

Q: I am not writing a history of Johnson's administration nor really a wholesale biography. I am mostly taking the material that he and I talked about together about during the last four years of his life and building a . . . biography around it. HHH: Gosh, that must be wonderful. I am writing a good deal by the way about my - let me show you what I have done here. You see this. Now this is just what I have done recently and I have 500 and some other pages done and - I do dictating it myself, but out of ~~memory~~ memory and it's very difficult you know. . . . Your memory is just not that accurate and you remember parts and later on you remember another part and ~~you~~ it seems like you are almost in conflict, but go ahead. Question: Well the main thing I want to ask you about was in the Senate where he's describing his version of winning in which he ~~said~~ considered a very important thing that could have happened. He said you came in with lots of good ideas and not ~~enough~~ ^{as much} patience as I did and he finally taught you the system. And I have seen it in secondary books as well, but I just but I don't want to cut into what you will be interested -- HHH: no, no, it's fine. I would just like to hear from you in the sense of he talks about the distinction between the practical ^{liberals} ~~liberals~~ of which you were one and the red hots or the ultra ultras, and how important it was to build the base and that's why he was a succesful Senate Leader because he found those like you who were willing to work on practical matters. HHH: I agree with that and I think what he told you from just that observation is absolutely true and I am going to stop this phone.

Q: . . . some carpool to pick up some 8-year olds. Let me just run down . When I came into the Senate, it was the 81st Congress and Lyndon Johnson was also a member of that Congress. I have often described our differences even at that time. He was well known. He was a part of the Texas delegation which had a powerful influence in the Congress, with Tom Connally being chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, with Sam Rayburn being Speaker of the House of Representatives and Lyndon Johnson having served in the House for a considerable period of time, having run for the Senate earlier and having been a sort of a protege' of FDR. So there was Lyndon Johnson over there and Hubert Humphrey who had been Mayor of Minneapolis and had also been the instigator of the civil rights plank at the Democratic Convention. That made me look like I was a bastard ~~at~~ at a ~~family~~ family reunion, you know. There were some very powerful Senators around here that looked upon me not only as a dangerous radical but as a sort of political fool. I didn't get to know Lyndon Johnson right away and obviously I didn't seek him out because quite honestly I felt that I wasn't at his level, not because I was unduly modest but simply because I knew that he knew so many people. ~~He~~ When he walked into

the Senate he talked to anybody and everybody. When I walked into the Senate I didn't have a friend.--That was a real close ~~xxxx~~ friend. There was Paul Douglas who later on became my friend and there was Clinton Anderson and there were a few others around, Claude Pepper, etc., but I had no real following. And I was labeled to put it bluntly, very severely labeled as a far out liberal simply because of my views on civil rights. Now the truth of the matter is that my political life had always been one of pragmatism. I was just writing a little piece here on liberalism and I remember what Roosevelt said. He said you try something. If it doesn't work, you try something else and try again, but you have got to get something that will work. Now that's always been my ~~xxxx~~ approach. I was Mayor of Minneapolis and I worked that way and I had a liberal record, but I always got along good with the business community eventhough I was endorsed by labor. When I came to Washington that seemed to all fade away in those first years. I was pigeon holed and there was no way that I could break out of that stereotype that had been fixed on me as a result of the Philadelphia Convention. My views on civil rights were always the same. I mean as a Mayor and I never considered that radical at all. I considered it just to be decent and normal. Well Lyndon Johnson was looked upon by most of my colleagues that I associated with Estes Kefauver, Paul Douglas and later on Herbert Lehmann and Claude Pepper, Jim Murray and others, the more liberal crowd -- he was looked upon as a sort of well not as a southerner as such but obviously one that consorted with the ~~southerners~~ southerners. He was a friend of Dick Russell. He was a clever guy. That's the way they put it, sort of not slick but he was a manipulator and he wasn't a "true believer." He could not "qualify" ~~xxxxxx~~ as a liberal. He was suspect but I got to like him as a person. I liked him for several reasons. First of all, I saw that he knew a lot of people who knew how to make that Senate work. It wasn't long before in a very short time - in two years, he was Minority Whip as you may recall for a little while. Then he became the Majority Whip to Ernest McFarland. It was perfectly obvious that he became - that he was more of the Majority Leader than he was the Majority Whip. McFarland was a nice man and a good fellow but he had been put in there by the Democratic Southern Coalition with the few that Lyndon Johnson could bring around. Lyndon Johnson was always able to get Theodore Francis Greene. He really always had him. He also had some others like ~~Joe~~ Joe Almandi for example at the time and Clinton Anderson. You know Clinton Anderson used to have personal suspicions about Lyndon Johnson. I think Johnson sort of noted that I wasn't always comfortable with the more true believers ~~xxx~~, that I . . . Q: There was really a sect that you could identify . . . southerner inner ~~xxxx~~ sect? Yes, yes. Just like there was a southerner inner club sect. There was another one of us over here and I in a sense had good credentials in the true believer liberals, but always a bit suspect, because I had friendships on the other side. You weren't even to have

social relationships over on the other side in those days. There was real ideological split here. There weren't over - at the most there weren't over 25 that you could call liberal Senators that occasionally voted the liberal line and even amongst the Democrats, at least 50 percent of them were southerners, southern Democrats or sympathizers with ~~them~~ southern Democrats. At that time the southern Democrats were what - they were oil depletion, they were anti-civil rights, they were basically in those two areas and very conservative on all tax policies. They were strong on public works, strong on agriculture and ~~x~~ not at all sympathetic to organized labor. Now I was strong on agriculture, strong on labor, strong on civil rights, strong on tax reform. I got in the tax reform fight ~~x~~ the second year I was ~~here~~ here. But Johnson seemed to - I don't know ~~xxxx~~ whether I should put it this way, it may be immodest, take a liking to me. Anyway he sought me out and from time to time, he visited with me; just informally, sometime only in the hall. Occasionally he would say well come on up ~~xxx~~ to the office, I want to talk to you. You used to have a good sense of humor. He joked a lot. He always talked about that he was going to cross breed me with Harry Byrd and he said that if I can ever get you to get about two pints of Harry Byrd's blood inside of you it will cool you off a little. You would be some man around here if I could just get a little bit of the restraint of Dick Russell on you you would be a great Senator, all that kind of stuff. Johnson always -- he was a born boss, a born leader, but in times a boss and his kind of political operation in the Senate was not the Caucus, it was individual ~~xx~~ treatment. He put the pieces together. He had his own little jigsaw puzzle. He didn't ever flush it all out in the one meeting. You came in in ones of twos. He didn't believe in pacts, in groups and he always had somebody else in there with him that would - I think that's the way he kept his credential with the ~~conservative~~ conservative community because I never figured Johnson was a conservative, never did I figure it. And I remember in 1960 I was on a program in New York, a radio program with this Mike Wallace, and Mike Wallace was trying to get me to say that Johnson was a reactionary and conservative. I said no, he's a liberal in the best sense of the word. He is a civil liberaterian and I had examples of what he done in protecting civil liberties and he had. He was a master of parliamentary strategy. He was a born leader for the Senator, much even more so than a leader in the Senate than he was even as President. He was a man of the Hill, of the Congress, no doubt about it. Question: I have a sense .. that he psychologically understood what each individual wanted? HHH: He studied them like an FBI agent. Question: How did he study them . .? HHH: He just spent time at it. He watched every move. Listen, he knew who was drinking and who wasn't. He knew who went out and had a date and who didn't. He knew whether or not they were in the hands of some particular lobby or not. He just knew about you. He really was uncanny. He was always asking questions and he was building this - he had a

~~sort~~ sort of computerized mind on this sort of thing. ~~That~~ I think Johnson always liked a little gossip anyway. You know. He enjoyed it. It wasn't that he wanted it for any sinister purpose. He kind of enjoyed it. He kind of liked to know who was betting on the baseball games and who was eyeing the girls and he had all of these weaknesses himself which was of course -- I don't say weaknesses, attributes. But you know ye was a man's man in a very real sense and he had a sense of power. One of the things he told me when I became Minority Whip, he said I want you to study every member of this body. You have got to know when a guy has had a fight with his wife and that's the day not to ask him to do anything. You have got to know when that fellow is in trouble and you have got to know when to put your arm around. He really knew how to handle you that way and he also had people watching if anything went wrong in your family and a letter would come or a telephone call, this sort of thing. With me, I think he came to the conclusion in a sense from his point of view that I could be had. I ~~k~~ never felt I was. I really felt that I was getting more than I was giving and I'll tell you why. I suppose that's the way most people when somebody touches them up a little bit. First of all I didn't change any point of view I had. I never changed my votes. Secondly, I was kind of the agent for the liberals with Johnson. He wouldn't talk to a lot of them. I helped get Paul Douglas on Finance and Herbert Leymann on Judiciary. Johnson would talk to me. He would come to me and say who do you want on there? I am not going to talk to these other fellows and he put me on the Steering Committee. I was there to see to it that our people - the liberal people got good assignments and he knew that I was going to fight him on oil depletion - on offshore drilling I mean, you know, what did we call that at the time, the revenues from the offshor oil anyway. And he knew that there were certain things that I couldn't possibly agree with him on but he also knew that I could bring along some of our people at the time. And when we needed a fight on the atomic energy act which he was involved in which was a great move on his part to see that the atomic energy wasn't just passed over into private hands. He knew that he could come to me. When we wanted to take on Eisenhower on the tax legislation, he got ahold of Walter George for example, myself and others. I was the liberal segment over there. He didn't enjoy talking to some of our real liberal friends. He didn't think they had a sense of humor and that they didn't trust him. He knew that they didn't trust him. Well I can't say that I always trusted him but I found him so darn interesting and I also knew that in a very real sense that he would pay off if you know what I mean, that if you did something for him he would do something for you. And he knew that he couldn't get you to do certain things. He knew what my position was. He didn't push you that far but he wanted to have -- I think what he really wanted was someone in the liberal ranks that would tell him what was going on so that he could do a better job ~~of~~ as a leader on the one hand and number two, someone that he could

use to work in those ranks and I didn't avoid that opportunity at all. I considered it a real opportunity. I used to say that some liberals are never so happy as when they are unhappy. They are never so unhappy as when they are happy. In other words when they get all that they want, they are really unhappy. I recall the minimum wage law. We had it up for about \$1.60 per hour or something like that or whatever the figure was at the time and everyone of our liberals were prepared for the big fight. / ^{Spencer} . . . Holland of Florida was going to lead the fight against it and we were determined to have a big battle; so was he. So one noon, about 2 ^{o'clock} ~~xxxx~~ one day Johnson's up there and I am on the floor, and I am the only one of the liberals there. He looked around and cased the place and saw that there wasn't too much opposition. He says now listen. I am going to call up that Fair Labor Standards and Wage Law and he said I am going to pass it. You said now you have got to tell all of your people around here not to make any speeches because he said, damn ~~it~~ ^{them}, they are going to want to make speeches and than old Spencer Holland and others are going to get in here and Harry Byrd and we will never get it passed. I said that's good enough for me. So he called it up but I forgot who was there but a couple of people around the floor and I went over and I said look we are going to pass this if we don't speak you know. ~~xxxx~~ You can just put your remarks in the Record and they agreed to it, and we passed it without a roll call vote. When Spencer Holland heard about it he came storming up out of the lunchroom downstairs in the Senate dining room and was mad as blazes. Well, Johnson said I had a quorum call. I fulfilled all the responsibilities. He said I had a quorum call and ~~x~~ if you were interested you could have called the Senate Cloakroom. I don't have a responsibility to go around here and see that each one of you have a hand-delivered message Spencer. He said there were people up there on the Senate floor and then the next thing I heard was some of my liberal friends were mad as blazes because they didn't have a chance to make a speech. So there you were with Spencer Holland mad ~~xxx~~ because he didn't get a chance to speak against it and some of my good liberal buddies angry because they didn't get a chance to speak for it. In the meantime Johnson and I had passed it. Well it was this kind of thing that was typical. Johnson also cherished his relationship with David Davinsky for example. He wanted to be known as a moderate liberal. He didn't want the title liberal but he was much more liberal than some of his utterances and he never wanted the title so therefore he escaped being brought into that liberal rank. Question: Well it's very interesting to me. I think that story of ~~age~~ thing was exactly . . . will never get credit because ~~x~~ . . .

HHH: Exactly. Same thing I saw him do on housing. He would do things like this. Another thing for example. I was going to miss a vote on housing which was important to me. He knew I was on my way back from Minnesota and the plane was stalled over

Washington because there was bad weather and he got on the telephone and called the tower and told the tower -- got the number of our plane and said that plane is up there and I want that Senator brought on in here. We have got a vote up here and you know Johnson would do things like this and he held up the vote until I got there, you see. Well I didn't forget things like that. Well what I guess I am saying to you is that I paid a price to be an associate of his, but he also paid a price in a very real sense. He did things for me and there were times that ~~xxx~~ we needed him that I could get him. Also he made appointments of Senators that never would have been appointed to committees that wanted to get on these committees. That would make the southerners ~~xxx~~ angry and he would ^{always have to} say to the southerners Well you know we get some help from Hubert. You know we have got to expect to give a little bit. Question: Why do you think he had so much trouble with this thing. Why couldn't they understand him? Was it different temperments? HHH: Yes, different temperments and he was from Texas and Texas was oil and that was at the heart at that time of the liberal conservative confrontation just as changing Rule 22 was at the heart of it. Today, we are going to most likely change Rule 22. That a cause that has been won you know. Timing is everything you see. Now we have got -- I don't even involve myself anymore in the fight on Rule 22 because the fight has been won. You know we are going to change it. Now we are going to change the oil depletion. It's going to come. Then you know it was ~~knxx~~ knock down, drag out. It was repeal of Taft-Hartley or you were for Taft-Hartley. Question: What about him on labor and Taft-Hartley. Where . . . HHH: Well, he voted - I am not sure now, you will have to check, but I believe he voted for Orlando Griffin but he did ~~x~~ it reluctantly and he got some mollifying amendments in there. He did this, this is the way he conserved his ~~x~~ conservative base. He ~~conserved~~ conserved his conservative base. At the same time he would work overtime on the labor movement because the labor movement -- personally, awe. The labor movement didn't get where it is by being stupid. The George Meanys and the I.W. Abells and the David Davinskys and the Amel Reevys, etc., they were practical fellows. They knew that Johnson wasn't going to vote for them but they didn't get angry with him. They didn't cut him up. They didn't cut him up because they knew he had ~~power~~ power and he could deliver for them on lots of other things. He could deliver on aid to education. He delivered for them on housing and public housing. He delivered ~~x~~ for them on fair labor standards and minimum wages which meant so much to the textile workers, to the lower income workers and he was always available for them. Let's put it that way. When somebody needed to weigh in on the President or something he was there. So the labor movement has two images -- the one that is very vocal and out in front, clear and

totally liberal and the other one is the pragmatic labor movement. Question: That explains it . . . HHH: No doubt about it because he would always k -- you know. He prided ~~himself~~ himself in the presence of even the most conservative picking up that telephone and calling up some labor leader and they knew Johnson had the power and they also knew that on certain things he was absolutely reliable. Q: Why do you think when he was given all of the pleasures that I had the feeling when I listed to him that he had in the Senate that he decided to run again . . . the vice presidency. . . . HHH: Yes, I think that's true and I think maybe it may have been frankly that Johnson wasn't sure that Kennedy was going to win. He had it going two ways for him you remember. He didn't lose his Senate seat and it gave him a chance for national exposure and there is no doubt in my mind that Johnson has presidential ambitions early. No doubt about it and I have a feeling that he thought that he had nothing to lose and everything to gain, that if we lose on this thing I will be back and I will be Majority Leader of the Senate. If we win I will be Vice President and he also felt quite frankly that he could still run this Senate as Vice President. When he came back as Vice President he wanted to be chairman of the Caucus. That lasted about two weeks. Q: How was the reason to decide on the separation of power . . . ? Well, I think that the minute that you leave the Senate, the whole body of the Senate says now look you left, it's your fault. It's a peculiar thing around here. Even a man as powerful as Johnson, with the friends that he had in the south and all, once that he became Vice President, he was no longer a member of the Senate family. Question: . . . special man. HHH: Special man. Now listen I think I was about as well liked as when I became Majority Whip as I have ever been in my life, but the minute I came back to the Senate as Vice President, it was different. I had left them. I had betrayed them. I mean after all why did I leave to become Vice President? Question: Let me just ask you one question about the inner club of southerners vs liberals. If you were walking around, how would you know who was in either one. Did they eat together? HHH: Yes. As a matter of fact a good number of the inner club ate in the inner dining room, not the public dining room. One of the first people to tell me that was Russell Long. Russell Long was my neighbor out in Copeland Terrace in Chevy Chase. He and I came into the Senate at the same time. We were good friends from the Louisiana State University. He was my neighbor two doors down. We used to go walking together a lot and see a good deal of each other and Russell said to me. He said, Hubert, you know you ought to get in there and meet the fellows that really run the Senate. You are in there in this public dining room and you ought to just get in with the people that are the movers and the shakers. He said, let me take you on in there. Well I never felt too welcome in there but I went on in there and the next thing I know I am talking with M Jim Eastland and I am talking with John McClellan and Walter George and Lyndon Johnson, the powers at that time, the real

powers, Dick Russel. They were all sitting around. They have got one little table in there that seats about 12 people around there and another table off to the side that seats 4 or 5 and that's where the business is done. That is where you develop your social contacts. You see ~~xxxx~~ Johnson used to say of us liberals that we never took time to cultivate the power centers. We were always out making speeches and he was right, from the point of view of the Senate. And he taught me something I never forgot that the way you get power around here is to be there. You be there. I have told students. I said you know people have said to me what is it that makes for a good Senator? And I say one simple thing, be there. Be at the committee meetings. Be present. Be on the Floor. Just be here because every day that you are away, you forfeit some power to somebody else and the --- Q: And the liberals Exactly, and our constituents demand it of us, demanded it of us and as I used to tell Johnson. I said, yeh, you guys can get elected by staying up here but our constituency demands to have a -- to put their fingers in the wounds every week. You know, they are doubting Thomases about us and they want to see us and they want to know what we are doing. They want to hear from us. I used to envy these southerners that can sit up here - Berny Maybank for example. Lister Hill, John Sparkman, all of these powerful southerners that were chairmen of committees in the old seniority ~~xxx~~ system. They just stay here and that's ~~they~~ the way they got to be chairmen of committees, and they didn't ever have to go home except just before election. This is what happened to Bill Fulbright. Bill Fulbright never knew what it was to have a campaign until the last two times. He wasn't prepared for it. We had to be out fighting for our lives everyday, but that reduced our effectiveness here. Question: Now besides the eating, did the liberal then ~~a~~ tend to have meetings together? HHH: Whenever we had meetings it was always for work, but southerners and the conservatives mixed the social life with it. ~~They~~ And they didn't demand 100 percent allegiance. Now just on key issues, that's all. The trouble with being a good liberal is that you have got to be a saint on every issue. You can't deviate. There is no room for defection. The conservatives ~~xxx~~ say look, there are two or three issues that we are concerned about, now you can play around with the rest of them. We don't mind what you do with the rest of them, but on the tax question, on the civil rights question, or whatever else, on Rule 22, those were the three; tax question, civil rights, and Rule 22, you stay with us on those and if you want to flirt off there with Humphrey and AFL-CIO and the AVA, running around playing drop the ~~h~~ hankerchief or whatever it is, you go ahead and do it. We don't care. You are not suspect. As long as we have you on these, but with the liberals, you had to be right on every issue. They rated you.



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