



Hubert H. Humphrey

HUMPHREY ASKS END
TO U. S. INVOLVEMENT
IN ANGOLA

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LOS ANGELES, CALIF., Jan. 12--Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn) today called for an end to United States involvement in Angola, which he said "has the makings of a first-class foreign policy disaster."

Speaking at the University of Southern California, Humphrey warned against the dangers of the Ford Administration's policies of aid to anti-communist forces in Angola.

"On close examination," he said, "they ignore shamefully the realities of the present Angolan situation and the tragic Vietnam experience.

"They involve gross oversimplifications of the impact of Soviet communism in Africa. And they distort the real nature of American interests at stake in that part of the world."

Although Humphrey stressed that "Angola is not Vietnam and I do not pretend that it is," he called it "the type of civil war which could lead to an incredibly protracted and destructive conflict."

"In Angola, as in Vietnam," Humphrey said, "we know very little about the country, its tribal culture and peoples. In short, we are again becoming involved as a world power with a half-world knowledge.

"In Angola, as in Vietnam, the involvement of outside powers only escalates the level of violence and makes a negotiated settlement more difficult to achieve.

"Finally, in Angola, as in Vietnam, we are backing the factions which have the least chance to achieve a military victory, which are the most compromised in nationalistic terms, and are in many ways the least prepared to rule."

(more)

Humphrey criticized the secrecy surrounding U. S. aid to Angolan forces, and claimed that "much of the difficulty with this policy can be traced to the manner in which it was made. Expert opinion was largely ignored and the Congress was disregarded."

He argued that the Congress should have a major role in deciding U. S. policy toward Angola, stressing that the Senate already has voted to stop the President from spending covert funds in that country, and that a similar vote is expected in the House.

"I am not in favor of arbitrarily tying the hands of this or any other President," Humphrey said, "I understand that the Congress cannot and should not run the nation's foreign policy on a day-to-day basis.

"But the decision to become involved indirectly in a military operation in Africa on the scale suggested by the President should not be made in secret -- nor should it be made only by a handful of Congressmen. The risks are too grave and the decision too important to our foreign policy to deny full-scale participation in the decision by the entire Congress through its regular processes."

Humphrey proposed an alternative policy to the Administration's which includes direct negotiations with the Soviets during which the United States would declare its willingness to cease its military involvement and pledge to work for a withdrawal of Zairean and South African troops from Angola.

In return, the United States would demand a cessation of Russian military aid and the withdrawal of Cuban troops. At that point, both the United States and the Soviet Union would jointly invite the OAU and any other group of African states to mediate the conflict.

"If the Soviets are totally unwilling," Humphrey said, "then we should use our considerable economic leverage to force them to reconsider their position."

Humphrey pointed to the lack of Soviet success in gaining a foothold in Africa since the independence movement began, "because the majority of African leaders abhor domination by outside powers in the fashion of former colonial domination."

"If the Soviets are desirous of repeating their African failures in the name of Marx and Lenin," Humphrey said, "I see no reason why we should imitate their folly."

REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles, California

January 12, 1976

One week from today, Congress will reconvene. The final session of the 94th Congress has great potential for making history. It occurs during the celebration of the nation's bicentennial. And it will take place during a Presidential election year.

However, the real historic potential for this Congress lies in the fact that it will consider a host of domestic and foreign policy issues sure to affect American life for years to come. Our agenda is packed with critical decisions to be made in such fields as energy, tax reform, health care, employment and the environment.

I can assure you that the Congress is committed to take action on these and other issues.

And we will do so despite the Administration's attempt to govern by veto, by inaction and by negativism.

One of the first items on the Congressional agenda for 1976 is not a domestic matter. It is a critical foreign policy issue.

I speak of Angola.

The decision soon to be made on whether America should continue to participate in Angola's civil war raises two important questions:

First: What can be achieved by continued American involvement in Angola?

Second: To what degree should Congress participate with the President in the formulation of foreign policy in situations such as Angola?

These are complex and far ranging questions. But permit me to share with you my thoughts and tentative conclusions in response to them.

Public debate and discussion of the Angola issue is in the best interest of a more open and rational foreign policy.

The basic facts of America's involvement in Angola no longer are secret. We have supplied two of the three tribal factions for the past year with approximately \$40 million in arms and materiel.

The President and the Secretary of State are very anxious to continue our involvement. And they want to increase the level of American aid.

Their rationale for continued and increased involvement is to stop Soviet penetration in Angola and all of Africa.

Their goal is to defeat the Soviet-backed MPLA and bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict. They foresee dire consequences if the U.S. does not persist in its present course.

At first glance, the Administration's justifications for our Angolan involvement seem plausible. However, on close examination, they ignore shamefully the realities of the present Angolan situation and the tragic experience in Vietnam.

They involve gross oversimplifications of the impact of Soviet communism in Africa.

And they distort the real nature of American interests at stake in that part of the world.

To continue American involvement in Angola is to forget some of the most painfully learned lessons of Vietnam.

Angola is not Vietnam and I do not pretend that it is.

But in Angola, as in Vietnam, we are involved in a civil war. It is the type of civil war which could lead to an incredibly protracted and destructive conflict.

In Angola, as in Vietnam, we know very little about the country, its tribal culture and peoples. In short, we again are becoming involved as a world power with a half-world knowledge.

In Angola, as in Vietnam, we claim to be defending freedom against communism. In fact, we are supporting two political factions about which we know almost nothing.

In Angola, as in Vietnam, the involvement of outside powers only escalates the level of violence and makes a negotiated settlement more difficult to achieve.

And finally, in Angola, as in Vietnam, we are backing the factions which have the least chance to achieve a military victory, which are the most compromised in nationalistic terms, and are in many ways the least prepared to rule.

I could go on with many more lessons from Vietnam. Frankly, I do not understand how the Administration could so easily forget some of these rather elementary lessons from a disastrous war which is so fresh in the minds of the American people.

But more important than the lessons of Vietnam is the reality of Africa.

The central fact of this reality is that the Soviet Union has been unable to gain a significant foothold in Africa since the independence movement began. Soviet ambitions to possess valuable ports, establish satellite states, and obtain great political leverage on the continent have been thoroughly frustrated.

The one possible exception to this statement could be Somalia. There the Soviets are trying to consolidate their position in a desperately poor and dependent country of questionable strategic importance.

The Soviets have fared so poorly because the majority of African leaders abhor domination by outside powers in the fashion of former colonial dominance. This fact has been the guiding rule of African politics in the past twenty years.

Neither we nor the Soviets will be able to influence substantially whatever faction finally prevails in Angola.

The winning side most likely will be a highly nationalistic, left-leaning group which resists domination by outside powers. Its independence will be strengthened by the country's considerable resources.

We have only to look to the other side of the continent -- to Mozambique -- to see the occurrence of this phenomenon.

For years the Soviets backed the revolutionary faction called FRELIMO, which fought the Portuguese and then came to power on June 4, 1975. Recently, however, the rulers of Mozambique refused the Soviets base rights on the Indian Ocean. They also publicly accused Moscow of heavy-handed tactics.

If the Soviets are desirous of repeating their African failures in the name of Marx and Lenin, I see no reason why we should imitate their folly.

The mistake of our involvement is further compounded by the fact that there is no vital American economic or military interest at stake in Angola. Such an assessment has been made by the State Department and by defense experts. The oil and mineral resources of the country are available at other locales in far greater abundance.

Thus, America comes to this conflict solely on the basis of a political rationale of questionable validity. And we are backing factions least likely to win on the battlefield.

Angola has the makings of a first class foreign policy disaster for the United States.

Much of the difficulty with this policy can be traced to the manner in which it was made. Expert opinion was largely ignored and the Congress was disregarded.

A decision of this magnitude requires more than an act by a few Executive branch officials. It must be thought through and subjected to thoughtful examination from various perspectives. Certainly, it should not have been decided by the Executive branch alone.

The Congress can play a far more creative role in foreign affairs than merely voting yes or no on Executive branch proposals. In this case the Senate quite early advocated an alternative approach of real merit which still could lead to a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, the Administration chose to cling to its cold war rhetoric rather than soberly examine its options.

The Senate has voted to stop the President from spending covert funds in Angola. The House will vote on the matter next week.

As an alternative to continued covert operations, we suggest that the President come to the Congress and ask for a specific amount of aid, presenting his justification for continued assistance to the two factions in Angola that we have supported. This public request and information then would be carefully and fully debated as Congress fulfills its responsibilities in determining the basic guidelines and framework of our foreign policy.

I am not in favor of arbitrarily tying the hands of President Ford or any other President. I understand that the Congress cannot and should not run the Nation's foreign policy on a day-to-day basis.

But the decision to become involved indirectly in a military operation in Africa on the scale suggested by the President should not be made in secret. Nor should it be made by only a handful of members of Congress.

The risks are too grave and the decision too important to our foreign policy to deny full-scale participation in the decision by the entire Congress through its regular processes.

There is little doubt that Congress has the constitutional right to share in the Angolan decision.

If the Angola question is submitted to the Congress, the decision might well be unfavorable.

But this is a risk which the democratic system compels the Administration to accept. If its policies cannot be justified to a majority of the Congress, it will not do for it to seek recourse to covert procedures in order to by-pass the Constitutional process.

I reject totally the philosophy that one branch or the other can be the final judge of what actions are or are not in the national interest. The ultimate decision in situations such as Angola must be a shared one according to our laws and traditions.

The great task ahead for United States diplomacy should not be a continuation of our military aid. Instead, we must use all our diplomatic skill to explore every avenue, including direct negotiations with the Russians, with the OAU, the Angolan parties and the U.N. This is the only possible route to avoid a prolonged war and great bloodshed.

Secretary Kissinger believes that continuing and increased American involvement is his only bargaining chip with the Soviets.

I disagree.

I believe we should take the following steps:

-- We should approach the Soviets and declare our willingness to cease our military involvement and pledge that we will work to obtain the withdrawal of troops in Angola from Zaire and from South Africa unless, of course, South Africa has carried through its announced intention to withdraw.

-- In return, we must demand a cessation of Russian military aid and withdrawal of Cuban troops.

-- Both the U.S. and the Soviets should jointly invite the OAU and any other group of African states to mediate.

Continuing American aid only encourages deeper Soviet involvement and intransigence.

It increases the risk of superpower confrontation.

It lessens the chance for meaningful negotiation.

The longer we are involved, the closer we will be associated with the involvement of the South Africans. And this perceived alliance of convenience would severely undermine our political influence in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World.

If the Soviets are totally unwilling to consider a serious American proposal, then we should use our considerable economic leverage to force them to reconsider their position.

The United States should make it clear to the Soviet Union that its intrusion violates the spirit of detente and jeopardizes its meaningful possibilities. We must be willing to force the issue of Russian involvement in Angola to the point where the Soviet Union asks "Is this worth the risk?"

In any event, we should put an end to our own involvement. We thereby would place ourselves in the strongest possible political and moral position with the Africans.

If the Soviet Union then persists, it will be isolated. The spectacle of the residual Soviet and Cuban presence soon would become increasingly embarrassing to the Soviets and the MPLA.

As has been the case elsewhere in Africa, Angolan nationalism likely will prove to be a more powerful force than Soviet Communism. Even if the Soviets gain some immediate tactical advantage, it is likely to be short-lived.

The cessation of outside aid and withdrawal of outside powers not only would diminish the level of violence, but also could open the door to mediation of the war.

To achieve this goal, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to lower the level of their statements for public consumption and begin to undertake serious negotiations.

There is much irony in the Administration's Angolan adventure. It suddenly and secretly decided to fight communism in a country of little importance to the United States and where the odds are decidedly against us.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger urge our nation on in Angola while in other far more important parts of the world we do little or nothing to thwart Soviet activity.

-- In Lebanon, for example, Syrian and left-wing extremists are being aided by the Soviets. This could strangle Lebanese democracy. What should our role be there?

And, in other areas, where is the voice of American liberty?

-- In Spain, we should be encouraging the new king and his administration to make democratic reforms to end peacefully an era of fascist rule.

-- In Portugal, now that the political situation has stabilized and the more moderate and democratic forces are in the ascendancy, we should devise ways to enable that country to continue peacefully on a course of democratic reform.

-- And in the Third World, we must not fail to be sensitive to the intense desires for political and economic independence. If we do ignore this fundamental commitment to independence, we will lose ground in the competition with the Soviets for influence.

-- In both Africa and Latin America, we often pay much more attention to ideologies than we do the people's struggle for survival. We are far more concerned about expropriation than land reform and equitable income distribution. Unfortunately, our lack of concern does not go unnoticed.

We must not lose sight of our foreign policy priorities. We must not forget where our real interests lie.

We must not lose our ability to discern the difference between cold war ghosts and real threats to our national interest.

I call upon the President to consider where the Administration's policy will lead our nation.

And I call on the President and the Secretary of State to make a serious offer to the Russians which could lead to peace in Angola.

Time is of the essence. A Presidential battle with Congress over this issue in the coming weeks only will postpone negotiations.

Extrication of the United States from Angola would hardly be perceived as weakness. Rather, it would be an act interpreted widely as a sign of maturity, common sense and restraint.

Angola represents the first major instance since the end of the Indochina struggle of an Executive branch effort to proceed without regard for the Congress. The Senate now has signaled the President that this cannot be. The Congress, at least, has learned something from Vietnam.

The old type of involvement which relied upon military force to counter overt Soviet efforts in the third world no longer will work. But this is not to say that we should opt out and avoid any involvement. Rather, we should seek to understand the forces at work in the rest of the world.

The strongest force in the world today is the universal aspiration for economic and political justice.

We should be in the vanguard of that struggle -- not as the would-be preservers of the status quo, but as the champions of others' legitimate aspirations.

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Shirley hearing
JEC

REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

JANUARY 12, 1976

{ Sean
Mr. Hamilton *FLORNOY* *debat*
Flornoy *by*
narrow
margin

Slams Republican Policy

at USC *Sept 1955*

'Disconsistent'

ONE WEEK FROM TODAY, CONGRESS WILL RECONVENE. THE FINAL
SESSION OF THE 94TH CONGRESS HAS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR MAKING
HISTORY. IT OCCURS DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THE NATION'S
BICENTENNIAL. AND IT WILL TAKE PLACE DURING A PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION YEAR.

HOWEVER, THE REAL HISTORIC POTENTIAL FOR THIS CONGRESS
LIES IN THE FACT THAT IT WILL CONSIDER A HOST OF DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES SURE TO AFFECT AMERICAN LIFE FOR
YEARS TO COME. OUR AGENDA IS PACKED WITH CRITICAL DECISIONS
TO BE MADE IN SUCH FIELDS AS ENERGY, TAX REFORM, HEALTH CARE,
EMPLOYMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE CONGRESS IS COMMITTED TO TAKE
ACTION ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES.

AND WE WILL DO SO DESPITE THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT
TO GOVERN BY VETO, BY INACTION AND BY NEGATIVISM.

ONE OF THE FIRST ITEMS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL AGENDA FOR
1976 IS NOT A DOMESTIC MATTER. IT IS A CRITICAL FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUE.

I SPEAK OF ANGOLA.

THE DECISION SOON TO BE MADE ON WHETHER AMERICA SHOULD
CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANGOLA'S CIVIL WAR RAISES TWO
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS:

FIRST: WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY CONTINUED AMERICAN
INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA?

and more significantly
SECOND: TO WHAT DEGREE SHOULD CONGRESS PARTICIPATE WITH
THE PRESIDENT IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN
SITUATIONS SUCH AS ANGOLA?

L THESE ARE COMPLEX AND FAR RANGING QUESTIONS. ~~SO~~ BUT PERMIT

ME TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

IN RESPONSE TO THEM.

L PUBLIC DEBATE AND DISCUSSION OF THE ANGOLA ISSUE IS IN
THE BEST INTEREST OF A MORE OPEN AND RATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY.

L THE BASIC FACTS OF AMERICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA NO
LONGER ARE SECRET. L WE HAVE SUPPLIED TWO OF THE THREE TRIBAL
FACTIONS FOR THE PAST YEAR WITH APPROXIMATELY \$40 MILLION IN
ARMS AND MATERIEL.

L THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ARE VERY ANXIOUS
TO CONTINUE OUR INVOLVEMENT. L AND THEY WANT TO INCREASE THE
LEVEL OF AMERICAN AID.

L THEIR RATIONALE FOR CONTINUED AND INCREASED INVOLVEMENT
IS TO STOP SOVIET PENETRATION IN ANGOLA AND ALL OF AFRICA.

↳ THEIR GOAL IS TO DEFEAT THE SOVIET-BACKED MPLA AND BRING
ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. ↳ THEY FORESEE
DIRE CONSEQUENCES IF THE U.S. DOES NOT PERSIST IN ITS PRESENT
COURSE.

↳ AT FIRST GLANCE, THE ADMINISTRATION'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
OUR ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT SEEM PLAUSIBLE. *I believe* HOWEVER, ON CLOSER
EXAMINATION, THEY IGNORE ~~SHAMEFULLY~~ THE REALITIES OF THE
PRESENT ANGOLAN SITUATION AND THE TRAGIC EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM.

For example,
↳ THEY INVOLVE GROSS OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF
SOVIET COMMUNISM IN AFRICA.

↳ AND THEY DISTORT THE REAL NATURE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS AT
STAKE IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.

↳ TO CONTINUE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS TO
FORGET SOME OF THE MOST PAINFULLY LEARNED LESSONS OF VIETNAM.

h ANGOLA IS NOT VIETNAM AND I DO NOT PRETEND THAT IT IS.

h BUT IN ANGOLA, AS IN VIETNAM, WE ARE INVOLVED IN A CIVIL
WAR! IT IS THE TYPE OF CIVIL WAR WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN
INCREDIBLY PROTRACTED AND DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT.

h IN ANGOLA, AS IN VIETNAM, WE KNOW VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE
COUNTRY, ITS TRIBAL CULTURE AND PEOPLES. h IN SHORT, WE AGAIN
ARE BECOMING INVOLVED AS A WORLD POWER WITH A HALF-WORLD
KNOWLEDGE.

h IN ANGOLA, AS IN VIETNAM, WE CLAIM TO BE DEFENDING FREEDOM
AGAINST COMMUNISM. h IN FACT, WE ARE SUPPORTING TWO POLITICAL
FACTIONS ABOUT WHICH WE KNOW ALMOST NOTHING.

L IN ANGOLA, AS IN VIETNAM, THE INVOLVEMENT OF OUTSIDE POWERS
ONLY ESCALATES THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND MAKES A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

L AND FINALLY, IN ANGOLA, AS IN VIETNAM, WE ARE BACKING THE
FACTIONS WHICH HAVE THE LEAST CHANCE TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY
VICTORY, WHICH ARE THE MOST COMPROMISED IN NATIONALISTIC
TERMS, AND ARE IN MANY WAYS THE LEAST PREPARED TO RULE.

L I COULD GO ON WITH MANY MORE LESSONS FROM VIETNAM. L FRANKLY,

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE ADMINISTRATION COULD SO EASILY FORGET
SOME OF THESE RATHER ELEMENTARY LESSONS FROM A ~~DISASTROUS~~ ^{Costly & Tragic} WAR

WHICH IS SO FRESH IN THE MINDS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

10
BUT MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM IS THE
REALITY OF AFRICA.

L THE CENTRAL FACT OF THIS REALITY IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GAIN A SIGNIFICANT FOOTHOLD IN AFRICA SINCE
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT BEGAN. L SOVIET AMBITIONS TO POSSESS
VALUABLE PORTS, ESTABLISH SATELLITE STATES, AND OBTAIN GREAT
POLITICAL LEVERAGE ON THE CONTINENT HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY
FRUSTRATED.

L THE ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THIS STATEMENT COULD BE
SOMALIA. L THERE THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR
POSITION IN A DESPERATELY POOR AND DEPENDENT COUNTRY OF
QUESTIONABLE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

L THE SOVIETS HAVE FAIRED SO POORLY BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF
AFRICAN LEADERS ABHOR DOMINATION BY OUTSIDE POWERS IN THE
FASHION OF FORMER COLONIAL DOMINANCE. L THIS FACT HAS BEEN
THE GUIDING RULE OF AFRICAN POLITICS IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

L NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE
SUBSTANTIALLY WHATEVER FACTION FINALLY PREVAILS IN ANGOLA,

L THE WINNING SIDE MOST LIKELY WILL BE A HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC,
LEFT-LEANING GROUP WHICH RESISTS DOMINATION BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

L ITS INDEPENDENCE WILL BE STRENGTHENED BY THE COUNTRY'S
CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES.

L WE HAVE ONLY TO LOOK TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CONTINENT --
TO MOZAMBIQUE -- TO SEE THE OCCURRENCE OF THIS PHENOMENON.

L FOR YEARS THE SOVIETS BACKED THE REVOLUTIONARY FACTION
CALLED FRELIMO, WHICH FOUGHT THE PORTUGUESE AND THEN CAME TO

POWER ON JUNE 4, 1975. L RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE RULERS OF
MOZAMBIQUE REFUSED THE SOVIETS BASE RIGHTS ON THE INDIAN

OCEAN. L THEY ALSO PUBLICLY ACCUSED MOSCOW OF HEAVY-HANDED
TACTICS.

L IF THE SOVIETS ARE DESIROUS OF REPEATING THEIR AFRICAN
FAILURES IN THE NAME OF MARX AND LENIN, I SEE NO REASON WHY
WE SHOULD IMITATE THEIR FOLLY.

L THE MISTAKE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY
THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO VITAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC OR MILITARY
INTEREST AT STAKE IN ANGOLA. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN MADE
BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND BY DEFENSE EXPERTS. THE OIL AND
MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY ARE AVAILABLE AT OTHER LOCALES
IN FAR GREATER ABUNDANCE.

h THUS, AMERICA COMES TO THIS CONFLICT SOLELY ON THE BASIS
OF A POLITICAL RATIONALE OF QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY AND WE ARE
BACKING FACTIONS LEAST LIKELY TO WIN ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

h ANGOLA HAS THE MAKINGS OF A FIRST CLASS FOREIGN POLICY
DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES.

L MUCH OF THE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS POLICY CAN BE TRACED TO
THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS MADE. EXPERT OPINION WAS LARGELY
IGNORED AND THE CONGRESS WAS DISREGARDED.

L A DECISION OF THIS MAGNITUDE REQUIRES MORE THAN AN ACT
BY A FEW EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS. IT MUST BE THOUGHT
THROUGH AND SUBJECTED TO THOUGHTFUL EXAMINATION FROM VARIOUS
PERSPECTIVES. CERTAINLY, IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ALONE.

in a covert operation

L THE CONGRESS CAN PLAY A FAR MORE CREATIVE ROLE IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS THAN MERELY VOTING YES OR NO ON EXECUTIVE BRANCH PROPOSALS.

L IN THIS CASE THE SENATE QUITE EARLY ADVOCATED AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH OF REAL MERIT WHICH STILL COULD LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ADMINISTRATION CHOSE TO CLING

TO ITS COLD WAR RHETORIC RATHER THAN SOBERLY EXAMINE ITS OPTIONS.

h THE SENATE HAS VOTED TO STOP THE PRESIDENT FROM SPENDING
COVERT FUNDS IN ANGOLA. THE HOUSE WILL VOTE ON THE MATTER
NEXT WEEK.

h AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUED COVERT OPERATIONS, WE
SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT COME TO THE CONGRESS AND ASK
FOR A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF AID, PRESENTING HIS JUSTIFICATION
FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO THE TWO FACTIONS IN ANGOLA THAT
WE HAVE SUPPORTED. THIS PUBLIC REQUEST AND INFORMATION THEN
WOULD BE CAREFULLY AND FULLY DEBATED AS CONGRESS FULFILLS
ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN DETERMINING THE BASIC GUIDELINES AND
FRAMEWORK OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

h I AM NOT IN FAVOR OF ARBITRARILY TYING THE HANDS OF
PRESIDENT FORD OR ANY OTHER PRESIDENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT
THE CONGRESS CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT RUN THE NATION'S FOREIGN
POLICY ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

h BUT THE DECISION TO BECOME INVOLVED INDIRECTLY IN A
MILITARY OPERATION IN AFRICA ON THE SCALE SUGGESTED BY THE
PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BE MADE IN SECRET. / NOR SHOULD IT BE
MADE BY ONLY A HANDFUL OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

h THE RISKS ARE TOO GRAVE AND THE DECISION TOO IMPORTANT
TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO DENY FULL-SCALE PARTICIPATION IN
THE DECISION BY THE ENTIRE CONGRESS THROUGH ITS REGULAR
PROCESSES.

h THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT CONGRESS HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO SHARE IN THE ANGOLAN DECISION.

h IF THE ANGOLA QUESTION IS SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS, THE
DECISION MIGHT WELL BE UNFAVORABLE.

L BUT THIS IS A RISK WHICH THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM COMPELS THE
ADMINISTRATION TO ACCEPT. L IF ITS POLICIES CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED TO
A MAJORITY OF THE CONGRESS, IT WILL NOT DO FOR IT TO SEEK RECOURSE
TO COVERT PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO BY-PASS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.

L I REJECT TOTALLY THE PHILOSOPHY THAT ONE BRANCH OR THE OTHER
CAN BE THE FINAL JUDGE OF WHAT ACTIONS ARE OR ARE NOT IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST. L THE ULTIMATE DECISION IN SITUATIONS SUCH AS

ANGOLA MUST BE A SHARED ONE ACCORDING TO OUR LAWS AND TRADITIONS.

L THE GREAT TASK AHEAD FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY SHOULD
NOT BE A CONTINUATION OF OUR MILITARY AID. L INSTEAD, WE

MUST USE ALL OUR DIPLOMATIC SKILL TO EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE,
INCLUDING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, WITH THE

OAU, THE ANGOLAN PARTIES AND THE U.N. L THIS IS THE ONLY

POSSIBLE ROUTE TO AVOID A PROLONGED WAR AND GREAT BLOODSHED.

h SECRETARY KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT CONTINUING AND INCREASED
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IS HIS ONLY BARGAINING CHIP WITH THE
SOVIETS.

h I DISAGREE.

h I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

-- WE SHOULD APPROACH THE SOVIETS AND DECLARE OUR
WILLINGNESS TO CEASE OUR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND PLEDGE
THAT WE WILL WORK TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS IN
ANGOLA FROM ZAIRE AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA, UNLESS, OF COURSE,
SOUTH AFRICA HAS CARRIED THROUGH ITS ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO
WITHDRAW.

h -- IN RETURN, WE MUST DEMAND A CESSATION OF RUSSIAN
MILITARY AID AND WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS.

L-- BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD JOINTLY INVITE
THE OAU AND ANY OTHER GROUP OF AFRICAN STATES TO MEDIATE.

L CONTINUING AMERICAN AID ONLY ENCOURAGES DEEPER SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT AND INTRANSIGENCE.

L IT INCREASES THE RISK OF SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION.

L IT LESSENS THE CHANCE FOR MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATION.

L THE LONGER WE ARE INVOLVED, THE CLOSER WE WILL BE ASSOCIATED
WITH THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS. AND THIS PERCEIVED

II ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE WOULD SEVERELY UNDERMINE OUR POLITICAL
INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD.

L IF THE SOVIETS ARE TOTALLY UNWILLING TO CONSIDER A
SERIOUS AMERICAN PROPOSAL, THEN WE SHOULD USE OUR

CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC LEVERAGE TO FORCE THEM TO RECONSIDER
THEIR POSITION.

Credits, Hi Technology

L THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET

UNION THAT ITS INTRUSION VIOLATES THE SPIRIT OF DETENTE

AND JEOPARDIZES ITS MEANINGFUL POSSIBILITIES. WE MUST

BE WILLING TO FORCE THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN

ANGOLA TO THE POINT WHERE THE SOVIET UNION ASKS "IS THIS

WORTH THE RISK?"

L IN ANY EVENT, WE SHOULD PUT AN END TO OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT.

L WE THEREBY WOULD PLACE OURSELVES IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE

POLITICAL AND MORAL POSITION WITH THE AFRICANS.

L IF THE SOVIET UNION THEN PERSISTS, IT WILL BE ISOLATED

L THE SPECTACLE OF THE RESIDUAL SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE

SOON WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY EMBARRASSING TO THE SOVIETS

AND THE MPLA.

As has been the case elsewhere in Africa, Angolan nationalism likely will prove to be a more powerful force than Soviet Communism. Even if the Soviets gain some immediate tactical advantage, it is likely to be short-lived.

The cessation of outside aid and withdrawal of outside powers not only would diminish the level of violence, but also could open the door to mediation of the war.

To achieve this goal, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to lower the level of their statements for public consumption and begin to undertake serious negotiations.

There is much irony in the Administration's Angolan adventure. It suddenly and secretly decided to fight Communism in a country of little importance to the United States and where the odds are decidedly against us.

L PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER URGE OUR NATION
ON IN ANGOLA WHILE IN OTHER FAR MORE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE
WORLD WE DO LITTLE OR NOTHING TO THWART SOVIET ACTIVITY.

L-- IN LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE, SYRIAN AND LEFT-WING
EXTREMISTS ARE BEING AIDED BY THE SOVIETS. THIS COULD
STRANGLE LEBANESE DEMOCRACY. ^{same} WHAT SHOULD OUR ROLE BE THERE?

L AND, IN OTHER AREAS, WHERE IS THE VOICE OF AMERICAN LIBERTY?

L-- IN SPAIN, WE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE NEW KING AND HIS
ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS TO END PEACEFULLY
AN ERA OF FASCIST RULE.

L-- IN PORTUGAL, NOW THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION HAS STABILIZED
AND THE MORE MODERATE AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES ARE IN THE ASCENDANCY,
WE SHOULD DEVISE WAYS TO ENABLE THAT COUNTRY TO CONTINUE PEACEFULLY
ON A COURSE OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM.

L -- AND IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST NOT FAIL TO BE
SENSITIVE TO THE INTENSE DESIRES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INDEPENDENCE. IF WE DO IGNORE THIS FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT
TO INDEPENDENCE, WE WILL LOSE GROUND IN THE COMPETITION WITH
THE SOVIETS FOR INFLUENCE.

L- IN BOTH AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, WE OFTEN PAY MUCH
MORE ATTENTION TO IDEOLOGIES THAN WE DO THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE
FOR SURVIVAL. WE ARE FAR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT EXPROPRIATION
THAN LAND REFORM AND EQUITABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION.

L UNFORTUNATELY, OUR LACK OF CONCERN DOES NOT GO UNNOTICED.

L WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES.

L WE MUST NOT FORGET WHERE OUR REAL INTERESTS LIE.

L WE MUST NOT LOSE OUR ABILITY TO DISCERN THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN COLD WAR GHOSTS AND REAL THREATS TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

L I CALL UPON THE PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER WHERE THE

ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY WILL LEAD OUR NATION.

L AND I CALL ON THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
MAKE A SERIOUS OFFER TO THE RUSSIANS WHICH COULD LEAD TO
PEACE IN ANGOLA.

L TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. L A PRESIDENTIAL BATTLE WITH CONGRESS
OVER THIS ISSUE IN THE COMING WEEKS ONLY WILL POSTPONE NEGOTIATIONS.

L EXTRICATION OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ANGOLA WOULD HARDLY
BE PERCEIVED AS WEAKNESS L RATHER, IT WOULD BE AN ACT INTERPRETED
WIDELY AS A SIGN OF MATURITY, COMMON SENSE AND RESTRAINT.

L ANGOLA REPRESENTS THE FIRST MAJOR INSTANCE SINCE THE END
OF THE INDOCHINA STRUGGLE OF AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH EFFORT TO
PROCEED WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE CONGRESS.

L THE SENATE NOW HAS SIGNALLED THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS CANNOT BE.

L THE CONGRESS, AT LEAST, HAS LEARNED SOMETHING FROM VIETNAM,

L THE OLD TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT WHICH RELIED UPON MILITARY FORCE
TO COUNTER OVERT SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE THIRD WORLD NO LONGER

WILL WORK. L BUT THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE SHOULD OPT OUT AND

AVOID INVOLVEMENT L RATHER, WE SHOULD SEEK TO UNDERSTAND THE
FORCES AT WORK IN THE REST OF THE WORLD.

L THE STRONGEST FORCE IN THE WORLD TODAY IS THE UNIVERSAL
ASPIRATION FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL JUSTICE.

L WE SHOULD BE IN THE VANGUARD OF THAT STRUGGLE -- NOT AS
THE WOULD-BE PRESERVERS OF THE STATUS QUO, BUT AS THE
CHAMPIONS OF OTHERS' LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS.



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