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REMARKS  
OF  
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Y.D.F.L. CONVENTION, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.  
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GUIDELINES FOR A NEW POLICY

△ The foreign policy of the United States in the 1970's must be a strategy for peace.

△ Our first priority must be to end the tragic struggle in Southeast Asia. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to End the War is a test of our determination to disengage, I have endorsed it.

△ As Chairman of the Democratic Policy Council, I supported the Council statement of February 9, 1970, that the policy interest of the United States "require a firm and unequivocal commitment to the American people that all

U. S. forces will be withdrawn from Vietnam in accordance with a definite schedule..."

Unfortunately the Paris negotiations have yielded no results. Clearly a new initiative for peace is needed. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, together with a stand-still cease-fire and the conduct of new free elections in South Vietnam, provide our best hope for peace.

To give further emphasis to my endorsement of the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, I recently sent Senator McGovern the following message:

"This Amendment provides the opportunity for reasserting an American initiative to encourage a political settlement of this cruel war. With this Amendment, our own policy for Southeast Asia will be subject neither to the veto of Saigon, nor to the provocative and sporadic military incursions emanating from Hanoi. It will afford us an opportunity to regard from a new perspective our own domestic needs and other international obligations.

"I endorse the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment as a firm

statement of official policy stating a clear commitment by our government to make an orderly and systematic withdrawal. It offers every possible protection for American military manpower and will bring our men safely home. It reasserts the responsibility of Congress in the conduct of foreign affairs, while leaving the President with necessary flexibility to fulfill his Constitutional obligations.'

Further, in the light of stated commitments to withdraw our combat troops from Vietnam, I have urged that we stop sending draftees into combat. It is a terrible price to ask of the involuntary citizen soldier.

∠ The primary responsibility for security and development in Asia rests with the Asian nations themselves. ∠ They must take the lead. ∠ It is they who best understand themselves --- their past and their hopes for the future. We should be prepared to cooperate --- to be a helpful partner, not a dominating force.

∠ We should continue, particularly during this period of transition, to be directly concerned with Asian affairs. We

seek an early end to the Vietnam war; but we cannot ignore the real problems that will continue in Southeast Asia once we are gone from Vietnam. Without becoming an Asian power, deeply enmeshed in the politics and problems of that continent, we can and should support hopeful efforts by local peoples to work out their own destiny.

∟ In September, 1968, at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, I gave my views on Southeast Asia in my speech entitled "The New Strategy for Peace." I said then that whatever role we play in Southeast Asia should carefully follow three guidelines: self-help; regional and multilateral assistance; and selective American involvement:

--- first, local countries must manifest a willingness to help themselves, both to provide security and to undertake economic and social development; and they must have the courage to organize their own affairs in ways that will provide them with a stable basis for governing:

--- second, primary responsibility for helping individual nations provide for their security and economic development should rest with the nations in the area and with multilateral and regional organizations and;

--- third, American help should be selective and carefully measured. Our efforts must be justified by our own interests and responsibilities; and they should be concentrated on economic development through multilateral means. We are no longer the only source of help against threats to the security of Southeast Asia, or against poverty. Hopeful developments there will be lasting only if they spring from efforts by local countries, and if they command broad popular support.

Our experience in Southeast Asia points to a central dilemma in foreign policy; the difficulty of reconciling stability with change. Today, we recognize that the stability of Soviet-American relations is necessary for the survival of the world.

But we also recognize that unless there can be change in the world --- economic, social and political change within countries and in international society --- then stability, itself, will prove fruitless and self-defeating.

We must find new ways to promote change within a framework of order, or the future of the world will be tyrannized by either anarchy or repression.

✓ We can begin by supporting efforts within Europe to move away from twenty years of confrontation, to a new European Commonwealth of nations embracing the entire Continent.

✓ The United States no longer has the dominating voice in European politics; nor do we wish it. But we are a European power, deeply involved in providing security and confidence, without which there would be no hope of change.

The Middle East is a critical arena in which we and the Russians must define an area of self-interest.

Now that a cease-fire is in effect we must make certain that it is properly maintained and respected by all parties so that

constructive negotiations may proceed.

There is much at stake in those negotiations. They offer the hope of reducing the risk of confrontation between ourselves and the Russians. It is an explosive danger spot... a major threat to peace.

It is that danger of confrontation that makes the Middle East the most likely area of the world to spark nuclear confrontation.

The Soviet Union has been playing a risky game in the Middle East --- risky for them --- risky for us --- and risky for all mankind.

We can only dissuade the Soviets from their dangerous course if we choose the path of patient work for peace.

We can meet the challenge of economic development... to help the Middle Eastern nations develop jointly their great wealth of resources . . . for the use of all mankind.

We can work to make the Mediterranean --- not a sea of conflict --- but a sea of friendship.

We can act --- pursuing our mutual commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons --- to keep such weapons out of the region.

These avenues are our best --- and only --- choice.

The search for peace depends on our convincing the Soviets to turn their efforts in the Middle East to peaceful development... economic development. Our interests in the stability of the region are parallel. Its volatility... and the danger that we could be brought into nuclear confrontation by a Middle East war... demand that we work together to preserve the peace.

To encourage negotiations, I urge a conference of the principal weapon suppliers to the region --- the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and ourselves --- not to propound an ultimate solution for the parties to conflict --- but rather to establish a Regional Development Authority. All countries interested in the Mediterranean and Middle East should be invited to participate. Resources now going into weaponry should



be diverted to a capital fund for development.

Neither the security of Israel nor that of any Arab state would be jeopardized by this approach.

The United States should make every effort to reduce the flow of arms into the area and press for Middle East Arms limitation arrangements.

However, pending such an arrangement, the United States must remain prepared to correct or prevent an arms imbalance which might either threaten Israel's existence or contribute to a resumption of major hostilities.

Although Israel must not be made insecure by any failure on our part --- there is a painful lesson to be learned --- arms beget arms.

We cannot hope for peace ... permanent peace ... unless there are comprehensive agreements among the major suppliers of arms to the area --- and by the recipient countries themselves. This arms race must not go unchecked --- for the sake of the people of the region ... for the sake of all of us.

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We cannot expect sudden success ... an overnight end to conflict, but we can hope that quiet counsel ... patient effort ... will lead these countries along the path of peace.

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The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) are now underway to prevent a new escalation in the arms race. We must not jeopardize these talks now by a pell-mell rush to prepare the very weapons that are the subject of discussion. We must not sow seeds of distrust that will bring forth deadly fruit.

The prospect of new and terrifying weapons increases the importance of the SALT talks. We must work patiently with the Soviet Union to achieve one common goal: continued survival in a world where nuclear technology itself is our greatest enemy.

From now on, we must both base much of our security on greater political understanding, or we will have no security at all.

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I do not argue that we can trust the Russians in all of our relations with them. We cannot: they are still not prepared to consider agreements with us or with our allies in many areas of the world in which competition and conflicts of interest could still have deadly consequences. But unless we transform Soviet-American relations in the critical area of nuclear weapons, we may not live to debate other questions of serious but lesser importance.

This will require a new diplomacy, managed with skill and patience, and extending far beyond the SALT talks. We must recognize that there is no easy exit from the many dilemmas facing us; we must take full account of the interests of our allies, in Europe and elsewhere; and we must seek ways to turn all aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union from the sterile byways of military confrontation into the more hopeful paths of political accommodation.

We could usefully begin regular annual working meetings at the highest level between American and Russian leaders. And we should expand trade relations, cultural contacts, and the search for peaceful engagement.

In addition to our critical relations with the Soviet Union, we must give full cognizance to the emergence of China as a major power in Asia. Today, Chinese power is still more psychological than factual, although it is growing. It would be a fatal error if we let ignorance and unreasoning fear in the face of future Chinese military power close the door to political understandings with Peking.

We must do all we can to end the isolation of China, helping to bring her into the community of nations, committed to respecting the legitimate rights of her neighbors. An isolated China is a danger to all the world; a China that is involved with the outside world will still pose problems, and perhaps even threats of a serious nature, but at least there will be some hope that accommodation will replace antagonism.

The resumption of American-Chinese discussions in Warsaw is a hopeful development. We must exert greater initiatives in the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions between

China and the United States. Cultural exchanges can also serve to broaden the contacts between our peoples.

We must also realize that the legacy of embittered Chinese-American relations will not be overcome in a year, or perhaps even in a decade. We can do much to come to terms with China, and come to terms with ourselves regarding China. Yet it may well take years before these efforts produce a visible change in our relations, before China will respond to our efforts. Our initiatives --- always taken in full consultation with our allies --- can lead to the eventual diplomatic recognition of China and her admission to the United Nations. This is also a part of the new diplomacy.

In Europe, we must show that our partnership there really means something, and support efforts to resolve the division of the Continent. As a part of the new diplomacy:

--- we should encourage our Allies' in their proposal for a European Security Conference, and realize that this conference can be part of the political process that can

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help achieve what we want --- troop reductions  
throughout Europe;

--- we should have more sensitivity and understanding when our allies express concern that we may deal over their heads in the SALT talks;

--- we should make consultation, particularly on force levels, a real on-going effort --- with regular meetings at the highest level --- not a vehicle for showmanship and American lecturing to our European allies:

--- we should encourage bi-lateral political contacts between our allies and the nations of the Warsaw Pact, including West German efforts to improve relations with the East:

--- we should work for expanded trade and cultural relations between East and West:

--- and we should help to make the NATO alliance an international instrument for peaceful engagement, not a

rigid institution committed to the past. With our allies, we can help to liquidate the legacy of military confrontation. But this will require a new American awareness of Europe's needs, problems, and hopes.

Elsewhere in the world, the dilemma of change versus order will be even more difficult to resolve, yet more pressing as population growth, poverty, and unrest disrupt whole continents.

There are more than a billion people in the world today in countries where the average annual income per person is less than 100 dollars. Hundreds of millions live on less than fifty dollars a year.

Evidence has shown us that poverty and deprivation, coupled with the beginning of education and hope, create a revolution of rising expectations.

As an American I take pride in the well-being and relative affluence we have been able to create for an increasing number of our citizens. But I also feel shame at the hunger, poverty, and deprivation which surrounds this prosperous island of the Western world.

Today, our material contribution to the developing world is far below the scant 1% of GNP proposed for development aid by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Our foreign aid has dropped to a post-war low. We have fallen behind many of our European Allies, and other countries that recognize, as did Pope Paul, that "Development is the new name for peace."

By ignoring this fact, we are taking a tremendous risk. We are trying to have the best of all possible worlds --- rightly giving up unilateral American peacekeeping, but at the same time turning our backs on the economic needs of development.

This will not work; it will only be self-defeating. Let us face the problem squarely: either we will take a strong lead in the development of the poorer half of the world, or one day its great social and economic problems will engulf us all as surely as would a nuclear war. We must choose our weapons to secure the peace: ideas and resources today, or guns and troops tomorrow.

We Americans, as part of our responsibility to mankind, must commit ourselves anew to economic and social development,



including control of the growth of population.

Our commitment should be to nation-building. Our interest is in having nations that are independent and secure --- and thereby free to pursue their own development within the community of nations.

To do this effectively, we must channel the bulk of our aid through multilateral institutions. This will place heavy demands upon the United Nations and other organizations, like the World Bank and regional efforts for development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At present, we pay too little attention to these institutions, often regarding them as poor relations to more powerful initiatives we take on our own in foreign affairs. Yet for many nations, and in many parts of the world, only institutions like the UN can provide the help that is needed, free from complications of super-power relations or national self-interest.

This applies to peacekeeping as well. If American peacekeeping is to be curtailed, that does not mean that there can be no

peacekeeping. It must be done by the United Nations or by regional agencies. Only this can help to prevent the drift of disordered change into open conflict, and to stem the tide of human suffering.

Finally, for us to understand our future role in the world, we need to change many of our basic ideas about the world, and learn about other nations, other peoples, other cultures, as we have never done before.

Like other great nations before us, we have too often suffered from the myopia of power, imputing to others attitudes about the world that they do not share, and often, in our zeal, imposing our cultural ideas where they are not wanted. We see others mimicking our material advances --- from the automobile to indoor plumbing --- but fail to realize that superiority on the assembly line may not mean superiority in way of life.

This is called the "American challenge" --- a challenge to resist unwanted influences coming from this country. But I say that this is really a challenge to us. We must break with the tradition that leads great nations to practice cultural imperialism. We must show that we can be involved in the world, without trying to dominate it.

We have had a unique experience; we still have much to offer to others; but we will benefit no one --- least of all ourselves --- if we corrupt our view of the world and all of our foreign policy dilemmas into a simple, misleading and often dangerous choice between right and wrong. We can no longer see all the world as divided between friends and enemies.

This challenge to our understanding of the world and of ourselves does not mean that we must shy away from making available to others what we do have to offer, both in resources and in experience. It is one thing to give freely of what we have; it is quite another to demand that our ways prevail.

This can be our contribution to the search for ways to promote stability, ordered change, development, and peace,

without recourse to fire and sword. It may win us few friends; but it should also make us fewer enemies.

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We are in a new age of revolution --- in political relations, technology, education, and rising expectations. We have come to regard these revolutions as commonplace, as the destiny of mankind, in coming years. Yet at the same time, we have too often attempted to contain the effects of revolution, by increasing the commitment of American power, often without much thought about our basic interests in security.

As we have become more involved in the world, we have permitted an increasing division between the ideals of our society and the facts of our power. We have not always understood that the aspirations of other peoples often follow a tradition that we ourselves began.

We cannot permit this to happen again. We must find ways of being involved in the world that will protect our security,

without stifling the legitimate desires of people who strive for their freedom and personal fulfillment.

We must seek peace, without prohibiting change.

We must be patient, not expecting a new world at peace to emerge in a day, a year, or perhaps even in this decade.

And we must inspire a new generation of Americans with hope that our ideals can once again be the cornerstone of our involvement in the world, not ignoring the continuing facts of power, but not letting them destroy the human dimension of our policy. We must place greater emphasis on human and personal values --- having enough to eat, being able to learn, living free from fear.

I believe we can do it. I believe we can make our ideals powerful again.

These are my guidelines for a New American Foreign Policy.

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