

* But to assure the security of this region, it must act as a region. You in Korea have understood the precious value of regional development, and regional security. You have been taking the lead in both. The meetings held in Seoul these past years to discuss collective security in the Asian and Pacific regions were historic ones. And they are bearing fruit.

Other people are aware of the Communist danger. The Japanese know about it. And the Japanese are as anxious as anybody else to preserve security in Asia. The mutual security treaty between the U.S. and Japan is not designed alone as a nuclear umbrella for Japan. It is just one in a series of plans to ensure the security of an entire region. It is clear, for example, that the American government will soon return both sovereignty and administration of Okinawa to Japan. We must. But that does not mean that Okinawa will be without defence or that American and joint security plans will be abandoned. It means that security responsibility must be shared.

* We are a Pacific power, not an Asian power--I have said that before. But we have friends and partners in Asia and we will not desert those friends. All we ask, is that the free countries of Asia do what must be done in the way of getting together and standing together for their own security, as well

as development. You may and will meet with different degrees of enthusiasm among the Asian Nations. But you will find that the need for peace is a very strong essential common denominator--and peace in Asia requires regional cooperation - regional development - regional security.

↳ That is why I have stressed the theme of partners today. We have a joint venture - Koreans and Americans. Its goal is expanding prosperity and ultimate peace. Its risks are great - and ever present. But its guarantors are the strongest possible - the united wills and hearts of two great people.

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